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Abstract 
 
 
Could shareholder primacy, with its assumed short-termist practices, have had its day when 
it comes to managerial activity centered on creating corporate value? Many business and 
opinion leaders appear to take this position, not least Jack Welch who famously declared 
‘shareholder primacy is the dumbest idea in the world!’ Indeed, in a post-Crash economy 
has a wider stakeholder focus with a longer-term outlook superseded any business notions 
of shareholder primacy and wealth maximization?    
      This research examines these possibilities through a consideration of the narrative 
companies produce, such as annual reports. From this corpus material, an assessment is 
made of whether UK managers’ perceptions about corporate value generation changed over 
the period covering the worldwide financial crisis, with respect to their relative favouring of 
shareholders and stakeholders.  
      The corpus of narrative material used is visualized as a conceptual space in which a 
conversation reflecting perceptual bias to the generation of corporate value occurs. To 
explore such corpuses, in order to compare narratives at points either side of the 2008 
Crash, a new methodology was devised called narrative staining. Hence, a detection and 
visual mapping over the period was made possible of managers’ changing perceptions 
concerning primacy (shareholder or stakeholder orientation) with its mediation by termism 
(a short or long-term bias). Termism is also originally conceived as part of a larger 
temporal category, which includes a sense of urgency to act (urgent versus non-urgent) that 
is similarly examined.  
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      The investigation reveals that over time perceptual change about value creation 
happened, though in unanticipated ways. Companies pre-Crash were often short-term 
stakeholder oriented then moved post-Crash to a long-term shareholder orientation.  
     A focus for this study was the corporate domain, consisting of a selection of FT250 
companies. However, managerial perceptions about corporate value creation are influenced 
not simply by the conversation of the corporate domain but rather by a multi-actor 
conversation taking place throughout the business environment. To comprehend this effect, 
the research mines further corpuses that comprise the UK’s regulatory domain (hard and 
soft law), the press (Financial Times and other newspapers), and relevant peripheral 
stakeholder organizations (including the Confederation of British Industry, the Institute of 
Directors, and the Trades Union Congress). These organizations demonstrated more 
complex, unforeseen, perceptual effects as the financial crisis proceeded with many 
aligning according to their political or business agenda, which also impacted any sense of 
urgency to act they had.  
      There appears to be no previous attempt at an extensive and multivariate analysis of this 
nature. And the findings challenge prevalent characterizations of shareholder and 
stakeholder behaviour. Moreover, the research shows that utilizing a wide set of 
stakeholder corpuses acts a viable proxy for broader financial perspectives amongst UK 
organizations. The technique of narrative staining therefore provides insights, hitherto 
inaccessible, for assessing and consolidating large-scale perceptual bias regarding value 
creation across the economy. The technique also has significant potential for other 
applications. 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
 
Obtaining an academic reference in order to return to academia after a long period of 
absence is not easy. I would therefore like to thank Dr. Fiona Jones, my former MSc tutor 
at the University of Hertfordshire. Dr. Jones kindly supplied a reference, despite the 
intervening years during which I had detoured professionally. This readily provided and 
supportive reference was instrumental in securing my place on the doctoral program.  
      While many annual reports are available on the web, this is not always the case for 
older ones – and as the data source for the research, all were required. The assistance 
therefore given by several individuals and organizations in supplying material from their 
archives deserves special mention and thanks. These include: Chris Kelly, Governance 
Advisor, CBI; Junior Bammeke, Joint Institute Secretary, IOD; Sheila Doyle, Policy 
Manager, ICSA; the CIMA research department at Cima Global; Sheila Ironmonger, 
Personal Assistant to G A Cope, and Barbara Richmond, Group Finance Director, Redrow; 
Andy Burrows, Vice President, Corporate and Investor Relations, BTG; and Aine 
O’Rourke, Company Secretarial Assistant, UDG Healthcare. 
      An integral part of the research was the analysis and visual representation of complex 
data. MEXL, a proprietary system from DecisionPro Inc., was of particular effectiveness 
for this. Its use also supported the development and application of narrative staining, a 
novel qualitative technique devised specially for the research. I am very grateful to Steve 
Hoover at the company who kindly provided a complimentary two-year copy of the utility 
for this investigation. The work would have been significantly more difficult without it. 
iv 
 
      I would finally like to express my gratitude to my supervisors: Professor Geoffrey 
Hodgson and Dr. David Gindis. The guidance they provided - as well as having been able 
to call on their invaluable experience - was of vital importance in both helping me develop 
as a researcher and conducting an investigation into a difficult field of inquiry. And in the 
last stages of preparation of the final drafts of the manuscript, the additional suggestions of 
Dr. Gindis for improvements were of particular help in increasing the clarity of the work. I 
am indebted to them for all their support and for helping me meet the challenges that my 
studies brought.  
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Table of Contents in Brief 
 
 
   
  Page number 
Abstract 
             
 i 
Acknowledgements 
      
 iii 
Table of contents in detail  vi 
Key figures and tables 
    
 xiii 
Glossary 
       
 xiv 
1.  Introduction            
       
   
 1 
2.  The evolving primacy debate in corporate  
     governance 
 
 
 27 
3.  About time! How corporate thinking on temporal  
     factors influences managerial behaviour 
 
 
   
 
 72 
4.  The development and implementation of the  
     narrative staining technique 
    
 114 
5.  Some counter-intuitive results 
     
 166 
6.  An exploration of the findings 
     
 223 
7.  Conclusion 
     
 269 
References 
     
 286 
Appendices  320 
 
vi 
 
Table of Contents in Detail 
 
  
  Page number 
Abstract             i 
Acknowledgements       iii 
Table of contents in brief  v 
Key figures and tables     xiii 
Glossary        xiv 
1. Introduction  1 
1.1 Evidence for a changed managerial discourse in response 
to the financial crisis 
 3 
1.1.1  Temporality and the 2008 Crash  7 
1.2 From the evidence to conceptualizing the research 
questions and hypotheses 
 11 
1.2.1  Specifying the research questions and     
          hypotheses 
 12 
1.3 Reevaluating notions about value creation  16 
1.4 A different approach to a complex problem        22 
2. The evolving primacy debate in corporate governance  27 
2.1 Support for shareholder primacy  29 
2.1.1  Academic advocates of shareholder primacy  30 
2.1.2  Parliamentary and regulatory support of   
          shareholder primacy 
 36 
2.2 Support for stakeholder primacy  41 
vii 
 
2.2.1  Academic advocates of stakeholder primacy  42 
2.2.2  Legislative support in the UK for stakeholder   
          primacy 
 50 
2.3 The push towards an ‘enlightened’ view of value 
creation 
 53 
2.3.1  Questioning shareholder primacy  53 
2.3.2  Problems with stakeholder theory  58 
2.3.3  Developing an integrated primacy ideal  61 
2.3.4  Enlightened value maximization  63 
2.3.5  Enlightened shareholder value  65 
2.4 Towards a broader understanding of shareholders and 
stakeholders 
 69 
3. About time! How corporate thinking on temporal factors 
influences managerial behaviour 
 72 
3.1 Understanding termism  75 
3.1.1  Confusion of aims  78 
3.1.2  The balanced view  82 
3.2 Executive remuneration and short-termism  84 
3.2.1  Other reasons for an assumed link  87 
3.3 Perceived pressures to be short-termist  91 
3.3.1  Boards as the origin of short-termist   
          perceptions 
 92 
3.3.2  Market pressures on managerial behaviour  95 
3.3.3  Sorting behaviour  98 
3.4 The pace of things  101 
viii 
 
3.4.1  Communication patterns  101 
3.4.2  Cultural influence  102 
3.4.3  Market background  103 
3.4.4  Psychological influences on a managerial  
          sense of urgency 
 106 
3.5 From temporality to narrative  112 
4. The development and implementation of the narrative 
staining technique 
 114 
4.1 Comparing qualitative techniques    115 
4.2 Casting a different approach  121 
4.2.1  From simple perceptual mapping to more  
          sophisticated possibilities 
 124 
4.3 Some research difficulties encountered  125 
4.3.1  Acquiring annual reports for company and  
          stakeholder organizations 
 125 
4.3.2  Additional technical problems faced  127 
4.4 Applying the ‘narrative staining’ procedure  131 
4.4.1  The narrative staining procedure as   
          undertaken considered in more detail  
 132 
4.4.2  Term combinations  140 
4.4.3  Including dimension synonyms  141 
4.4.4  Deeper levels of analysis  142 
4.4.5  Basic filtering  142 
4.4.6  Sets of variables examined  143 
4.4.7  Further combo processing for initial analysis  
         of multiple stakeholder corpuses 
 144 
4.5 Stakeholder corpuses used  146 
ix 
 
4.6 A perceptual mapping approach  149 
4.6.1  Processing the uni-dimensional graph with  
          colour coding 
 150 
4.6.2  Interpretation of the output  152 
4.6.3  Rules applied to tri and quad combo output  
          and dealing with partials 
 153 
4.7 Conducting secondary analyses  155 
4.7.1  Universal perceptions  156 
4.7.2  Alignment analysis  158 
4.7.3  Examining VRTs within combos  160 
5. Some counter-intuitive results  166 
5.1 Pre to post-Crash difference as a minimax proportion  166 
5.2 Applying perceptual mapping  168 
5.2.1  Multiple stakeholder v single stakeholder  
          maps 
 170 
5.3 Main findings for primary corpuses  173 
5.3.1  Corporate corpus  175 
5.3.2  Regulatory corpus  185 
5.3.3  Comparing bi, tri and quad levels of analysis  191 
5.3.4  Extending the analysis to peripheral  
          stakeholder organizations 
 191 
5.4 Output of secondary analyses   192 
5.4.1  Universal perceptions  193 
5.4.2  The narrative strip results  193 
5.4.3  Stakeholder alignments  197 
5.4.4  Results from assessing VRTs within combos  208 
x 
 
6. An exploration of the findings  223 
6.1 Primary corpuses  225 
6.1.1  The behaviour of the corporate domain  226 
6.1.2  The regulatory domain and its impact on the  
          corporate domain 
 230 
6.1.3  Further reasons for primary corpus findings  234 
6.2 Secondary corpuses  241 
6.2.1  Group A agenda and behaviour  242 
6.2.2  Group B agenda and behaviour  247 
6.2.3  Group C agenda and behaviour  251 
6.2.4  Matrix analysis and its interpretation  253 
6.3 Further possible reasons for changes in corporate 
narrative orientation 
 255 
6.3.1  Crisis and narrative change  256 
6.3.2  Managers may form biases when putting  
          terms together 
 259 
6.3.3  Managerial bias leading to broader change in  
          corporate governance orientation 
 263 
6.3.4  Terms can reflect changing core values  264 
7. Conclusion  269 
7.1 From the Crash of 2008 to an appreciation of the 
complexity of narrative 
 275 
7.2 Interdisciplinary and future real-world applications  277 
7.2.1  Negotiations  279 
7.2.2  Analysis of share performance  281 
7.2.3  Counter terrorism  283 
xi 
 
References  286 
Appendices    320 
A1    Timeline  320 
A2    Table summarizing research questions and  
         hypotheses  
 322 
     A3    Dataset example  324 
     A4    Extract of master list of VRTs and DimSyns  325 
A5    Researcher instructions for implementing the narrative  
         staining procedure 
 
 327 
A6    Term combinations  330 
A7    Filtering term combinations  332 
      A8   Preliminary term frequency analysis  333 
A9    Intra-corpus frequency analyses of VRTs for     
         corporate and regulatory datasets 
 339 
A10  Intra-corpus combination frequency analyses on 
         8-element sets 
 341 
      A11 Comparison of a basic combo bar graph with a  
              perceptual map 
  345 
A12  Comparison of MEXL and XLSTAT  347 
A13  Correlation results for primary corpuses  350 
A14  Comparing bi, tri, and quad levels of analysis  351 
A15  Perceptual maps for peripheral stakeholder  
         organizations 
 354 
     A16  Data matrices for secondary analyses of VRTs  362 
A17  Data matrices for alignment graph generation  364 
A18  Radar graphs for a twelve-stakeholder corpus  
         analysed by set 
 365 
xii 
 
A19  Cross-corpus table of results for research questions and  
         hypotheses 
 366 
A20  Secondary corpus organizational profiles  368 
A21  Impact of mission statement narrative  375 
 
xiii 
 
Key Figures and Tables 
 
   Page number 
Fig 1.2 A multi-actor perspective of the corporate value 
creation narrative 
   
 19 
Fig 1.3 Dynamic inputs and outputs for corporate 
narrative 
   
 21 
Fig 1.4 Mapping the effects of the global financial crisis 
on stakeholder perceptions of corporate value 
   
 25 
Fig 2.2 Milestones in soft law corporate governance 
regulatory development 
   
 37 
Fig 2.7 Key developments in the thinking about primacy 
   
 62 
Fig 3.3 How short-termism is not the problem 
commonly believed 
   
 96 
Table 3.1 Temporal concepts 
   
 110 
Table 4.1 Examples of terms used 
   
 137 
Table 4.4 Coded term combinations for a 4-element set 
   
 141 
Fig 4.3  Sets of VRT and DimSyn variables 
   
 143 
Table 4.6 Primary and secondary stakeholder corpus 
constituents and word sizes 
   
 147 
Table 5.2 The narrative strip 
   
 194 
Table 5.3 Research questions supported or not supported, 
summary table for primary corpuses and 
stakeholder corpus groups 
   
 215 
Fig 6.1 Covert and overt corporate narrative 
   
 237 
Table 6.1 General organizational profiles observed in 
secondary corpuses 
   
 241 
Table 6.3 Comparison of corporate mission statements, pre 
to post-Crash 
   
 267 
Fig 7.1 How the multi-actor perspective of the value 
creation narrative can be seen to change once 
narrative staining is applied 
 274 
 
xiv 
 
Glossary 
 
 
Bias (perceptual bias): A perceptual modifier underpinning a tendency to behave in a 
certain manner - or a leaning to act more one way than another - when faced with equally 
possible alternatives to follow. As a perceptual modifier, ‘bias’ is understood in the 
psychological or cognitive sense and is non-pejorative. For the purposes of this research, 
the terms bias and disposition denote similar modifiers and may be used interchangeably. 
 
Combination (combo): A combined variable that contains two types of narrative term: a 
value-related term (VRT) and a dimension synonym (DimSyn). These are examined in 
unison – as opposed to separately – through a process of narrative staining; including by 
secondary analysis. A combo is therefore also considered a complex variable. 
 
Constituency: A stakeholder group (including that of shareholders) whose members have 
a common or beneficial interest or involvement in a company.  
 
Construct: From a psychological perspective, a cognitively based conceptual idea or 
structure, and one not directly observable. Hence, it is a theoretical entity representing 
something believed to exist. Considered in this investigation is the theoretical construct of 
perceived corporate value. 
 
Corporate governance (or governance): A process by which corporate behaviour and the 
value creation process is steered. Included in that are orientations to primacy and 
temporality.  
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR): A self-regulating approach to conducting 
business companies adopt in order to be socially accountable to their stakeholders and the 
wider public, as well as to themselves.  
 
Corpus: A body of text (eg. corporate annual reports, corporate governance codes). In this 
investigation corpuses are mined to distil narrative based on term combinations. 
 
xv 
 
Dimension synonym (DimSyn): A category for terms that are designated to interrelate 
with VRTs. This forms the basis of a complex variable whereby concepts can be looked at 
in unison (in this research, for example, long-term stakeholder primacy). 
 
Domain: An organizational grouping having common activities, characteristics or purpose. 
Containing multiple constituent organizations, a domain may be represented by multiple 
corpuses (or sub-corpuses); and these may also be amalgamated into one large corpus. For 
example, this study considers two primary domains: the corporate domain (reflected in the 
corpuses of twenty FT250 companies) and the regulatory domain (reflected in the 
documents for soft and hard law). Hence, the primary domains – with their respective 
combined sub-corpuses – are distinct and examinable. 
 
Legislation: Legally-binding rules (hard law). For example, regulating corporate 
governance or activity through the Companies Act 2006. 
 
Managers (or executives): The corporate individuals steering governance, and hence a 
company’s value creation process. 
 
Matrix analysis: A secondary analysis generated from the narrative staining procedure for 
the differentiated examination of the main construct in the combo. In this research it is a 
VRT reflecting corporate value; and split to consider financial and non-financial VRTs 
separately. 
 
Multi-actor conversation: A discourse or narrative formed from the input of multiple 
participants. These participants may include a variety of stakeholder constituencies as well 
as other actors who provide (often forceful) input to affect or bias the conversation. The 
multi-actor conversation is also subject to ‘reflexive processes’. 
 
Narrative staining: A qualitative multi-variate mapping technique, enabling a visual 
comparison of how complex (combined) variables change across multiple corpuses. The 
basis of the methodology is an extraction of frequencies for pre-selected narrative terms 
from the corpuses under analysis. This then feeds a combinatory approach to examining the 
complex variables graphically, through colour coding the combos. Visual comparisons of 
the resulting data for different time points (or corpuses representing another focus) can 
then be made.  
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Narrative strip: A secondary analysis generated from the narrative staining procedure that 
– as a qualitative data reduction – allows for large-scale visual comparisons across multiple 
corpuses based on the mapping of variables.   
 
Perceived corporate value: What is thought of as value in companies by executives as 
well as commentators. This perception may reflect expected or actual financial value 
generation. Similarly, it may be a perception reflecting value that is known (eg the value of 
current sales, or the non-monetary importance to corporate value of a physical asset) or 
unknown (eg intangibles such as probable efficiencies, specialist knowledge, or assets with 
potential value but not yet realized). Perceived corporate value is thus a construct based on 
multiple abstractions of value. It is also a cognitive view of the concept of value in 
companies rather than any other, such as philosophical or economic. And importantly for 
this research, because measurement can be conducted on the abstractions, it allows an 
examination of potential extremes of managerial focus on a particular constituency for 
corporate value creation. 
 
Perceptual mapping (or positioning mapping): A technique generally found in 
marketing for visually depicting consumer behavior. The term ‘positioning mapping’ may 
sometimes be used when the procedure is applied to considering the market position of a 
product rather than just a liking or disliking of a product, though the terms are often used 
interchangeably. This investigation has adapted perceptual maps as an element in narrative 
staining. They allow a visual representation of any pre to post-Crash changes in perceived 
corporate value by a variety of organizations. 
 
Post-Crash: After 2008 (The main part of the Crash is often taken to be between 2008– 
2009, so post-Crash may also be considered as after 2009). 
 
Pre-Crash: Before 2008.   
 
Primacy: Refers to the ascendant constituency in a manager’s perceptions and hence the 
main focus or beneficiary of the creation of corporate value – in this research the choice is 
between shareholders and stakeholders. 
 
Reflexive process: An interaction involving a two-way feedback loop. Hence, a process 
whereby managers’ perceptions affect how they interact with their stakeholders, which in 
turn alters how stakeholders perceive they should interact with managers. Similarly, how 
xvii 
 
the corporate environment generates a narrative which affects stakeholders who might then 
lobby for change, that in turn affects the corporate environment and a revised narrative.  
 
Regulation: Non-binding principles of best practice (soft law) – ie a non-legal approach 
for controlling business behaviour. Hence, to foster the compliance to high standards of 
governance activities. For example, since 2010 what was formerly the Combined Code is 
currently the Corporate Governance Code (for businesses) and the Stewardship Code (for 
financial institutions looking after other people’s money). 
 
Search space: A corpus conceived as a conceptual space in which its narrative material is 
explorable. The corpus is thus a search space where a conversation can be identified taking 
place – or changing if multiple corpuses constitute different search spaces. In the present 
study this conversation reflects perceptual bias to corporate value creation. The 
terminology of ‘virtual search space’ may also be used, although a search space is in fact 
real and not a representation. 
 
Sense of urgency: The alacrity, or otherwise, with which an action by, say, a manager is 
taken to reorientate their corporate behaviour. The choice in this study is between urgent 
(UR) and non-urgent (NUR). 
 
Shareholder primacy (ShP): The favouring of shareholders in corporate value creation 
 
Shareholders: A group of equity investors involved in the corporate value creation process 
through their voting power or monetary input. 
 
Soft and hard law: Terminology denoting the strength of regulation. Soft law refers to 
non-compulsory principles of best practice, often in the form of Codes of conduct. Hard 
law refers to enforceable legislation, often in the form of Acts of Parliament. 
 
Stakeholder primacy (StP): The favouring of stakeholders in corporate value creation. 
 
Stakeholders: For the purposes of this research, stakeholders are participants in the 
corporate value creation process (eg. employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, 
community). Their input is largely through non-monetary investment means (eg employee 
time) though not necessarily; for example, business grants made by regional bodies to 
attract entrepreneurs to their area, something common with new technology such as 
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biotech. In general, stakeholders are participants other than shareholders, though this may 
not always be the case and shareholders can also be considered as stakeholders. 
    
Temporality: The experience of, or relationship with, time. This is in contrast to time 
viewed as a physical progression. For this research it includes termism and a sense of 
urgency to act. 
 
Termism: The tendency to take a short-term (ST) or a long-term (LT) view. May also be 
referred to as time horizon; though time horizon is rather a description of the options, 
whereas termism is more about a cognitive disposition ie an individual can be short or 
long-termist.  
 
Value-related term (VRT): A category for terms reflecting the main construct - and thus 
encompassing notions underlying how corporate value is perceived to be created. Terms 
may be finance-related or otherwise; eg price or efficiency (other constructs besides value 
may be similarly examined, hence the undesignated form is an XRT). The important factor 
is that a chosen term is related to the construct in some way. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
          
   
 
‘Shareholder value is the dumbest idea in the world!’ Jack Welch proclaimed (Guerrera, 
2009), despite having pursued this objective for many years as CEO of General Electric. 
And it had worked for the company, which had enjoyed steady growth under his leadership. 
Welch, though, did not conduct his former approach in a vacuum. Perceptions of how and 
for whom corporate value is created changed dramatically in the late 20th century, with 
shareholder value maximization becoming the model many businesses followed. In this 
complex period a rising global focus on shareholder primacy soon developed. At the same 
time, it was a period leading in to one of the worst financial catastrophes on record. Yet 
regardless of Jack Welch’s comments, in an ideal world who should companies favour in 
order to generate superior value for their business: shareholders (investors with a direct 
financial stake in the company) or stakeholders (groups including employees, customers 
and suppliers)? The question is far from simple, particularly in the light of the 2008 Crash. 
Indeed, the relative business merits of shareholders and stakeholders have been part of a 
long-running and evolving debate.  
      Underlying notions of shareholder primacy and stakeholder primacy are two different 
motivations. First, the necessity of creating corporate financial value so companies can 
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achieve their commercial and innovative objectives. And second, the desire for an 
inclusivity of different constituency interests, to give them voice and to recognize their 
unique, often valuable, input. To be commercially successful managers may attempt to seek 
a balance in group priority, as Lorsch and Maciver (1989) emphasize. But 
misunderstanding the concepts involved can cause a disproportionate stress on one 
constituency’s interests, and with serious consequences. An overwhelming shareholder 
primacy fuelled the financial crisis along with some deeply felt effects within companies in 
the process is, for example, the general belief. According to Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
(2002, p17), commenting on the period, a ‘retain and reinvest’ approach gave way to that of 
‘downsizing (job losses), and distribute (increased payout ratios)’ as the basis of 
shareholder value primacy. Moreover, there was a marginalization of stakeholder interests, 
while managerial interests aligned with external financial ones such as pension funds. In 
pursuing that path, CEOs became more like asset managers; while their compensation – 
including bonus packages and stock options – became tied to stock market performance. 
Meanwhile, if senior managers harboured any ideas about the importance of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) their attention moved instead to focus on earnings and short-
term growth for corporate success (Englander and Kaufman, 2004). 
      In the run-up to the 2008 Crash, this was the financialized1scenario believed to have 
been in place: companies were excessively gracing shareholders to the exclusion of other 
stakeholders who were suffering as a result. This thinking went further too. Not only was 
the economic wellbeing of shareholders paramount but they were consequently one of the 
                                                          
1With respect to the corporate world, we may also understand financialization in relation to executives as an 
emphasis placed on, and easier access to, capital markets, securitization of debt, or a greater proportion of 
assets held as a stock portfolio. Connected to this is the more psychological issue of the lack of executive 
attendance to growing financial difficulties, eg between 1980 and 2010 where corporate debt-to-equity ratios 
increased. With respect to the financial world, we may also define financialization as the growing scale, 
profitability, increasing share of national income, or importance of the finance sector at the expense of, or 
relative to, other sectors or the rest of the economy, and with an associated shrinking regulation of its rules.  
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main culprits to blame for the financial crisis. It was also a thinking that implied that the 
focus had to switch back to wider stakeholder concerns.    
      But despite these predominating assumptions of corporate financialization, how did 
major companies react strategically to the financial crisis in relation to their constituencies? 
In particular, how might they have reevaluated their notions of what corporate value meant 
in the light of the altered circumstances they faced?  
      In this investigation, addressing that complex question is by the application of a new 
qualitative analytical technique called ‘narrative staining’. Consequently, with respect to the 
pre and post-Crash UK economy, an objective analysis is made of multi-actor 
organizational discourses to determine how managers may have changed their perceptions 
concerning value creation. 
  
1.1 Evidence for a changed managerial discourse in response to the financial crisis 
The extreme economic pressures on businesses caused by the Crash of 2008, and their 
resulting effects as Fig 1.1 highlights, represented a potent backdrop for a widespread 
corporate response. These were pressures shaping the UK business landscape before, 
during, and beyond 2008. And it forced companies to react by drastically changing the way 
they functioned and conducted business. Inevitably, this reevaluation process would affect 
how companies thought about the inputs they required for financial success, and hence the 
generation of corporate value. Yet whether the impact of the Crash was on direct monetary 
generation by, for example, reduced market access or indirectly monetary through 
decreases of internal efficiency, the constituency to be promoted, investors or a wider set of 
stakeholders, represented a core consideration for managers if they were to bring their 
companies effectively out of the economic storm.  
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      In looking at the creation of corporate value before the Crash, the academic discourse1 
at the time points to a fostering of managerial bias2 towards investors - even if in some 
cases there was a call to reexamine that situation (eg Englander and Kaufman, 2004). In the 
aftermath of the Crash, therefore, might a fundamental shift in corporate thinking have 
taken place? Indeed, beyond even maintaining the status quo, could managers have moved 
away from a shareholder primacy orientation altogether?345  
                                                          
1See eg Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Rappaport, 198 1; Rappaport, 1986; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2002, p17; 
Englander and Kaufman, 2004; Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004. 
2The terms ‘bias’ and ‘disposition’ refer to similar behaviours (see Glossary). 
3OECD, 2018, Non-Financial Corporation’s Debt to Surplus Ratio - Indicator. 
(https://data.oecd.org/corporate/non-financial-corporations-debt-to-surplus-ratio.htm#indicator-chart). 
4IEACW (2008). The Impact of the Credit Crunch on UK Businesses. The State of the Economy Report.  
5Source http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-37002436 
 
Catastrophic Effects of the 2008 Crash on the British Economy 
 
• 2008 saw 312,000 UK businesses shutting down. And in 2009 closures would 
reach 492,000 (Duedil, 2012).  
• During 2008-2009 there were more than one-million job losses (Duedil, 2012).  
• As the immediacy of the Crash gave way to the evolving financial crisis. 
companies found themselves having to contend with:  
➢ A persistent stalling of growth in industrial productivity (Dolphin and Hatfield 
2015; Jacobs et al, 2016, pp.10-15),  
➢ The experience of lingering high corporate debt levels on over-leveraged 
positions (Monteiro, 2013, p11; OECD, 2018).3 
• Banks, in many cases, withdrew overdraft facilities, even for well-performing 
businesses (IEACW, 2008),4 creating further pressure on companies’ ability to stay 
afloat, as well as achieve innovative or financial success. 
• Difficulties continue into recent times, according to Lee Hopley, chief economist 
of the manufacturing body EEF, where businesses, having lost faith in the banks 
and so tending to avoid them for raising capital, are suffering ‘a persistent 
hangover from the credit crunch’, hampering their ability to invest (Hopley, 
2016).5  
 Fig 1.1 
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      The rhetoric of former CEOs like Welch seems to support that view. Business had to 
distance itself from a focus on shareholders and the accrual of short-term market gains. A 
body of work suggested in that context that post-Crash stakeholders became more 
important in managers’ purview as a means of value generation (see Deakin, 2010), as not 
doing so would be commercially destructive. In part, it was perhaps due to the influence of 
writers1 who had advocated a stakeholder-oriented governance in the run-up to the Crash 
beginning once again to find traction as the effects of the financial crisis subsided. And 
with the acknowledgement companies did not work in isolation, there was reinforcement 
for the idea that the effective governance of companies by boards required the serving of all 
constituencies’ interests, not just its shareholders.2 Furthermore, in reevaluating their post-
Crash position with respect to the constituency to favour for creating value, it was more 
than a matter for companies of considering a broader stakeholder base in a simplistic 
fashion; managers also had to accept they had a changed role in that regard (Mayer, 2012).  
      Similarly, if corporate governance in the run-up to the Crash appeared to focus on the 
tripartite relationship of a company’s board, its management, and its shareholders, after the 
Crash it would perceive a changed global business environment. The G20, of which the UK 
is a significant member, stated in 2009 they would ‘implement responsible fiscal policies’, 
and which were to be ‘attentive’ and ‘flexible’, in recognition of the need to support these 
new conditions.3 Any favorable perception prior to the Crash of banks and financial 
institutions, meanwhile, gave way to increasing scrutiny post-Crash of their actions.4 In that 
                                                          
1See eg Freeman, 1984; Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Mitchel et al, 1997; Blair and Stout, 
1999; Jones and Wicks, 1999; Key, 1999; Lepineux, 2005. 
2In addition to eg Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; see also DesJardins and McCall, 2004. This 
was not a new concept. Early in the 20th Century E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. had proposed that companies had 
citizenship duties that lay beyond the company itself (Dodd, 1932). 
3G20 communiqué, Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, 2009, published in the FT, September 25, 
2009. 
4See eg https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20811289 on pay and other reforms. A recognition of short-
termist behaviour is in The Kay review of UK equity market and long-term decision-making by John Kay 
(2012). 
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changed environment, corporate boards would have to account for these factors in their 
decision-making. They would also have to become more cognizant of the possibility of 
leadership failures. Companies and directors, for example, had perpetrated massive frauds 
in the years preceding the Crash. Enron and WorldCom, two major listed companies, went 
bankrupt in 2002. The fallout from these and other ruined businesses impacted large 
numbers of investors and employees. Episodes of this nature underscored a growing 
realization following the financial crisis that stakeholders in their many forms were part of 
larger society and could be significantly affected by corporate activity (Sprague, 2010). 
Indeed, a link to even broader stakeholder interests had begun to be recognized, inasmuch 
as maximizing shareholder value could impact the environment (Mathern, 2013); and with 
the environment itself being another stakeholder. 
      In addition, the common belief that investors were owners of a company met with 
legalistic challenge, particularly as they did not own full control rights (see Deakin, 2005; 
Ireland, 2008; Stout, 2012).1 Such work similarly aided in changing perceptions, as it 
served to question the perceived primacy of shareholders and their supremacy over other 
stakeholders. Moreover, the Crash gave new meaning to hard law in legislation laid down 
in the Companies Act 2006. With s172 stressing the importance of taking into account the 
interests of ‘members as a whole’, companies were more likely to have a greater focus on 
their broad stakeholder base. 
      There is also empirical support for a shift in perspective from Vasudev (2012) who 
provided a survey on corporate attitudes to primacy. The conducting of this survey was also 
in the post-Crash year the present study focuses on, which is useful. The research looked at 
                                                          
1See also Kay, Shareholders think they own the company - they are wrong. FT (10.11.15), 
https://www.ft.com/content/7bd1b20a-879b-11e5-90de-f44762bf9896. Deakin in Williamson, J., Driver, C., 
and Kenway, P. (Eds.) similarly challenges current ownership patterns and structures in Beyond Shareholder 
Value (2014) published by the TUC). The think tank, Tomorrow’s Company, promote ownership from the 
point of view of Stewardship. See their reports: Tomorrow’s Owners - Defining, differentiating and rewarding 
stewardship (2009), and Better Stewardship - An agenda for concerted action (2018). 
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managers in America, Canada and the UK, and across all these countries found a 
predominance amongst these individuals for a stakeholder focus. Indeed, there was 100 
percent backing of stakeholder ideals in the UK. Vasudev was fully aware that companies 
could be ‘indulging in fashionable rhetoric rather than taking the idea seriously’ (p.400), 
but was still able to state that: ‘Evidence of acceptance of the stakeholder ideal is strong, 
and there is also a trend among the companies to take concrete action to actualize the 
principle in their governance framework and policies’ (p.434).  
      While some ideals of CSR may have been in evidence prior to the Crash1, after the 
Crash they appear to have taken on a very different, and more powerful, complexion. The 
stakeholder focus moved, highlighted Lauesen (2015, p45), ‘from an outside-in 
(responsive) to a more inside-out (pro-active) view, suggesting an engagement with 
multiple stakeholders’. Companies, therefore, were more likely to make strategic decisions 
themselves about the constituency they needed to interact with instead of external events 
alone determining their actions. Moreover, Lauesen stressed, in meeting adverse situations 
CSR was no longer about a use of philanthropy to engage with stakeholder concerns for the 
purpose of maintaining the existing state of affairs but rather about a comprehensive 
operational response. 
    
1.1.1 Temporality and the 2008 Crash: Another major reevaluation facing managers 
relates to the termism they employ when they interact with various constituencies. That is 
the tendency to take a short-term or a long-term view. Indeed, the concept is about how 
                                                          
1Fairfax (2006) noted an increased use of stakeholder rhetoric, indicating a conversation was starting to occur 
about how to be socially responsible from a business perspective. However, it is not known the extent to 
which these ideals were genuinely promoted by companies; corporate philanthropy, for example, was seen as 
a necessary part of conducting a successful business as it helped develop trust. It was the notion of doing well 
by doing good for a strategic advantage in the generation of corporate value (see The Economist Survey, 
2005; Porter and Kramer, 2006). 
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companies act strategically with respect to time horizon in their utilization of shareholder 
and stakeholder input.  
      Prior to the Crash many large companies appear to have made business decisions that 
gave greater emphasis to short-term results1 and accompanying rewards at the expense of 
the long term consequences of their actions (Mayer, 2013; Fried, 2013, Sullivan 2014).2  
      Arguably, these were behaviours intended to make it seem the business was doing 
better than it actually was,3 as it created a revised market perception and an altered 
corporate narrative in the process (eg Gleadle and Haslam, 2010). On the effect of these 
actions on the market, Fried (2011) discussed how easily executives manipulate short-term 
share prices when there are stock buybacks or issuances. Short-termist behaviour was 
sufficiently strong in the pre-Crash economy4 managerial strategies could be implemented 
that reduced the chance of long-term benefits to companies in favour of short-term gains 
(Blair, 1995). Surveys conducted amongst finance executives likewise demonstrated that 
many had been willing to forgo value-creating projects in order to deliver short-term profits 
(eg Graham et al, 2006). 
      In sum, short-termist practices, associated with a market-led shareholder primacy, were 
seen as heavily implicated in the financial crisis (see eg Froud et al, 2006; Kiarie, 2006; 
Keay, 2013). Indeed, Copeland, et al (2010, p5) suggested not only was it that the financial 
crisis could be traced to a misunderstanding or misapplication of the principles of value 
                                                          
1There are various possibilities for this: to make the company look good in the financial markets, and with 
consequently a manager’s main preoccupation centered on share value (Millon, 2002; Andersson et al, 2008); 
to beat earnings expectations for the next results date (Duruigbo, 2011; Sullivan, 2014); for personal gain by 
virtue of market performance-related pay and associated bonus packages (Cassidy, 2002). 
2Sullivan, 2014, defined short-termism as an excessive focus on the part of corporate managers, the investing 
public, and market analysts on short-term metrics such as quarterly earnings, and a corresponding lack of 
attention to future strategy and long-term value creation. 
3Behaviours like these could also have led to posting questionable figures based on creative accounting with 
respect to sales and profits (Graham, et al 2006) or earnings accruals (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). 
4It was recognized that short-termism at its worst had dire consequences for corporate success and value 
creation prior to the 2008 Crash by many observers. See eg: Twentieth Century Fund, 1992, assessing 
speculation and market volatility; Cassidy, 2002, on executive abuses and the supporting of a greed-driven 
corporate culture. 
9 
 
creation, a long-term endeavor, but that at its core it resulted from those concerned 
‘forgetting to value value’. Yet moving through that period, the persisting concern was the 
extent of this behaviour and where overwhelmingly ‘directors were managing their 
companies in order to achieve maximization of shareholder wealth in a short-termist 
manner’ (Keay, 2013, p63).1 
      More long-term behaviour was thus called for to refocus UK business on the creation of 
real value rather than value based on a - frequently false - perception of their market value 
based on share price. The Corporate Governance Code (2012, p1) supported that view, 
stating: ‘The purpose of corporate governance is to facilitate effective, entrepreneurial and 
prudent management that can deliver the long-term success of the company’.2 A similar 
though broader view proposed that prominent institutional investors had indeed altered 
their perspective to cover a variety of stakeholder concerns, including: environmental 
protection, labor matters, human rights, and related corporate governance reforms. And 
these were all central to long-term financial success (Harper Ho, 2010).    
      The post-Crash economy, from that perspective, saw an increasing link between long-
termism and the company’s stakeholders. Long-term value creation was through effective 
corporate governance that recognized multiple constituencies along with the company’s 
social and environmental impact. It was a rationale, Sprague (2010) highlighted, which 
                                                          
1In the pre-Crash period pressures from the financial markets and corporate boards could have been 
defensible. For example, the increase in market activity seen in the late 20th century, Laverty (1996) 
suggested, placed a greater focus on short-term price activity than on long-term value. Yet as listed companies 
it was not something these businesses could easily avoid. Similarly, if pursuing the interests of shareholders a 
board could be required to manage for the short-term if it was in the best interests of the company (CLR, 
1999; Millon, 2002); see also Bushee, 1998, on companies with a short-term focus (eg biotech) favoured by 
myopic or ‘transient’ institutional investors who might pressure them to increase short-term earnings; how 
investment outlook matches to specific industries based on similar time horizons (Mauboussin, 2011; 
Mauboussin and Callahan, 2015). 
2For a broader view, stressing long-termism - and still recognizing stakeholders had a part to play but re-
emphasizing shareholders - see on a growing enlightened perspective that found expression in the UK’s 
legislative structure, in the still extant s172 of the Companies Act 2006. This is in addition to the regulatory 
environment typified by the Corporate Governance Code (2012, p1); and the Enlightened Value Maximization 
model (Jensen, 2002). 
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viewed an enhancement of the company’s chances of achieving success as being through 
using sustainable resources, an activity that necessitated looking many years ahead. 
      A second major temporal factor is a sense of urgency to act. With respect to managers, 
however, there appears to be no specific research on how they might have acted over the 
period of the financial crisis.1  
      Yet what scattered associated research there is suggests that managers can feel a need to 
act with urgency in response to crises2 in general. It is a context where, becoming 
increasingly recognized prior to the Crash, were the behavioural influences on managers’ 
sense of urgency to act. Mitchell et al (1997), for example, highlighted that in having to 
make a prompt corporate decision – such as for potentially favouring a short-term position 
– the ‘salience’ of a particular constituency to managers was integral. An increased urgency 
may also manifest where managers and investors reinforce each other’s behaviour resulting 
in a reduced time horizon for both constituencies (Bolton et al, 2006). Similarly, the 
contextual characteristics associated with decision options impact the urgency with which 
managers respond (see Bluedorn and Denhardt, 1988). Indeed, the context of the financial 
crisis was a powerful and urgent force on managers to provide a strong response and to face 
how they were going to maintain, if not develop, their company’s value-creating resources. 
      Crisis events are motivators, it seems, otherwise managers do little to alter established 
corporate practices and maintain the status quo.3 Ruff and Aziz (2007), for example, 
highlighted how crises may act as a prompt for managers to revise their style of 
communicating with stakeholders as the scenario unfolds. And for Griffin (2014), crisis 
situations may cause managers to act to protect their corporate reputation. Unsurprisingly, 
                                                          
1There is very little research on the concept itself (Goodman et al, 2001, p507).  
2See also Drucker, 1981, on turbulence and unpredictability; Weick, 1988, on the cause of enactment in a 
crisis; and Seeger et al, 2005, on post-crisis discourses. 
3The status quo is also subject to a visceral v cognitive tension to act as well as investor pressures (see 
Erasmus, 2015). 
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therefore, alacrity is called for when crises impact a company. And when the crisis abates 
so too, it may be understood, will the need to act with urgency. 
      Furthermore, leading into the financial crisis managers had to respond to market 
demands, accounting for the reducing time period during which companies could benefit 
from a level of sustained competitive advantage (Wiggins and Ruefli, 2005).1  Investors, 
meanwhile, often had different holding-time preference rates (Bushee, 2004; Haldane, 
2015). Thus, some were more likely to respond faster to market fluctuations. It was an 
effect increasingly managers had to take account of in the pre-Crash market environment. 
 
1.2 From the evidence to conceptualizing the research questions and hypotheses 
The mounting financial crisis represented a turbulent period for companies and it meant 
many had to shift their governance perspective in response. Hence, with changed economic 
conditions managers had a renewed choice concerning the constituency to favour to best 
effect for the generation of value – if indeed any change in focus was required. At the same 
time, a changed perception of heightened temporal pressures could have been in place as 
well. And from the evidence discussed it would seem that before the 2008 Crash managers 
were overly focused on shareholders and with a short-term perspective, along with no 
obvious feeling of urgency that they needed to change their behavior – as they had not yet 
felt the crisis. After the Crash, by contrast, managers appeared to favour stakeholders. They 
also, it seems, took greater care to interact with them from a long-term perspective, and 
with a greater sense of urgency that they needed to do so. 
      From that perspective, the research questions and hypotheses of this investigation take 
their lead. And to that end, the concept of perceived corporate value2 is integral, as this is 
                                                          
1Underpinning this was a growing societal trend towards urgent behaviour. The pace of change of daily life 
had increased. For example, speeded up communication patterns such as email (Mauboussin and Callahan, 
2015); and pressures for shorter deadlines (Bluedorn and Denhardt, 1988).  
2See Glossary 
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the main construct measured. Pivotally, the conceptualization of perceived corporate value 
is as a complex cognitive phenomenon, impacted by other corporate perceptions,1 
specifically primacy and temporality. Before expanding on this idea below, it is nonetheless 
possible to conceptualize, more generally, how biases may potentially change over time.  
 
1.2.1 Specifying the research questions and hypotheses: The approach taken to 
understanding changes in perceptual bias to corporate value by a variety of stakeholders is 
to conceive a corpus of narrative material produced by a company or an organization as a 
conceptual search space. Within that space, by looking at relevant terms managers employ, 
it is possible to ask specific research questions of the narrative – and generate further 
hypotheses – concerning how perceived value might alter over time. Hence, this allows an 
examination of a change in managers’ perceptual bias.  
      Therefore, in mining and examining the corporate corpus, to assess how managers might 
have altered their primacy focus over time with respect to the creation of value, the main 
research question is as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q1. Did the crash of 2008 change perceptions of corporate value in relation to the  
       relative merits of shareholder primacy and stakeholder primacy? 
 
 
Similarly, a consideration is made of two different aspects of temporality for the 
corporate corpus. The first is termism and the second is a sense of urgency to 
reorientate2 behaviour. Hence, this concerns whether managers feel a need to act or 
change something in the way they meet their day-to-day responsibilities. 
                                                          
1There are other forces impacting the multi-actor understanding of corporate value as well, including the 
media, the political environment; as well as responses to economic events, see eg Appendix 1. 
2A sense-of-urgency to ‘reorientate’ or ‘act’ are interchangeable in use for the research. 
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Q2i  Did the crash of 2008 change perceptions of corporate value in relation to          
a long-term or short-term outlook (ie termism; the relative merits of time    
 horizon orientation)?  
 
Q2ii Did the crash of 2008 change perceptions of corporate value in relation to 
an urgency to reorientate or a non-urgency to reorientate outlook (ie the   
relative merits of sense of urgency orientation)? 
 
      However, also required in this research is to know how the corporate domain compares 
to the regulatory domain. These same questions (Q1 – Q2ii), but focusing on changing 
regulatory perceptions of corporate value, are therefore asked of the regulatory domain. 
      Further utilizing the idea of a search space for the corporate and regulatory corpuses, a 
consideration is made of the different aspects of these questions in unison – ie up until now 
there has been separate examination of primacy and temporality dimensions. Specification 
of these potential combined effects is through hypotheses. In this way, an examination is 
made of how complex perceptions about corporate governance with respect to value 
creation might have changed over the crisis period.  
      As before, there is a consideration of the same concepts, though here codes are applied. 
Potential movement is, therefore, firstly with respect to dimensions of primacy 
(shareholder primacy (ShP) and stakeholder primacy (StP)). And secondly, with respect to 
temporal dimensions of termism (long term (LT) and short term (ST)), as well as the 
alternative temporal dimensions of a sense of urgency (urgency-to-reorientate (UR) and 
non-urgency-to-reorientate (NUR)).  
      The main hypotheses formed in this context therefore are:  
 
 
H1a: Pre crash, value-related terms will dominate in the space representing short-term ShP.  
H1b: Post-crash, value-related terms will dominate in the space representing long-term StP.  
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For a sense of urgency, a similar format is used: 
H2a: Pre crash, value-related terms will dominate in the space representing NUR ShP  
H2b: Post-crash, value-related terms will dominate in the space representing UR StP.   
 
 
 
      The corporate and regulatory corpuses are the primary corpuses examined.1 The 
corporate corpus consists of 20 FT250 companies, and the regulatory corpus consists of 
hard and soft law. These sources provide narrative material to start evaluating the complex 
conversation taking place about value creation in these domains. 
      Extending the investigation beyond the primary corpuses, however, the research 
questions and hypotheses are applied to a secondary corpus. This corpus comprises ten 
peripheral stakeholder organizations2 – or sub-corpuses – providing business support or 
advice. By this approach, through the exploration of different organization’s narratives, a 
multi-actor perception on value creation becomes observable across the economy. 
      Another analysis made is whether the narrative language found in the primary corpuses 
becomes less financially-oriented over the crisis period.3 This potentially addresses whether 
there was an increased financialized scenario in place prior to the Crash in relation to the 
value creation discourse of managers. Separately, at a more detailed level, therefore, the 
following hypotheses4 for the termism dimensions are proposed: 
 
 
H1c: Pre crash, there will be a dominance of financial value-related terms compared to non- 
         financial value-related terms clustering towards the space representing short-term ShP.  
H1d: Post-crash, there will be a dominance of non-financial value-related terms compared  
         to financial value-related terms clustering towards the space representing long-term StP.  
                                                          
1Chapter 4 provides a list of corpus constituents. 
2These are explained more fully below 
3As the analysis proceeded, an extension was made of this aspect of the research to examine clusters of 
organizations, inclusive of secondary corpuses. 
4 See Appendix 2 for this in tabular form 
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      And for the sense of urgency dimensions the same hypotheses are looked at as with H1c and 
H1d but once again with respect to a non-urgency to reorientate (NUR) with shareholder 
primacy (ShP) and an urgency to reorientate (UR) with stakeholder primacy (StP). Hence:  
 
    
H2c: Pre crash, there will be a dominance of financial value-related terms compared to non- 
         financial value-related terms clustering towards the space representing NUR ShP.  
H2d: Post-crash, there will be a dominance of non-financial value-related terms compared  
         to financial value-related terms clustering towards the space representing UR StP.  
 
      In a multi-actor economy, managerial perceptions are likely to be affected by their 
environment (including the actions of managers in other companies, the regulatory context, 
academic ideas, and the media). In a related vein, therefore, a consideration is made of the 
possibility of corporate and regulatory domains influencing one another. Hence, the 
following questions look at whether there is any related change between these domains: 
 
Q3: Over the crisis period, are any changing regulatory perceptions of corporate 
value associated with any changing managerial or executive perceptions of corporate 
value? 
(Q3 investigates effects of soft and hard law together. Separate regulatory effects 
undergo investigation respectively with Q3a and Q3b). 
 
      Consequently, confining the focus of the investigation of the pre and post financial 
crisis period to perceptual estimations of corporate value – where ‘value’ may be 
understood as an expected as well as an actual monetary valuation of corporate activity – 
how narrative moved over time for various players associated with British companies is 
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examined.1 In all these cases, the belief is that companies – and other organizations – will 
have taken an increasingly financialized stance in the run-up to the 2008 Crash, with 
associated biases forming. By contrast, after the Crash – having perhaps learnt some 
lessons2 – this study assesses where their biases led them. 
 
1.3 Reevaluating notions about value creation 
In testing the research questions and hypotheses, the notion of perceived corporate value is 
central. Moreover, from the perspective of this investigation, there needs to be an 
appreciation that examining any ‘reevaluation’ of corporate value is not about assessing 
corporate value3 itself but about how corporate value might be perceived to alter. The 
distinction is subtle but fundamental definitionally, and it opens the topic to enquiry. 
      Indeed, Hughes (2013), in discussing financial versus non-financial elements for an 
article in HBR, stressed how wide-ranging a concept and difficult to measure corporate 
value is, and how ‘Measurement of value has been mooted in the past but never achieved 
broad success due to the variable nature of the concept in organizations’. Furthermore, it 
could encompass shared value, too, as Porter and Kramer (2006, 2011) offered based on a 
fostering of the relationship between business and the community in which it operates. 
Moreover, any attempt to define corporate value and its increase inevitably meets problems 
when there is a deliberation of the concept from the perspective of different constituencies’ 
interests.4  
                                                          
1As will become increasingly apparent in the forthcoming chapters, it is the terminology embedded in 
narrative that is reflective of corporate value in its various forms. 
2Stiglitz (2017) comments on this possibility of whether lessons were likely learnt following the financial 
crisis. 
3Additionally, the concept is not to be confused with corporate core values, a set of beliefs held by a company 
(see eg Freeman et al, 1988). 
4Chapter 2 expands on this. 
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       Yet, rather than an attempt to define1 and analyse corporate value, the research focus in 
this investigation instead examines what it is thought to be at any given time and then 
compares that to another instant in time. The research thus considers, not any absolute 
measure, but the changing relative disposition managers had over the 2004-2012 period to 
promote the interests of a particular constituency for value creation.  
      Perceived corporate value is thus representative of a an altering view with respect to 
the relative merits of shareholder primacy, stakeholder primacy, a short-term perspective, 
and a long-term perspective, as managers within various organizations changed their 
particular perceptions. There is a similar conceptualization for a sense-of-urgency to act or 
not to act. 
       The context of perceived corporate value therefore offers an alternative approach to 
investigating the primacy debate, as it allows measurement. Consequently, the approach 
may make use of the fact that what organizations think is represented in what their 
managers and executives write; the terms they use, and which can be quantified. In this 
way, potential alterations to perceived corporate value due to managerial biases is assessed 
by examining how narrative in the form of original corpuses of annual reports changed in 
response to the effects of the financial crisis, between 2004 and 2012. By assessing the use 
of certain terms, these reports reflect the kinds of managerial responses concerning primacy 
orientation and temporality – or changes in their biases – and underlie efforts to succeed 
within the business environment operated in. Specifically looked at are, for example, the 
terms: price, efficiency and investor.  
                                                          
1This research confines itself to notions of corporate value. However, there is additionally a broad historical 
context for attempting to define value going back to Aristotle in ancient Greece, around 360BCE. While more 
modern characterisations of value or its mediators have evolved a context so wide-ranging it includes from the 
philosophical, economic, and sociological, to the cognitive, developmental, and hormonal (see Stigler, 1950, 
for a useful review; Almquist et al, 2016, on price perception; and Myers, 2017, on behavioural mediators). 
Recent work in behavioural economics (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) has though brought the role of 
cognition to the forefront in understanding value; a link made between value and perception particularly 
pertinent to this investigation. See also http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/value-creation.html 
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      The first corpus of narrative-based documentation examined over this period is, as 
noted above, for twenty FT250 listed UK companies. Various industrial sectors provide the 
source for these. For example, the utility infrastructure company Pennon, the transportation 
company National Express, and the gaming and Hard Rock Café owners Rank 
Entertainment. The research then similarly considers narrative change during that time for 
the UK’s regulatory environment with respect to soft and hard law (utilizing, for example, 
the Corporate Governance Code and the Companies Act 2006 respectively). This corporate 
domain together with the regulatory domain form the primary corpuses examined. 
Additionally, this research considers narrative change with respect to perceived corporate 
value for a variety of peripheral stakeholder organizations offering British business support 
or advice. These secondary corpuses include the CBI (Confederation of British Industry), 
the IOD (Institute of Directors) and the TUC (Trades Union Congress), and again looking 
at their annual reports1. Overall, such a multi-actor assessment allows an examination of 
changed perceptions concerning value creation across a section of the economy as the 
twelve stakeholder organizations met the challenges of the global financial meltdown.         
      Fig 1.2 shows some of the complexity involved for corporate value perception by 
depicting the multi-actor economic segment used in this investigation. Moreover, reflexive 
processes, as indicated, add another layer of complexity to the dynamism of the system. 
Although at a deeper level, corporate narrative inputs can have limitations.2 Infusing 
narrative is a cultural grammar, which in some cases can operate restrictively. As Veldman 
and Willmott (2016, p.584) highlighted, there is a single loop form of reflexive learning 
with respect to the UK’s regulatory environment,3 with only minor changes ever made, and 
where there is a rejection of ‘critical scrutiny of the presence, nature and mobilization of the 
                                                          
1Additional relevant topic reports for organizations where appropriate are also used - ie better quality data or 
more reflective of perceived corporate value. 
2The regulatory environment, for the purposes of this illustration, is engendered by the ‘politics’ input. 
3Specifically the Corporate Governance Code, though equally applicable to other documentation. 
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A multi-actor perspective of the corporate value creation 
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Stakeholder organizations (coloured blue) in the economy (within red boundary) assumed to all have a 
similar understanding of corporate value-creation and reflected in their narratives (acronyms refer to 
specific corpuses used in the study). This assumption occurs as a result of the forces (solid bordered 
purple arrows) acting on the observer’s perceptions as they interpret the various organizational 
discourses; with forces similarly acting on organizations directly (dotted bordered purple arrows) to 
intensify the effect. Organizations may also impact one another, creating additional progressive - or 
reflexive - forces, the effect intensified and again being perceived by an observer. The perception of 
value creation results, therefore, from dynamic multi-actor interactions, involving stakeholder 
organizations, human perspective, the economic environment, and varied external forces. 
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Multiple stakeholder organizations (coloured blue) in the economy (red boundary) all 
assumed to have a similar understanding of corporate value-creation and reflected in their 
narratives (Letters refer to corpus constituents used in this study). This understanding 
occurs as a result of the forces (solid bordered green arrows) acting on the observer’s 
perceptions as they interpret the various organizational discourses; with forces si ilarly 
acting on organizations directly (dotted bordered gr en arrows) to intensify the effect. 
Organizations may also impact one another, creating dditional progressive - or ref exive - 
forces; the effect intensified and again being perceived by an observer. 
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taken-for-granted understandings that frame and support theories and practices of 
governance’. Yet, overall, the belief is, such stakeholder corpuses as a cross section of the 
national economic landscape provide a credible sampling, a proxy for wider financial 
perspectives amongst UK organizations. 
      That narrative is important to value creation is not surprising as every company1 has 
their own back-story. Each encapsulates its corporate culture, history, goals, beliefs about 
its business and societal role, and values concerning right or wrong behaviour in its day-to-
day operations. Not least, it reveals what companies see as necessary factors feeding value 
creation as well as the importance to them of financial success in that regard.  
      Indeed, through conducting business there is a production of an arena where various 
constituencies are subject to the more subtle dispositional effects companies bring to bear 
on them. This arena is, consequently, where the continuing, often volatile debate 
concerning the relative merits of a shareholder primacy versus a stakeholder primacy model 
finds greatest articulation. Who should be favoured is an ongoing question for business as 
Chapter 2 shows. Yet for all the passions evoked, based on all the preconceptions about the 
best-preferred constituency for value creation, the debate itself is still one that rests 
essentially, not on primacy, but on a narrative process involving the transmission of ideas; 
each party, manager or constituency, attempting to propound an advantage.  
      Clearly, recognizing whether a company is shareholder or stakeholder oriented, indeed 
what constitutes corporate value for them at any moment, or indeed whether they are driven 
by financial concerns alone as opposed to also having a sense of social responsibility, can 
be understood as a matter of perceptual bias amongst other elements acting on the corporate 
discourse.    
                                                          
1The terms ‘company’ and ‘organization’ are interchangeable in use for the study. 
21 
 
      And considered as a dynamic, interactive narrative process, linked to the concept of 
corporate value as it seems to be, it is nonetheless visible in a loose depiction. Fig 1.3 
shows a simplified view of the process1 as inputs (left) and outputs (right) in relation to the 
way corporate narrative is formed and alters through information being exchanged or acted 
on by a range of elements (imagine the spheres in motion and bumping one another), and 
where it eventually impacts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
      For this study the possibility of narrative change with respect to primacy, or movement 
over time, for stakeholder organizations and companies is how this research has sought to 
understand the complex functionality involved. Fig 1.3 is a snapshot of one moment in time 
for the biasing forces acting on a company’s narrative. And in fact considered in this 
                                                          
1Though not shown in Fig 1.3, the factor of ‘shareholder and stakeholder primacy’ may also be understood as 
an input to narrative. 
Fig 1.3 Dynamic inputs and outputs for corporate narrative 
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research is only part of this depicted process; eg the regulatory (soft law) and legislative 
(hard law), along with moderating biases (ie dispositions for primacy orientation, termism, 
and sense of urgency) as inputs and value perception and creation as outputs.  
      Affecting the way organizational narrative plays out, moderating biases with respect to 
primacy and temporality are therefore seen to determine how a wide-ranging and changing 
set of complex ideas concerning value creation are passed on to employees and other 
stakeholders through the type of transmission used.  
 
1.4 A different approach to a complex problem       
In forming the research questions and hypotheses, a corpus is, in the first step in the 
analysis as discussed, a conceptual search space in which variables can alter position. This 
provides a theoretical framework in order to answer primarily: has there been a pre to post-
Crash change in the perceptions of corporate value? The variables – perceived corporate 
value, along with its moderating biases – can therefore undergo assessment and mapping. It 
is, hence, on that basis – of movement – that there is a formulation of the hypotheses. 
      The next step is to identify and conceptualize the associations of the variables 
themselves, whose movements within that search space will require mapping. The 
accomplishment of this, as will become increasingly apparent, is through the extraction of 
relevant terms representing the variables from the corpus narratives. And based on these 
extracted terms, this research thus examines ideas about the moderating biases of primacy 
and temporality in unison – and as they are associated with managerial perceptions of 
corporate value creation. It thus extends previous work from the corporate governance field 
on the relative merits of shareholder versus stakeholder primacy – and long-termism versus 
short-termism – as considered separately (see eg Lazonick and O’Sullivan,  2002, p17; 
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Freeman, 1985), by recognizing and addressing the complexity involved. This perspective 
underpins a multivariate formulation of the concepts. 
      To evaluate such complexity requires an appropriate method. Hence, the novel 
qualitative approach of narrative staining presented in this investigation helps to untangle 
the ideas within the debate. In addition to directing the construction of the variables, the 
method does this by analyzing, objectively, how organizations altered their intricate 
discourses over the period, reevaluating their strategic responses on corporate value 
generation.  
      Narrative staining thus introduces a different type of approach for comparing the pre to 
post-Crash corpus narrative of organizations. More specifically, the technique allows the 
assessment of complex (combined) narrative terms organizations employ, synthesizing 
narrative components like primacy and termism. And as an extension of the corpus 
linguistic analysis toolbox, the technique departs from many types of corpus linguistic 
analytic methods by employing terms1 related to value in some way and chosen in advance 
of a consideration of a corpus. It is only then that there is an analysis of the corpus, with 
frequency counts made of the usage of all these value-related terms (VRTs). But, in original 
fashion, by assessing in mathematical combinations the frequencies for VRTs and terms for 
time horizon dimensions, along with shareholder terms like ‘investor’ and stakeholder 
terms like ‘employee’, potential variation over time is identified. This is an objective 
consideration of these variables, as opposed to a general tendency to consider them 
separately, though somewhat vaguely impacting one another. It therefore usefully integrates 
                                                          
1For example, ‘price’, ‘share’, and ‘strategy’ (labelled value-related terms or VRTs). Similarly considered are 
pre-selected terms for comparison dimensions (DimSyns). These, for example, are terms referring to how 
executives can be short-term or long-term in outlook: like ‘now’ or ‘lasting’ (ie time horizon), which may bias 
their actions. 
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these concepts for the business arena, and specifically with respect to commercial 
experiences of the financial crisis.  
      The basis of the analytical approach, therefore, is the extraction of term frequencies for 
pre-selected categories of terms appearing in stakeholder corpuses for pre and post-Crash 
time points. But, crucially, as will be shown in Chapter 4, a consideration of these complex 
terms - based on their frequencies – is in colour-coded combinations in the next step of the 
procedure. This then feeds a graphical mapping analysis (including in 3D if required). In 
this way, there can a visual assessment of any split of the colour coded and interacting term 
based variables. How these variables change over time is then observable with respect to 
the main primary corporate and regulatory corpuses, as well as the secondary corpuses of 
peripheral stakeholder organizations, this study examines. Hence, comparisons can be made 
of multiple corpuses, both contemporary or at different time points. 
      There are several new concepts in this research. Fig 1.4 therefore shows a summary of 
the whole process and how there can be a generation of results in a consolidated manner on 
a simple graphic, the narrative strip.         
      Furthermore, narrative staining is applicable to an extensive dataset of multiple and 
varied stakeholder corpuses, and there is therefore an original broadening of the 
investigation. And by consolidating and assessing large-scale perceptual bias regarding 
value creation across the economy, insights are provided, hitherto inaccessible - and 
particularly with the production of the narrative strip. Thus, the procedures employed in 
narrative staining allow the revealing of a multi-actor discourse with respect to corporate 
value creation. 
      That, in sum, is the approach presented in this investigation that utilizes the concept of 
perceived corporate value to look at organizations and their potentially changing biases on 
the subject. 
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      And though a focus in the corporate governance discussion of this investigation is on 
the shareholder and stakeholder primacy debate, as the next chapter highlights, a corollary 
of examining perceived corporate value in this research is that identifying what best creates 
value is not the aim, nor is it about taking sides in the shareholder versus stakeholder 
debate. Instead, for what appears the first time, the purpose of this research is to understand 
whether the type of primacy, which dominated prior to the 2008 Crash, corresponded to 
popular or pre-analytic beliefs. Hence, this research examines observationally from a 
variety of organizational corpuses who was favoured to create value, and whether this 
changed with respect to the financial crisis. 
      Presented here then is an approach providing a different way, a new tune, that hopefully 
sheds light on what has been a notoriously difficult area to explore. 
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2. The Evolving Primacy Debate in Corporate 
Governance 
 
 
 
  
    
 
Captains of industry and academics across economies would add their voice to decry the 
rise of shareholder primacy following the Crash of 2008. Besides Jack Welch’s, famous 
statement that ‘shareholder primacy is the dumbest idea in the world’ (Guerrera, 2009), Paul 
Polman, CEO of Unilever, classed it a cult, Roger Martin, dean of the Rotman School of 
Management at the University of Toronto, called it a ‘crummy principle that is undermining 
American capitalism’, while Xavier Huillard, CEO of French construction and public 
services company Vinci Group, labelled it ‘totally idiotic’1.  
      Clearly, a prevalence of negative perceptions about shareholder primacy was present 
across the business world - even though many companies retained a focus on investors in an 
attempt to maximize profits. An alternative, however, was a model focussing on the primacy 
of stakeholders, and stressing the interests and promotion of a broad range of constituencies 
for the development of a successful business (Freeman, 1984). Significantly, the stakeholder 
model presented a more nuanced understanding of shareholders as only one type of 
                                                          
1Source for quotes: Denning, 2015 (https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2015/02/05/salesforce-ceo-
slams-the-worlds-dumbest-idea-maximizing-shareholder-value/#1df8a4c87883). 
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stakeholder when it came to creating corporate value. And though perhaps sidelined in the 
lead-up to the financial crisis, in recent times the approach has nevertheless found 
increasing resonance with business leaders. For these individuals, orienting towards 
stakeholders is in fact a worthwhile initiative, as simply making sure one’s employees are 
satisfied in their work can increase a business’s long-term value (Edmans, 2015). 
      Marc Benioff, CEO of Salesforce, one of America’s major cloud computing services 
companies, summed up the ideal primacy perspective for corporate governance to take after 
his attendance at the Davos conference of the World Economic Forum (WEF): 
  
‘We have an imperative to shift from creating shareholder value to stakeholder 
value… corporate management isn’t just accountable to shareholders… businesses 
must focus on serving the interests [of] all stakeholders – customers, employees, 
partners, suppliers, citizens, governments, the environment and any other entity 
impacted by its operations’. 
Benioff, 20151  
 
      Benioff‘s sentiments echoed those of Klaus Schwab, founder of the WEF. For Schwab 
change towards greater stakeholder engagement is fundamentally necessary in the running 
of companies, and for the manner in which those companies should be interacting with 
multiple constituencies for a better world.2 Indeed, an increased involvement of business 
with a varied stakeholder base, calls for greater corporate social responsibility (eg Preston 
and Post, 1975; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Businesses from this broad stakeholder 
perspective have the chance to be both more sensitive to the needs of their social 
environment, helping it where necessary, and more aware of opportunities for prosperity 
and growth. 
                                                          
1Ibid p27:1; see also https://www.huffingtonpost.com/marc-benioff/a-call-for-stakeholder-
activists_b_6599000.html 
2’Schwab has championed the multi-stakeholder concept since the Forum’s inception’. See: World Economic 
Forum (https://www.weforum.org/about/klaus-schwab). 
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      Yet by contrast, there have also been dissenters from this view where, for example, there 
has been the suggestion that shareholder primacy offers protection for different 
constituency’s interests, as well as looking after their concerns and creating harmony 
amongst the disparate group’s aims. From that shareholder-oriented position, companies are 
likely to have a greater chance of being successful (eg Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004). 
Furthermore, the desire amongst business leaders to pursue stakeholder interests might not 
be due to altruism at all but simply a matter of different interests coinciding (see The 
Economist 2005). 
      What these views say about the movement of perception concerning value generation 
with respect to the Crash may therefore not be as clear-cut as first appears. And this lack of 
clarity is one of the reasons the present study seeks to determine, objectively, the change in 
primacy perspective that took place as managers underwent the experience of the 2008 
Crash. Moreover, such objectivity addresses a formidable gap in the literature, wherein the 
importance of particular constituency interests to value creation is the focus rather than 
identifying the dominant one in place. Nevertheless, that academic discussion provides a 
context for the present research, with respect to the most likely constituency to be in the 
ascendency entering and exiting the financial crisis. Without any partiality for either model, 
therefore, a consideration is made of the support for both shareholder and stakeholder 
approaches, and how latterly an integrated view has evolved. 
 
2.1 Support for shareholder primacy  
An article by Milton Friedman (1970) in the New York Times Magazine is generally credited 
for popularizing the idea of shareholder value maximisation in the pre-Crash years. ‘There 
is one and only one social responsibility of business’, he wrote, ‘to use its resources and 
engage in activities designed to increase its profits…’. However, other academics as well as 
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the regulatory environment in the UK have also contributed to furthering a shareholder 
focus. 
 
2.1.1 Academic advocates of shareholder primacy: Friedman’s (1970) work would lead, 
arguably indirectly, to years of following an extreme interpretation of shareholder primacy 
as the major approach for companies to follow. Yet the subsequent development of agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1976) added weight to that primacy position. 
Managers were, according to the theory, cast as agents acting on behalf of absent owners or 
shareholders, their principals.1 Thus, there was a delegation of authority to managers to 
perform a service, which they clearly had to carry out to the best of their ability. These 
ideas, however, followed on from another idea: the capital market as a managerial 
disciplining mechanism (Manne, 1965). As a result, there was greater emphasis placed on 
managerial performance from an agency approach, where the market would judge how well 
they did. Manne’s ideas also indirectly helped address the need to protect shareholders from 
executive self-interest, a facet of corporate behaviour highlighted early on in the 20th 
Century by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means (1932) but had persisted.2 And with share 
prices determining whether managers were efficient in their roles there was added impetus 
to the concept of shareholder wealth maximization. By the 1980s share price performance 
and corporate performance would become heavily interwoven (Blair, 2003). Indeed, the 
focus of boards would change in that decade due to far greater shareholder activism, a result 
of mergers, takeovers, and the rise of institutional investors. But a foremost effect was that it 
                                                          
1See also Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983. 
2This includes the impact on managers of wider share ownership patterns from the late 19th century (Berle and 
Means, 1932; Jefferys, 1938; Mitchell and Dean, 1962; Michie, 1999, p.4; Hannah, 2007; Rutterford et al, 
2011; Cheffins et al, 2012). These were factors understood as implicated in the splitting of corporate 
ownership and control, the province of the latter moving to full-time professional managers who had a very 
different feeling of identification to the company, and one often unchecked (Florence, 1953; Scott, 1986; 
Coffee, 2001, p.40). Also evident where friction between management and workers boiled over into violence 
(see Tedlow, 1976). 
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all served to alter perceptions progressively amongst senior managers in relation to their 
understanding of where corporate value lay.  
      That shareholders were to receive increased favour from managers when it came to 
value creation had legal support as well. Hansmann and Kraakman’s (2001) view was that 
for the US and UK ‘the basic law of the corporate form has already achieved a high degree 
of uniformity, and continued convergence is likely’. A principal reason for convergence, 
they explained, was a widespread normative consensus that corporate managers should act 
exclusively in the economic interests of shareholders, including non-controlling 
shareholders. It was a consensus that seemed to rely on a notion of director’s fiduciary 
duties as being not only towards shareholder primacy through maximizing shareholder value 
but also based on the establishment of a common standard. In other words, almost everyone 
was already using a shareholder-oriented model of the company so it must have merit.   
      It is perhaps an odd conclusion. However, Sundaram and Inkpen (2004) provided more 
considered theoretical support. For them, maximizing shareholder value maximizes value 
for the whole firm, hence all stakeholders are to benefit. As the central position of Sundaram 
and Inkpen (2004, pp.353-355), they cited a number of reasons why they believed it is so, 
some of which are:  
 
1. The goal of maximizing shareholder value is pro-stakeholder [because shareholders are  
     the main force for maximizing of output. They are also only residual claimants on cash  
     flow]. 
2. Maximizing shareholder value creates the appropriate incentives for managers to assume  
     entrepreneurial risks… thus, managing on behalf of shareholders forces managers to go  
     beyond ‘satisficing’1 effort levels. 
3. Having more than one objective function will make governing difficult if not impossible 
4. It is easier to make shareholders out of stakeholders than vice versa. 
                                                          
1A term the Sundaram and Inkpen (2004) coined to mean doing only as much as required and no more. 
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5. In the event of a breach of contract or trust, stakeholders, compared with shareholders,  
     have protection (or can seek remedies) through contracts and the legal system. 
 
      Sundaram and Inkpen’s (2004) work is interesting as it attempted to deal with many of 
the critiques that were likely to arise against a shareholder maximization approach. 
Specifically, how if it was so effective, could it explain the excessive use (and inadequate 
policing) of compensation packages, as well as the extreme pay ratios managers seemed to 
enjoy?1 Even allowing that this was a discussion on the agenda prior to the Crash of 2008, 
the researchers recognised that these (broken) boundary factors led to ‘convulsions and 
corporate scandals of 2001 and 2002’ but also that the critiques and boundary constraints 
are not necessarily unique to a shareholder value maximization view. They can happen 
when the self-interest of any constituency gets out of control.  
      The work of Rappaport (1986) presented a very different approach. Again, the view was 
that shareholder primacy constitutes the best method of increasing a company’s value. 
However, stressed was the need to take an objective perspective on how to generate value 
through effecting strategic change - and thus shifting the shareholder value concept away 
from only the existing market value of a business. It is an approach looking to increase 
value from the smallest part of the business up, through bringing about strong cash flow 
generation, such as from sales growth. The application of metrics2 to this scenario then 
                                                          
1Extreme pay ratios remain a major concern. The pay of FT100 senior executives can represent a disparity of 
over 130 times as much as employees further down the corporate ladder, according to recent figures (CIPD, 
2017); money that could potentially go to building the company. In the US, pay ratios are presently even 
higher at 271:1 according to the Economic Policy Institute. See http://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-pay-
remains-high-relative-to-the-pay-of-typical-workers-and-high-wage-earners/ 
2Metrics include a shareholder value added metric (SVA), and the development of valuing strategies for 
strategic planning Rappaport (1981). These also have benefit for companies establishing a price of their shares 
as a prelude to sale, re-purchase, divestment or going public, or those that become potential takeover targets. 
And a discounted cash flow model (Rappaport, 1986) considering the trade-offs; ie the returns of projected 
strategies as well as against potential returns forgone; hence the rate of return – as a baseline for discounting – 
that could have been earned by investing in a different prospect but one that carries equal risk. Companies can 
therefore make comparisons of strategies. Managerial judgement of discount rates, however, may be subject to 
bias - and where risk perception may be an influence on such bias. 
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enables a comparison of results against actual results and projections. Such testing leads to 
the selection of strategies.  
      For Rappaport (1986), gaining competitive advantage through internal strategic 
development and creating shareholder value together equate to the corporate objective. The 
difficulty as he saw it, though, was that such shareholder maximization is not universally 
accepted, or when used its implementation is incorrectly carried out and ‘causes pain’. But 
as the rationale for companies to develop, it is anticipatory and hence forward-looking. And 
as with Sundaram and Inkpen’s (2004) view, would allow greater gains for all stakeholders. 
      Taking its cue from the American Legal Institute’s (ALI) list of director’s duties (see 
also Keay, 2013), the work of Lorsch and Maciver (1989) offers another perspective on 
shareholder primacy, and where their research through survey seeks to examine the nature 
of the director-shareholder relationship. Principally, it turns out perhaps unsurprisingly that 
shareholders are favoured, with many directors making decisions that protect shareholders’ 
interests and ensuring they make a good return on their investment. There have been few 
qualitative studies of this nature and the findings are consistent with Yoshimori (1995), who 
similarly highlighted the shareholder-oriented model as being prevalent in the UK and the 
US during this period: 70.5% of UK managers believed shareholders warranted priority over 
other stakeholders; for US managers the figure was a comparable 75.6%. 
      But there is more to it than simply restating the commonly accepted belief about all 
directors pursuing a shareholder primacy agenda. And what is particularly notable about 
Lorsch and Maciver’s (1989) work was how it develops as a typology, with their findings, 
as in Fig 2.1, showing how directors are dissimilar in outlook. In part, it may be due to 
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prevailing circumstances, where managers nowadays have to respond. They are often, 
suggest the researchers, making decisions that give consideration to: the current trend for 
majority shareholdings to reside with institutional investor; high frequency trading 
accounting for a significant proportion of daily trades; that mergers and hostile takeovers are 
an ever-present possibility. Share ownership patterns are therefore far from simple, and how 
directors should attempt to understand who the shareholders are and what their interests are 
is by no means clear. Moreover, director duty cast as the shareholder primacy norm may 
foster a widely accepted conviction of a legal requirement to look after the interests of 
shareholders as the most important constituency to whom they are accountable.1 As Lorsch 
and Maciver (1989) highlighted, despite the best of intentions, a conflict of accountability 
faces directors. Yet directors, they also observed, feel their broader responsibilities. For 
example, looking after the company’s long-term future, even though it may be of secondary 
                                                          
1See also Smith, 1998, on the misconceptions relating to the shareholder primacy norm; Roe, 2001, on 
implications for organizations; and Martin and Riel, 2011, on the systemic forces on managers and senior 
executives – board pressure, the requirement to manage investor expectations, and pressures of market hype - 
dictating how value should be created ie by keeping share price high. 
 
 
Types of Director (as depicted by Lorsch and Maciver, 1989) 
 
Traditionalists: shareholders number one 
Rationalizers: what is good for shareholders is good for other constituencies – including 
employees and community – as well as the company (implicitly follows the rulings of the 
Delaware Court) 
Broad Constructionists: feels responsibility to wider stakeholder base; to balance priorities 
and values of all constituencies 
Fig 2.1 
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importance. And other constituencies, though perhaps coming even further down their list of 
priorities, that have importance too.  
     Evidently, this is not about self-interest as directors face very real and challenging day-
to-day decisions. Moreover, it does not matter from the perspective of this study whether 
there is a legal requirement to favour shareholders or not; the interest is in where directors 
or managers perceived their duties to lie. And for different directors, beyond looking after 
their own interests, there is a great deal of variability in meeting these challenges, as 
highlighted by Fig 2.1. So that over and above a basic typology, a level of thoughtfulness is 
indicated about the way, primarily, shareholders should be treated, and secondarily the 
relevance and needs of multiple constituencies. From a perceptual point of view, directors 
are somewhat in the shareholder primacy camp when it comes to governance processes, but 
not completely. 
      If Lorsch and Maciver’s (1989) research views shareholder primacy as a matter of 
directors being unescapably disposed to a degree to this particular constituency in meeting 
the corporate objective, by contrast Koslowski (2000) sees the promotion of shareholder 
primacy as vital because it is the ‘control principle’ rather than the objective of the 
company. The purpose this engenders might centre on consumer satisfaction or producing 
optimal consumer products. Maximizing shareholder value is, by this view, not the main 
objective of a firm’s corporate governance but rather one of several. It is, thus, an 
instrumental end to achieve the corporate goal by reorienting perspective on the role of 
shareholder primacy, or indeed managerial strategy interplaying with the various markets 
for corporate control.  
      In that context, while a somewhat reconceived approach, it is still looking to a market 
metric of price and that brings with it market pressures on companies. Indeed, there may be 
a fine distinction between the broader instrumental purpose attached to shareholder primacy 
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and that of managerial purpose, leaving room for abuses as Koslowski (2000) recognises. 
External pressures, he suggests, that force efficiencies might be the cause. For example: a 
mistaken transfer, a ‘spillover’, from the influence of financial institutions to the industrial 
firm; a focus on residual future profit; speculative share manipulation; or repercussions on 
capital formation when meeting the needs of competing stakeholder interests through 
participation or bargaining.  
      Yet in making efficiencies, Koslowski (2000) recognized that the creation of perverse 
speculation and business practices amongst managers occurs if there is over-incentivising to 
implement them with, for example, stock options. Abuses in the corporate arena, however, 
are not confined to remuneration practices but can emerge from board or director activities 
in multiple ways. While many businesses continued to favour their investors, quite 
legitimately, there was also, therefore, a development of regulation to counter bad corporate 
behaviour. 
   
2.1.2 Parliamentary and regulatory support of shareholder primacy: There had been 
intermittent exploitative uses of public companies by directors, such as pay rising faster than 
earnings (Conyon et al, 1995), and the scandals in cases such as PolyPeck, BCCI and the 
Maxwell Group, corporate governance practices during the late 1980s and early 1990s 
needed addressing. In response, the UK Parliament would step into the fray with several 
analyses covering a general scope of boardroom activity relating to the role and duties of 
directors. Notably, there was the Cadbury Report, 1992, focussing on board structure, as 
well as the reinforcing of board accountability through the introduction of the concept of 
‘comply or explain’. This document would additionally serve to strengthen the perspective 
regarding shareholder primacy by clearly siting a company’s ownership with those who had 
invested their money, stating that: ‘Boards of directors need to… [make their  
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 Fig 2.2 
 
1From 2012 to 2016 the Corporate Governance Code refers to the accountability of the company 
to its shareholders in law. 
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accountability effective] through the quality of the information which they provide to 
shareholders, and shareholders through their willingness to exercise their responsibilities as 
owners.’ A two-way approach perhaps. But the Parliamentary, Company Law Review 
Steering Group (CLRSG), 1999, supported such a clear statement about shareholder 
ownership and primacy. It stated that: ‘the ultimate objective of companies as currently 
enshrined in law – ie to generate maximum value for shareholders – is in principle the best 
means also of securing overall prosperity and welfare’ (Company Law Review, 1999; see 
also Keay, 2013). Not only had the CLRSG pronounced on the primacy of shareholders but 
also that this primacy, as they perceived it, was integral to a much greater social wealth 
through financial increase. And it is a legal perspective that is reflected in the UK’s soft law 
regulatory framework, which similarly pronounced, ‘…in law the company is primarily 
accountable to its shareholders…’ (Corporate Governance Code, 2016, p3). In other words, 
shareholders came first. 
      Besides the Cadbury Report there were other governmental reports addressing necessary 
improvements in corporate governance practices. Fig 2.2 highlights some of the important 
soft law regulatory milestones (and responsibility for which then passes to the FRC for 
long-term implementation from 2003). Hard law support came from the Companies Act 
2006, particularly s172, where due to business practicalities a consideration of ‘members’ 
often meant managers giving primacy to shareholders before any other stakeholder. In 
addition, The Takeover Code, in its supervisory role, supported the market side of this 
process.  
 
‘The Takeover Code is designed to ensure that shareholders are treated fairly, are 
not denied an opportunity to decide on the merits of a takeover and are afforded 
equivalent treatment by an offeror. It provides an orderly framework within which 
takeovers are conducted’.  
        The Takeover Code 2006, Appendix 1 
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      But one significant corollary of the regulatory approach was that the mechanism of 
corporate control was no longer with the financial markets alone. It was also with the 
corporate governance framework (see Fig 2.2). Indeed, it could be said this is what the 
various UK regulatory analyses and measures were designed to do1, along with the further 
continuing advices of the FRC that charge boards with greater responsibility for value 
creation (Fig 2.3). Moreover, in contrast to other countries the UK’s dual regulatory 
approach to corporate governance in the pre-Crash economy was seen as fairly unique, a 
‘third way’ (Williams and Conley, 2005). 
   
 
   
      Hence, there was non-explicit support for shareholder primacy from soft law regulation, 
in addition to explicit hard law support from s172 of the Companies Act 2006. In 
combination, it was a framework representing a potentially powerful additional market 
control mechanism. 
                                                          
1Eg reports by Cadbury, Higgs, and others; or in fact the legal framework through the Companies Act 2006, 
which stresses the duties of directors. 
Fig 2.3 
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      Indeed, though in principle the regulatory framework could hypothetically shift where 
corporate value is perceived to be, expanding or redirecting it to other important stakeholder 
constituencies by virtue of all the controls it brought to bear, it is essentially still a 
shareholder primacy model taking its cue from an agency perspective. Seen in relation to the 
FRC Guidance 2011, as Fig 2.3 indicates, it means the main relationship between manager 
and shareholder was very much still the situation as soft law had reinforced, and with the 
board as arbiter in the process of creating corporate value. 
      This support for shareholder primacy, however, stands in contrast to legal viewpoints on 
fiduciary duties, such as that of Johnson and Millon (2005, p1644) who state: ‘It is 
indisputable that officers are agents for the corporate enterprise, not the stockholders. Their 
responsibility to any particular corporate constituency is only indirect, and any benefits (or 
costs) to such key groups are incidental effects that flow from decisions made in the interest 
of the corporation as a single, undifferentiated entity’. Indeed, even if differentiated the 
company is still seen as a nexus of contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) rather than a 
complex entity held together by ‘ontological glue’ (see Gindis, 2007). Such glue, when 
present, can serve to integrate stakeholder diversity and promote collective action for 
enhanced value creation. Though again, it stands in contrast, conceptually, to shareholder 
primacy and how companies are structured as well as supported by the UK regulatory 
environment to promote that aim. 
      Furthermore, with the corporate governance framework in the UK as it is, in essence 
two of the three elements of agency theory (incentivising and a market for corporate 
control) have been found to have flaws and the remaining one of monitoring is the element 
that is being developed through regulation. As discussed too, there is also a re-emphasis on 
the rights of shareholders. The indisputable nature of senior executives as agents of the 
corporate enterprise alone appears to be questionable. And even if it might not be fair to 
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characterize all executives in a negative light, it nevertheless still views them as self-
interested where their decisions require curbing from selfish actions. Hence, there is a need 
for a regulatory means of monitoring.  
      Despite the academic and regulatory support for shareholder primacy, for many 
observers the issue centered on whether it was possible to take a broader and more inclusive 
view on how companies achieve success as well as create value. The stakeholder primacy 
model appeared to offer an alternative in this regard. 
 
2.2 Support for stakeholder primacy 
Underlying the stakeholder model is the idea that a variety of constituencies - such as 
customers, suppliers, the environment, as well as employees - could make an instrumental 
contribution to the success of a business.1 Indeed, seen as another type of stakeholder, 
investors are able to make an important financial contribution or play a part through the 
market’s disciplining mechanism. Yet, from a stakeholder perspective, businesses had to 
feel they were part of a larger commercial entity, constituted from multiple interests beyond 
those of shareholders alone. They had to recognize that these constituencies all had stakes in 
the company. Stakeholders were, for example, ‘persons or groups that have, or claim, 
ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities, past, present, or future.’ 
(Clarkson, 1995, p.106).2 Companies, therefore, had responsibilities to – and were 
connected with – a wider set of constituencies in order to manage, co-ordinate and further 
                                                          
1This is dependent on the recognition of their potential by businesses. And while this recognition may not be 
denied - even from a shareholder primacy perspective - claims to remuneration beyond that contractually 
agreed can complicate the matter. 
2There are, in fact, many definitions of a stakeholder, including: ‘Any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives’ (Freeman, 1984, p.46); ‘Peoples and groups who 
either impact on or may be impacted by its [a company’s] policies and operations’ (Frederick et al, 1992). 
However, the notion of a stakeholder is a contested concept (Miles, 2012) with hugely varying definitions 
regarding criteria for inclusion. There are over 66 definitions of a stakeholder according to Mainardes et al 
(2012), while Mitchell et al (1997) offer 38 definitions, Friedman and Miles (2006) 55 definitions, Laplume et 
al (2008) 179 definitions, and Miles (2011) 435 definitions. 
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those interests, both externally1 as well as internally (see eg Crane and Matten, 2010). And 
the constituencies when fully recognized and leveraged could make significant contributions 
to corporate value generation.  
      As an internal constituency, employees were a particularly important resource.2 And a 
broader stakeholder view that emphasised the promotion of their interests and their 
contributory role would enter the limelight from the early 1980s onwards through the work 
of several investigators. 
 
2.2.1 Academic advocates of stakeholder primacy: Of particular significance to a 
stakeholder primacy model is the influential work of Edward Freeman (1984). Freeman’s 
key insight was to link stakeholder involvement with strategic management. Research 
subsequently carried out, often in association with colleagues, served to build a different 
way to understand how corporate value is developed and the vital role of managers in 
cultivating relationships amongst a wide set of constituencies for this process to be 
successful. Moreover, the idea of shareholders as only one type of stakeholder was 
increasingly accepted. 
      One of Freeman’s (1984) innovations was the ‘hub and spoke’ model, also known as a 
‘bicycle-wheel’ model. It viewed the corporate organization as the hub for a series of 
interdependent relationships, which also included, as Crane and Matten (2004) drew 
particular attention to in commenting on Freeman’s work, a wider set of stakeholder 
constituencies influenced by the company’s operations (see also Mainardes et al, 2011, 
p229).  
                                                          
1As a forerunner of CSR, there had been the promotion of external citizen duties early in the 20th Century (see 
Berle, 1931; Dodd, 1932).   
2In the sense that employees work within companies. Of note, however, is that employees are outside parties in 
company law, although specially connected to the company through labour law. 
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      As it stood, the model was largely about the flow of information between those in the 
relationship with the intent of producing a type of agreement on strategy. Yet as Freeman 
(1984, p54) commented, ‘…for stakeholder analysis to be meaningful [it, the model] must 
be taken one step further….’ And in Freeman et al (1988), there had been an expansion of 
the conceptual view of a stakeholder theory by showing the centrality of values to the 
model. Effective firms act strategically on the values top managers hold, they argue, and this 
being so it is a research conception that leads to a managerial view of corporate morality 
(see also Jackall, 2010). Actions managers take have moral implications affecting others, 
such as about how a company implements its ideas on corporate social responsibility as well 
as the overall corporate narrative they construct to explain or justify the strategic and social 
endeavours they have carried out. Understood as problematic, one solution is for managers 
to recognise that rather than their own values, stakeholders’ values are vital to strategic 
outcomes.   
      Moreover, in recognizing these values the obligation on managers, Freeman et al (1988) 
stressed, is not just one of a superficially expressed moral requirement of respecting the 
legitimacy of certain stakeholder’s claims. That is a rout down which the imposition of lip-
service could easily be stimulated. Employees should not be depended on either to override 
their values in favour of loyalty or the good of the company. Indeed the notion of strategic 
management as proposed by Freeman (1984) was one that went far beyond that of lip-
service. Rather, its more nuanced perspective was fundamentally: a value-clarification 
process between multiple parties; the allowance of independent choice; and more than 
simply aligning employees’ values with corporate values. Indeed, Auster and Freeman 
(2012) would take these ideas further, where for them the notion of organizations simply 
‘living’ their values was insufficient. There needed to be 'corporate authenticity’. And when 
in place it leads, they suggested, towards the ultimate goal, or ends, of the ‘poetic 
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organization’, where there is a type of alignment of all good things organizational. As 
idealistic as it sounds, the basic point was that there be an ongoing conversation amongst all 
relevant constituencies to foster that authenticity. 
      The approach, however, was not without its critics. Key (1999), for example, in 
response to Freeman’s (1984) work, saw it as being about goal trade-offs, and argued 
against his concept of ‘value fit’, where alignment of managerial and employee values was 
an aim. For Key, such a model was in fact a ‘resource conversion entity’ and rather less 
about giving all stakeholders automatically the same priority and an equal voice. Mitchell et 
al (1997, p870) add, ‘The common "bicycle-wheel" model of a firm's stakeholder 
environment does not begin to capture the ebb and flow of changes in stakeholder-manager 
relations or the fact that these relations are multilateral and often coalitional, not bilateral 
and independent’. 
      Yet the aim of Freeman and his associates was for a deeper understanding of the variety 
of stakeholders contributing to a company’s value creation. Hence, a greater integration of 
values held by all constituencies, including those of managers, to ultimately feed a 
company’s success. Conceived that way, stakeholder theory is more than a starting point; it 
is a holistic concept of a goal and a means to achieving that goal (see eg Freeman et al, 
1988; Mitchell et al, 1997). Hence, it is reinforced that all stakeholders are important not 
only shareholders.1  
      Companies, meanwhile, often use simple corporate maps to conceptualize relationships 
(such as hub and spoke). Businesses will define stakeholders positionally in terms of the 
attributes separating them – which is to say, defined in terms of what makes them who they 
are. Clearly, stakeholders are seen principally from the company’s standpoint. And it leaves 
a wide field for subjective assessment by managers in how a differentiation of stakeholders 
                                                          
1See also Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman and McVea, 2001; Jawahar and 
McLaughlin, 2001 Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004. 
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should occur. Companies, nevertheless, need to know whom they are interacting with in 
their relationships in a clear fashion. Indeed, at its most basic, managerial success perhaps 
rests simply on a ‘names and faces’ approach as a prelude to making things work for the 
company (see Gilbert, 1992; Crane and Matten, 2004; McVea and Freeman, 2005).  
      Companies may view attributes as important. But a focus on them has to be more than a 
recognition of some set of identity characteristics, or even an agreed dictum of know your 
stakeholder. Others have therefore taken the stakeholder model a step further to counter 
some of these problems. The work of Mitchell et al (1997), for example, looked at a 
differentiation of stakeholder attributes in terms of salience in order to understand the 
relationships involved. They developed a salience typology1; hence, indicating the degree to 
which managers will end up favouring any particular constituency. And salience, they show, 
will be dependent on one or more elements of power, legitimacy and urgency being in 
operation. This takes an attributional definition of a stakeholder in a different direction to 
one based on qualities as opposed to some physical or contributory property.        
      Indeed, another way the theory was developed was by a consideration of power that 
encompassed various actors. Looking at the power relationship between groups would allow 
managers to better perceive the stakeholders with whom they were interacting. For 
stakeholder management it was a critical dimension, particularly in regards to recognizing 
who had greatest power (see Wartick and Mahon, 1994). Looking inter-departmentally, 
managers may favour employees through the application of measures of stakeholder power, 
which could be in terms of staffing factors or the size of the budget as well as the amount 
and source of any additional funding a department receives (Carroll, 1989). Rowley (1997) 
understood stakeholder power in terms of a network structure and the position held within it. 
Frooman (1999) however, sees stakeholder theory from the opposing side. In his 
                                                          
1As a typology, it is also interesting to compare with that produced by Lorsch and Maciver, 1989, on director 
types and how shareholders are favoured, see Fig 2.1. 
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perspective, it was about the influence (or power) on managerial decision-making via 
strategies that stakeholders can bring to bear.1 Conceptually, it follows on from one of 
stakeholder theory’s main precepts: that the purpose of the company is to manage the 
interests of different stakeholders, including changes in expectations and demands (Evan 
and Freeman, 1983). 
      In the context of the work by Mitchell et al (1997), it is worth noting there has been a 
challenge to ‘legitimacy’ as a notion of importance. The simple reason for this is that ‘the 
appropriateness of a stakeholder's claim may not matter nearly as much as the ability of the 
stakeholder to affect the direction of the firm’ (Frooman, 1999, p193). Power, it would 
seem, trumps legitimacy. As Freeman (1984) emphasised, ‘strategies for dealing even with 
groups well beyond the fringe will be put in place if those groups pose a threat to the firm’. 
Nevertheless, while together power and legitimacy in the conception of Mitchell et al (1997) 
are potential factors of importance, theirs was also one of the first rare pieces of research 
that considered how a sense of urgency was relevant. This, though, is an aspect examined in 
the present study. 
      Donaldson and Preston (1995) take a substantially different approach to the 
development of a stakeholder theory - and one contrasting with a simplistic input-output 
model. They see the theory as having been distorted by writers who find support for their 
own professional conceptions of it (eg to attempt explanations on the decision-making 
process or why firm’s exist). Or as Pesquex and Damak-Ayadi (2005) put it with some 
added gravitas, these writers are ‘underlining the correlation between facts and a certain 
conceptualization thereof’. The result is that ‘concepts [such as] stakeholder, stakeholder 
model, stakeholder management  
                                                          
1Including, as a result of the power to influence regarding the legitimacy of contracts or claims in play. See, for 
example, Savage et al, 1991; Brenner, 1993; Starik, 1994. 
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and stakeholder theory’ are used in multiple ways ‘and often supported (or critiqued) with 
diverse and often contradictory evidence and arguments’ and where the lines are frequently 
blurred (Donaldson and Preston, 1995, p66; see also Brummer, 1991).  
      To a large extent, the problem is definitional; something the present study, in dealing 
with broader terminology within this field, has had to grapple with. And in response, 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) understand stakeholder theory as distinctive when considered 
from three concise categories applicable to different ways of perceiving, or interacting with, 
the company (Fig 2.4). These categories1 are: descriptive, instrumental and normative – 
with the latter particularly focused on by the researchers. 
      Of themselves however, these categories cannot be fully justified – the literature is 
wide-ranging and problematic; descriptively, managers may be observed acting more 
ethically than supposed or by contrast, legal constraints regulate. Similarly, there is a low 
level of theoretical integration between the normative, instrumental and descriptive 
(Lepineux, 2005). 
      Yet when integrated, the three categories are mutually supportive. It is thus 
comprehensive, variably adaptive, and going beyond ‘organizations have stakeholders’. 
Hence, for Donaldson and Preston (1995) ‘stakeholders are those that experience actual or 
potential harms or benefits… as a result of the firm’s actions or inactions’. 
      With this kind of coverage, what the model offered was a reoriented, philosophically 
based, normative view, where managers are to act as if all stakeholders’ interests had 
intrinsic value. From this standpoint, it therefore advances a stakeholder theory in such a 
way that it leads, not simply to a proposition for an improved organizational model, but  
 
                                                          
1Additionally for: descriptive (see also Brenner and Molander, 1977; Brenner and Cochran, 1991; Pelle-
Culpin. 1998; Jawahar and Mclaughin, 2001; Pesqueux and Damak-Ayadi); for instrumental (see also Preston 
and Sapienza, 1990; Preston et al, 1991; Jones, 1995). 
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Three Criteria Can be Applied 
Descriptive: to be able to describe and test empirically corporate characteristics or test against 
competing models  
 
Instrumental: what companies can achieve if they follow a stakeholder model – and linking practice 
within a stakeholder context to performance outcomes  
 
Normative: rationalizing a stakeholder model as an ethical imperative – the normative underpins the 
other aspects of descriptive and instrumental criteria, too, and rests on the notion that stakeholders 
have legitimate interests in the company – their ‘stake’. And these interests are to be recognized as 
having intrinsic value and ‘meriting consideration for their own sake’ rather than because they might 
further the interests of another constituency such as shareholders or managers. Moreover, the focus of 
stakeholder theory should be on the simultaneous attention towards a variety of important 
stakeholders. 
 
‘Stakeholder management requires, as its key attribute, simultaneous attention to the legitimate 
interests of all appropriate stakeholders, both in the establishment of organizational structures 
and general policies and in case-by-case decision making.’  
Donaldson and Preston, 1995, p67  
 
      Normative stakeholder theory also interprets the function of the company towards its objectives, 
through developing the ethical or philosophical guidelines that supports it, and which in turn leads to 
how the operation and management of companies is undertaken (see Donaldson and Preston, 1995, 
p71). In other words, how managers are going to function or behave through the (normative) 
standards they employ. 
 
Fig 2.4 
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also to a moral argument for managers to support all stakeholders, even if not necessarily all 
equally.  
      Moreover, Donaldson and Preston (1995) begin to relate their stakeholder model with its 
inherent pluralism to a modern theory of property rights – a bundle of many rights 
comparable to land rights - where no single theory of property rights can account for all 
eventualities with respect to the entitlement of these rights (see also Grossman and Hart, 
1986 on residual rights). From this broader contractual perspective, the normative principles 
underlying property rights, they suggest, are similarly applicable to a wide-ranging set of 
stakeholders having multiple interests. 
      Consistent with such a pluralist view of the company, Charreaux and Desbrieres (2001) 
sought to relate the primacy of stakeholder value to the creation of corporate value in a more 
concrete, measurable fashion. Consequently, in attempting to understand the range this 
pluralism needs to cover in a market context, the researchers attempted to define for whom a 
company should be run. Certainly, they took the concept beyond a narrower shareholder 
point of view – even downplaying the importance of external equity financing for 
shareholder value creation – and instead tried to apply the idea of stakeholder value creation 
as inputs from a wider field. In their pluralist European perspective, value creation came in 
large part from competitive advantage when interacting with markets for goods and 
services. Indeed, from internal training, and not from financial metrics or accounting 
measures.  
      Furthermore, rather than the employment of some readily available market-based metric, 
which they saw as coming with dangers, Charreaux and Desbrieres (2001) proposed a 
measure of created value based on the difference between respective perceptions of 
opportunity prices and costs by all stakeholders. It is an approach seeing alliances and 
partnerships, beyond shareholder interests, as underlying value creation; and based on a 
50 
 
measure of perceived rent increase (a difference between opportunity prices and costs)1 
rather than traditional return on capital, and so better reflecting the entirety of stakeholder 
value. 
      Though much remained indeterminate in their conception concerning how to achieve a 
calculation from multiple stakeholders when some may be unknown – or even if known 
their exact contribution may be unknown or, in fact, there are information asymmetries – it 
was nonetheless a similar conception to other stakeholder theorists (eg Freeman, 1984). 
Running efficient firms is by meeting the needs of all stakeholders, not just one group.  
      With particular relevance to crises, they similarly note that a lessening of strategic 
management, where there is reduced R&D investment leads to downsizing and less value 
creation. Yet, Charreaux and Desbrieres (2001) also recognized that managers often seek to 
safeguard their own interests. But notwithstanding that, they have a central – not single – 
role in value creation in a pluralist stakeholder organization. Oddly, though, they take the 
view that if managers appropriate created value – wages, bonuses etc – they will have an 
incentive to become more stakeholder-aligned. This is very much in keeping with the 
arguments used for shareholder primacy advocates who draw on agency theory, where the 
belief is that a market mechanism will keep incentivized managers under control. As is now 
known – and as expanded on below - this turned out not to be the case. 
 
2.2.2: Legislative support in the UK for stakeholder primacy: Desiring legislative change 
to target a larger corporate constituency base, and increase board accountability, the UK had 
chiefly approached this through the implementation of the Companies Act, 2006. It is hard 
                                                          
1Rent, as used by Charreaux and Desbrieres (2001), seems to depart from standard definitions (where income 
earned from a factor of production is greater than the least amount necessary to bring that factor of production 
into use, and which is independent of opportunity costs – the best alternative choice) and instead is applied to 
rent received in a perceived sense. 
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law currently in force. And Section 172(1) mandates ‘a duty to promote the success of the 
company’ by having regard to employees, suppliers, the community, and so on (Fig 2.5).1 
      In developing the overall legal framework for CA2006, the Company Law Review 
Steering Group (CLRSG) helped form s172. In fact, The CLRSG in a more detailed form 
had expressed the coverage of the obligation on directors as being to ‘achieve the success of 
the company for the benefit of the shareholders by taking proper account of all the relevant 
considerations for that purpose… [hence] a proper balanced view of the short and long term; 
the need to sustain effective ongoing relationships with employees, customers, suppliers and 
                                                          
1It is notable that CA2006-s172 represents a similar broadened stakeholder outlook to that of the US legislative 
conception specified as the Business Judgement Rule. 
 
  Section 172:  Duty to promote the success of the company 
  (1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would 
       be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
       members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to - 
 (a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
 (b) the interests of the company’s employees, 
 (c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, 
      customers and others, 
 (d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
      environment, 
 (e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high 
      standards of business conduct, and 
 (f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
 
                                                                                                          Source: UK Companies Act 2006 
Fig 2.5 
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others…; [and to] consider the impact of its operations on the community and the 
environment’ (CLR, 2000, para 2.11).  
      With much of this additional detail going by the wayside in s172 of the Act there is 
evidently a limited amount of legal guidance for directors. Furthermore, whilst s172 and its 
foundation looked to enumerate the scope to a greater or lesser extent concerning what 
directors needed to be cognizant of under statute in relation to wider stakeholder interests, it 
is still primarily an approach giving primacy to shareholders, as they are often the dominant 
‘member’ group. 
      Indeed the test, under s172, of how directors choose between different interests is 
whatever will bring greater long-term shareholder value to the company. That is, in theory; 
in reality there may be a degree of uncertainty about how a director might achieve this, or in 
fact how they might be accountable if they cannot. The provisions of s172, moreover, leave 
directors with considerable discretion as long as they act ‘in good faith’ to interpret the way 
they might handle situations faced. Practically, Kiarie (2006) suggested, this could mean 
they need only ‘consider’ a stakeholder interest at a board meeting and leave it at that, 
having discharged their duty. Conversely, it could mean they must do something more 
concrete to meet their obligation. Yet overall, as Keay (2010) contended, s172 is unlikely to 
have made much difference as far as the problematic corporate governance and stakeholder 
issues evident in the period leading up to the credit crunch and ensuing financial meltdown. 
      Nevertheless, during those pre-crisis years s172, arguably, helped begin a process of 
motivating directors to think more about their stakeholders as value-generating assets. In 
later years, from 2014, the Corporate Governance Code would further support this.1 
                                                          
1Soft law in the form of the Corporate Governance Code, as noted above (Section 2.1.2), has in recent years 
stressed shareholder primacy. However, since 2014, following the period the current study examines, in 
reference to board composition it stated: ‘Diversity is as much about differences of approach and experience, 
and it is very important in ensuring effective engagement with key stakeholders and in order to deliver the 
business strategy.’ (Corporate Governance Code, 2014, p2). It is only in the latest edition, however, that 
multiple references are made, including: ‘To succeed in the long-term, directors and the companies they lead 
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2.3 The push towards an ‘enlightened’ view of value creation  
The present research is not about determining which of the approaches, shareholder or 
stakeholder primacy, is better. It is instead about observing the reality of what was in place 
in relation to the 2008 Crash – and indeed how termism, in the form of forcing a short or 
long-term market view, as Chapter 3 expands on, might have impacted the relative 
perception of each.  
      Consequently, the following is not a detailed critique of the approaches, but rather an 
overview of developing perceptions about primacy during the immediate period leading up 
to the economic crisis. Underscoring why changes were contemplated it is therefore useful 
to look at several factors that provided an impetus for change; and that include criticisms 
directed at both shareholder and stakeholder approaches. And at the same time as a 
shareholder maximization approach – with concurrent managerial excesses or financializing 
effects – was still very much in evidence pre-Crash, there were attempts made to integrate 
what was essentially useful from both models. This was particularly the case as regards to 
taking a pluralistic viewpoint to include societal actors, an aspect promoted, for example, 
through academic and regulatory means. Changed perceptions, generating pressures for a 
specific economic scenario regarding value creation, likely therefore resulted both before 
and after the Crash. In practice, this means that an enlightened view with respect to primacy 
and termism orientations offers an alternate possibility for an outcome different from the 
evidence presented and hence the main hypotheses (H1a – H1b) looked at in this research. 
 
2.3.1 Questioning shareholder primacy: There are three main criticisms of shareholder 
primacy. 
                                                          
need to build and maintain successful relationships with a wide range of stakeholders; …a result of financial 
crises and high-profile examples of inadequate governance and misconduct… have led to poor outcomes for a 
wide range of stakeholders’ (Corporate Governance Code, 2018, p1). 
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      Firstly, it encourages a short-term perspective by companies towards ever-increasing 
shareholder value maximization (Keay, 2013), and with, as Andersson et al (2008) 
highlighted, resulting damage to corporate strategizing. It is an effect fuelled by overuse of 
managerial incentives it is believed1. A shareholder value maximization model also appears 
to have provided a context for abuses in the years prior to the 2008 Crash. In some cases, 
this would lead to embroidering corporate narrative against actual accounting numbers 
(Gleadle and Haslam, 2010). At the more excessive level, it would drive greed amongst a 
few executives (see Fig 2.6). Yet an associated effect was how over the crisis period and 
beyond even good executives were increasingly perceived in an undermining fashion. For 
researchers like Froud et al (2006), it was all part of a growing financialization of the 
corporate sector. 
      Secondly, shareholder primacy can work against developing relationships of trust with 
stakeholders. This is something that in turn discourages them from making investments (not 
just financial investments but also time, labour, contribution of amenities, provision of 
expansion opportunities, and so on) over the longer-term and with an associated loss of 
benefits for the company (see Kiarie, 2006).       
      The third criticism of shareholder primacy was that a wider perspective on how 
companies create monetary value needed taking. In reality, the persisting recognition of this 
had been in the background to much of the shareholder versus stakeholder primacy debate. 
Indeed, it was not only resonant with respect to primary or internal corporate stakeholders 
(see eg Freeman, 1984) but on a broader social basis with respect to a responsibility 
companies had to the wider community (eg Preston, 1978; Carroll, 1979; 
                                                          
1See, for example, Hall and Liebman, 1998; Conyon, 2014; Mauboussin and Callahan, 2015. And Chapter 3 in 
relation to termism which enlarges on the topic. 
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Fig 2.6 
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Waddock and Graves, 1997). In that context, CSR was both vital to value creation and far 
more than a ‘bolt-on policy’ that boards might append to their activities to skirt issues of 
externality (Tudway and Pascal, 2006).  
      Yet CSR initiatives could positively impact financial performance in a manner separate 
from the promotion of shareholder value maximization. Evidence came, for example, from 
Hillman and Keim (2001), looking at components of corporate social performance. 
Stakeholder management, they found, led to improved shareholder value - although 
interestingly social issue participation did not. CSR could also generate shareholder value 
by creating goodwill (Godfrey et al, 2009). It signalled a value-adding process as 
stakeholders acted to revalue intangible assets where it had meaning for them; an effect with 
particular reference to the how the Crash was felt.  
      By contrast, the poor outcomes of pursuing an extreme shareholder value maximization 
approach was emphasized by Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2002) who highlighted how growth 
and competition during the 1960s and 1970s detrimentally affected corporate performance, 
and where cost-cutting measures became the basis of shareholder value. Several factors are 
responsible, in their view, for this narrowing of wider stakeholder interests including that: 
managers began to be shareholders too, deregulated markets, an alignment of managerial 
interests with external financial ones, a failure to invest in skills education, a movement of 
savings into pension funds and an over-reliance on stock markets for corporate success. But 
in the end, they conclude, stressing shareholder value may have short term benefits as a 
basis for current prosperity and competitive advantage but is not sustainable, nor is it the 
best method to build up an economy whether the US or elsewhere. Nor indeed has the 
thinking about this changed in the intervening years with respect to the ability of the model 
to be profitable. As Stout (2012) stressed, empirical studies demonstrate no compelling 
evidence that firms run with shareholder maximization-focused governance perform better.           
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      Despite such evidence, strategic choice when it came to favouring either the 
maximization of shareholder value or other constituencies could be highly complex for 
companies in reality (Kay and Silberston, 1995). Indeed, adding complexity was the legal 
view, in contrast to the regulatory position, that shareholders could not be owners of a 
company as they did not own full control rights (Honore, 1961; Stout, 2002; Kay, 2015).1  
      Yet before the Crash, some researchers saw the shareholder primacy model as a viable 
approach provided concerns were addressable.2 The necessity of ensuring managers did not 
make strategic decisions to favour shareholders simply because it was in their personal 
interests to do so, was one of these concern. As Bainbridge (2003) observed, there is 
‘director primacy’, where directors promote their own interests in lieu of being accountable 
to shareholders as owners. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) took an agency perspective on the 
matter (where there is separation of ownership and control), and where better shareholder 
returns and managerial accountability could be achieved through creating an obligation3. 
This could be via incentive contracts, improved financing mechanisms, debt contracts, and 
so forth.  
                                                          
1Additionally, with a wide distribution of share ownership any legal rights of ownership, or primacy of 
shareholders, are questionable (Stout, 2002; Mukriwi, 2013). These challenges to ownership by shareholders 
represent a position at odds with the extent managers are duty-bound by legislation to look after shareholder 
interests; supported by s172 of the Companies Act, and the shareholder primacy norm. And though a detailed 
analysis of the ownership v control debate is beyond the scope of this review, this is a clash, it may be noted, 
underlying how misperceptions of the legal view have entered the shareholder primacy debate. 
2Crouch (2014), for example, comments on the usefulness of a shareholder primacy model. 
3Such an approach could also serve to increase managerial self-interest when incentives become the focus, 
alone, of managerial actions. Hence, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) offer that investors must avoid adverse 
selection and moral hazard, by retaining the ability to select competent managers, and then making them 
accountable for their discretionary decisions or control rights they employ over investor funds. Adverse 
selection and moral hazard describe scenarios where one party is at a disadvantage. Often it is due to 
information asymmetry – ie one party is not privy to all the necessary facts. Eg, where the hiring of a manager 
has taken place in good faith but their interests do not in fact coincide with those of the company; they are only 
for themselves. Moral hazard can also be about information asymmetry but relates to behaviour after the fact. 
Hence, once in their role the less a manager perceives they will be constrained the more they will behave with 
self-interest, or even just the less the perceived risk the greater the chance-taking. 
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      That said, and assuming shareholders are in fact owners, they may be highly distributed 
smallholders or indeed highly concentrated institutional blockholders. Hence, pursuing their 
appropriate obligation can often be confusing for managers (Lorsch and Maciver, 1989).  
     Not surprisingly then, accountability can only function if the relationship between 
managers and shareholders is understood regarding who is responsible to whom. But with 
its complexities, the primary goal of shareholder value creation can be ‘a little vague’ and 
where, ‘managers tend to maximize corporate wealth under their control, rather than 
shareholder wealth (Ross et al. 2002). In other words, managers default to what seems their 
most applicable course. As they go on to say: 
 
‘The available evidence and theory are consistent with the ideas of shareholder 
control and shareholder value-maximization. However, there can be no doubt that at 
times corporations pursue managerial goals at the expense of shareholders. There is 
also evidence that the diverse claims of customers, vendors, and employees must 
frequently be considered in the goals of the corporation’.  
 
Ross et al. 2002, (pp.16-17)  
 
 
      Personal agendas of senior executives notwithstanding, it is evident then that the duty to 
promote the interests of the company, as laid out in the Companies Act 2006, can at times 
override accountability to shareholders. 
 
2.3.2: Problems with stakeholder theory: One of the main criticisms against a stakeholder 
theory1 of the firm is that it is easy to get in to a position where all constituencies are viewed 
                                                          
1Lepineux (2005) addresses challenges faced by stakeholder theory by providing a useful list of problems still 
needing to be overcome at the juncture prior to the 2008 Crash. For example, a definition of stakeholder 
theory’s object of focus remains debateable; the stakeholder spectrum and the classification of constituencies 
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as having intrinsic value and that no particular interest should dominate. It highlights the 
often unworkable nature of pluralism (Clarkson, 1995). There is also an academic view 
against companies pursuing stakeholder value altogether on the basis that it permits 
stakeholders to freeride on shareholder investments and effort and that it constitutes a 
redistribution of wealth that should be a function left to the State (see Pettet, 2005). Even 
taking a less vehement position the term stakeholder from a pluralistic perspective can apply 
to sub-groups as well as the main groups themselves (Jones, 1995), adding a layer of 
confusion for managers and directors to try to work out. In fact, as Mainardes et al (2011) 
highlight, the boundaries for what constitutes a stakeholder group actually remain quite 
imprecise.  
      Moreover, without any clear justification for applying appropriate bias, for attending to 
one group more than another, this presents practical issues. For example, in whose interests 
should a company be run (Mansell, 2013), and to exactly whom are managers accountable? 
While if managers try to determine this, by what criteria should they choose who these 
important stakeholders actually are – without a single market metric, as shareholder value 
has, it presents a tough dilemma? And by contrast, who is deemed unimportant? Likewise, 
who should be charged with this choosing: the board, the CEO, or indeed other stakeholders 
(Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004)? And without any justified bias as Clarkson (1995) pointed 
out there is often a tendency towards normative justifications like ‘the purpose of the 
corporation is to create and distribute wealth and value to all its primary stakeholder 
groups without favouring one group at the expense of others’. Such an approach perhaps 
owes more to lip-service than to anything else. 
      And in trying to satisfy everyone managers end up satisfying no one. It is a recipe for 
losing sight of what the company is about, where having ‘multiple objectives is no 
                                                          
along this scale is variable. See also Key (1999) who sees the multivariate elements of the broad stakeholder 
system in which a company operates as left undefined and unexplained, and therefore incomplete as a model. 
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objective’ (Jensen, 2002). Undoubtedly then, in pursuing the corporate objective from a 
stakeholder perspective it helps to know who should be favoured. Yet, many definitions 
have been formulated regarding who a stakeholder is (see also Miles, 2012). Indeed, there is 
a degree of convergence toward the idea that stakeholders affect and are affected by 
corporate activity, much in line with Freeman’s (1984) definition. The difficulty, however, 
is the breadth and vagueness this and other definitions imply, of which there are hundreds.1 
This is not to suggest that companies take guidance from all these definitions. But if they do 
not know how they should characterise their stakeholders, value becomes a much more 
amorphous concept for companies to delineate and measure across the various diverse and 
often competing interests. Indeed, the incorporation of more subtle environmental variables 
like time to make the theory dynamic, for example, is a mediating aspect that to date has 
found very little emphasis (Key, 1999). It is, however, an aspect the present research 
addresses. But, once again, a true pluralism, let alone a corporate objective, is hard to attain.   
      Stakeholder theory, then, by having multiple objectives or by serving the vested interests 
of those constituencies who promote those interests, means that it cannot provide an 
implementable model, as Jensen (2002) pointed out. As such, the model is incomplete, 
having no clear, principled foundation, and where the stress is in fact on corporate 
behaviour that is value seeking rather than value maximizing. But similarly, Jensen (2002) 
recognizes that behaviour that is value maximizing alone says nothing about how to 
establish initiatives or ventures that create value. The theory, therefore, requires clarification 
concerning how individuals create such value towards the corporate objective: is it, for 
example, through one or more routes including, production, CSR, or something else? Hence, 
for a stakeholder model to be effective requires developing a perception concerning what is 
                                                          
1Ibid p.41:2 
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most valuable in achieving the company’s objective and then contextualizing it; which is to 
say, management somehow implementing the model to that agreed end. 
 
2.3.3 Developing an integrated primacy ideal: Both shareholder and stakeholder models 
have shortcomings yet elements within each of them remain appealing. Fundamentally, the 
development of relationships to foster stakeholder involvement recognizes that these 
constituencies represent key inputs to value generation, and that they are integral if 
competitive advantage is achievable. While bearing in mind the often insoluble problem 
presented by stakeholder theory in relation to attempting to balance the interests of multiple 
constituencies, in addition to assessing how well these interests are feeding in to the 
corporate objective (see also Section 2.1.1), the pursuit of profit maximization has uses in 
specifying a single metric for measuring performance. 
      In seeking an integrated primacy ideal, a suggestion is that, by default, convergence of 
stakeholder and shareholder theories would come about. For example, by managers 
pursuing profit maximization, which will serve long-term stakeholder interests (see eg 
Jensen, 2002; Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004); or equally that if managers look after their 
stakeholders this will maximize profits and shareholder returns in the long-term. As support 
for integration, it all sounds meaningful. In practice, however, the theories can produce 
different normative obligations on the part of managers. For example (and based on Smith, 
2003), closing a factory in a community with the associated loss of jobs and with no attempt 
at retraining those made redundant would safeguard shareholders’ interests but in no way 
support the employees or the community where the factory is sited (these both being 
important stakeholders). Yet stakeholder theory would see an obligation to these groups. 
There would be an expectation on the company to do something even if affecting its profits;  
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Fig 2.7 
 
 
 
Berle and Means (1932). A need to protect the 
interests of shareholders from self-interested 
executives - a potential solution to managerial 
control - by attributing ownership to shareholders. 
 
Dodd (1932). Managers as trustees on behalf of 
wider stakeholder interests – including for that of, 
the larger and more encompassing, society’s 
interests. Also proposed is the idea that if 
shareholders are distinct from the company, and the 
company considered as a separate entity or 
corporate personality, it must have citizenship duties. 
 
Manne (1965). Shareholder primacy reconceived as a 
managerial disciplining mechanism; shareholders 
now appreciate they have control rights to alter the 
fate of the company they’ve invested in.  
 
Friedman (1970). Reinforces the concept of 
managers having a single responsibility, that of 
increasing shareholder value. His article is credited 
with spurring a significant increase in bias to extreme 
shareholder primacy. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). Agency Theory 
proposed to overcome the self-interested tendencies 
that managers (principals) may display, and thus 
work on their behalf (as agents) for their 
advancement (see also: Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). The basic idea is that with a 
separation of ownership and control managerial 
accountability should be central. 
 
Preston and Post (1975). A call for greater corporate 
social responsibility (see also Frederick, 1978; 
Preston, 1978; Carroll, 1979). 
 
Evan and Freeman (1983). Stakeholder theory’s main 
precept highlighted: that the purpose of the company 
is to manage the interests of different stakeholders, 
including changes in expectations and demands  
 
Freeman (1984). Demonstrates a link between 
stakeholder involvement and strategic management. 
Central, is the notion of relationships that must be 
fostered for corporate success and value creation. 
Stakeholders are also to be defined positionally 
within companies in terms of their distinctive 
attributes. 
 
 
 
Rappaport (1981, 1986). Shareholder primacy 
through an objective perspective, not simply a 
conceptual viewpoint, on how to create value 
through effecting strategic corporate change. 
 
Freeman, Gilbert and Hartman’s (1988). Stakeholder 
model understood as an internal corporate 
clarification process, and going beyond what a 
rational-strategic model conceives 
 
Donaldson and Preston (1995). Categories applicable 
to different ways of perceiving, or interacting with, 
the company: descriptive, instrumental and 
normative. 
 
Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997). The salience of the 
stakeholder to managers is important to taking 
account of their interests – salience is based on: 
power, legitimacy and urgency. 
 
Koslowski (2000). The idea that a company can have 
multiple objectives – only one of which need be 
financial. 
 
Charreaux and Desbrieres (2001). Pluralist view of 
the company reinforced. The researchers also 
attempt to implement a measure for stakeholder 
value. 
 
Jensen (2002). Enlightened value maximization (EVM) 
proposed. The aim is to maximize a firm’s long-term 
market value – as opposed to short-term financial 
performance. It is an integrative approach that 
reconceives the role of stakeholders depending on 
their relative importance to market value. 
 
Auster and Freeman (2012). The notion of corporate 
authenticity where there is alignment of managerial 
and stakeholder interests – embodied in the ‘poetic 
organization’. 
 
Keay (2013). Enlightened shareholder value (ESV) as 
an integrative ‘principle’ is proposed to take a 
balanced view of the short and long-term for 
competitive advantage. It is regulatory driven based 
on the Companies Act 2006, which places an 
obligation on directors to promote the success of the 
company, taking account of ‘the interests of 
members as a whole’.  
 
 
 
Key Developments in the Thinking about Primacy  
1 
1While the authors were addressing the possibility of self-interested managers abusing absentee owners, they also argued - 
in relation to what is now termed shareholder primacy - that the needs of community were rather of paramount concern to 
large corporations (see Berle and Means, 1932, p354). There is a potential argument here that this was an idea ahead of its 
time. 
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an expectation to meet the obligation even at the expense of its own existence. ‘Stakeholder 
theory would not support a “cut and run” approach’ (Smith, 2003). Shareholder and 
stakeholder models are, therefore, very different conceptualizations and hence can produce 
very different potential outcomes. 
      Consequently, the integrated ideal is of a different form; and perhaps following in the 
tradition of a varied set of key developments in thinking concerning primacy (see Fig 2.7). 
Two similar1 models are in fact advanced, that together utilize stakeholder and shareholder 
concepts, though coming from slightly different angles. The first is that of ‘enlightened 
value maximization’ (and its associated ‘enlightened stakeholder theory’), which places the 
corporate objective at centre stage, and the second is that of ‘enlightened shareholder 
value’, which is more regulatory driven and focussed on improving board and director 
behaviour. 
 
2.3.4 Enlightened value maximization: Companies must have a single objective (and one 
that is measurable by a single monetary market metric2) and they should be value seeking as 
well as value maximising.3 These are the key points of Jensen’s (2002), approach. And it is 
in countering the seeming irreconcilability of these requirements that the concepts of 
‘enlightened stakeholder theory’ (EST) and ‘enlightened value maximization’ (EVM) are 
offered.  
                                                          
1In this context, the similarity of names can be confusing. Enlightened value maximization, enlightened 
stakeholder theory and enlightened shareholder value present similar nomenclatures. Whilst Keay (2013) 
states that shareholder value may be referred to as shareholder primacy or shareholder wealth maximisation. 
Bainbridge (2003) argues, however, that shareholder primacy differs from shareholder wealth maximisation. 
2Total market value is the ‘sum of the market values of the equity, debt, and any other contingent claims 
outstanding on the firm’. 
3Value maximizing and value seeking taken individually say nothing about how managers should go about 
creating a vision or strategy – or the initiatives or projects that create value, or for that matter, how employees 
can be motivated to contribute to this process. Indeed, how to stop managers from maximizing the company’s 
share price exploitatively, to the exclusion of any value seeking behavior, so as to increase the value of their 
own stock options. This is an outcome that Jensen’s earlier work (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) on agency 
theory, failed to foretell could happen. And it was managerial and executive behaviour particularly prevalent 
during bull markets of the late 1990s and early 2000s (see Cassidy, 2002). 
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      EST seeks to address the objective function, integratively, recognising the contribution 
of a wide variety of stakeholders in companies achieving success; and where the company’s 
objective should be the actual focus of these stakeholders – eg building a plane. As a single 
objective, each division in a company then contributes their part to this one goal.  
      At the same time, the aim is to maximize a firm’s long-term market value – as opposed 
to short-term financial performance – which is where EVM comes in. And unlike 
stakeholder theory, per se, based on the interests of different constituencies, value 
maximization is rather attainable over time through a carful delineation of the objective 
companies truly want to strive for – ie the focus is the corporate objective as opposed to the 
focus being the satisfaction of multiple stakeholders themselves. What EVM therefore tells 
companies is how to measure success in what they do. Indeed, when they are doing ‘better’ 
that goes beyond reference to multiple personal or vested interests and values. 
      But it is in the integration1 of EST with EVM that a more successful outcome is 
achievable, as it re-centres what managers need to do to generate real value within their 
companies – and how to hold them accountable either through their market performance or 
in comparison to other companies in their sector (Vinten, 2001; Kiarie, 2006). Hence, in 
furthering the objective function managers might specifically consolidate stakeholder skills 
(value seeking) and, all things being equal, thereby maximizing a company’s long-term 
market value (value maximizing) – as opposed to short-term financial gains. In doing this 
the role of stakeholder is reconceived (eg employees, CSR or community) to the corporate 
objective depending on their relative importance to market value, as an eventual measure2 of 
success. And it is not about balancing constituency interests (CSR-based or otherwise). 
                                                          
1Other researchers, it is worth noting, have attempted to integrate towards a single monetary objective function 
by using, for example, corporate mapping to bring disparate perceived value elements together, eg linking 
strategy to value (Lukac and Frazier, 2012), stakeholder value to shareholder value with an emphasis on CSR 
(Moir, 2007), and the importance of having a monetary goal as an encompassing metric in the form of 
shareholder value creation (Mauboussin, 2011) 
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There is similarly a consideration of what the optimal corporate behaviour is that will 
extract the most from society’s limited resources (including varied constituencies), and how 
to then use these to best effect to achieve the corporate objective and, crucially, create value 
over the longer-term. 
      Through this approach, there is an important shift in the notion of value maximization 
alone to appreciating how carefully thought out corporate strategy and stakeholder 
motivation underpins it. This is the essence of value-seeking behaviour. And in making this 
shift, Jensen moved the discussion from a simplistic financial and market-led understanding 
of how value creation occurs in companies into the realm of organizational theory (Braydon 
2006). 
    
 2.3.5 Enlightened shareholder value: Similar to the notion of ‘enlightened value 
maximization’ (Jensen, 2002) is the concept of ‘enlightened shareholder value’ (ESV). It is 
a notion deriving from statute embodied in s172 of the UK Companies Act 2006, legislation 
that aims to support the creation of a ‘long-term’ corporate governance culture (see Keay, 
2013).  
      In that context, Williams (2012) observed how following the 2008-2009 financial crisis 
the desire of policy-makers to foster a long-term perspective in how business decisions were 
made gave rise to renewed interest in the enlightened shareholder value provisions of s172. 
There is a particular focus on the obligation of directors to take into account a range of 
interests, as s172d signifies, in discharging their ‘duty to promote the success of the 
company’ (see also Section 2.2.2). From an enlightened shareholder value perspective, it 
meant not only employees but also broader constituencies with respect to CSR and the 
environment had a vital role to play. The production of profits, it was increasingly also 
stressed, could not be at the expense of these constituencies, even if some companies did not 
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fully recognize the role they had, or even if in the short-term their exploitation was more 
profitable (see McLaren, 2004). Directors and senior executives were therefore to act for the 
company to the best of their ability ‘in good faith... for the benefit of members as a whole’.  
      ‘The ESV principle’, as it has become known (see Keay, 2013), in fact took its cue from 
the work carried out to reform the business landscape by the Company Law Review 
Steering Group (CLRSG) in developing the legal framework for the Companies Act 2006, 
and that aimed to be more encompassing of constituency interests. Yet as Keay (2013) 
pointed out: ‘what the CLRSG was concerned about was the fact that directors were 
managing their companies in order to achieve maximisation of shareholder wealth in a 
short-termist manner and that directors in fact have, in appropriate cases, an obligation “to 
have regard to the need to build long-term and trusting relationships with employees, 
suppliers, customers and others in order to secure the success of the enterprise over time” 
(CLR, 1999)’. If there was to be long-term corporate value creation, these types of 
stakeholder factors – along with their mediation, and their occasional negation, by short-
term perceptions – had to be taken in to account. This was the view of the steering group. 
Indeed, it is thinking that reflects the many concerns companies appeared to push aside 
when pursuing shareholder maximization, such as favouring of short-term financial 
indicators rather than facilitating long-term R&D strategies, and for which a solution was 
necessary (see Salacuse, 2004). 
      To that end, the CLRSG felt overall that the advantages of utilizing a shareholder 
primacy approach, and hence an orientation favouring value maximization, outweighed that 
of a pluralist, stakeholder primacy one. Indeed, as previously discussed in relation to s172, 
(Section 2.2.2), how directors choose between different interests is based on the precedence 
of what will bring greater long-term shareholder value to the company, and less about the 
balance of stakeholders’ interests.  
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Enlightened Shareholder Value: What it Means Practically 
 
Enlightened shareholder value (ESV) sets an obligation on directors based on s172 of 
the Companies Act to achieve the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
as a whole, and in doing so to have regard for wider stakeholder and long-term 
interests. Practically, this is interpreted to mean: 
 
▪ To satisfy stakeholder interests, there must be generation of shareholder value.  
▪ Profit maximization remains the corporate objective as with shareholder primacy 
but directors must consider the interests of stakeholders and the implications of 
their executive decisions, inasmuch as it impacts shareholder value in the longer-
term. ESV sees shareholder interests as prevailing; stakeholder theory (as with 
pluralism generally) attributes no automatic priority to any constituency, and where 
a director’s role is to balance competing interests for the benefit of all stakeholders, 
including shareholders. 
▪ There is ‘the need to sustain effective ongoing relationships with employees, 
customers, suppliers and others’ as well as to ‘consider the impact of its operations 
on the community and the environment’. 
▪ ESV is a preferred approach - taking its cue from the existing company law 
framework - in which directors can carry out their responsibilities with greater 
potential ease, as corporate law requires no changes. 
▪ ESV requires a change in orientation from a short-term to a long-term shareholder 
value creation perspective. However, it also emphasizes a need for companies to 
take an appropriate balanced view between short and long-term strategic 
requirements. 
   
 
Sources: Modern Company Law, Strategic Framework, 1999; Kiarie, 2006; Keay, 2013 
 
 
Fig 2.8 
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      Furthermore, and based on the statutory regulation, there were two additional outcomes 
that in Keay’s (2013) view the ESV principle addressed.  
      Firstly, there was director behaviour. ESV sought to limit the abuses of power against 
any particular constituency (or highlight the need of directors to be aware of their unfair 
behaviour that they had failed to take account of). And, similarly, poor quality attitudes they 
might be inclined to employ in their governance methods if left to their own devices. These 
latter behaviours required removal before they had a chance to become established.  
      Secondly, was that ESV may be used as an educational tool. In practice this meant that 
companies, in promoting the success of the company, should strive to better understand the 
processes and procedures, interrelating with stakeholders, they had in place and what 
needed to be developed to reach, both in the short and long-term, their main objective – 
whether it was building a plane, delivering a leisure industry service, or anything else. 
Moreover, also addressable from this educational perspective were the reservations of those 
against the notion of value maximization as a goal. Writers, such as Michael Mauboussin 
(2011), for example, stressed the fact that many people simply misconceived what 
maximising shareholder value was actually about. 
 
‘It is now in vogue to dismiss the idea that creating shareholder value should be a 
CEO’s guiding objective. Concepts like “societal value,” “shared value,” and 
“customer capitalism” are offered as desirable and more enlightened substitutes. 
This is muddled thinking. CEOs who understand the principles of shareholder value 
and execute effectively will satisfy most, if not all, of the objectives of those who 
call for a new way of thinking. The problem is that the true definition of creating 
shareholder value seems to have gotten lost…  
      Critics imply that managing for shareholder value is all about maximizing the 
short-term stock price. Companies that manage for shareholder value, the thinking 
goes, do whatever it takes to engineer an ever-higher market price. That is a 
profound misunderstanding. The premise of shareholder value, properly understood, 
69 
 
is that if a company builds value, the stock price will eventually follow. The 
objective is to build value and then let the price reflect that value…  
      A CEO’s job is about resource allocation with a goal of earning a return in 
excess of the opportunity cost of capital. This requires difficult trade-offs.’ 
 
 
               Mauboussin, HBR, 2011 
 
      Undeniably, there is a degree of discretion for directors, as well as uncertainty they 
might experience about particular courses of action that results from the way s172 of the Act 
is constructed; though many senior executives may want to take the right course of action 
anyway but feel constrained (see Deakin, 2010). Hence, encapsulated as the ESV principle 
was the notion of enabling the development of trust and relationships with important 
stakeholder constituencies, while getting directors away from overly focusing on the 
financial markets. And crucially – particularly for this present research in determining 
termist perceptions in relation to the 2008 Crash – the impact on how directors managed 
their businesses over longer-term horizons. 
   
2.4 Towards a broader understanding of shareholders and stakeholders 
What much of the research demonstrates is the sheer complexity, as well as noise, of the 
shareholder versus stakeholder debate.  
      For one thing, there is the ongoing argument about whether shareholders are truly 
owners of a company (see Key, 1999; Stout, 2012). Conceived as part owners, shareholders 
may generally be understood to have the upper hand over other stakeholders, and 
particularly so during the pre-Crash period.  
      There is also the often-believed contractual obligation to maximize shareholder wealth 
(see Stout, 2002; Mukwiri, 2013). Yet, that argument notwithstanding, whom to favour for 
best creating value remains an issue for companies if they are to achieve success – though 
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having felt the effects of largescale financial crisis, to suggest that in the post-Crash 
economy following 2008 firms might have learnt from their mistakes is not untoward.  
      Nevertheless, in addition to any evident managerial indecisiveness about which 
constituency in actuality should be favoured, abysmal executive behaviour clouds the debate 
even further, with the worst examples hitting the news, as Fig 2.6 highlights. It would seem, 
as well, that in a hugely pressuring financial environment that existed during the 1980s1, 
managerial excess was in many cases incentivized. And incentivizing in one form or another 
continued into other areas of managerial performance, reinforcing a slowly advancing 
perceptual bias with respect to the relative merits of shareholders over other stakeholders. 
Managers could only be shareholder focused and self-serving by that account. It was this 
kind of aberrant corporate thinking that was to lead, according to Stout (2013, p1176), 
‘directly in the 1990s and 2000s to skyrocketing executive pay, increased earnings 
inequality, and more than a few spectacular accounting frauds’.  
      But if a financialized characterization of companies, particularly based on managerial 
excess, has any validity to it, then an overwhelming pre-Crash shareholder primacy would 
have been in place in those organizations. Conversely, would the Crash have caused such an 
orientation to cease? Or indeed, could such a shareholder primacy orientation have been at 
all sustainable over the longer-term?2 With multiple forces operating, however, there is a 
great deal of noise, which serves to increase the difficulties of determining the reality of 
primacy perceptions for the period the study examines. 
      The field is clearly difficult to fathom; while the excesses of a variety of executives did 
not help in advancing an objective understanding of the sides of the primacy debate and how 
each is implicated in value generation – nor for that matter did the financial crisis overall. 
                                                          
1See, for example, Twentieth Century Fund, 1992; Blair, 2003; and Stein, 1989, on takeover pressures. 
2The latest high executive pay ratios (CIPD, 2017), suggest at least some residue nowadays of a shareholder 
primacy orientation 
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And as the extensive research shows, there are good reasons for a utilization of both aspects. 
Indeed, there is little in the way of barriers from the UK’s regulatory framework, which 
seems to tip towards the supremacy of shareholders; albeit it now takes more of an 
‘enlightened’ standpoint concerning ‘members as a whole’ in s172 of the Companies Act. 
      Certainly, shareholders are vital for the development of business and the creation of 
value. But companies may also find it beneficial to utilize the value-enhancing inputs from 
their other important constituencies, such as employees and customers. This is not about 
CSR or corporate philanthropy just good business sense. Though how to accomplish that is 
not always easy for companies to determine due to all the business, social, market, and 
psychological factors involved. It is also a model of corporate success that, as Chapter 3 
focuses on. has to take account of the way time horizon is considered. 
      Nonetheless, the extent to which companies were able to take account of broader 
constituency interests prior to the Crash and after may have drawn on an enlightened view, 
which possibly had gained ground in executives’ outlook. From that standpoint, whether 
there was of a level of shareholder primacy perspective maintaining a status quo in some 
fashion over the period of the financial crisis is unclear. But it is feasible that companies 
began to give more consideration to employing the best of both concepts post-Crash, and 
indeed perhaps culminating in them beginning to look more towards their wider stakeholder 
base to generate real long-term value. 
      The weight of facts as well as the general pre-analytic belief appears, from that 
perspective, to suggest it is likely a shareholder primacy outlook dominated prior to the 
financial crisis, and that this subsided to favour more stakeholder constituencies afterwards. 
But whether this was the reality or not is the focus of the investigation.  
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3. About Time! The Influence of Temporal Thinking on 
Managerial Behaviour 
 
 
 
  
 
 
It is an attractive proposition to view many of the most recent corporate governance 
problems and crises, and how they play out in the financial markets, through the lens of 
short-termism versus long-termism. After all, following a path of short-termism has to be 
the culprit for the terrible worldwide financial disasters a variety of companies triggered, 
surely? Sheila Blair, former Chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, was in 
little doubt concerning how such wrong-headedness was a cause of the 2008 Crash and the 
subsequent global economic meltdown, stating that, ‘in my opinion, the overarching lesson 
of the [financial] crisis is the pervasive short-term thinking that helped to bring it about. 
Short-termism is a serious and growing problem in both business and government’ (Blaire, 
2011)1.   
                                                          
1It is important to note that these comments were made with particular reference to the US banking industry. 
The pressures to behave in a certain way – and any concomitant ‘too big to fail’ attitude that served to bail 
them out -  are not the same as for the corporate world in the view of the present study, which as a 
consequence does not include financial companies in the research. It should be further noted that this 
association of financial companies and non-financial companies when it comes to their behaviour is often 
misguidedly made. Remarks are by FDIC Chair Sheila C. Bair to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C. 
June 24, 2011. See https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spjun2411.html 
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      But are comments, such as Blaire’s, representative of the way short-termism (and by 
contrast long-termism as the antidote) operates in companies? Indeed, it may be all too easy 
to apportion blame for the 2008 Crash on short-sited managers kowtowing to excessive 
shareholder demands for quick market returns. And similarly, it may be too easy to blame 
over-incentivizing for increases in such behaviour. In offering a critique of the widely 
accepted opinions on short-termist thinking, Kaplan (2017, p1), sets out the given belief as 
being that:  
 
‘US companies as a group underinvest in capital expenditures as well as research 
and development. According to the argument, this benefits the companies in the 
short-term, but harms the companies in the long run where the short-term is usually 
defined as the current quarter or, perhaps, current year or two, while the long-term 
would be more than five years out.’ 
 
      The evidence suggests, however, a somewhat different reality. Indeed, a connection 
between any commercial short-termism and overall performance is much harder to 
demonstrate than first appears. A particular reason for this may be that the corporate 
perception of time as different horizons – and also differentially perceived by individual 
managers – is a vital, though often overlooked, ingredient in how companies will decide on 
a course of action (see Mauboussin and Callahan, 2015).  
      Besides the assumed effect on performance, there is, as Sheila Blaire’s comments 
suggest, the common belief that short-termism was completely pervasive leading into the 
Crash; where the extremes of termist decision-making were thought to have been most 
evident. Yet in reality, it transpires companies may have started to alter their mindset about 
short versus long-termism even as the pressures in the economy were mounting. As Chapter 
2 showed, an enlightened view had been developed, whether enlightened shareholder theory 
or enlightened value maximization. In that context, the addressing of termism was 
74 
 
paramount, not simply primacy, with a greater focus on long-term value creation (see Keay, 
2010). In addition to meeting a growing public disenchantment with corporate practices, an 
enlightened view more than likely also met a genuine desire amongst insightful business 
leaders to find a better way to address multiple stakeholder interests including those of 
shareholders. Certainly, this broad enlightened perspective was supported by the legislative 
structure in the UK, which drew on that theoretical background, expressing the concept as 
that, ‘the likely consequences of any decision in the long term’ must be taken into account 
by directors in developing a successful governance framework and corporate strategy (see 
s172 CA2006). Not only was this thinking therefore gaining prominence before the 2008 
Crash but there was also an assumption conveyed that a switch in the balance from a short-
term to a long-term outlook, was the solution that companies needed to employ to be 
successful.  
      Of course, the assumption that long-termism is good begs the question of why, if it is 
apparently so straightforward in this respect to pinpoint the source of Anglo-American 
corporate ills and solve them, the problem has not been tackled up until now? For one thing, 
the relative merits of a long-term corporate outlook versus a short-term one has considerable 
weight behind the necessity in the UK of pursuing virtually a complete movement towards 
the long-term view (see eg s172 CA2006; CLR, 2000, para 2.11). This stands in contrast to 
how the relative merits of shareholder versus stakeholder primacy have different, and 
discernible, schools of thought, as we saw in Chapter 2. With termism, however, the right 
option to pursue appears to be unequivocally established. From an unbiased academic 
perspective that is problematic. At the same time it overlooks any potential value in short-
termism, as opposed to myopic executive thinking, or the role each type of termism together 
might play in promoting corporate success – training and making efficiencies, for example, 
are activities that need to be done in the short-term for positive long-term outcomes.  
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      To see how this thinking unfolds, the relevant literature on temporality is considered – 
that is as it applies to companies by virtue of the behaviours of their senior executives and 
managers due to temporal factors. Of particular importance to the way these individuals 
think are two major themes examined: a) termism – that is the tendency to take a long-term 
or a short-term view; and b) a sense of urgency, that is the feeling that something must be 
done and one needs to act now, urgently, rather than at a less demanding later point, and 
hence, non-urgently. The two concepts of termism and sense of urgency are associated as 
we will see, but they are different and subtle distinctions can be determined. For example, a 
manager might be short-termist in approach, implementing a strategy for a limited duration, 
yet they may not have an accompanying sense of urgency to do so; it is simply expedient for 
them to act that way. At the same time the present research is mindful of how these factors 
relate to the scenario in place round the period of the financial crisis, and indeed whether 
one or another of these factors might have fed it.  
     By considering both these temporal factors this research addresses some of the lack of 
academic clarity in this area. This chapter, however, also looks at some of the latest findings 
on the subject then turns to several major factors believed to affect termism and the way 
observers have thought about it. Some of the reasons commonly held up as causes for short-
termism are thus considered.  Additionally reviewed in that context is relevant work on 
remuneration practices and executive tenure. Also examined are some of the perceived 
pressures to be short-termist, as well as the phenomenon of sorting behaviour, where a 
differential perception of time horizon may dictate market involvement. 
 
3.1 Understanding termism  
‘One reason the question of short-termism still hasn’t been settled’ wrote Martin (2015) ‘is 
that the answer is fundamentally unknowable. There is no control group; we cannot 
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compare the performance of America with short-termism to that of America devoid of short-
termism – or even prove beyond a doubt that short-termism exists in the first place.’ Though 
it might have been overstressed as a culprit, as we see below, it is a fair assumption that 
short-termism exists and is in operation. Indeed, the academic and business world has given 
it a great deal of attention. Yet it remains incredibly difficult to analyse. As Martin went on 
to explain, practically all the standard approaches (including, measuring R&D, executive 
tenure, and looking at corporate buybacks) have all produced ambiguous findings. 
      Nevertheless, the question of whether short-termism was becoming more prevalent was 
analysed in a recent study conducted by the McKinsey Global Institute (Barton et al, 2017). 
In their novel research they formulated a Corporate Horizon Index (CHI score) based on a 
number of financial metrics. Tracking 615 companies from 1999 to 2014 (Fig 3.1), it 
appears there has been a trend towards increased short-termism. Interestingly, as the 
investigators point out, there is ‘a slight reversion away from short-termism in the years 
immediately preceding the financial crisis. Increases in fixed asset investment and strong 
earnings growth during this period appear to be the main driver. However, short-termism 
resumed during the crisis and has largely continued to increase since.’ 
      Whether their explanation is correct or not we can see that the changes in short-termism 
are in a fairly narrow range. What this graph does show very nicely, however, is an 
aggregate of perceptions on short-termism. And discounting industry factors, such as 
competition and changes in market configuration as popularity alters amongst investors, the 
effect for the relative performance of corporate perceptions – ie based on short-termism – 
between companies is revealing. Hence, companies who scored higher on CHI than those 
who scored low had higher comparative differentials on: revenue (+47%), earnings (+36%), 
economic profit (+81%) (a measure representing a company’s profit after subtracting a 
charge representing the opportunity cost of the capital the firm has invested – ie it is 
77 
 
working capital, fixed assets, and goodwill), and market capitalization (+$7bn) at the end of 
the period in 2014. And by 2015, the study’s authors point out, companies with higher CHI 
scores had on average also created around 12,000 more jobs than the shorter-horizon 
companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
      Despite the apparent light thrown on the problem by Barton et al (2017) the problem, as 
already noted, is not so easy to unpick. For example, the fact that short-termism may 
increase does not mean there will necessarily be a concomitant change in long-termism. The 
two facets could be operating separately - an aspect the present study has sought to address 
in applying the technique of narrative staining. Summers’ (2017) critique, though, supports 
the point where he observed there needs to be more than financial performance measures, as 
used for the CHI, to fully understand the feeds to short-termism and indeed what is needed 
to generate long-termism. Balance aside, there must also be, for example, a focus on 
strategic measures. Hence, in contrast to this study, there are no qualitative (or causal) 
measures accounted for, rather it is about output measures alone. This is also an aspect that 
links at a deeper level to the stressing of trust and relationships amongst stakeholders if 
Fig 3.1 
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value generation is to be understood, and to the implementation of improved reporting 
mechanisms to determine how well this is being undertaken, including, for example, 
‘integrated reporting’ (Howitt, 2017). With those facts in mind whether there has been an 
overemphasis on the notion of short-termism is considered. 
 
3.1.1 Confusion of aims: Critics who promote the idea that stakeholders, whether 
employees, customers or any other important constituency, should be given more 
consideration in corporate governance, point to ‘pernicious short-termism’ in support of 
their contention (Roe, 2013). Along with a perceived over-incentivizing of managers and 
senior executives it is a believable viewpoint though in many ways unsupported 
(Mauboussin and Callahan, 2015). In this context, an explanation of events is often that of 
an increasing financialization of corporate activity (see Froud et al, 2006). But it is an 
interpretation harking back to the 1990s and academic concerns on lack of capital 
investment, reduced manufacturing, asset-stripping and downsizing, rather than any later 
ostensible causes leading up to the 2008 Crash – such as the collapse of the housing market 
or poorly constructed financial products, or indeed the stressing of short-termism as a 
rationale. Whether the notion is therefore applicable to today’s capital markets and their 
relationship to companies is problematic (Haslam, 2010). Although, this perhaps has 
applicability in our time, post-Crash, too. For example, how when talking about 
competition, change, or global markets, corporate rhetoric about shareholder value may still 
be employed at the expense of value that could be usefully generated by stakeholders. 
Indeed the terms of the ‘financialization debate’ may simply change over time, with 
termism often now an easier target. 
      But in addressing stakeholder interests, noted Roe (2013), it is important to recognize 
that these interests can be long-term and they can be short-term. Tracking into termism, 
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therefore, it is feasible that critics may have misconceived the distinction between 
shareholder value and stakeholder value, as different perceptions of corporate value. 
Shareholder primacy as a model, for example, does not actually say anything about the time 
frame within which companies need to act (Millon, 2002). This is a distinction particularly 
relevant to those who connect short-termism with an excessive favouring by executives of 
shareholder and market concerns (see Froud et al, 2006; Kaplan, 2017), as it is not primacy 
that is important so much as how termism is handled in that context. And though Jack 
Welch, the former CEO of GE, may have been quick to famously comment that 
‘shareholder value is the dumbest idea in the world!’ after he had left the company (see 
Guerrera, 2009), in reality shareholder value maximization could in fact be understood as a 
long-term approach. In pursuit of this aim, managers can really only affect strategy – and 
only indirectly share prices – implementation of which takes time (Beinhocker, 2006; Tse, 
2011). This is similar to the argument put forward by Mauboussin (2011) where shareholder 
value maximization is itself a worthwhile goal though often misconceived as such. Yet 
where wealth maximization is fundamentally a long-term objective, not short-term, as 
Bistrova and Lace (2012) highlighted, commitment to the very ideal of long-termism 
alongside sustainability is what counts.  
      If any confusion is evident, it may be a result of the conundrum being far less about the 
choice of primacy perspective taken, and attempting to draw distinctions, than that the way 
termism works is equally applicable to shareholder and stakeholder perspectives. In the push 
to stress long-termism – as well as to link shareholder primacy with short-termism – it is 
easy to forget this. The point is a vital one, as it means if future stakeholder interests are 
under-specified in some manner, similar results can occur of which shareholder theory is 
accused. In other words, long-term stakeholder value destroyed by less R&D or innovation 
or overly ambitious attempts to redistribute any economic surplus to a variety of stakeholder 
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interests (Danielson et al, 2008). Although accepting that short-term and long-term 
strategies are useful yet differ does not negate that a corporate strategic decision still has to 
be made concerning whether it should be short-term or long-term horizon objectives that 
need to be predominantly set (Hu, 1990) or indeed what length to set for each.  
      Nevertheless, whichever the primacy, too much short-termism can produce a variety of 
outcomes, it seems, a few of which are: 
 
• A tendency to work towards only the 
next earnings report – with a 
likelihood of only just beating 
analysts’ forecasts and/or reporting 
very small positive earnings 
• Undue risk taking to maximize 
short-term earnings – financial 
institutions may invest in assets with 
hidden risk or take on excessive debt 
just to increase their short-term 
profits (see Dallas, 2012) 
• Increased share buybacks 
• Share price volatility  
• Deterioration of firms’ 
competitiveness and/or performance  
• A focus on dividends at the expense 
of long-term capital investment or 
R&D  
• Reduction in investment 
expenditures 
• Reduced communication with 
stakeholders 
• Increased systemic risk within 
industry and economy 
• Reduced long-term potential of the 
entire economy 
 
(Sources: EY, 2014; Brochet et al, 2015) 
 
 
      Clearly excessive short-termism comes with dire consequences for corporate success 
and value creation. And this was something recognized prior to the 2008 Crash not only by 
the UK legislative and regulatory bodies attempting to put a new corporate governance 
framework in place (eg Combined Code, 1998; CA2006) but also by other observers1. 
While more recently, Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, one of the leading money 
                                                          
1See eg Twentieth Century Fund, 1992, on speculation and market volatility; Cassidy, 2002, on executive 
abuses and the supporting of a greed-driven corporate culture. 
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managers, wrote that ‘the effects of the short-termist phenomenon are troubling . . . more 
and more corporate leaders have responded with actions that can deliver immediate returns 
to shareholders, such as buybacks or dividend increases, while underinvesting in 
innovation, skilled workforces or essential capital expenditures necessary to sustain long-
term growth’ (Fink, 2015). 
      Short-termism was therefore in the spotlight before and after the Crash, where the 
assumption was that it had to be a bad approach followed at the expense of a long-term 
perspective, and with an industry-wide prevalence. Short-termism required eradicating was 
the thinking, as it was the culprit across the economy for a lack of solid corporate growth in 
value. In addressing concerns, John Kay, for example, was charged by the UK Secretary of 
State for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), with examining the relationship between 
equity markets and long-term corporate decision-making (Kay, 2012). In America, the 
concept had similarly gained the notice of politicians, though with starker overtones. Joe 
Biden portrayed it as ‘one of the greatest threats to America’s enduring prosperity’ (Biden, 
2016), while Hillary Clinton proposed tax changes to promote long-term investing (see 
Pethokoukis, 2015a). Clinton’s sentiments mirrored those of the Brookings Institute 
(Galston and Kamarck, 2015), and the Democrat leaning Aspen institute who wrote: 
 
‘We believe a healthy society requires healthy and responsible companies that effectively 
pursue long-term goals. Yet in recent years, boards, managers, shareholders with varying 
agendas, and regulators, all, to one degree or another, have allowed short-term 
considerations to overwhelm the desirable long-term growth and sustainable profit 
objectives of the corporation.’ 
 
 
      Moreover, with the overriding academic and political propulsive forces in place, in the 
wake of the financial crisis the likelihood was that an already disenchanted public was 
Aspen, 2009, p2 
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galvanized to a new perception of predominating business practices. And despite the 
complexity of the issues, could have led to unsupported generalized views that all short-
termism is bad and that all companies that display short-termist practices are evil, or that ‘all 
executives are crooks who sacrifice long-term value for short-term profits’ (Edmans, 2017). 
A focus on the terrible examples of fraud or abuse, where the media loves a good story, 
certainly did not help and only served to add to the perception (see Chapter 2, Fig 2.7). As 
Edmans further noted, a negative view of short-termism of this nature can play into 
populism.   
      The reality, however, was that the issue of short-termism had been recognized and 
considered inconclusive long before the financial crisis ever got started (see Laverty, 1996). 
Furthermore, since the Crash any discussion on short-termism had tended to be 
characterized as a one-sided debate (Mauboussin and Callahan, 2015; see also Pozen, 2014). 
Nevertheless, even if such research was an accurate reflection of the intricacies and 
limitations of short-termist thinking, the views represented in those works appear to have 
been in the minority. 
 
3.1.2 The balanced view: Opinions about the need to avoid short-termism at all cost have 
undeniably taken hold amongst academics, politicians, and the masses. It perhaps simply fits 
the experience of many managers and senior executives too (see also The Economist, 2017). 
But such thinking about the perils of short-termism might be a stretch. Rather there is good 
reason to say it is about balance between short and long-term objectives, a perspective vital 
for the sustainability of a successful business (EY, 2014). Even Jack Welch, in a more 
considered mood, stated, ‘You can't grow long-term if you can't eat short-term. Anybody 
can manage short. Anybody can manage long. Balancing those two things is what 
management is’. There is risk involved undoubtedly, but this is what executives must handle 
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in meeting business challenges. Simply put, companies need to attend in the immediate term 
to important factors in their own right as well as because they will in turn have long-term 
impact. For example, making near-term efficiencies - and where short-term pressures could 
in fact prompt companies to do so (Kaplan, 2017). Similarly, the implementing of training 
programs for employees. In either case, the rewards may only come through several years 
down the line. Peter Drucker (1995, p54) put it more elegantly than Welch, ‘The… specific 
task of managers is to harmonize in every decision and action the requirements of the 
immediate and long-range future. Managers cannot sacrifice either without endangering the 
enterprise’.  
      In fact, addressing what happens when the balance is out of kilter the opposite way, one 
study points out, ‘in some markets excessive long-termism is the greater risk. When long-
termism becomes an excuse for a lack of scrutiny or influence over the corporate decision 
making the result can be poor capital allocation, lower long-term investment returns and a 
drag on macro-economic growth’ (Barton et al, 2016, p11)1. The Economist (2017) simply 
depicted short-termism as a ‘slippery idea’. Further, in looking at the actual findings that 
have begun to be consolidated in recent years, as Mauboussin and Callahan (2015, p70) 
wrote, ‘many of the commonly perceived symptoms of short-termism don’t stand up to 
scrutiny, and there are some legitimate reasons for the shortening of time horizons’. Being 
short-termist may just have come with the business territory managers had to deal with day-
to-day, or indeed that in the broader economic climate in which managers operated they 
could be little else. Either way, companies may not have all been as wickedly short-term 
focused as might be thought! 
                                                          
1Barton, D., Bailey, J., and Zoffer, J. (2016). Rising to The Challenge of Short-Termism. FCLT Global. 
https://www.fcltglobal.org/; See also Roe, 2015 for a similar opposing view; and Pethokoukis, 2015b, for a 
useful analysis 
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      Yet the points discussed so far are not simply underlining the importance of termism, 
both short-term and long-term. In fact, intertwined with perspectives on termism are notions 
of primacy as well as corporate governance; and the whole easily confounded (see eg Roe, 
2013). At least, common perception leads to that outcome.1 And yet, when the BIS carried 
out a consultation, examining the orientation of boards with respect to a long-term focus, 
and why they might not pursue such an apparently worthwhile goal, there were some 
surprisingly thoughtful views despite the complexity involved.  
 
‘The definition of short-term and long-term was questioned by numerous respondents 
who suggested that this was likely to vary by sector and company. However, most 
recognised that companies do need to plan for the long-term. Several respondees 
suggested that a short-term focus was not necessarily a bad thing – especially at a 
time of crisis.’ 
              BIS, 2011, p7 
 
      Yet despite such potential insights, with respect to the Crash of 2008 and the way 
termism is understood by companies what can be made of the available academic 
information on the topic – as opposed to government surveys of corporate professionals, as 
useful as they might be? And, the recent work of Barton et al (2017) notwithstanding, in 
penetrating some of this confusion for the purpose of providing background for the current 
research, can that information indicate anything further about the scenario in place during 
those crisis years examined?  
 
3.2 Executive remuneration and short-termism  
For the general public, perhaps one of the biggest concerns about the way companies are 
run, both before the Crash of 2008 and certainly since, relates to executive 
                                                          
1See on financialized business practices eg Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2002; Kiarie, 2006; Froud et al, 2006. 
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remuneration1.The Occupy Wall Street and G20 Summit protests2 perhaps stand testament 
to this. The examples highlighted by the media of rogue executives who have lined their 
pockets and retired with huge payouts, even as they were running their former companies 
into the ground, only fuels the ordinary person’s anxieties3.  
      But concerning regular managers and senior executives, not the exceptional types of 
cases hitting the headlines, the issue is how the remuneration of these individuals appears to 
have become progressively linked to their company’s stock price in recent years to the 
detriment of a long-term corporate outlook. Sometimes coming under the heading of 
financialization, where managers see corporate concerns through only a financial lens, this 
specific behaviour relates to a tendency to see performance as based on strategies 
maximizing short-term return on investment. And it personifies executives as looking only 
towards the next half-yearly corporate reporting date and the figures they are to produce.4 
Surveys of finance executives appear to support this myopia, demonstrating that many were 
willing to forgo value-creating projects in order to deliver short-term earnings (Graham et 
al, 2006). There is also the suggestion that companies utilizing equity-based compensation 
to a major extent in their pay regimes are more likely to manipulate their reported earnings 
through discretionary accruals (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). Additional evidence 
points to such manipulation extending to careful timing of the release of information, and 
                                                          
1Remuneration refers to compensation or pay; it can mean a whole package of incentives, including salary plus 
bonuses (for eg performance) plus equity-based pay.    
2On October 10, 2011, a Facebook campaign was launched that called for protests to take place at the London 
Stock Exchange, Paternoster Square, for the 15th October. It was to be in solidarity with the Occupy Wall 
Street protests against social and economic inequality taking place during that period in many countries (OWS 
is part of the Occupy movement inspired by anti-austerity protests in Spain by the 15-M movement). There 
were to be simultaneous protests planned for the day in New York and other cities worldwide. On 15th 
October, while The London Stock Exchange was the initial target for the Occupy protesters, the police blocked 
access to Paternoster Square, enforcing a High Court injunction against public access. It is estimated 2,500-
3,000 people gathered instead nearby outside St Paul's Cathedral, with around 250 camping overnight. The 
protest stayed at the site till late December (see further at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_G20_London_summit_protests#Timeline_of_the_protests). 
3See also Chapter 2, Fig 2.8, underscoring how these perceptions might be wrong. 
4In the US, where reporting dates are more frequent, it is a managerial myopia dubbed ‘quarterly capitalism’ 
(see Barton, 2011). 
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where this appears to coincide with lower market prices prior to the uptake of options (see 
Millon, 2002). Whether these behaviours indicate short-termism or something more 
inappropriate, though, is debatable.  
      Still, a principal reason believed to account for short-termism, and how this behavior 
became a norm for executives, is the increased use of stock options or stock-related forms of 
pay (which by definition get pegged to market performance) in addition to basic salary and 
bonuses as part of the executive package received.1 For example, data suggests that up till 
the 1990s pay arrangements were in place utilizing long-term performance linked pay 
(Boschen and Smith, 1995). The inclusion of equity options in executive pay packages then 
rose, according to Mauboussin and Callahan (2015), to about one-quarter during the early 
1990s, moved to about one-half in the early 2000s, and levelled near 40 percent, around the 
time of their research. 
      Alternatively, in looking at the pre-crisis years, 1980-1994, there is a 97.3 percent 
increase in salary plus bonus. However, with the addition of annual stock option grants real-
term valuations rise to a mean of 209 percent for what executives actually took home (Hall 
and Liebman, 1998). Taking slightly different time frames, Conyon (2014) showed that US 
CEO equity-based pay between 1980 and 2003 grew six-fold. He noted, too, that with this 
tendency of public companies to provide executives with more ‘pay at risk’ forms of 
remuneration it is not just stock options but also grants of restricted stock – which cannot be 
transferred till certain conditions are met – that have been gaining in use since the mid-
2000s. While Murphy (2012) shows that inflation-adjusted median CEO compensation 
                                                          
1Investigations in this area - in the years around the financial crisis - often focus on US data due to greater 
reporting transparency, as Bruce and Skovoroda, 2015, note. US figures are nevertheless likely indicative of 
the UK so are worth consideration. Indeed, Zalewska (2013) showed there is often conformity between US and 
UK data on pay and performance. However, in referring to British companies in her aptly titled ‘Gentlemen do 
not talk about money’, where performance differences are demonstrated, it is associated with remuneration 
dispersion amongst board members. Nevertheless, the issue is perhaps more complex. For example, that 
varying cross-national mediators - ie the operation of institutional and cultural factors - are involved at some 
level in affecting remuneration practices is underscored by Gooderham et al (2018).  
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packages at S&P 500 firms increased from $2.9 million in 1992 to about $9.0 million in 
2011, which he points out represents ‘a real growth rate in US CEO pay of approximately 4 
percent per annum every year for almost 30 years’. It seems the Crash of 2008 caused little 
interruption to this trajectory. 
      These packages, however, are long-term incentives, not short-term, and something 
boards have moved increasingly towards using as the above figures show (see eg Polsky and 
Lund, 2013). Nevertheless, taking into account a broad range of compensation incentives 
that includes equity-based pay, there appears a likelihood of detecting a corresponding 
association with value-enhancing performance indicators.1 Added support for this 
association was observed when looking at the highest paid directors of companies, where an 
8.94 percent increase in their annual income produced through cash and unexercised options 
combined (option value was calculated using a Black-Scholes approximation), generated a 
ten percent rise in shareholder value (Main et al, 1996).  
      A connection between remuneration and performance can therefore be made – and one 
seen as a background factor to unfolding events of the pre-Crash period. But the nature of 
the remuneration was to incentivise for the longer term. Executives were prepared to wait 
for their money until they exercised their option – or indeed, till they had increased 
performance to make the option more valuable. Hence, whether equity-based remuneration 
caused executives to become more short-termist – particularly as portrayed by media 
commentators – in the context of these types of compensation arrangements does not seem 
to be supported.  
 
3.2.1 Other reasons for an assumed link: There can be many reasons for executive 
remuneration and stock prices becoming associated and why such pay packages continued 
                                                          
1See eg Mehran, 1994; Benito and Conyon, 1999; Buck et al, 2003; Conyon, 2014. Although, while such 
findings may be useful, they also serve to obscure reality. 
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to be used that had nothing to do with an assumed exploitative managerial disposition 
towards short-termism. For example, ‘US companies were not required to treat employee 
stock option grants as an expense until 2004. This created a superficial picture of greater 
profits even though the market recognized the economic consequences… [and] the stock 
market had above-average results in the 1980s and 1990s, which conferred substantial 
benefit to those executives who took equity-based pay’ (Mauboussin and Callahan, 2015, 
p73:14).  
      In the same vein, the pay-performance link, often taken to be the underpinning rationale 
for the use of pay incentives, might in fact be tenuous once cumulative data is used to look 
at shareholder returns rather than annual accounting data (Marshall and Eling-Lee, 2016). A 
different picture emerges by that perspective (see below: A matter of time frames in 
reporting), and where it is the short-termism imposed by the process of quarterly reporting 
that causes the difficulty, not managers themselves. 
 
 
A Matter of Time Frames in Reporting 
 
Four-hundred and twenty nine major US companies were analysed for MSCI by Marshall 
and Eling-Lee (2016), looking at the years between 2006 and 2015. Companies that 
‘…awarded their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) higher equity incentives had below-
median returns’. As Fig 3.2 shows, there is little relationship between higher pay amounts 
and 10-year TSRs (Total Shareholder Returns) – where there was the expectation of a 
decent relationship if incentivizing were effective in producing improved market 
performance.  
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      Most of the TSR activity clusters towards the left. The red line indicates the median, and 
where a slight negative relationship suggests a small association between lower pay and 
improved performance. A more detailed analysis of this latter finding showed that, broken 
down by sector, some companies paying their CEOs less could outperform other companies 
by as much as 39 percent. 
      From a cumulative perspective, Marshall and Eling-Lee (2016) suggest, pay incentives 
might only fuel managerial pay excesses and there appears little reason to maintain them.1 
Indeed, they add, senior executives receive as much as 70 percent in equity-based 
compensation, yet can have no long-term effect on the market perception of the company.  
 
 
                                                          
1The interesting corollary is that a question then exists about why companies would continue to give 
performance-related remuneration – let alone why it would be thought by anyone to be connected to termism – 
if it does not actually work in the longer-term. See also Ariely et al, 2009 on how paying in excess of what is 
fair does not necessarily make individuals any more motivated for dealing with non-routine challenges. 
Fig 3.2 
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      Overall, such factors may serve to give a false impression that excessive short-termism 
is in operation. Moreover, there appears no clear link between equity-based pay and short-
termism – nor it seems with market performance. In assessing the research, Walker (2010) 
stated that he was ‘aware of no empirical evidence establishing that executive pay term is 
inadequately focused on long-term performance [ie biased towards short-termism] from 
either a shareholder or societal perspective.’ In addition, rather than anything to do with 
termism, executive remuneration is it seems associated with the size of the company in the 
economy (see Hall and Liebman, 1998; Conyon, 2014; Gabaix et al, 2014). Yet the common 
belief that equity incentives and short-termism are connected remains very strong and 
perhaps has more to do with perception than reality. 
      Nevertheless, a possible reason for the belief is the assumed use of transitory managerial 
tenures. The thinking is that with short employment contracts managers are not going to be 
staying long and so want to milk their profits – equity-based or otherwise – as soon as they 
are able. This could also mean they may have a shorter time horizon than investors, and 
again motivated to act sooner rather than later (Walker (2010). Indeed, they will have little 
motivation for long-term strategizing as it is their successors who will more likely receive 
the recognition if an intervention is effective, and ‘benefit from rents that come to the 
company under that approach’ (Alan and Gale, 2000). Managers, similarly, might take on 
more risk than appropriate for the simple reason that if they do better than the expected 
market target they will get a substantial bonus while if they do not do better or they fail in 
some manner, as their tenure is short the cost to them of losing their job is minimal (EY, 
2014). However, as tenures and remuneration lengthen increased risks may also be taken, 
but to the detriment of shareholder value in the process (Cooper et al, 2016). 
      In contrast, though, to all these possibilities, average tenures while dipping during the 
worst of the financial crisis have in fact generally increased overall. Figures produced by 
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Schloetzer et al (2014) for The Conference Board1 show tenures for the years in question: 
10 years (2000), 11.3 (2002), 7.2 (2009), 8.1 years (2012), and 9.7 years (2014). CEO 
tenure, the authors propose, started lengthening in 2013 as the effects of the 2008 financial 
crisis subsided and stronger markets took effect.2  
      The upshot is that tenure is not an effective argument for managerial short-termism. 
     
3.3 Perceived pressures to be short-termist 
A Price Waterhouse Cooper survey amongst 250 executives of FTSE100 companies 
revealed, they would choose an option of a low return sooner (£250,000 tomorrow) than the 
option of a high return later (£450,000 in 3 years) (PwC, 2011; see also Haldane and Davies, 
2011). Similarly, US executives would give up the chance of pursuing viable longer-term 
projects that created economic value for their firm in order to meet that quarter’s earnings 
expectations (Graham et al, 2005). Indeed, counterproductive strategies may even be 
followed where the chance of long-term benefits to the company are reduced in favour of 
short-term gain (Blair, 1995). Working towards the next results date was, therefore, the 
reality for many managers (see Millon, 2002). 
      But despite greater profitability often sidelined willingly by executives, they 
nevertheless felt heavily pressured. 
 
‘The executives I work with speak openly about the market pressures for short-term perfor-
mance. Though my perspective might be colored [by] my empathy toward them, I would 
say that to a person, they want to ensure that their companies do as well as possible in the 
long run. But they believe the capital markets place unrealistic and unproductive 
                                                          
1There are additional corroborating figures provided by Karlsson et al, 2008; Favaro et al, 2010; and Equilar, a 
provider of board intelligence data. 
2What has happened since is more complex. PWC, for example, provide figures showing a decline in UK 
tenures: 8.3 years (2010), and 4.8 years (2017), against a global downturn to an average of 5 years. However, 
actual measurement is not clear-cut. A variety of factors affect results (eg depends on the form of departure – 
ie whether the executive was dismissed, retired, or changed industry position - the age of the executive, and 
the geographic location - ie Europe, US, UK or worldwide - as well as the metric or methodology used by a 
particular study) (see also Conference Board, 2017). 
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constraints on them. Their eternal question is, How much can we invest in the long term 
before Wall Street starts agitating and making our lives so miserable that it threatens our 
ability to manage productively at all? For the better positioned of them, the answer is that 
they can invest nearly all that we would wish them to. But the CEOs who are already under 
threat or pressure, especially from activists, can invest almost nothing at all’  
Martin, 2015 
 
      According to Bawden (2007), Henry Silverman, chairman of Realogy Property Services 
Group, ‘complained bitterly’ about shareholders being obsessed with the short-term.1 His 
solution was to advocate taking companies private. But from many managers’ viewpoint, 
pursuing shareholder value in the short-term was a smoothing exercise, though one that 
dominated their behaviour often uncomfortably2. And the pressure was felt to be mounting 
to the extent it needed attention: ‘The balance between short-term accountability and long-
term value creation has fallen out of balance; it is time to reconsider what can be done to 
restore the long-term to its proper place in corporate planning and strategy’ (Barton et al, 
2016, p3).  
 
3.3.1 Boards as the origin of short-termist perceptions: Boards may – with awareness or 
not – support short-term distortions of managerial behaviour, according to Roe (2013, 
2015). Managers might therefore: vigorously pursue good results during a limited tenure; 
push off poor results to a future time beyond their tenure; or fit in with the board culture, be 
it ‘dynamic’ or ‘lacklustre’. And where, if the latter, a board can cite any number of 
misunderstood short-term market pressures on them for a failure to adapt to new business 
conditions. ‘It is not impossible that the short-termist view captures a rhetorical high ground 
                                                          
1Bawden, T. (2007). Surge in buyouts of quoted companies as hassled bosses line up to go private. The Times 
(January 13). 
2See eg Barton et al, 2016; Koller et al, 2017. 
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in the case for board autonomy by contrasting the positive connotation of patient long-term 
capital against short-termist frenzy’ (Roe, 2013. p1005). 
      Claiming short-term pressures may also deflect problems faced in the running of the 
company, allowing managers to feel less accountable (Edmans, 2017). Yet managers could 
also fear for their jobs, or are persuaded by the board that if they do not engage in a short-
term strategy shareholders will ‘move against them and have them removed through one of: 
pressure placed on the board; a resolution at a shareholders’ meeting; or as a result of a 
takeover’ (Keay, 2013). In agreeing tenure terms, suggests Edmans (2017), claiming they 
should not be evaluated for three years is an attempt by managers to address the problem by 
guaranteeing employment for that period. However futile the attempt might be, with 
financial markets increasingly short-term focused it could be that managers are not entirely 
incorrect in trying to extend their employment time frame.1 
      Similarly, in pursuing shareholder primacy as a route to achieving their corporate 
objective, boards may misguidedly believe that managing for the short-term is the 
expectation (CLR, 1999; Millon, 2002; see also Mitchell, 2001 on the ethic of stock price 
maximization). As a fixated position, however, this belief may in reality be inconsistent with 
shareholder primacy, which specifies no specific time frame for companies to achieve 
results (Millon, 2002).  
      If companies feel compelled to act based on a short-term horizon one possible cause is 
the influence of investment consultants, who in turn advise the major institutional 
shareholders (Barton et al, 2016). The company board then takes the brunt of the effect, as 
Barton (2011) highlighted. This occurs despite those shareholders agreeing they were a cause 
of short-termism (MORI, 2004).2 
                                                          
1See eg Rappaport, 2005; Tonello, 2006; Aspen Institute, 2009; Alan Greenspan, Francis Boyer Lecture, The 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington DC, December 5, 1996. . 
http://www.aei.org/publication/the-challenge-of-central-banking-in-a-democratic-society-2/; Keay, 2013. 
2MORI, 2004, NAPF/IMA Short-Termism Study Report. 
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      Hence, while managers may blame market pressures for short-termism, in reality they 
are subject to a variety of board pressures affecting them (eg Hayes and Schaefer, 2009; 
Cable and Vermeulen, 2016). 
      Business leaders, however, realize that short-termist pressures affect them and freely admit 
they would prefer to use longer strategic planning horizon. But, with an internal corporate 
initiation through metric use and a subsequent response of managers to changed investor 
conditions, they are in a cycle of self-reinforcing perceptions (Barton et al, 2014). Indeed, a 
negative feedback loop (Barton, 2016).  
     Within that context, the impetus for executive compensation may not always be from 
executives. With a short-term outlook, stressing share price performance, boards could have 
an embedded pay-for-performance culture. Their actions may then purposely create wage 
distortion through the incentives they offer. With the market a keen observer of corporate 
activities a CEO’s wage may be over-inflated to temporarily move market perception 
skyward with respect to the company’s current value and future prospects (see Hayes and 
Schaefer, 2009). The research carried out by these investigators addresses what is termed 
the Lake Wobegon Effect, a behavioural disposition where no company wants to admit to 
having a CEO who is below par, and so no company lets its CEO's compensation contract 
fall below market expectations. Hence, having an upwardly distorted compensation contract 
is a signal to the market to expect good things! 
      The pressure from boards is undoubtedly a strong effect. And it is progressive as well. 
Almost two-thirds of managers said the pressure to generate short-term results had increased 
over the previous five years. Yet at the same time nearly 90 percent stated that a longer time 
horizon in business decisions would have a positive effect on corporate performance (Barton 
and Wiseman, 2014). Managers are, it seems, trapped between knowing what is good for the 
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company and doing what is good for the company; and with any pressure from boards 
apparently tracking down the line onto them 
 
3.3.2 Market pressures on managerial behaviour: A market in which discount rates1 
appear to favour the short-term for corporate investment does not help managers to choose 
the appropriate time horizon to use. There is excess discounting – that favours the short-
term use of capital – and which has increased over time (Haldane and Davies, 2011). For 
companies it can fuel a tendency for share ‘buybacks’2 as the best use of funds. Buybacks, 
according to Plender (2015), have risen to pre-crisis levels.  
      Similarly, since 1980 dividend payout ratios3 have generally been in an upward trend, 
according to Haldane (2015). And with shorter equity holding periods and higher discount 
rates, there is an augmentation of any short-termist outlook (see also Kay, 2012). 
      For many, these facts reflect a move of the market system towards producing short-term 
pressures on companies. Indeed, noted Haldane (2015), ‘over the past decade the equity 
market no longer appears to have been a source of net new financing to the UK corporate 
sector… Total payouts to shareholders, both dividends and buy-backs, are also back to their 
pre-crisis peaks, totalling almost $1 trillion in the US, and £100 billion in the UK, in 2014’. 
      However, these short-termist notions implied, argued Kaplan (2017), the money 
disappeared from shareholders and reinvestment never occurred. Indeed, without long-term 
projects to invest in, share buybacks remain an important option. This is a view that sees 
                                                          
1The generally accepted belief is that companies look to buy back their own shares to increase short-term 
market prices, irrespective of the long-term impact. For example, where they are likely to miss their Earnings-
Per-Share target (see eg Lazonick, 2014; Edmans, 2017). 
2The use of discount rates is for assessing investment projects against other potential sources of value 
generation. And discounts are 5 percent to 10 percent greater than would be expected at one-year time 
horizons, and are therefore a significant barrier to longer term investment horizons, and particularly so when 
accumulated and compounded (Haldane, 2015). 
3Dividends paid to shareholders relative to the amount of total net income of a company. 
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How short-termism is not the problem commonly believed 
 
Inaccuracy of perceptions 
• Chief executives serve increasingly longer terms, not shorter ones as widely held: bosses departing 
in 2015 had an average of 11 years in office for S&P 500 firms, the highest figure for 13 years.  
• Activist hedge funds are not leveraging the market by large block holdings; they own less than 1% of 
the stock market.  
• Trading of the average share occurs many times because of high-frequency computerised traders. 
But their churning masks the sharp rise of passive funds, which already own 13% of the market and 
which hold shares indefinitely. 
• Incentivizing CEOs through pay for performance or stock options has increased from $2.9 million in 
1992 to around $9.0 million in 2011 (Murphy, 2012). And the use of incentives has been associated 
with increased market returns. However, this masks the long-term nature of incentives. CEOs will 
not get the profits from these unless they stick around and improve the company. Further, if the 
reporting period is changed from a year or less to a 10-year cumulative basis to report shareholder 
returns, paying CEOs more does not lead to companies performing better in the stock market 
(Marshall and Eling-Lee, 2016). 
• Quarterly capitalism (managers putting their efforts towards the next reporting date) is blamed for 
short-termism. But it also depends on the industry the company is in, the kind of investors they 
attract based on their time horizon, and the narrative managers tell about their company. Many 
long-term investors will stay in for the long-haul and not be swayed by short-term figures.  
 
Apparently myopic markets often look far into the future  
• The bond market lends to the government for 30 years for an interest rate of just 3%.  
• Equity investors place enormous values on firms that will not make serious profits for many years. 
That includes through new offerings (IPOs), venture capital funds, and directly for companies that 
have a convincing narrative. Amazon is the world’s fifth-most valuable firm, with a colossal $400bn 
market capitalisation. About 75% of that value is justified by profits where the expectations is they 
are to be made a decade or more from now. It is probably the biggest bet in history on a company’s 
long-term prospects. But Jeff Bezos, its CEO, annually reiterates the company’s long-term approach. 
 
Companies are not investing at dramatically low levels  
• Figures suggesting hoarding of capital to fund excessive buy-backs are misleading. Buy-backs are so 
high because profits are abnormally high, which in turn may reflect the rising level of concentration 
in most industries. Were firms to try to invest all their surplus funds, they would need to almost 
double investment to a reckless 17% of sales. If Ford invested all its record cash flows, based on 
2016 figures, it would double its plant in 30 months, an act of insanity in the car business. 
• Investment - capital spending plus research and development - is 9% of sales for S&P 500 firms, in 
line with the 25-year average (excluding financial companies).  
• For the economy, private-sector capital spending, excluding housing, is at 12% of GDP, equal to the 
average since 1945. 
 
Main source adapted from The Economist, 2017 
Fig 3.3 
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buybacks not as a short-term market pressure but rather a utilization of markets by 
managers, albeit in the short-term. 
      Furthermore, a long-term view, not a short-term one, is supported by high – or volatile – 
stock prices, otherwise there would be no excess value within a share price over and above a 
company’s known asset value (Abarbanell and Bernard, 2000; Rappaport and Mauboussin, 
2001). Similarly, PE ratios when historically high mean prices are forward-looking (see eg 
Kaplan, 2017, p22). Indeed, despite high valuations varieties of companies come into being 
all the time with little in the near term to recommend them. Amazon is an example, where 
for many years it was in this position, including with debt and a lack of any positive returns. 
These are the so-called ‘unicorn’ companies – often the focus of IPOs in such areas as 
biotech - where, rather than short-term gains, investors are thinking about potential future, 
long-term gains, when they make their buying decision (Mauboussin and Callahan, 2015). 
      So why do critics from politics, academia and the media propound the idea that the 
market is the source of short-term pressure on companies - and that this is a pressing 
danger? Part of the answer may have to do with cognitive bias. First is hindsight bias, where 
people under pressure may look to past times as being better than the present, which they 
see as fraught with economic perils. Yet they forget there were pessimists in the past too and 
markets and businesses survived (see eg Kaplan in Frick, 2017). The second example is 
highlighted by Edmans (2017) who points out that ‘In the current political climate, many 
people see companies as evil, and are very willing to accept evidence that supports this view 
and reject evidence that contradicts it’. This is, in other words, a form of confirmation bias.  
      Yet overall, ‘…short-termers ignore a lot of evidence that goes against their position’ 
(Kaplan 2017). Hence, the pressure on managers to be short-termist. And with slim 
evidence to the contrary, it is pressure apparently not coming specifically from the markets. 
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3.3.3 Sorting behaviour: Research suggests companies and investors do not all behave the 
same with respect to time horizon. Public companies, for example, are less likely than 
private companies to invest more in the short term. An outcome is that public companies are 
more near-term profit seeking than private companies (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006), 
and attracting particular kinds of investors with different time preferences accordingly.  
      In fact, a certain amount of winnowing is involved, and where a matching eventually 
occurs between companies with investors. Observing corporate behaviour without 
appreciating this time-related process can lead to a misperception about short-termist market 
pressures dominating. Evidence for this market-matching behaviour comes from research on 
voluntary disclosure horizons in conference calls by Brochet et al (2012, 2015). Their work 
demonstrated how short-term orientated investors appeared more attracted to companies 
with a greater focus in their conference calls on the short-term; while long-term oriented 
investors appeared more attracted to companies with a greater focus on the long-term.    
      Like attracts like it appears; or as Buffet (1979) wrote, ‘In large part, companies obtain 
the shareholder constituency that they seek and deserve.’ Yet a mechanism appears in place 
where long-term investors incline towards companies having: longer time horizons for 
higher discretionary spending on R&D and advertising; less issuing of guidance1; and less 
risk- taking. Conversely, short-term oriented investors incline towards companies associated 
with poorer use of resources; more myopic choices, and higher risk-taking (Brochet et al, 
2015). 
      But these apparent differences may obscure a certain market balance achieved between 
short and long-term institutional investment, as Brochet et al (2015) indicate. The sorting 
process, through investor attraction to companies with either short or long-term orientation, 
                                                          
1This is a comparable finding stressed in Bushee, 2004, on quasi-investors; see also Chen et al, 2011 who 
document an increase in long-term investor holdings after stopping guidance completely 
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Examples of short- and long-term oriented industries and companies  
 
 
Panel A: Examples of industries with short- and long-term focus, based on Fama-French 
industry classification (48 industries)  
 
 
Long-term oriented industries  Short-term oriented industries  
 
Aerospace  Electronic Equipment  
Apparel  Computers  
Beverages  Banking  
Utilities  Trading  
Agriculture  Energy  
Consumer goods  Steel  
Defence  Business Services  
Automobiles and Trucks  Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment  
Construction  Wholesale  
Pharmaceutical  Business Supplies  
 
 
Panel B: Examples of short-term and long-term oriented firms  
 
Long-term oriented companies  Short-term oriented companies  
 
Teco Energy Inc.  Apache Corp.  
Mosanto Co.  Seagate Technology Corp.  
Pepsico Inc.  Chevron  
Northrop Grumman Corp.  Cisco Systems Inc.  
General Mills Inc.  ConocoPhillips  
Colgate-Palmolive Co.  Cypress Semiconductor Corp.  
Allegheny Energy Inc.  General Cable Corp.  
General Mills Inc.  Goldman Sachs Group Inc.  
Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc.  United States Steel Corp.  
Coca-Cola Co.  Netgear Inc.  
Caterpillar Inc.  Netopia Inc.  
Ford Motor Co.  On Semiconductor Corp.  
Walt Disney Co.  Packaging Corp of America  
Dow Chemical  Lorillard Inc.  
Nike Inc.  Skyworks Solutions Inc.  
Kohl's Corp.  Valero Energy Corp.  
 
 Source: Brochet et al, 2015 
Fig 3.4 
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thus informs a categorization of particular industries (see Fig 3.4), and underlies the 
market’s effective character. 
      Brochet et al’s (2015) research is very much about the narrative produced in company 
disclosures; and one of the very few pieces of research conducted that is comparable to the 
present study1. This kind of qualitative approach, they highlight, is revealing about 
managerial actions in a way that quantitative studies based on metrics cannot be. 
      Looking deeper at how investors sort, Bushee (2004) classified institutional investors 
into three categories: transient, quasi-indexer, and dedicated. Of these, as their name 
suggests, transient investors have short-term interests in the market - smaller holdings, a 
speculative trading orientation, and a tendency to act rapidly on corporate disclosures, 
whether media-attractive ‘news events’ or frequent short-term earnings guidance figures. 
Quasi-indexers, however, are long-term investors in many companies, although holding 
relatively small positions. They are attracted to companies producing detailed annual and 
quarterly reports, covering monitoring or historic information2. Dedicated institutional 
investors are also long-term investors but there is a reversal of other characteristics: they 
take major stakes but in a small number of companies (see also Serafeim, 2014). Both quasi-
indexers and dedicated institutions are generally insensitive to short-term performance and 
their presence in the market related to lower stock price volatility. Yet seeing the market 
only from the perspective of transient investors provides a false impression of associated 
corporate activity, as well as the need for a broad market activity profile.  
     These broad investor interests inevitably alter over time to different industry sectors. And 
for short-term investors this has particular resonance. As Barton et al (2017) showed, since 
                                                          
1See also Li, 2010, for a review of the textual analysis literature associated with this limited area. There is 
additionally a small literature on using qualitative analysis of annual reports to predict stock prices. See, for 
example, Wisniewski and Yekini (2015) who suggest these narratives contain valuable information that the 
market may not have taken into account in its pricing. See also, Merkley (2014) and Brochet et al (2015) on 
the further use of narrative disclosures and what they can reveal. 
2Brochet et al, 2015, produce similar findings 
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2015 the use of funds dictated by a short-termist approach migrated more strongly to idea-
intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals, technology, software and biotechnology. 
While in capital and labour-intensive industries such as automobiles, chemicals, machinery 
and retail, margins contracted.  
      There is a vital sorting mechanism for termism at various levels - including the sector 
and the individual levels - that is integral to how managers interact with the financial 
market. Yet, the complexity involved may serve to obscure the actual time horizon 
companies have implemented. 
      
3.4 The pace of things 
Connected to termism is another temporal phenomenon, which is how the speed of things is 
perceived. Things can ‘feel’ as if they are getting faster; the events around one moving at a 
more rapid rate. And there is a sense of urgency to act, or to at least respond in kind, to meet 
this effect. It is behaviour for which there has been very little research1 or even 
understanding that it is relevant, as well as different, to short-termism when it comes to 
companies. If at all discussed, in fact, the two can get characterized together (in the work of 
Mauboussin and Callahan, 2015, for example, despite its extremely useful analysis of the 
termism field this similar categorization can be found). The present research, however, 
investigates both termism and this notion of a sense of urgency, and while recognizing their 
association, treats them as separate temporal concepts.  
 
3.4.1 Communication patterns: For many individuals and companies, their temporal 
experience is of a speeded up world due to changes in modes of communication dictating 
pace. In our time, this pace is increasingly faster as technology advances. Compared to what 
                                                          
1A small, more philosophical literature exists, beyond the scope of this review, which discusses urgency in 
relation to preference, equality and wellbeing. See Amartya Sen’s (1979) lecture. 
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is now called ‘snailmail’ received in the post, email, Twitter, WhatsApp, Facebook, are 
much quicker methods of communication, and all tend towards a pressure for an (almost) 
immediate response. Urgency is becoming a norm for many. Stories about employees 
harried by voicemails from their superiors demanding information or reports, long after 
work hours ended, are legion.  
      And underlying changes to communication patterns is that the diffusion of technology is 
faster too. Thierer and Eskelsen (2008) provide figures for the time it takes for the use of 
new technologies to become the norm for half of US households. It took 71 years for the 
telephone and 10 years for access to the Internet. Radio, the personal computer, and colour 
television, are somewhat in the middle at 28, 19 and 18 years respectively. Increased 
technology diffusion rates, they suggest, coincide with the feeling within individuals 
themselves that change is happening at a faster pace (see also Mauboussin and Callahan, 
2015).  
 
3.4.2 Cultural influence: Interestingly, there is a cultural dimension associated with the 
experience of an urgency to act amongst managers. The basis of this, Hampden-Turner and 
Trompenaars (1993) observed, is that Eastern cultures understand time ‘synchronously’ 
whereas in Western cultures time is understood more ‘sequentially’ (see also Table 3.1). 
And companies in Eastern cultures, such as Japan, will look to coordinate corporate efforts 
to function simultaneously, even if the resulting objective takes longer to establish. By 
contrast, companies in Western cultures, such as the US and the UK, will aim to achieve 
objectives fast, with units of time minimized, and hence using the shortest sequences to 
achieve the end result. It all points to a cultural difference in the perceived sense of urgency 
to take action as challenging market events arise. Or simply day-to-day business problems 
which are similarly with handled at the requisite pace. In comparing managers, Hampden-
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Turner and Trompenaars (1993 p78) highlight that: sequential managers do one thing at a 
time, keep to schedule, and are accustomed to a series of short-term relationships, broken 
without much difficulty and new ones formed. On the other hand, synchronous managers do 
many things at once - as there is a much more elastic conception of time - understand 
schedules as desirable rather than absolute, and are accustomed to permanent links formed 
through a lifetime. Whatever the advantages or disadvantages of either approach to 
managerial behaviour or to how business is conducted1, the point is that there are these 
differences in culture when it comes to the speed or sense of urgency with which action is 
taken. 
    
3.4.3 Market background: The market environment in which managers operate can change 
with respect to time horizon and a sense of urgency. As Wiggins and Ruefli (2005) showed, 
the time period in which companies may enjoy a degree of sustained competitive advantage 
across industry sectors has reduced. The reason for this, the investigators suggested, is a 
shift to hypercompetition.2 This effect might be due to a price war, the invasion of 
established product, services, or geographic markets, or indeed the result of ‘deep pockets’ 
where an aggressive company has an overwhelming financial capital advantage. This latter 
case may be due to the power of a multinational or power created through corporate 
alliances, or corporate and political alliances. In these circumstances, ‘Betting on the future 
feels risky and even imprudent if change is rapid…  [and] If the sustainability of a 
company’s economic profit is fleeting, there is less reason to bet big on the future’ 
(Mauboussin and Callahan, 2015). Additionally, shareholders fall into different classes 
within the market nowadays based on time preference rates3 serving to mediate perceptions 
                                                          
1A full analysis of the specifics of pace with respect to cultural differences of managers is beyond the scope of 
this review. 
2A rapid and dynamic form of competition characterized by unsustainable advantage. 
3And particularly transient investors as Bushee, 2004, notes - see Section 3.3.3). 
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(Haldane, 2015); and with fibre optic technology improvements algorithmic trading has 
dramatically reduced holding periods down to milliseconds for specialist hedge funds (see 
Lewis, 2015). To the extent these factors operate and represent an urgent financial 
challenge, investors can feel a greater sense of needing to act in the near-term rather than 
wait. 
      Also intertwined with a sense of urgency are changes to industry configuration within 
the market (who is important, who is not). In this context, ‘asset lives’1 could be considered, 
though in association with market capitalization profile to understand their impact on a 
sense of urgency. It is a logical presumption that companies that spend more for equipment 
expected to have a long life-span, and do not seek a rapid return on their capital outlay, are 
also taking a longer-term view of their potential business. They are in it for the long haul 
compared to companies who take an opposite approach.  
      However, as Mauboussin and Callahan (2015) draw attention to, the market 
capitalization profile of certain sectors in the market has changed over time along with asset 
lives. For example, they note that in 1980 healthcare and information technology as a group 
represented 17 percent of the market capitalization of the leading 1,500 US public 
companies, with an average asset life of 11 years. By 2015, these sectors, even though 
representing an increased 30 percent of the market, had an average asset life of eight years. 
This effect overall reflects a dramatic change in market configuration to favour a faster pace 
for many businesses. 
      In reality, however, for some companies in particular sectors it makes sense to have a 
short-term horizon for capital investment while for others a long-term one is far more 
appropriate. There are therefore different time frames for planning ahead – a water supply 
                                                          
1Asset lives are accounting measures of depreciation representing the useful life expected of capital equipment, 
such as vehicles or machinery. 
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company may have many years to develop a project whereas a computer chip maker is 
subject to ever-changing demand for the next upgrade. Yet the figures presented by 
Mauboussin and Callahan (2015) on asset lives show that overall they have reduced in 
recent times. It all points, once again, to many investors and managers feeling an urgency to 
react sooner rather than later in a market that is largely reforming for them on a continual 
basis.  
      Another outcome of the findings is that they suggest a potential shake out of companies 
and investors whose feelings of urgency to react (or termist mindset) do not match the 
industry sector. Other pressures may feed into this, but it nevertheless points to a dynamic 
process centred on where the action is and that managers or investors have to navigate. 
      Besides any selection process occurring to favour one type of company or sector over 
another based on a sense of urgency to choose, the additional interrelating factor of 
corporate governance might be involved. Mauboussin and Callahan (2015) test this utilizing 
a HOLT score, a measure of effective corporate governance. And corporate governance 
tends to be better in sectors, they report, where asset lives are long than in sectors where 
asset lives are short. In other words, in cases where monitoring long-term investments is 
most relevant, corporate governance tends to be the most developed. Once more, it is 
perhaps a case of like being attracted to like; or in fact, it is about the narrative told by 
companies to attract those investors as well as motivate their stakeholders to keep involved. 
      Still, with corporate governance seen to be better for sectors with longer asset lives, this 
observation conceivably reflects a business desire to favour the longer term in a market 
whose overall makeup over time has changed. The reality, though, is a market balance 
favouring a majority of companies, where the perception is that things need to happen 
within a narrower time frame because that is the expectation. As Mauboussin and Callahan 
(2015) put it, ‘the appropriate period of evaluation has shrunk as the composition of the 
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market has shifted from companies more reliant on long-term assets to companies with 
shorter asset lives.’ Although as they go on to propose, ‘This is not short-termism but rather 
a clear-eyed reflection of the changes in the underlying economy.’ Yet, with asset lives 
reducing the perceived change in pace, or sense of urgency, for those sectors and companies 
involved is apparently speeding up. 
 
3.4.4 Psychological influences on a managerial sense of urgency: Urgency, as a factor of 
salience managers need to take account of in addressing the primacy of a stakeholder 
constituency’s interests, is an important psychological and temporal concern within 
companies.1 Yet, ‘given the different manifestations of time in organizational life, there is 
surprisingly little research on time in this setting’ (Goodman et al, 2001, p507; see also 
Bluedorn and Denhardt, 1988). Indeed, it is not just about how managers might interact with 
important constituencies or even markets to, say, favour a short-term position; albeit one 
accepts that view of their behaviour. Rather ‘there is a shortage of research in the project 
management literature on aspects of time other than clock time’ (Biesenthal et al, 2015). It 
is no surprise then that when it comes to the temporal concept of a sense of urgency with 
which managers might take action, something they undoubtedly need to do in a variety of 
different ways when faced with diverse and challenging situations, the dearth of 
management and psychological research is perhaps even more pronounced. An increasing 
trickle of applicable temporal studies is becoming evident however. As they begin to form 
an integrated body of work, a number of these are considered. 
 
i) Effects of time pressure: Deadlines are perhaps the most obvious pressure on a sense of 
urgency to act. Locke and Latham (1975, 1984) highlighted how deadlines employed in 
                                                          
1See Mitchell et al, 1997; see also Eyestone, 1978; Wartick and Mahon, 1994; Hill and Jones, 1992; 
Williamson, 1985. 
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association with an organizational goal increased that goal’s motivational aspect1. And in 
some cases, as Peters et al (1984) show with 164 managerial and non-managerial bank 
employees, with deadlines shortened performance can actually increase.2 
      But while deadlines may create a greater urgency to complete work in a shorter 
timespan, there is conversely ‘Parkinson’s Law’ (Parkinson, 1957), where ‘work expands so 
as to fill the time available for its completion’3. Hence, a reduction in a sense of urgency, as 
when deadlines lengthen subjects work at a slower pace (Bryan and Locke, 1967; Arvedson, 
1974). 
      Pressures of deadlines notwithstanding, for CEOs the time urgency they embody may be 
expressed in the way they handle the time management of their teams; and when teams do 
well, a CEO’s time urgency, according to Chen and Nadkarni (2017), is in turn positively 
related to their corporate entrepreneurship4. It is about how CEOs through their sense of 
time urgency interact with their senior managers to lead, motivate, and indeed push them, 
towards the corporate objective (see also Waller et al, 2001). 
      Whilst not specifically couched in terms of ‘urgency’ a few allied temporality studies 
are notable. For example, how time pressured decisions become more politically 
conservative (Hansson et al, 1974); how inequality of choice alternatives serves to lengthen 
the time for decision-making (Pollay, 1970) and so lessening any sense of urgency. And 
how ‘negative information’, that is information about why not to do something or what 
could go wrong, became more relevant as time pressure to make a decision increased 
(Wright, 1974).5 Similarly, the better the self-control in the face of rewards now versus 
                                                          
1See also: March and Simon, 1958; Bassett, 1979; Peters et al, 1984; McGrath and Kelly, 1986; Bluedorn and 
Denhardt, 1988. 
2See also Kelly and McGrath, 1985; Andrews and Farris, 1972 on the complexity of this finding and a possible 
U-shaped relationship. 
3Bluedorn and Denhardt, 1988, similarly highlight ‘Parkinson’s Law’. 
4Defined as activities covering innovation, corporate venturing, and strategic renewal (Zahra, 1996). 
5See also Ben Zur and Breznitz, 1981; Zakay and Wooler, 1984; also Greenwald, 1969, on how decision 
options are mediated not simply by time but also by option attractiveness. 
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rewards later the more an individual may be able to avoid procrastinating (O'Donoghue and 
Rabin, 1999). This is clearly useful for managers; although the researchers find such 
individuals may also be too fast on the trigger, having a tendency to act with excessive 
urgency! And an associated strand of this topic, though beyond this study’s range of 
coverage, is that of ‘intertemporal choice’; making some type of calculation of the economic 
tradeoffs with respect to the relative costs and benefits of taking an action sooner, more 
urgently, as opposed to later.1 
    
ii) Effect of individual differences and cognitive impact on managerial context: There is 
an apparent stability or systematic nature for the urgency phenomenon.2 Research on 
temporal orientation and deadlines, for example, considered the experience of time urgency 
amongst individuals (Waller et al, 2001). Yet in finding perceptions differ, they observe 
time urgency3, however, to be a relatively stable individual-difference personality variable. 
This variable differentiates into groups based on temporal orientation: time-urgent and non-
time-urgent. Time urgent individuals need schedules to drive them, often using deadlines as 
measures of the time remaining to complete a task. Non time-urgent individuals tend to be 
less concerned about remaining time, even tending to under-estimate its passage (Waller et 
al, 2001). Rastegary and Landy (1993) point out, that where there are tight deadlines it may 
indicate a need to intensify one's work pace as the deadline approaches. But, it is a pressure 
to get things done, that time-urgent individuals may feel more keenly than those who are 
non-time-urgent. By that account, time-urgent executives would be more likely to react to 
situations - or indeed favour one stakeholder group over another since it is the most 
                                                          
1See eg, Samuelson, 1937, on the discounted utility model in which the passing of time is conceived of as 
reducing the value of a behaviour or choice to be made; and recent work on how this idea is flawed due to 
oversimplification by Frederick et al, 2002. 
2That is it functions repeatedly in the same way amongst subjects or groups with the same temporal 
orientation. 
3Waller et al, 2001, define time urgency as the frequent concern with the passage of time. 
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expedient thing to do given the business constraints on them and the forces of their own 
personality.  
      Additionally, in many cases other psychological factors tend to impact a sense of 
urgency. Waller et al’s (2001) work emphasizes this aspect, in that while time urgency 
might be a relatively stable individual-difference variable, it is also understood to be about 
what the individual brings to bear cognitively to cause a different outcome in the face of a 
need to act with urgency. As Zakay (1993, p67) wrote ‘…time stress is a product of either 
real-time constraints or because of a subjective perception of time stress due to personality 
traits or managerial style’. Certainly, as time stress or pressure mounts – ie the time allowed 
or available to make a decision reduces – the research suggests there is a greater urgency to 
take action. Yet in those highly pressuring scenarios, the psychological as well as the 
contextual characteristics of decision alternatives appear to impact the urgency with which 
managers might act (see also Bluedorn and Denhardt, 1988). Indeed, as time pressure 
increases on individuals: a) the search for [viable] alternatives will become more vigorous, 
and b) selective perception will increase (March and Simon, 1958, pp.196-194). 
 
iii) Temporal synchronization and entrainment: A sense of urgency is often about how a 
manager perceives the pressure with which they should interact with time itself to get their 
project completed. Table 3.1 provides various definitions of time applicable to organizations 
and hence a means to understand the temporal framework managers work within. 
      Time pressures are also cues (zeitgebers) which underlie the sense of urgency to act 
managers experience. Examples include: deadlines for scheduled projects or processes, 
including a new product launch to be introduced to the consumer market by a particular date 
(Craig and Hart, 1992; Deschamps and Nayak, 1995); turbulence in the environment, 
including at its worst with the financial crisis; market or business uncertainty forcing a 
change in managerial behaviour (Crossan et al, 2005).  
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      Similarly, inter-institutional projects embody macro cycles set by dominant players or 
situations (Dille and Soderlund (2011).1 Viewed as time givers or time setters (also 
zeitgebers), these players create pace and speed for activities to proceed, or scheduled 
elements to be controlled, and to which other organizations in a project must adjust. The 
                                                          
1See Shi and Prescott, 2012, on the topic in relation to the acquisition of, or alliance with, another company. 
    
    Temporal term 
 
    Definition 
     
 
 
 
    Chronos 
     
     
    Objective, homogeneous, measurable, Newtonian time, (also termed even   
    time, physical time, calendar time, or clock time). Flows in one direction, linearly,   
    where the managerial goal is often to speed up organizational processes 
   
     
     
    Kairos 
     
 
     Subjective, heterogeneous, experienced, Einsteinian time (or event time)     
     
   
    Linear time 
     
 
    Linked to clock time and represents an objective understanding of time in       
    organizations as a limited organizational resource – eg projects with a  
    defined start and an end and to which time is allocated.    
     
 
 
    Cycle time 
     
 
 
 
    Time is seen as a recurring pattern, which enables predictions and planning   
    conceptually based on the past.    
     
 
                     Entrainment 
   
 
    The process of adjusting pace or cycle of one activity to synchronize with  
    Another.    
     
 
    Zeitgeber 
     
 
    Pacers or temporal cues that guide entrainment (a zeitgeber may also be     
    seen as a stimulus, and a sense of urgency a manager’s psychological  
    response).      
 
       
    Urgency  
 
       
      
     A cognitive response to external temporal cues largely in the form of time    
    pressures, and causing an altering of time horizon towards the shorter-term.  
    Time urgency, however, is also understood as a stable individual-difference  
    personality variable. 
 
 
       
    Monochronic and  
    polychronic time  
    use  
 
       
      
     The utilization of time can be monochronic, where one activity is done at a  
    time, or it can be polychronic, where many activities are done at the same   
    time (this may also be due to cultural variation – sometimes expressed as a  
    sequential versus a synchronous experience of time). Greater urgency may be  
    attributable to both forms depending on circumstance. 
 
 
Table 3.1: Temporal concepts (adapted from sources including: Hall, 1983; Das, 1991; Crossan et al, 2005;  
and as quoted in Biesenthal et al, 2015). 
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time given out or set, the researchers indicate, could also be by industry leaders or 
government entities through budget or audit cycles.  
      Management, therefore, must often synchronize its activities to get in step with players 
setting the macro pace for activities to proceed smoothly; a process referred to as 
‘entrainment’1. However, the difficulty is when there a failure to maintain synchronicity. 
Project entities could be out of sync with their different macro pacers causing devastating 
effects on the project (Dille and Soderlund (2011). Or if inter-institutional relationships 
operate at different cycles or temporal rhythms, it can lead to confusion and conflict, and in 
turn affecting successful collaboration (Biesenthal et al, 2015). Time overruns and being 
over budget are common outcomes. Alternatively, there is an absence of mediating 
zeitgebers, and a company cannot synchronize its chosen activities, as it does not receive the 
cues necessary to adapt and old patterns persist (Ancona and Chong, 1992; Ancona et al, 
2001). And without these cues a company is unlikely to manifest any sense of urgency when 
called to. 
      Given that a (positive) pacer impacting the company demands faster action it will 
potentially cause a company to act with greater urgency to achieve the same pace, with 
cycles matching. However, if an adapting tempo or pace is absent from a company it will 
likely return to its initial state, and any urgency with which a pace was attempted will 
deteriorate. McGrath and Kelly (1986), for example, showed that groups maintained their 
initial pace even when subsequently given differing amounts of time to complete their task. 
A change in pace is possible the researchers note, but subsequent entrainment is ’not as 
                                                          
1Entrainment concerns the process by which synchronization occurs (Table 3.1) and for it to work properly 
there must be some sort of repetition to give one process or activity a chance to latch on to another. The ability 
to entrain to a new cycle is understood as a function of exposure to ‘zeitgebers’, that are new pacers or cues 
(see Table 3.1), to which a company must adapt – synchronizing their tempo, rhythm or pace to the new cycle. 
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automatic and easy as initial entrainment’.1 This means that, however urgent the need, 
things get harder to change as time goes by and behaviours become entrenched. 
 
3.5 From temporality to narrative 
As the debate on primacy moved towards an ‘enlightened view’, to take account of a wider 
range of constituencies, there has also been a greater acceptance that taking this approach 
itself feeds into long-term value creation. By contrast, there has unfortunately been a 
generalized thinking that short-termism is associated with shareholder primacy. Reflected in 
the pre-Crash state of affairs, managers’ incentive contracts are a main cause for this issue, 
is the belief, and largely for all that is wrong with the corporate world. The research support 
for this is weak. While there were undoubtedly areas that needed to be addressed in the way 
companies were run that fed the financial crisis - including extreme pay discrepancies 
between employee levels, and external forces operating such as from institutional investors2 
- termism does not appear to be functioning as the main culprit in the way it is often thought 
to be. In fact, short-termism seems more likely led by board behaviour as well as managers 
themselves in a self-reinforcing cycle. Further, to consider short-termism from the 
perspective that all investors and companies are the same does not do justice to their 
variation, an aspect inherent to efficient market functioning. Certain companies, like 
electronics or wholesale companies, have to be short-termist because that is the nature of 
their business; and others, like utilities or pharmaceuticals, long-termist for the same reason. 
The jury is still out, therefore, on determining exactly how short versus long-termist 
behavior of corporate executives operated in relation to the financial crisis.  
                                                          
1It is a characteristic of the entrainment model that could explain why changing the senior executive team and 
the CEO often brings positive results, according to Ancona and Chong, 1996. 
2Pay discrepancies (CIPD, 2017) and institutional pressures as discussed are in evidence nowadays as well. 
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      A similar reasoning is applicable to the sense of urgency with which executives acted. 
Although highlighted in the way it has been in this review, a sense of urgency represents an 
alternative way of thinking about this temporal concept as something distinct from short-
termism, though related. Although, the scenario in place with respect to the Crash is again 
unclear. Still, because the normative view seems to be that short-termism and a sense of 
urgency to act – along with a focus on shareholder primacy – were the prevailing 
perceptions prior to the Crash of 2008, the research hypotheses1 of the present study take 
their lead from that in an attempt to ascertain the reality.  
      But if any certainty is possible to draw from the literature on this topic, it is that of the 
fundamental importance of temporality – termism and a sense of urgency – to the corporate 
governance methods businesses employ. This applies internally as well as externally to the 
way managers think, strategize, and interact with their markets. Indeed, with recent work on 
integrated reporting,2 time horizon is an increasingly recognized factor companies need to 
take into account when they assess, through developing their reporting narrative, their 
operational and systemic behaviour, with the aim of improving these integratively for value 
creation ‘both now and in the future’ (Howitt, 2017). It is about time. And for companies 
time is a factor that cannot be undervalued. 
 
     
       
 
                                                          
1For example, NUR prior to the Crash. See H2a. 
2See the IIRC: https://integratedreporting.org/what-the-tool-for-better-reporting/ 
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4. The Development and Implementation of the Narrative 
Staining Technique 
 
 
 
 
     
 
This investigation presents a complex set of research questions and hypotheses. These relate 
to changing managerial primacy and temporality perceptions as they impact corporate value 
creation in response to the 2008 Crash. An outcome of this complexity is the requirement to 
assess multiple variables simultaneously – this is something that does not appear to have 
been attempted previously. And the approach chosen to undertake this is a narrative-based 
qualitative analysis.  
      An approach of this type often begins with some form of content analysis of a text. In 
this investigation, however, a corpus linguistic approach appeared more suited to an in-
depth assessment of the collected datasets: multiple annual reports for different stakeholder 
domains. It was also more suited to the requirement to make comparisons of these domains 
over time. And fundamentally, for corpus linguistics, its analytical rationale is less about 
themes, as focused on with content analysis, and more about an examination of patterns 
found in the text, which is particularly relevant to the high volume term frequency data this 
study generated. Sinclair (1991, p100) aptly stated ‘language looks rather different when 
you look at a lot of it at once’.  
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      Furthermore, beyond simply assessing whether comparative change occurred - with 
respect to how managerial thinking about value creation altered in relation to the financial 
crisis - this study additionally sought to visually map these changes in primacy and 
temporality perceptions as the catastrophic effects on businesses were experienced. Corpus 
linguistic techniques, stressing a patterning aspect, appeared therefore to offer a useful 
methodology.  
      But while a corpus linguistic approach provided insights, the multiple demands of the 
investigation required something more than currently available to carry out the analysis in 
its entirety. As a consequence the technique of narrative staining was devised and applied.  
      This chapter discusses the development of the narrative staining technique as a novel 
qualitative methodology, problems experienced as the approach was progressed, and how 
the technique was implemented for this investigation. To begin, an overview is given of 
some relevant qualitative approaches that bear on the research analytics required for this 
study.  
 
4.1 Comparing qualitative techniques   
Discourse analysis was initially considered for the investigation but quickly found to be 
unsuitable. Primarily the reasons for this were: its unit of coding was too large, utilizing the 
sentence or categorical level; its focus tends to be on a fairly small particular text or two 
rather than being easily used comparatively across large multiple corpus datasets; and it is 
concerned with how individuals construct categories, and is hence a subjective approach 
depending largely on the context and discursive qualities of the writer of the text, as well as 
the interpretation by the investigator. Meaning can be fluid. Indeed, discourse analysis aims 
at revealing socio-psychological characteristics of people involved rather than text structure.  
It is an approach, therefore, too abstract. For this research, an approach was required that 
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readily homed in on the text structure itself. Data had to be inherent in the text and not a 
result of an exploration of how any categories were socially constructed. Hence, the need 
was for a far more objective analysis to consider how data might change over time to reflect 
managerial bias. 
      By contrast, content analysis, which seemed applicable to the textual focus of the study, 
attempts to describe the characteristics or properties of documents and communication 
objects, such as textual data, pictures, audio, or video, in some manner. As such, it may have 
a number of purposes and cover a variety of techniques (Neuendorf, 2002). It sometimes 
gets used, as a result, as a catch-all term, including for both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Yet the procedure can lead to being able to make valid inferences from the text 
(Weber, 1990, p.9) and in a systematic manner (see Krippendorf, 2004, p.3). However, as a 
descriptive technique inference is limited to that text and by the scope of the content. Hence, 
it is not causal, nor can in some form, one document be related to another, which was a 
requirement for making comparisons over the crisis period. 
      At its simplest, the use of content analysis to examine frequencies of word occurrences 
in a text or corpus - which is where this research similarly takes its lead. Another use is to 
extract an underlying theme from an examination of the spoken or written material of 
individuals – a procedure eliciting data examinable qualitatively or quantitatively. The 
procedure often involves thematic coding, so building up a picture of the distinctive, often 
subtle, perceptions reflected in the material that may be prevalent. For example, looking at 
organizational or stakeholder behaviours.    
      Yet while thematic features were relevant, the conclusion was that content analysis was 
inadequate as an approach because it could not handle all the analytical requirements of the 
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current research.1 Besides the above issues, any social or organizational constructs identified 
in a content analysis are in a singular thematic form, whereas this research required the 
functioning of bias to be understood when corporate value - even as a theme - is viewed in 
the context of different dimensions on which it impacts (ie components of primacy and 
temporality). This is a far more complex construct. A theme of stakeholder behavior – or 
any other variable including that of corporate value – on its own would not therefore 
provide the necessary data to address the hypotheses, which consider combined constructs 
(eg H1a: Pre Crash, value-related terms will dominate in the space representing short-term 
ShP).  
      Likewise, when using content analysis more thematically it may be concerned with 
meaning, intention and consequence (Downe-Wamboldt, 1992) to try to make sense of the 
construct found and examined. While this may help theoretically to describe the corporate 
value phenomenon of interest and provide the flexibility to make abstractions (see eg 
Robson, 1993), data in this research does not require consideration in that way. Instead, and 
in line with basic content analysis, a more elementary frequency-based approach is used.  
      Examining frequencies is fundamental to corpus linguistic analysis too. And, in further 
comparing content analysis with corpus linguistics, a corpus linguistic search to explore 
term use can, by contrast, be as simple or as complex as one wants it to be (see eg Gries, 
2016). Such analyses may thus have a much larger scale of focus and assessment2 than 
content analysis, making it potentially of use. However, though having more flexibility with 
corpus sizes3 than content analysis - where a very limited number of texts or other objects 
                                                          
1There is also thematic analysis as a separate but similar technique to content analysis though similarly found 
to be too abstract for the needs of this research (see Vaismoradi, et al, 2013). 
2Where term frequencies underlie the use of not only corpus linguistic analysis, but also perceptual mapping 
and correspondence analysis (See also Lebart et al, 1998). 
3This refers to the number of documents within a corpus. One document, however, can contain millions of 
words. 
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such as transposed interviews may be used – corpus linguistics can similarly have 
limitations. 
      Content analysis might also be considered contrived, as constructed themes in analyses 
are dependent on the investigator’s evaluation of what constitutes a theme. Corpus 
linguistics however is more objective, and with a concern on language use in real contexts 
(Adolphs and Lin, 2011). On that basis, one important linguistic analytic method is 
colocation analysis. And with its mapping facility, it was initially thought applicable for this 
research. Work on climate change (Fig 4.1) by Grundmann and Krishnamurthy (2010), for 
example, is a foremost study demonstrating how a visual assessment can be made of a 
discourse through examining the collocation of words; that is how one particular word is 
present in relation to another. It also showed, significntly, how colour could be used to 
indicate changes in perception. And a method of visualization was specifically a 
requirement for the present research in mapping how bias with respect to primacy and 
temporality might alter over time. 
      In applying collocation, an examination is made of each side of the discourse to see if, 
or how, it differs from the other. In one part of their study, drawing on twenty years of 
newspapers in the US and the UK, Grundmann and Krishnamurthy compared how the terms 
‘change’, ‘warming’ and ‘greenhouse’ varied in relation to other high frequency terms 
within a five-word proximity. These terms were then colour coded according to a specific 
area of interest, or frame as they identify it, though in essence a theme. 
      It is an interesting study as it shows a variation between the UK and the US in the way 
each country thinks – whether by a political, scientific or an action frame. For example, the 
UK (with more purple) is seen as far more action-oriented than the US on climate change. 
Based on term frequencies the approach in general demonstrates a visual mapping of how 
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the thinking about a concept – in this case climate change – can be compared between 
corpuses and mapped. 
 
 
 
      In relation to the present research, this type of linguistic analysis, designed to explore 
language use for a given corpus, seemed to offer analytical possibilities. It was feasible, for 
example, to examine frequencies over time, one corpus against another, by such an 
approach and map the effect. Independently, too, the idea of using terminology relating to 
‘action’, had been thought an interesting notion to explore. For this study, it took expression 
as a sense of urgency to act – and in comparison to other research, finessed more in 
conception as part of a larger temporal construct.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1: Simple mapping by colour. Source Grundmann and Krishnamurthy (2010) 
Initial search term to identify appropriate texts: cc = climate change, gw = global warming, ge = greenhouse effect 
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      Yet while all that was the starting point for this investigation, a standard corpus 
linguistic analytical approach was not suited to the requirements. It would not have been 
possible, it was felt, to examine a complex variable as had been conceived in this way (ie 
primacy and temporality together – see Introduction). Indeed, looking at the frequencies of 
each part of such a combination individually for mapping was not an option. In many ways 
corpus linguistics, though often sophisticated for identifying patterns, as Grundmann and 
Krishnamurthy (2010) demonstrated very well, did not allow the addressing in some 
combined or multivariate manner the impact of one frequency on another as it changed over 
time; rather a purely corpus linguistic approach would take the research in a different 
direction. Such methodology also generally confines itself to two or three corpuses at a 
time, whereas in this research there were two primary corpuses and ten secondary ones. 
Furthermore, this type of corpus linguistic analysis lacked a sufficiently advanced 
visualization tool. Hence, one that could handle the multiple variables this research 
employed (ie two time periods, themselves variables, for: shareholder primacy bias, 
stakeholder primacy bias, short-term time horizon, long-term time horizon, along with the 
use of value-related terms or VRTs)1. And it meant that, while providing considerable ideas 
for tackling the research challenge faced, a corpus linguistic analysis approach was not 
feasible.  
      In sum, the design of most qualitative analytical techniques, whether content analysis or 
others2, and differing with respect to thematic verses pattern evaluation, enables the 
                                                          
1See Appendix 4 for examples 
2For applications and their limitations see: Timmis, 2015: p.4, on what can be done with corpuses; Scott, 1996, 
p53, on semantic prosody, how a word can take on a positive or negative orientation by virtue of its 
association with another word (eg ‘sure’: as in definitely sure v not sure); corpus stylistics, the exploration of 
literary texts, (see eg the CLiCDickens project at Nottingham); and Uhis and Greenfield (2011) - utilizing 
Greenfield's Theory of Social Change and Human Development (2009) in conjunction with Kasser and Ryan’s 
Aspiration Index (1996), for generating a list of aspirational terms for experimental testing, such as how the 
desire for ‘fame’ or ‘power’ changes over time, http://faculty.knox.edu/tkasser/aspirations.html. It is about 
changes in a value system. The application of this corpus linguistic orientated approach is to a content analysis 
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handling of only a limited number of datasets. And colocation analysis apart, all have 
inadequate or non-existent mapping capabilities, a component the present research required. 
A colocation analysis while not appropriate for this research, however, is nevertheless a 
related methodology to what was ultimately to become narrative staining. 
 
4.2 Casting a different approach 
Investigating the financial crisis over time presented considerable challenges to determine 
the way primacy and temporality variables required specification and examination, as well 
as mapping how they changed over the period of investigation. Standard linguistic analysis 
techniques, as discussed, while providing insights about how to go about the research were 
nonetheless unsatisfactory for the task it was found. As a result of the lack of suitable 
methodologies for the needs of the present research, therefore, that the approach of 
narrative staining was devised.  
      Narrative staining - itself based on perceptual mapping found in marketing - is 
essentially a qualitative approach. As an addition to the family of corpus linguistic analysis 
techniques, through using frequencies too, narrative staining also has a quantitative element. 
Additionally, it is a type of advanced graphical methodology. This narrative-based 
analytical method is, consequently, useful for analysing multivariate research questions 
from high volume frequency data – which is to say, where more than one conceptual 
phenomenon is simultaneously under investigation and the requirement is to look at the 
interplay. More specifically, the method allows a visual assessment of complex (interacting, 
term-based) variables in large corpuses. Comparisons can then be made of multiple 
corpuses, both contemporary or at different time points. If taken to its conclusion for this 
                                                          
of TV shows in different decades to see how any shift in communitarianism versus individualism might be 
operating. 
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extensive purpose, the approach is also a type of qualitative data reduction method. Chapter 
6 explores the far-reaching implications of this, as there is an impact on many academic 
domains as well as other areas of scientific and business importance.  
      The name ‘narrative staining’ is inspired from the variables (as combined terms) when 
processed appearing much like bacteria in a Petri dish once treated in some manner to 
change their colour. The name apart, from this central analysis, other secondary analyses are 
then possible – generally by making frequency counts of the data in different ways – that 
allows for further research questions to be addressed. 
      Applied to analysing the way a complex (combined) construct, corporate value, operates 
over time, narrative staining, rather than describing the construct, as with content analysis, 
focuses on its dynamic form in the context of primacy and temporality as it is impacted over 
the period of the financial crisis. Indeed, it is not how the construct is used per se, rather it is 
the objective change in its use that is to be assessed. Q1, for example, seeks an answer about 
a change in the relative merits of shareholder versus stakeholder primacy. Moreover, there is 
an avoidance of absolute conceptions of the construct of corporate value. The only interest 
is in the perception of relative change in corporate value in some larger comparative sense 
as a focus over time. In that regard, no qualitative method appears to date to have used a 
combinatory approach for assessing multiple variables. Hence, perceptual change, expressed 
as a combination of variables, reflects the manner managerial bias impacts on, firstly, who 
those executives favour (shareholders or stakeholders) and, secondly, their temporal horizon 
(short-term or long-term) in creating corporate value.  
       Additionally, in contrast to content analysis and the centring on what Hacker (2004) 
called the ‘visible communication content’ in applying narrative staining the theme of 
corporate value – and its specification as VRTs – is chosen in advance of an analysis of the 
text. It is not an extracted or ‘visible’ theme, or text-dependent in that sense, but a pre-
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selected one. The purpose of this is to make the investigation research led rather than text 
content led.  
      Colour coding based on themes is routinely a part of content analysis. However, 
narrative staining utilizes a different type of colour coding. Crucially, instead, the basis of 
the colour coding applied is on the combinations of the variables of VRTs and DimSyns1. 
And it is the distribution of these coloured combos, rather than any themes – as understood 
by content analysis - that generates the mapping effect over time. Hence, this was not 
achievable with currently available content analysis or alternative linguistic analysis 
methodologies. 
      Whilst the focus of qualitative analytical approaches is on a limited number of datasets, 
narrative staining is, rather, a qualitative data reduction method. Due to this there is great 
flexibility when it comes to examining multiple corpuses - and with particular applicability 
to multivariate research questions from high volume frequency data for complex variables. 
      The observation may be made of a small number of data insufficiencies in the dataset of 
occasionally missing data points (see Appendix 3). However, the scale of the analysis – one 
of the features made possible by the approach – has helped to smooth out anomalies, 
particularly from the large primary corporate and regulatory corpuses.  
      The technique has not been easy to develop but the reward is that narrative staining has 
proven highly effective in analysing a very large body of data in an original way; and 
beyond the parameters of this study, it is also has broader relevance. Indeed, narrative 
staining, where terms are extracted and handled dissimilarly to other methodological 
techniques, and with its ability therefore to look at complex bias, can be understood as 
having a different purpose to a collocation analysis or other related corpus data extraction 
                                                          
1And as seen below, coloured according to what DimSyn (primacy or temporality) the combo contains, not the 
VRT, as this gives a more effective result. 
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methods. On that basis, narrative staining appears to fit as another form of corpus linguistic 
analysis, and with consequently extensive application. 
      Furthermore, something that does not appear to have previously been undertaken is to 
look at multiple corpuses in the way conducted for this investigation. Yet the method 
developed has provided a window into the multi-actor, value-creating outlook of companies. 
Coupled with looking at other stakeholder organizations it provides a view across the 
economy of business thinking in regard to value creation apparently never before observed.   
 
4.2.1 From simple perceptual mapping to more sophisticated possibilities: In using the 
narrative staining technique its underlying analytical methodology, based on perceptual, or 
positioning mapping1 as it is also called, was found to be connected with correspondence 
analysis (see also Lebart, et al, 1998). This opens up other areas of possible investigation – 
as well as potentially further quantitative analysis if a study requires it. 
      Important corpus linguistic studies using correspondence analysis and that bear on the 
current research include: measuring the changing usage of scientific terms over time 
(Degaetano-Ortlieb et al, 2013); how gender difference relate to spoken English (Brezina, 
2013); and comparing English and Japanese professional writers of English language, such 
as journalists, to assess how they each express their discourse (Yasuhiro, 2013).2 
      The key point is how the methods are geared to analysing high volume frequency data in 
visual form; perceptual mapping (largely used in marketing) and correspondence analysis 
(with wider academic use). This is in contrast to SPSS3, which appears never to have been a 
                                                          
1The use of these names is interchangeable. See: MEXL from DecisionPro Inc, http://www.decisionpro.biz/,  
the utility used in the present research 
2Statistics Package for Social Scientists; often the first choice for conducting analyses but apparently not for 
graphic requirements. 
3See also: van der Veen, et al (2008) on diachronic analysis – a time-based data comparison. Their work is 
relevant to the current research, even though theirs is a study in the field of environmental archaeology. It is 
also important for using Conoco, another correspondence analysis utility. In addition: Abdi and Bera (2014) on 
the relationship between types of music favoured and colour preference; and the extensive work on 
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favoured option in any easily identifiable research, despite its significance-testing 
capabilities and the numerical statistics it can generate.        
      Furthermore, while much of this material was not detectable early on – as there was no 
one to furnish the information directly – the extensive effort to find it was eventually 
rewarding. To date, the current research appears to be the first to look at corporate 
behaviour and perceptual bias with respect to value creation, and to attempt it from the 
angle of complex variables. In addition, the achievement of this is within the context of 
narrative, which has been key to the analytical focus taken.  
      Nevertheless, having gone through this investigative process, the multidisciplinary usage 
of these techniques highlighted is here observed not only to be germane to the present work, 
and how narrative staining could evolve, but could also be said to similarly reflect the type 
of cross-boundary research this study embodies.  
 
4.3 Some research difficulties encountered 
Narrative staining begins with the collection of narrative material in order to form (original) 
corpuses. However, apart from the challenge of developing a methodology, discussed 
above, it was equally a challenge initially acquiring material. There were also technical 
problems that needed addressing. The following section reviews several of these difficulties. 
 
4.3.1 Acquiring annual reports for company and stakeholder organizations: Going back 
to 2004 or 2005 material was not always available, on either dedicated websites (eg 
PortAlchemy) or academic databases (eg Northcote). Material had to be narrative-based not 
financial reports and accounts (FRAs). It may be noted, some specialist portals were not in 
                                                          
correspondence analysis and its development as an important methodological approach by one of the foremost 
writers on the technique, Michael Greenacre. In particular, the measurement of raw data of ecological samples 
(Greenacre, 2010).  
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existence until fairly recently. The outcome is a lack of historic content. In addition, they 
often use the same corporate sources to find and display company reports, and if the 
company has not made it available for indexing or uploaded (for which they sometimes pay 
a fee to commercial sites) they are not there. Companies were, therefore, contacted directly 
– sometimes they had reports and sometimes they did not! As a result, tracking down of this 
information required the expenditure of significant time. One company (UDG Healthcare) 
had its original registration in Ireland and therefore presented a slightly different set of 
access difficulties. The designated contact for investment matters, in this case, did not reply 
to requests. A contact in the subsidiary did, providing a copy of an early report, though it 
was a very poor photocopy. All other companies did respond, and were helpful in providing 
what they could. Although, similar problems were faced with the peripheral stakeholder 
organizations. 
      Another problem was the changes that companies had gone through over time. There 
were name changes as well as takeovers, but also a movement with respect to their placing 
in the FT250. Over such a time span as covered in this research these types of changes are 
inevitable. So an initial check was made of companies on when they were established. All 
were in existence at 2004 or prior – with existence an obvious pre-requisite for going public. 
With regards ranking in the FT250, except for one company, ranked in 2015, they were 
generally all constituents of the FT250 for 2004 and 2012. It was Sophos, in fact, that 
gained its ranking in 2015. However, it was determined acceptable to stay in the research, as 
it was the only company in the overall study that had this profile, though more importantly 
had an analysable history for the time period required. If ranking of companies was in 2004 
and 2012 but fell out later that would not have been considered a problem; as it was those 
particular periods that were of interest. However, all companies had gained their rank at the 
time of the study and so it is true to say they were all FT250 constituents.  
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      Besides accepting the natural evolution expected of companies as they transform to meet 
the challenges of their markets, some flexibility was necessary here too due to the 
difficulties accessing for each company both website information and annual reports and 
doing this for two time periods. With these criteria, the choice of companies for the study 
was not simply a matter of looking up a list of FT250 constituents and picking some. Indeed 
a lot of sifting took place. Hence, being too strict in this regard would have led to having 
insufficient information. It was a matter of balance. 
 
ii) Corporate websites: The analysis of corporate websites initially formed a pilot study to 
test the methodological approach and the analysis software. Later incorporation of these 
results into a larger dataset were made along with the annual reports – although dropped in 
the final analyses, as they were only representative of the corporate corpus, not the full 
twelve. 
      The biggest problem encountered was to be able to analyse multiple pages of a 
company’s website. And to do this for both pre-Crash and post-Crash periods.1  
 
4.3.2 Additional technical problems faced: 
i. Utilizing content providers correctly: A decision had to be made concerning the best 
system to use: ProQuest or Factiva? In due course, the finding was that Factiva was 
better. Also a challenge at first was to find the best way to generate content from 
searches carried out. After trial and error, the finding was that the single search term 
‘corporate governance’ gave the most effective results and that generated content 
that allowed independent assessment of the frequency of VRTs and DimSyns. 
                                                          
1Textstat, a corpus analysis utility, was used to do this. 
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Additionally, as a term, the finding was that ‘corporate governance’ also had the 
added feature that needed employment: that it did not contain any of the VRT or 
DimSyn terms. 
 
ii. Forming and using a specialized corpus for frequency analysis in this research: 
Specialized corpuses proved a vital factor in this kind of investigation. And it is 
something that had to be constructed. It is particularly important too since this 
investigation is heavily company-focussed and the requirement was the assessment 
of change in bias within these (and peripheral stakeholder) organizations. 
 
iii. Term size:  A range of terms were generated for VRTs and DimSyns (see Appendix 
4). These included single word terms and multiple word terms. For VRTs for 
example: cash, earnings, margin, business strategy, sustainable advantage, and 
strategic management. For the time horizon DimSyns, there were potential terms 
such as: brief, persistent, fast-track, and slow deployment. It would be useful to use 
multiple word terms to obtain a more rounded view of how companies think. But in 
practice, single word terms are far more prevalent in annual reports – something all 
companies produce – so there is little choice other than to use them. 
 
iv. Problems with term meanings: One of the biggest issues that had initially required 
grappling with related to value primacy definitions: The corporate governance 
literature uses several terms related to corporate stakeholders, but often somewhat 
loosely. Shareholder value, for example, may also mean shareholder primacy or 
shareholder value primacy; and similarly where the stress is on stakeholders as the 
central terminology of use ie stakeholder value and stakeholder value primacy, and 
so forth. The same is true if the use of terminology for shareholder value 
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maximisation is considered. And for companies themselves, there is often a 
difference between corporate value (a monetary amount) and corporate values (the 
core philosophies that drive a company’s conduct, and in many cases espoused 
through their mission statement). The addition of one letter, an ‘s’, makes a 
considerable difference to perceived meaning – particularly for those working in the 
corporate world. Although just to confuse things, a corporate value could also mean 
one core value in a list of corporate core values. Similarly, an understanding of 
corporate value may be purely from an accounting point of view; eg the present 
value of all cash flows before the planning horizon plus the present value of all 
predicted cash flows after the planning horizon. 
       While in many cases of analytical research a consideration of these types of 
nuances might not matter much here a way was needed to pick this apart 
linguistically so that it could be seen exactly how perception was actually being 
impacted and who exactly was being impacted. It was, therefore, necessary to 
address the degree of blurring. And as a result, the conception used of measurement 
variables was as dimensions. And the dimension chosen of shareholder primacy and 
stakeholder primacy (corporate governance dimension) refer, always, to categories of 
individuals – eg investor, manager, owner, and so forth. In the same way, when 
considering long-term or short-term or urgent to act and non-urgent to act (temporal 
dimension) it refers to a perception or related affect. And then, likewise, another 
measurement variable, a value-related term, was then always a descriptor of a 
generally accepted term used to mean value in some form, such as share or earnings. 
There could be theoretical controversy or debate over a value-related term’s usage as 
to its being truly reflective of value (eg price v efficiency) but all these value-related 
terms deemed acceptable for the master list played in to the concept of value through 
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a wide-ranging perspective of how such terms are used by different constituencies 
when talking about corporate value.   
  
v. Handling document word bias: Such as where there is a differential appearance of 
particular terms in different documents. Eg ‘price’ may appear more in a company 
report than in a regulatory report. All terms that are comparable in some way are 
important to tell us the narrative differences of interested, and most usefully 
compared to highlight the narrative of a particular set of terms to reflect a mass 
perception. Bearing in mind there is an external choosing of terms, the idea was to 
find a term that best reflects the content of all the material examined.  
 
vi. Term noise: For example, ‘share’ can mean I will share with you, or it can mean a 
share of a company. In constructing the frequency list, these terms all required 
checking. Also considered was term context. This becomes relevant when examining 
phrases like ‘short-term’, where the context could be positive or negative, as in the 
company has shown short-term success v the company has been a complete failure 
in the short-term. Another, issue to contend with was how to handle word variants. It 
was not an issue for all terms chosen for VRTs and DimSyns but where applicable a 
set of rules about what to include had to be set – and the solutions was to be 
consistent in applying the rules. Included with ‘environment’, for example, were 
‘environments’, ‘environmental’, and ‘environmentally’. 
 
vii. Corporate dataset orientation concerns: Though this research has focussed on UK 
FT250 listed companies, in reality big companies frequently have global operations, 
and are not only UK-oriented. The upshot of the situation is that, while quite 
understandable and indeed appropriate that managers would steer their companies 
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that way, it is nevertheless difficult to get a fully UK-centric view of business from 
them. This is something that can potentially bias the results in the sense that any 
study of this nature can never truly be about a total UK perspective of how UK 
companies perceive value. 
 
viii. Validity concerns when comparing time periods: How certain, for example, might 
the thinking be that any difference – or movement in term perception – found 
between the two time periods looked at are a valid reflection of any change caused 
by the Crash of 2008? In reality, as with any scientifically rigorous correlational 
analysis there cannot be an ascription of causal reasons; that the Crash altered 
corporate perception concerning the value narrative cannot be said in absolute terms. 
What can be said, however, is that a relationship is observable. And because the 
Crash was the biggest event between the time periods examined, the assertion that 
the Crash is a major associated factor in changing perception amongst corporate 
executives as well as other stakeholders – rather than a cause – has considerable 
validity.  
 
4.4 Applying the ‘narrative staining’ procedure  
The analytical part of narrative staining entails the extraction of term frequencies for 
specific pre-selected categories of terms appearing in stakeholder corpuses for pre and post-
Crash time points. Corpuses are then compared according to the research questions and 
hypotheses detailed in the Introduction. 
      To that end - and hence in order to undertake an analysis of complex terms within 
corporate narrative as this investigation required - a number of stages must be gone through 
(researcher instructions are given in Appendix 5). Many of the stages, it can be noted, 
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whilst simple in theory and often involving repetition, in practice can require a lot of time-
consuming effort. In Stage 1, for example, the production of a specialized corpus (as was 
constructed a number of times) may involve collating extensive material from multiple 
sources after making personal approaches to the appropriate organizations; none of which, 
as discussed above, may be straightforward to do. 
 
4.4.1 The narrative staining procedure as undertaken considered in more detail: 
i. Conceptualization of a complex topic: First, is a clear specification of the concepts for 
investigation – though as indicated above accomplishing this was not straightforward and a 
degree of objectivity was necessary to pick apart amalgams of financial concepts concerning 
shareholder primacy, stakeholder primacy, and corporate value, that have popular 
resonance.    
      Once specified, the approach taken was to collate a variety of terms often used for these 
concepts. Rather than an exact version of a concept – which is unfeasible due to the 
impossibility of definition in many cases – what is aimed for are terms in use by 
organizations that are a reflection of a theme or an underlying construct. Hence, this 
research is not attempting to define corporate value. In the majority of instances this means 
a ‘family resemblance’1, may be attributable to different terms; but bearing in mind the 
fluidity of language, they might not always reflect common thinking. Then deemed as 
‘related’ in some way, any variety of these terms form a single category. For the main 
research variable, namely perceived corporate value – which by this process can include 
terms that concern both financial and non-financial value – a depiction of the terms of 
                                                          
1A concept from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, as terms are not quite synonymous but related. 
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interest are therefore made as value-related terms or VRTs1. But to understand the further 
complexity involved with respect to this study’s research questions – in other words to see 
how the VRTs might be affected by perceptions as companies pass through the Crash of 
2008 – then considered are the contextual, similarly perceptually-rooted factors, as 
dimensions. For this research, the interest is on the primacy of shareholders versus 
stakeholders. And as with the VRTs, terms for these shareholder and stakeholder 
dimensions (DimSyns) are chosen in a likewise manner.  
      As indicated in the Introduction the VRTs and dimensions can be understood as 
operating within a conceptual search space. This space is a representation of a corpus, and 
with more than one corpus dataset examined – representing pre-Crash and post-Crash 
periods – it allows a format for detecting movement and hence picking up any changing bias 
over time. 
 
ii. Creating a master list for choice of initial terms: Choice of Terms used was by virtue of 
being the most relevant on the master list of terms (see Appendix 4). The component lists 
consisted of value-related terms and dimension synonym terms – this latter set covering 
corporate governance terms for dimension that included: primacy (shareholder and 
stakeholder) and temporal (termism and sense of urgency). Together, all these terms formed 
the basis for assessing how their corpus frequencies, pre and post-Crash, were later observed 
and hence fed in to the narrative staining procedure. The construction of the master list was 
as follows: 
 
                                                          
1This method, it may be noted, is applicable to other research areas too where instead of perceived corporate 
value the topic requiring examination might be, for example, ‘belief’ where it would be a BRT, or 
‘disaffection’, a DRT, and so forth accordingly. 
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a) Choice of value-related terms (VRTs): These were taken from the business 
literature and popular business press, (eg, ‘competitive advantage’, ‘market forces’, 
‘price, ‘share’...). Table 4.1 shows the final list, containing a whittled down selection 
of VRTs. Its production was by assessing for relevance using the Ngram1 viewer of 
the British Library. This generates a measure of user-defined search volume data of 
its digital web archive2. The viewer can generate monthly usage search volume data 
for any term between 2004 and 2011. Also used for an alternative measure of 
monthly web search volume for particular terms was Keyword Spy3. The aim of the 
site facility is website promotion. As data was progressively collected for both 
measures a correlation was run which showed a fairly strong relationship (r=0.67). 
Later term analysis therefore mainly used Keyword Spy, as this was easier to 
implement. 
      Terms may include those describing value assessment (eg monetary), those 
reflecting value drivers (eg connected to productivity improvements), or other 
related phrases. Yet what the research is interested in here is not a structural 
understanding of value, or indeed how some of the terms may be interrelated with 
others in any attempt to depict what business value is, but rather how these value-
related terms might track over time. Terms like competitive advantage, market 
forces, earnings, assets, strategic management, CSR, ethical behaviour, stock option, 
and so forth, were candidates through sifting out for the most relevant ones. In 
practice, as noted above, single-word terms were found to be better to use as they 
                                                          
1The basis of the Ngram viewer is the concept of ngrams, referring to a contiguous sequence of n elements in a 
sample of speech or text. However, an explanation of this, from the field of computational linguistics, is 
outside the interest of the present research. 
2See http://www.webarchive.org.uk/ukwa/ngram/ 
3See www.keywordspy.com 
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tended to have higher frequencies of corpus use, making it much easier to find 
instances to assess. 
 
b) Choice of dimension synonym terms (DimSyns): A similar approach was 
undergone to source DimSyns then check for relevance as was conducted for value–
related terms. Shown in Table 4.1 is the final list containing a whittled down 
selection of DimSyns.  
      As illustrations of initial candidates of synonymous terms, a consideration was 
made of the following (see also Appendix 4), and where some of these terms were 
eventually used. However, there was a rejection of several on technical grounds. For 
example, and as previously noted, single word terms are more likely to be used as 
they work better than multiple word terms which have low frequency of occurrence 
in annual reports.  
 
• On the corporate governance dimensions (ie shareholder primacy, 
stakeholder primacy) for ‘shareholder’: shareholder, investor, equity partner, 
stock owner, etc; for ‘stakeholder’: stakeholder, manager, agent, supplier, 
and employee.1  
• On the temporal dimension, for termism (Long-Term): time horizon, future 
objectives, plans etc, for termism (Short-Term): temporary, now, etc.  
• On the temporal dimension for a sense of urgency (urgency to reorientate): 
must do something, action, execute, force, hurry, etc; and a sense of urgency 
(non-urgency to reorientate): all’s ok, aligned, balanced, fine, etc. 
 
                                                          
1The term ‘employee’ whilst having a monthly search volume of 5,000,000 (see Appendix 4) is nonetheless a 
much rarer term in annual reports, making it difficult to use. 
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iii. Further selection by frequency analysis: Extracted from the master list were twenty 
VRTs and twenty DimSyns (Table 4.1), using criteria of highest search volume frequency 
data. 
      Numbers on the vertical axis refer to the VRT reference position in the Excel 
spreadsheet used, so ‘Alliance’ is number ‘16’ and so forth. 
      Shown in Fig 4.1 are the graphed results. This initial analysis using corporate websites 
formed the pilot study1.  
      The graph in Fig 4.1 shows the frequency analysis for the twenty chosen VRTs 
conducted on the corporate website dataset. This was a corpus constituted with the websites 
of the 20 FT250 companies examined in this investigation, and for the same years the 
annual reports were assessed (2004 and 2012). In a similar manner to Table 4.1, numbers 
refer to their reference position in the Excel spreadsheet, though here on the horizontal axis; 
so once again ‘16’ is ‘Alliance’ and so forth.  
 
                                                          
1Website results were incorporated into part of the main analysis to produce a wider stakeholder corpus for the 
initial assessment and determination of terms to use. However, in the final analysis corporate website 
frequency data was not included as no other peripheral stakeholder domain had suitable websites for analysis, 
and hence for further comparison – ie the use of website data might have skewed the result so this part of the 
corporate corpus dataset was removed. One reason for this eventuality is that corporate websites have a 
different audience, often the general public. However, corporate websites and other stakeholder organizations’ 
material, largely based on annual reports, have a more business-oriented audience. 
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     Corpuses for both time points were analysed for frequencies of the same terms. What is 
observable in Fig 4.2 is how some terms in the analysis – due to greater frequency – drew 
apart from pre to post-Crash. That was one of the criteria of interest, along with whether 
terms had any implied connection that made intuitive sense when considered together – as 
the basis for a following stage where sought would be a formation of, and a balance in, 
combinations. For example, whether some terms were financially oriented and others were 
non-financially oriented with respect to value creation.  
Table 4.1 – Examples of terms used 
    
Extracted terms from the master list, both value-related terms (VRTs) and dimension synonyms (DimSyns) 
   
   ShP=shareholder primacy; StP=stakeholder primacy; LT=long-term; ST=short-term 
 
1Cells in yellow refer to terms used in preliminary analysis, as detailed below in Fig 4.2 (these terms 
subsequently also forming VRT-1 variables). Note that, as only used in later combinations DimSyns are 
unnumbered. 
2’Customer’ is a stakeholder term but it can also be a value-related term where a customer is an asset amenable to 
leverage. It is a characteristic of language that terms often have varied meaning dependent on context. The 
implication of this is that it is necessary to make a choice on usage for conducting research. Likewise, other 
single terms are feasible but dependent on their document frequencies, eg ‘environment’ or ‘community’ may be 
good potential stakeholder terms – and have high search volume - but have rare occurrence in a specific text.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
Table 4.1 – Examples of terms used 
    
Extracted terms from the master list, both value-related terms (VRTs) and dimension synonyms (DimSyns) 
   
   ShP=shareholder primacy; StP=stakeholder primacy; LT=long-term; ST=short-term 
 
1, 2 
(VRT) 
(DimSyn) 
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      The same analysis was conducted for the corporate annual reports Table 4.2, for 
example, shows how the term frequencies were analysed in greater depth in Excel. 
 
 
 
      With comparably interesting results obtained from an analysis of annual reports, and 
added to the websites making a fuller corporate managerial view, as a result ultimately of 
the pilot study and further analysis the terms chosen were: customer (c), price (p1), return 
(r), and share (s). As indicated in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 where the cells are coloured yellow. 
     The frequency and graphical analysis indicated that the four VRTs chosen were 
interesting and of greater importance to explore. That is not to say that other terms would 
not be assessed, or that they were not interesting by themselves or in combination, but 
simply that this was the first group thought suggestive to be looked at. Additionally, of 
importance here was the development of a new methodology; terms can then be added later 
for further investigation – as in fact a variety were to the extent possible in this research. 
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      The frequency analysis used Textstat and Nvivo analytical software. Textstat is a free 
utility for carrying out corpus linguistic analytics on websites. Nvivo allows advanced 
analysis of qualitative data from textual material. Also done was a normalizing of the data 
for each document in the corporate dataset, a procedure allowing comparisons across 
documents with varying numbers of words. This also allowed an amalgamation of the 
documents into one single corpus – though a consideration was also made of websites and 
annual reports separately. Yet, as seen later, the finding was that annual reports were the 
more useful. 
 
Table 4.2 – Extract from term frequency table for annual reports for three of the twenty FT250 
companies examined (‘stdrdzd’=normalized).  
Period pre post pre post pre post pre post pre post
Number of 
words in doc 1450 8181 31756 60868 26141 50912 29221 55249 30305 60253 28584 64076 25881 55813 30393 42493 41969 81138 35419 52380 23193 55344 39434 62681 40402 70732 8909 13307 6387 22801 49320 75506 21933 51727 43922 72114 23203 34658 24193 57429 562015 1047662 recheck
Terms
Value-related raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd raw stdrdzd CO: T/ShV CO: T/ShV CO: T/StV CO: T/StV CO: T/LT CO: T/LT CO: T/ST CO: 
T/ST
co index pre co index 
post 
co index 
pre
co index 
post 
pre post
Alliance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.000 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 7.000 0.240 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.051 4.000 0.064 2.000 0.050 1.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.041 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.091 12.000 0.232 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.000 0.129 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.019 0.073 0.043 0.110 0.057 0.258 0.114 0.079 0.041 20.000 0.004 -0.512 -0.360 2.680 1.963 ####### 54.08982 2 1
Capital 4.000 2.759 23.000 2.811 31.000 0.976 63.000 1.035 43.000 1.645 44.000 0.864 50.000 1.711 96.000 1.738 29.000 0.957 39.000 0.647 40.000 1.399 94.000 1.467 55.000 2.125 76.000 1.362 42.000 1.382 59.000 1.388 59.000 1.406 140.000 1.725 46.000 1.299 43.000 0.821 57.000 2.458 100.000 1.807 67.000 1.699 55.000 0.877 64.000 1.584 103.000 1.456 17.000 1.908 23.000 1.728 15.000 2.349 33.000 1.447 52.000 1.054 132.000 1.748 19.000 0.866 77.000 1.489 56.000 1.275 66.000 0.915 34.000 1.465 29.000 0.837 39.000 1.612 96.000 1.672 1.596 1.392 3.436 3.160 5.180 4.215 12.186 8.463 3.737 3.051 20.000 0.172 1.050 1.013 4.242 3.336 82 75
Communication 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 18.000 0.567 17.000 0.279 9.000 0.344 14.000 0.275 2.000 0.068 2.000 0.036 3.000 0.099 6.000 0.100 7.000 0.245 10.000 0.156 4.000 0.155 23.000 0.412 1.000 0.033 6.000 0.141 5.000 0.119 11.000 0.136 4.000 0.113 8.000 0.153 4.000 0.172 7.000 0.126 4.000 0.101 5.000 0.080 9.000 0.223 12.000 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.000 0.182 7.000 0.093 1.000 0.046 14.000 0.271 3.000 0.068 10.000 0.139 2.000 0.086 2.000 0.058 6.000 0.248 3.000 0.052 0.144 0.134 0.309 0.304 0.466 0.405 1.095 0.813 0.336 0.293 -0.403 -0.245 2.789 2.078 7 7
Competition 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.000 0.157 2.000 0.033 0.000 0.000 3.000 0.059 0.000 0.000 5.000 0.090 0.000 0.000 9.000 0.149 1.000 0.035 8.000 0.125 0.000 0.000 3.000 0.054 5.000 0.165 1.000 0.024 1.000 0.024 20.000 0.246 0.000 0.000 3.000 0.057 2.000 0.086 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.032 0.000 0.000 3.000 0.042 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.075 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.000 0.053 0.000 0.000 10.000 0.193 3.000 0.068 7.000 0.097 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.029 0.000 0.000 6.000 0.104 0.027 0.073 0.058 0.166 0.087 0.222 0.204 0.445 0.063 0.160 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968 1.000 -0.519 -0.306 2.673 2.017 1 4
Customer 0.000 0.000 10.000 1.222 65.000 2.047 99.000 1.626 2.000 0.077 11.000 0.216 19.000 0.650 87.000 1.575 4.000 0.132 23.000 0.382 21.000 0.735 128.000 1.998 10.000 0.386 39.000 0.699 15.000 0.494 48.000 1.130 45.000 1.072 116.000 1.430 120.000 3.388 123.000 2.348 11.000 0.474 40.000 0.723 8.000 0.203 35.000 0.558 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 15.000 1.127 6.000 0.939 53.000 2.324 21.000 0.426 105.000 1.391 19.000 0.866 21.000 0.406 35.000 0.797 211.000 2.926 3.000 0.129 15.000 0.433 1.000 0.041 4.000 0.070 0.643 1.130 1.384 2.565 2.086 3.422 4.907 6.870 1.505 2.476 0.097 0.751 3.289 3.074 33 61
Dividend 0.000 0.000 5.000 0.611 7.000 0.220 45.000 0.739 31.000 1.186 52.000 1.021 34.000 1.164 43.000 0.778 7.000 0.231 6.000 0.100 53.000 1.854 109.000 1.701 38.000 1.468 73.000 1.308 33.000 1.086 28.000 0.659 50.000 1.191 82.000 1.011 39.000 1.101 62.000 1.184 32.000 1.380 68.000 1.229 19.000 0.482 68.000 1.085 12.000 0.297 8.000 0.113 3.000 0.337 1.000 0.075 5.000 0.783 15.000 0.658 67.000 1.358 97.000 1.285 41.000 1.869 53.000 1.025 47.000 1.070 54.000 0.749 3.000 0.129 8.000 0.231 40.000 1.653 66.000 1.149 0.943 0.835 2.030 1.897 3.060 2.530 7.198 5.080 2.208 1.831 0.397 0.456 3.589 2.780 48 45
Enterprise 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.031 3.000 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.031 2.000 0.077 4.000 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.000 0.071 1.000 0.012 6.000 0.169 3.000 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.016 5.000 0.124 2.000 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.044 2.000 0.041 4.000 0.053 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.039 1.000 0.023 1.000 0.014 2.000 0.086 2.000 0.058 3.000 0.124 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.024 0.080 0.056 0.121 0.074 0.285 0.149 0.087 0.054 -0.509 -0.355 2.683 1.969 2 1
Environment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 21.000 0.661 33.000 0.542 15.000 0.574 47.000 0.923 29.000 0.992 60.000 1.086 15.000 0.495 24.000 0.398 46.000 1.609 91.000 1.420 32.000 1.236 82.000 1.469 28.000 0.921 27.000 0.635 11.000 0.262 66.000 0.813 25.000 0.706 14.000 0.267 10.000 0.431 25.000 0.452 6.000 0.152 72.000 1.149 20.000 0.495 74.000 1.046 0.000 0.000 5.000 0.376 0.000 0.000 5.000 0.219 41.000 0.831 71.000 0.940 3.000 0.137 11.000 0.213 11.000 0.250 35.000 0.485 7.000 0.302 20.000 0.577 11.000 0.455 34.000 0.592 0.526 0.680 1.131 1.545 1.705 2.060 4.011 4.136 1.230 1.491 -0.021 0.301 3.171 2.625 27 37
Equity 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.244 16.000 0.504 74.000 1.216 22.000 0.842 61.000 1.198 20.000 0.684 66.000 1.195 36.000 1.188 69.000 1.145 6.000 0.210 63.000 0.983 12.000 0.464 66.000 1.183 11.000 0.362 45.000 1.059 21.000 0.500 68.000 0.838 16.000 0.452 53.000 1.012 10.000 0.431 63.000 1.138 45.000 1.141 47.000 0.750 21.000 0.520 67.000 0.947 2.000 0.224 4.000 0.301 4.000 0.626 46.000 2.017 34.000 0.689 87.000 1.152 12.000 0.547 80.000 1.547 20.000 0.455 65.000 0.901 16.000 0.690 37.000 1.068 11.000 0.455 50.000 0.871 0.549 1.038 1.182 2.357 1.782 3.144 4.192 6.313 1.286 2.276 0.003 0.659 3.195 2.983 28 56
Information 4.000 2.759 0.000 0.000 53.000 1.669 53.000 0.871 16.000 0.612 35.000 0.687 14.000 0.479 100.000 1.810 29.000 0.957 64.000 1.062 32.000 1.120 50.000 0.780 21.000 0.811 117.000 2.096 19.000 0.625 86.000 2.024 35.000 0.834 75.000 0.924 34.000 0.960 37.000 0.706 16.000 0.690 62.000 1.120 25.000 0.634 43.000 0.686 23.000 0.569 126.000 1.781 7.000 0.786 13.000 0.977 7.000 1.096 33.000 1.447 38.000 0.770 84.000 1.112 9.000 0.410 106.000 2.049 30.000 0.683 75.000 1.040 22.000 0.948 32.000 0.923 21.000 0.868 56.000 0.975 0.914 1.154 1.967 2.620 2.966 3.494 6.977 7.015 2.140 2.529 0.368 0.775 3.560 3.098 47 62
Investment 0.000 0.000 7.000 0.856 34.000 1.071 78.000 1.281 58.000 2.219 64.000 1.257 40.000 1.369 84.000 1.520 122.000 4.026 100.000 1.660 58.000 2.029 104.000 1.623 21.000 0.811 67.000 1.200 28.000 0.921 27.000 0.635 68.000 1.620 117.000 1.442 57.000 1.609 49.000 0.935 32.000 1.380 55.000 0.994 68.000 1.724 68.000 1.085 34.000 0.842 97.000 1.371 29.000 3.255 18.000 1.353 15.000 2.349 24.000 1.053 69.000 1.399 77.000 1.020 27.000 1.231 47.000 0.909 87.000 1.981 58.000 0.804 27.000 1.164 42.000 1.212 20.000 0.827 40.000 0.697 1.591 1.145 3.425 2.601 5.163 3.469 12.146 6.964 3.725 2.510 1.045 0.766 4.237 3.090 82 62
Labour 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.033 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.020 1.000 0.034 2.000 0.036 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.017 2.000 0.070 1.000 0.016 2.000 0.077 0.000 0.000 3.000 0.099 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.048 8.000 0.099 4.000 0.113 1.000 0.019 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.036 1.000 0.025 3.000 0.048 0.000 0.000 3.000 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.041 1.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.019 0.055 0.043 0.082 0.057 0.193 0.115 0.059 0.041 -0.521 -0.360 2.671 1.963 1 1
Manufacturing 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 8.000 0.252 0.000 0.000 24.000 0.918 41.000 0.805 8.000 0.274 11.000 0.199 5.000 0.165 25.000 0.415 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 24.000 0.927 33.000 0.591 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.024 1.000 0.024 0.000 0.000 12.000 0.339 2.000 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.000 0.182 23.000 0.305 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.019 7.000 0.159 1.000 0.014 9.000 0.388 19.000 0.548 3.000 0.124 0.000 0.000 0.188 0.149 0.404 0.338 0.609 0.450 1.432 0.904 0.439 0.326 -0.358 -0.230 2.834 2.093 10 8
Pay 0.000 0.000 16.000 1.956 39.000 1.228 132.000 2.169 22.000 0.842 80.000 1.571 36.000 1.232 131.000 2.371 53.000 1.749 134.000 2.224 65.000 2.274 114.000 1.779 39.000 1.507 106.000 1.899 28.000 0.921 69.000 1.624 49.000 1.168 167.000 2.058 32.000 0.903 105.000 2.005 36.000 1.552 121.000 2.186 6.000 0.152 5.000 0.080 49.000 1.213 92.000 1.301 35.000 3.929 29.000 2.179 8.000 1.253 73.000 3.202 51.000 1.034 119.000 1.576 13.000 0.593 116.000 2.243 71.000 1.617 155.000 2.149 37.000 1.595 49.000 1.414 28.000 1.157 71.000 1.236 1.296 1.861 2.789 4.226 4.205 5.637 9.891 11.316 3.034 4.079 0.750 1.482 3.942 3.805 67 101
Performance 0.000 0.000 3.000 0.367 37.000 1.165 142.000 2.333 24.000 0.918 115.000 2.259 50.000 1.711 85.000 1.538 38.000 1.254 117.000 1.942 47.000 1.644 158.000 2.466 35.000 1.352 158.000 2.831 58.000 1.908 88.000 2.071 105.000 2.502 212.000 2.613 61.000 1.722 101.000 1.928 23.000 0.992 107.000 1.933 83.000 2.105 191.000 3.047 88.000 2.178 198.000 2.799 1.000 0.112 13.000 0.977 0.000 0.000 16.000 0.702 105.000 2.129 270.000 3.576 21.000 0.957 85.000 1.643 78.000 1.776 129.000 1.789 31.000 1.336 63.000 1.818 39.000 1.612 115.000 2.002 1.369 2.032 2.946 4.613 4.441 6.153 10.447 12.354 3.204 4.453 0.823 1.653 4.015 3.976 70 110
Price 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.122 7.000 0.220 49.000 0.805 17.000 0.650 30.000 0.589 20.000 0.684 34.000 0.615 15.000 0.495 47.000 0.780 26.000 0.910 88.000 1.373 16.000 0.618 69.000 1.236 26.000 0.855 52.000 1.224 25.000 0.596 83.000 1.023 26.000 0.734 42.000 0.802 27.000 1.164 49.000 0.885 17.000 0.431 44.000 0.702 31.000 0.767 75.000 1.060 1.000 0.112 2.000 0.150 0.000 0.000 16.000 0.702 78.000 1.582 97.000 1.285 13.000 0.593 45.000 0.870 27.000 0.615 22.000 0.305 22.000 0.948 39.000 1.125 20.000 0.827 25.000 0.435 0.640 0.805 1.378 1.827 2.077 2.437 4.886 4.892 1.498 1.763 0.094 0.426 3.286 2.749 33 44
Resource 0.000 0.000 3.000 0.367 19.000 0.598 10.000 0.164 10.000 0.383 13.000 0.255 11.000 0.376 13.000 0.235 20.000 0.660 23.000 0.382 11.000 0.385 48.000 0.749 8.000 0.309 13.000 0.233 3.000 0.099 5.000 0.118 7.000 0.167 9.000 0.111 15.000 0.424 12.000 0.229 0.000 0.000 4.000 0.072 15.000 0.380 63.000 1.005 20.000 0.495 67.000 0.947 5.000 0.561 1.000 0.075 7.000 1.096 5.000 0.219 22.000 0.446 29.000 0.384 7.000 0.319 7.000 0.135 16.000 0.364 16.000 0.222 8.000 0.345 9.000 0.260 12.000 0.496 19.000 0.331 0.395 0.325 0.851 0.737 1.282 0.983 3.016 1.974 0.925 0.712 -0.151 -0.054 3.041 2.269 20 18
Return 0.000 0.000 4.000 0.489 12.000 0.378 35.000 0.575 14.000 0.536 16.000 0.314 19.000 0.650 45.000 0.814 20.000 0.660 21.000 0.349 21.000 0.735 34.000 0.531 15.000 0.580 52.000 0.932 33.000 1.086 33.000 0.777 27.000 0.643 94.000 1.159 18.000 0.508 26.000 0.496 19.000 0.819 32.000 0.578 15.000 0.380 10.000 0.160 2.000 0.050 42.000 0.594 12.000 1.347 18.000 1.353 3.000 0.470 5.000 0.219 31.000 0.629 42.000 0.556 17.000 0.775 35.000 0.677 26.000 0.592 9.000 0.125 10.000 0.431 19.000 0.548 6.000 0.248 8.000 0.139 0.576 0.569 1.239 1.292 1.868 1.724 4.395 3.461 1.348 1.248 0.030 0.190 3.222 2.513 30 31
Share 6.000 4.138 43.000 5.256 66.000 2.078 331.000 5.438 231.000 8.837 289.000 5.676 175.000 5.989 213.000 3.855 145.000 4.785 335.000 5.560 192.000 6.717 376.000 5.868 227.000 8.771 352.000 6.307 242.000 7.962 243.000 5.719 267.000 6.362 438.000 5.398 181.000 5.110 267.000 5.097 211.000 9.098 306.000 5.529 151.000 3.829 330.000 5.265 293.000 7.252 352.000 4.977 74.000 8.306 12.000 0.902 48.000 7.515 61.000 2.675 254.000 5.150 452.000 5.986 147.000 6.702 459.000 8.874 229.000 5.214 286.000 3.966 198.000 8.533 243.000 7.011 242.000 10.003 498.000 8.672 6.618 5.402 14.243 12.265 21.471 16.359 50.512 32.844 15.492 11.839 6.071 5.023 9.264 7.346 340 292
Strategy 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 18.000 0.567 20.000 0.329 5.000 0.191 16.000 0.314 9.000 0.308 26.000 0.471 35.000 1.155 46.000 0.763 18.000 0.630 66.000 1.030 3.000 0.116 46.000 0.824 12.000 0.395 15.000 0.353 9.000 0.214 139.000 1.713 18.000 0.508 58.000 1.107 13.000 0.561 55.000 0.994 18.000 0.456 142.000 2.265 15.000 0.371 58.000 0.820 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.075 0.000 0.000 5.000 0.219 13.000 0.264 49.000 0.649 12.000 0.547 12.000 0.232 8.000 0.182 27.000 0.374 9.000 0.388 13.000 0.375 11.000 0.455 48.000 0.836 0.365 0.687 0.786 1.560 1.186 2.081 2.789 4.179 0.855 1.506 -0.181 0.308 3.011 2.632 19 37
shareholder - 
stakeholder
long-term - short-
term
scaled for circle 
with 360 deg and 
magnified scaled for LT
pre post pre post Total words p/doc pre Total w/p/d postpre post pre post pre postpre post pre post pre postpre post pre post pre postpre post pre post pre postpre post pre post pre postpre post pre post pre post
(Pharm) (Recruitment)(Oil & Gas Prod) (Auto Services) (Software) (Food) (Healthcare) (Gaming)(Chemical) (Home Construction) (Transport) (Electronics) (Pubs) (Infrastructure consulting ind/eng - Oil & (Retail) (Defence/Aero-space) (Manufacturer) (Eng Serv) (Biotech) (Utility)
f (standardized)
Average  totalSophos Tate & Lyle UDG Rank Vectura Page GroupNational Express Electro-components Greene King Amec Cairn Energy AA
Term frequency table for FT250 companies, pre and post crash (managerial database using annual reports)
AO World Qinetiq PZ Cussons Bodycote BTG Pennon Grp Croda Redrow
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4.4.2 Term combinations: The terms chosen were then examined in combination, using the 
approach of ‘n choose r’, often denoted as n!/r!(n-r)!, for different subsets, hence 4 choose 3 
as shown below in Table 4.3. Although initially calculated manually for the pilot study – by 
forming matrices, and then reading off the required combinations, as Table 4.3 indicates – 
more complex calculations for the main study were done with an Excel calculator1 that was 
adapted for use in this investigation.   
 
 
 
     Simply as an example of how the approach works, Table 4.4 demonstrates the outcome 
of this procedure for the first 11 VRTs using a 4-element set. Though as explained below 
much of the analysis was conducted on the 8-element set (as a larger set of results these 8 
choose r sets are given in Appendix 6), and making these 4-element combinations redundant 
for the main part of the research as they contain no DimSyns. The combination frequencies 
were then multiplied to give the product on which the subsequent data analysis was 
conducted. 
 
 
    
                                                          
1Source: http://www.get-digital-help.com/2015/02/26/return-all-combinations/#comment-285532). 
c p1 r s   Result (code) 4-element combo product 
definition 
✓ ✓ ✓   cp1r customer x price x return 
✓  ✓ ✓  crs customer x return x share 
✓ ✓  ✓  cp1s customer x price x share 
 ✓ ✓ ✓  p1rs price x return x share 
Table 4.3 
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Level 
Ref 
number 
4-element combo 
code 
4-element combo product 
definition 
bi 
1 cp customer x price 
2 cr customer x return 
3 cs customer x share 
4 p1r price x return 
5 p1s price x share 
6 rs return x share 
tri 
7 cp1r customer x price x return 
8 crs customer x return x share 
9 cp1s customer x price x share 
10 p1rs price x return x share 
quad 11 cp1rs customer x price x return x share 
 
 
      As a conventional starting point, this 4-element combo formulation allowed the 
conducted of an initial exploratory frequency analysis on the primary (corporate and 
regulatory) corpuses. Results confirmed that differences in term usage in this combined 
form over the period were evident.1 
 
4.4.3 Including dimension synonyms: Having confirmed that the combo approach 
generated differential findings for the VRTs, the next step was to assess how they behaved 
in an interactive form with dimensions of interest to this investigation, hence that of primacy 
and termism. Using an 8-element set for the main analysis, an examination was made of all 
terms in order to form combos (ie including DimSyns with VRTs). These terms were 
handled in the same way as the initial set of four VRTs (customer, price, return, and share), 
                                                          
1Preliminary and intra-corpus term frequency analyses are given in Appendices 8 – 10. This includes for 4-
element and 8-element combinations where DimSyns are included with the VRTs.  
Table 4.4: Coded term combinations for a 4-element set 
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considering their frequencies to sift out the most relevant. There were another four terms 
making eight in total, which additionally included: investor (i), manager (m)1, permanent 
(p2), now (n). Respectively, these represented the dimensions of shareholder primacy, 
stakeholder primacy, long-term and short-term. This formed the basis for the Set 1 analysis. 
 
4.4.4 Deeper levels of analysis: With an n choose r approach as the value of r increases 
from 2 to 4 (the latter being the maximum r value) there are increasing combo levels to 
investigate. These are represented as bi, tri and quad levels. In a similar way to that 
demonstrated in Table 4.4, calculated accordingly are the product frequency totals. 
 
4.4.5 Basic filtering: With an 8-element set balancing is necessary so as to allow for 
possible VRT/DimSyn bias (ie even though these were all being treated simply as terms at 
this point, representatives of all one type or the other was not wanted – though 
representative of each were wanted). Thus to exclude combos that could not be effectively 
used involved filtering. Table 4.5 shows excluded bi combos in with a fuller table for tri and 
quad combos provided in Appendix 7.  
 
 
cp Customer, price im Investor, manager 
cs Customer, share ip2 Investor, permanent 
cr Customer, return in Investor, now 
ps Price, share mp2 Manager, permanent 
pr Price, return mn Manager, now 
sr Share, return p2n Permanent, now 
 
                                                          
1This may seem an odd choice for the stakeholder category. But based on academic definitions of a 
stakeholder (see Chapter 2, Fig 2.5), managers are stakeholders, and the term ‘manager’ is thus understood as 
a stakeholder term. And while other stakeholder terms (eg ‘employee’) may be seen as better, it is subjective. 
Additionally, there are constraints based on the narrative itself, ie what terms are actually present in the text 
used so are measurable. 
Table 4.5: Filtered bi combo exclusions for Set 1 VRTs 
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      For example cp, representing customer and price, could not be used in the main analysis 
as they are both VRTs; nor in a bi combo can ip for investor and permanent as there would 
be no VRT. Similarly, in a tri combo cp2n (customer, permanent, now) would be excluded. 
The reason is that terms in the combo from different dimensions conceptually represent 
opposing ways of thinking. Hence, individuals (shareholders and stakeholders) whose 
viewpoint are being measured cannot be both long-term and short-term oriented 
simultaneously (ie permanent and now respectively). As a result, their experimental 
treatment, as a general rule, is to cancel each other out.1 Combos similarly cannot be 
oriented for both shareholder primacy and stakeholder primacy in their perception for the 
same VRT.  
 
4.4.6 Sets of variables examined: For the research overall, four studies were conducted, 
with each using a different combination set of VRTs and DimSyns. As above, all 
                                                          
1This will be explained in more detail in Section 4.6.3: Rules applied to tri and quad combo output and dealing 
with partials 
 
Set 1. VRT-1: customer, price, return, share; DimSyns-termism: short-term (now), 
long-term (permanent). 
Set 2. VRT-2: equity, pay, performance, strategy; DimSyns-termism: short-term 
(now), long-term (permanent) 
Set 3. VRT-1 and DimSyns-sense of urgency: urgency-to-reorientate (action), non-
urgency-to-reorientate (efficient). 
Set 4. VRT-2 and DimSyns-sense of urgency: urgency-to-reorientate (action), non-
urgency-to-reorientate (efficient). 
 Fig 4.3. Sets of VRT and DimSyn variables 
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frequencies were initially determined. In the first two studies, there was a variation of the 
value-related terms but there was use of the same DimSyns.  
      In the third and fourth the same VRTs (as in Set 1 and Set 2) were used but in these 
cases looking at the alternative temporal dimensions for a sense of urgency; which reflects a 
need to take action or not. Hence, an urgency-to-reorientate (UR) and a non-urgency-to-
reorientate (NUR), where the DimSyns respectively were action (a) and efficient1 (e2).  
 
4.4.7 Further combo processing for initial analysis of multiple stakeholder corpuses: 
 
 
i. Data normalization: Having produced letter (bi) combinations, their corresponding term 
combination frequency totals are calculated. However, frequency data for each term had to 
normalized, as with single terms (see Table 4.2), and so enabling cross-corpus comparisons. 
Normalization is done prior to multiplying to form a combo, it may be noted. For the 
corporate dataset (websites and annual reports), this was done for each term of each of the 
twenty FT250 companies used. The regulatory dataset, though large, required a more 
straightforward normalization as there were a smaller number of documents. The other 
stakeholder corpuses were later similarly handled. To make results easier to work with a 
scaling factor, 10n, was applied. Hence, the calculation was: (term1 frequency/no of words 
in doc1) x (term2 frequency/no of words in doc1)… x (10n), and so forth  
      This procedure does not change the distribution of results across conditions – though 
may statistically – but rather amplifies the results, allowing processing of these by utilities 
that would otherwise have problems carrying out calculations on extremely small numbers 
(see also Appendix 5. Stage 9). 
                                                          
1It may be thought that ‘efficient’ would not be an opposite to ‘action’. However, when things are efficient 
they are working fine and no changes are required; there is no need for action. 
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      At this time, there has been use of a basic product of term frequencies in the combo 
formation to reflect value-creating perceptions. However, the work holds out the possibility 
of using more complex mathematical combinatory relationships between terms that might 
better mirror how the brain perceives intricate concepts, an effect going beyond the province 
of corporate governance.    
 
ii. Comparing multiple corpuses in greater depth: The above process yielded 96 usable and 
comparable combinations for the 8-element set with term subsets for bi, tri and quad levels 
analysed, hence subsets ≤4 (note there are 112 combos if partials included)1. Also looked at 
for completeness during the pilot study were the frequencies for the 4-element set.2  
      For the next step, there was the use of another filtering procedure. This was on the 
combinations to determine which ones had increased (or decreased) over time the most 
according to stakeholder corpus. Constructed for this purpose was a minimax difference 
measure, with automatic calculation for this set up using an Excel template. It applied the 
following simple formula: (High – low)/high. 
      The application of this formula was to pre and post-Crash datasets, and yielding a result 
for each term across all available stakeholder corpuses, which were now all included in the 
analysis3. The dataset produced had a range of 0 – 100 for each data point generated. 
However, a result could be higher in pre or post-Crash datasets so the information of 
whether a result was pre or post-Crash had to be preserved. This was accomplished by 
denoting pre-Crash results with a ‘-‘ symbol (and post-Crash results simply with no 
additional symbol). This choice of this approach was due to being best indicative of 
direction; it did not mean actual values were negative or positive.  
                                                          
1This will be explained in more detail below in Section 4.6.3). 
2As shown in Appendices 8 and 9. 
3The minimax output is given in Chapter 5, Table 5.1 
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      However, treated in this manner the data lent itself to correlational analysis. Thus Q3 – 
assessing whether regulatory changes over the crisis period were associated with changing 
executive perceptions of corporate value – could be addressed.1  
      Filtering of the minimax results allowed a highlighting of the visual effect. Colour 
coding was used for ranges at or above +/- 60% - 80% and +/- 80% - 100% and the others 
ignored. This output shows that colour coded cells distributed unevenly, indicating how they 
could reveal patterns that might vary amongst different stakeholders. 
 
iii. Filtering output of perceptual maps: Minimax difference filtering was also useful when 
generating perceptual maps (a process described in the next section). Where combos in a 
map appeared to be providing an erroneous impression of their impact, they could be 
excluded based on their minimax difference value, or a pre to post-Crash normalized data 
difference. In practice, there was often a 20% cut-off used, with any combo below that 
amount removed. 
 
4.5 Stakeholder corpuses used 
The overall corpus contained sub-corpuses that included corporate documentation for pre 
and post-Crash time periods, made up of corporate annual reports and website pages for 
twenty FT250 companies, while the regulatory corpus consisted of hard law and soft law, ie 
The Companies Act, Corporate Governance Codes and The Stewardship Code. These sub-
corpuses were the main focus of the initial research. Table 4.6.a gives a breakdown of 
constituents and corpus sizes. Then extending the study, there was a consideration of ten 
other stakeholder organizations (Table 4.6.b) through the information they produced. 
 
                                                          
1Q3a and Q3b looking at soft and hard law respectively could also be addressed. 
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a) Primary Corpuses Word Sizes 
i. Regulatory corpus – pre and post-Crash with number of words in sub-corpuses 
Pre-Crash Total 
 
Post-Crash 
 
Total 
Companies Act 
2006 
Combined Code 
2003 
 Companies Act 2006 
with amendments 
and notes 2015 
UK Corporate 
Governance Code 
and Stewardship 
Code 2012 
 
307,806 22,469 330,275 569,115 14,716 583,831 
 
ii. Corporate corpus – pre and post-Crash (2004/2012)1 with number of words in sub-corpuses 
by company 
Company Sector Annual Report 
 
Website 
 
  pre-Crash Post-Crash Pre-
Crash 
Post-Crash 
AO World  Retail 1,450 8,181 14,781 131,836 
Qinetiq Defence/Aero-space 31,756 60,868 40,973 45,395 
PZ Cussons Manufacturing 26,141 50,912 30,191 39,600 
Bodycote Engineering Services 29,221 55,249 6,033 59,035 
BTG Biotech 30,305 60,253 47,529 38,999 
Pennon Grp Utility 28,584 64,076 10,872 26,737 
Croda Chemical 25,881 55,813 8,124 27,851 
Redrow Home Construction 30,393 42,493 18,133 86,539 
National Express Transport 41,969 81,138 35,384 19,897 
Electro-components Electronics 35,419 52,380 36,332 34,926 
Greene King Pubs 23,193 55,344 12,813 40,072 
Amec Infrastructure 
consulting ind/eng - Oil 
& Gas 
39,434 62,681 25,057 27,041 
Cairn Energy Oil & Gas Products 40,402 70,732 26,380 16,249 
AA Auto Services 8,909 13,307 43,583 104,688 
Sophos Software 6,387 22,801 31,903 99,320 
Tate & Lyle Food 49,320 75,506 10,575 12,557 
UDG Healthcare 21,933 51,727 11,154 8,446 
Rank Gaming 43,922 72,114 13,169 42,820 
Vectura Pharmaceuticals 23,203 34,658 10,520 9,191 
Page Group Recruitment 24,193 57,429 40,604 118,972 
      
Totals  562,015 1,047,662 474,110 990,171 
 
 
Table 4.6. Primary and Secondary Stakeholder Corpus Constituents and Word Sizes 
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1      
      In constructing this original stakeholder corpus dataset a balance between constituents 
was sought. For the formation of the primary corpuses - the regulatory domain apart due to 
the limited documents available - there was careful selection of varied FT250 companies, 
                                                          
1In a small number of cases when specific year reports not available the nearest year’s documentation was used 
eg 2005 and 2011. 
Table 4.6 Cont.  
b) Secondary Corpuses Word Sizes - pre and post-Crash with number of words in sub-
corpuses 
Organization Corpus constitution Corpus word size 
  Pre-Crash Post-Crash 
Financial 
Services 
Authority (FSA) 
Annual reports and business reports for 2004/2005 and 
2011/2012. 
90,901 112,886 
Financial Times 
(FT) 
All FT article sources for 2004 and 2012 from digitized 
newspapers. A single primary search term of 'corporate 
governance' used to pull a manageable corpus via 
Factiva - this then searched as with other corpuses. 
682,131 185,237 
Newspapers 
(general) 
Combined article sources for The Times, Sunday Times, 
Daily Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph, The Guardian, both 
2004 and 2012 from digitized newspapers. A single 
primary search term of 'corporate governance' used to 
pull a manageable corpus via Factiva - this then 
searched as with other corpuses 
181,525 152,565 
Centre for Policy 
Studies (CPS) 
Variety of corporate governance related topic reports, 
2004 and 2012 
75,313 57,229 
Confederation of 
British Industry 
(CBI) 
Annual reports 2004-2005 and 2012 10,611 15,423 
Chartered Inst. 
of Management 
Accountants 
(CIMA) 
Annual reports 2004 and 2012 11,650 25,517 
Inst. of 
Chartered 
Secretaries and 
Administrators 
(ICSA) 
Annual reports from 2005 to 2006 and 2011 to 2012 17,000 9,280 
Inst. of Directors 
(IOD) 
Annual reports plus relevant corporate governance 
documents for 2004 and 2012 - also includes ecoDa 
report, 'Comply or Explain' for 2012. 
25,528 26,445 
Inst. of Public 
Policy Research 
(IPPR) 
Variety of corporate governance topic reports, 2004 and 
2012 (labelled ‘a’), and for the same years mixed reports 
on energy and climate change (labelled ‘b’). The two 
document groups were combined as a total (‘a’+’b’). 
173,962 
    
(a:72,098) 
   
(b:101,864)  
397,192 
   
(a:243,902) 
   
(b:153,290)  
Trades Union 
Congress (TUC) 
Congress reports and associated website documents, 
2004 and 2012. 
191,753 211,295 
    
Totals  1,460,374 1,193,069 
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with the aim of no more than two or three from each business or industry area. For the 
secondary corpuses of peripheral stakeholder organizations, a cross-section of different 
types of organization was similarly sought. 
       A significant amount of time and effort went into the sourcing and production of this 
broad corpus dataset. Achieved, however, was as even an organizational mix as possible for 
assessing changing perceptions over time with respect to a variety of stakeholder narratives 
concerning corporate value. 
 
4.6 A perceptual mapping approach 
Standard graphing utilities have limitations, being unable to depict multiple variables 
extensively as this research needed.1 But it has been determined, instead, that perceptual 
maps are very appropriate for this study, as they best represent the virtual search space 
conceived. In the marketing domain, these types of maps are often used. Many academic 
disciplines also employ variants: eg in environmental biology, utilizing forms of multi-
dimensional scaling, factor analysis or correspondence analysis. There is further 
consideration of this in Chapter 6, where an exploration is made of how the approach may 
be developed. Within marketing, perceptual maps are sometimes termed ‘positioning maps’ 
due to their association with attempts to look at market perceptions based on surveys of, say, 
brands in relation to the attributes each might have in the perceptions of consumers; eg for a 
beer it might be taste, thirst-quenching capability, strength, colour, nice to enjoy with 
friends, and so on. In these instances, it is therefore about understanding the market position 
of a product. This type of graph is thus adapted for use in this investigation, where corpuses 
are like brands and term combinations, as discreet groups, are like attributes. 
                                                          
1It is possible to depict the combos and their movement on a bar chart. However, these have little flexibility 
and are not easy to produce, requiring considerable manual construction (see Appendix 11). 
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      A proprietary system called MEXL was identified1 that could handle the analysis in a 
more sophisticated manner than producing a basic graph – including being able to generate 
results in 3D if required. Extensive use, therefore, has been made of its abilities where, for 
example, a plot can be made of 8-element bi combinations for all stakeholder organizations 
to look at distributions pre and post-Crash. And similarly, for providing an overall feel for 
what the organizations are doing as a whole in relation to each other and specific combos.  
      However, the main use of MEXL has been in its application to single organizations 
where an assessment has been made of pre and post-Crash sub-corpuses. In this context, 
while multiple data sources are the norm for these kinds of approaches (ie looking at 
attributes for multiple beer brands; or in fact as also done, multiple organizations), the uni-
dimensional analytical possibilities of these graphs it is found have been overlooked as a 
useful qualitative method. And these are possibilities that have particular relevance to the 
complex research questions this study poses. Indeed the maps, as applied for this work, are 
ideally suited to deconstruction and then later reconstruction in a consolidated form across 
stakeholder organizations, allowing for easier large-scale comparisons. 
 
4.6.1 Processing the uni-dimensional graph with colour coding: The pre to post-Crash 
result is generated on a single dimension axis2, as shown in Fig 4.4a for the Financial Times 
in a Set 2 analysis3,4. 
      The observation is that there are two clusters, which fall into pre and post-Crash 
conditions respectively. Data do not always split symmetrically like this but when they do it 
                                                          
1MEXL is an add-in for Excel produced by DecisionPro Inc, (http://www.decisionpro.biz/). 
2Axes represent variance explained, and Dim 1, the horizontal axis, accounts for technically 100% of the 
variance. However, as the maps’ uni-dimensional features alone are being employed variance is not relevant to 
the use of the maps in this research (ie variance is only on one dimension hence it accounts for 100%). 
3See also Section 4.4.6: Sets of variables examined for their different combinations. 
4Note that the use of ‘Dim’ as axis dimension labels is not to be confused with the separate use of dimensions 
in this research – as ‘DimSyns’ – which are categories of biasing variables, forming parts of combos.  
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is these clusters that are of interest. And in fact, for MEXL, each cluster is a mass of combos 
one on top of another, and (though automation would be much preferred) these are then 
manually separated as shown in Fig 4.4b so that they can be examined. 
      Hence, there is no meaning attributable to this manual positioning – it is simply what 
makes the combos easier to read and further process. The only thing that is important is that 
there are two main clusters based on the two conditions. 
 
 
 
 
      
      A categorization is then made of the mapped combinations into four colour-coded 
groups. This is dependent on what dimension synonym (DimSyn) they contain, not their 
value-related term (VRT). So ri (return, investor) is coded according to its shareholder 
primacy dimension, which in this case is ‘investor’ (i). Hence, the categories are:  
 
 
VRT-shareholder primacy, VRT-Stakeholder primacy, VRT-long-term, VRT-short-term 
 
 
      Used for this part of the analysis are blue, green, purple and orange, though colours are 
an individual choice based on what personally works visually.  
Fig 4.4a Fig 4.4b 
Combos are manually exploded from the horizontal axis before colour coding 
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     When applied it produces a positioning (perceptual) map for the FT as depicted in Fig 
4.4c. 
 
   
 
      It can be noted here that the output from other utilities, such as XLSTAT - which is 
more quantitatively oriented - necessitates the requirement for a similar handling of the 
results to pull the combos apart and colour code them.1 However, because of its greater 
flexibility and graphical features, MEXL has been determined to be more useful for 
analysing the twelve stakeholder corpuses and the large quantities of accompanying data in 
the study. 
 
4.6.2 Interpretation of the output: To interpret this map for the FT and similar maps, the 
relative distribution of colours are looked at (here also used are Set 2 VRTs, see Section 
4.4.6, though the approach is the same whatever the VRTs). In this case, in Fig 4.4c the 
                                                          
1See also Appendix 12 for a comparison of utilities 
Fig 4.4c: Positioning map for the Financial Times with colour coded exploded view of term 
combinations on Dimension 1  
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proportions of shareholder primacy terms (blue) and stakeholder primacy terms (green) are 
the same pre and post-Crash (1:1 in both cases). But noticeably there is a bias of short-term 
terms pre-Crash (orange), where there are 3 orange combos but nothing else for termism. 
While post-Crash there is a bias for long-term terms (purple); in this case, 4 purple to 1 
orange. The perception in respect of primacy has not altered pre to post-Crash for the FT. 
But in respect to termism, perception for the FT is very different, where pre to post-Crash it 
has in fact moved over the period. As mentioned, this approach is applied across all the data. 
 
4.6.3 Rules applied to tri and quad combo output and dealing with partials: In the bi 
scenario, the requirement is to have always one VRT and one DimSyn; there cannot be any 
more elements for a bi combo. However, in the tri and quad analyses the procedure requires 
a modified approach as there is a third (or fourth) slot that can contain another element.  
      Where this additional slot in the combo has a DimSyn that is opposing, or conflicting, 
the rule is set such DymSyns cancel each other and are removed1. A manager, for example is 
thus treated as unable to be both short and long-term oriented simultaneously for the same 
VRT. 
      The case of partials arises when – in the quad scenario for example – after filtering any 
conflicting associated DimSyns, there remains a secondary combo, which for the quad 
scenario will be in the bi form. Table 4.7 provides an example of this situation. As Chapter 
5 shows, partials may sometimes be useful to include in an analysis. 
 
 
                                                          
1See also: Basic filtering, Section 4.4.5. 
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      Table 4.7 shows the general rules applied. However, to make it more clear Fig 4.5 shows 
the tri scenario output for the FT after exploding the view and coding. Looking at the post 
condition at the top of the cluster it may be noted that 19) emp2 (equity, manager, 
permanent) has been manually reproduced – first colour coding is for permanent (p2) so 
coloured purple, as it is a long-term DimSyn, then for manager (m) so coloured green, as it 
is a stakeholder DimSyn. By contrast, 4) ep3m (equity, pay, manager) next to it has only one 
DimSyn (manager) so is not reproduced but coloured green accordingly. Other combos are 
similarly treated.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.7. General rules for handling tri and quad combo output 
Output  Example 
Output 
combo count 
Colour code 
More than one VRT, is 
considered as one VRT 
  
tri: rsn (return, share, now)…  
 
quad: crsn (customer, return, share, now)…   
 
 
rs-n (1) 
 
crs-n (1) 
According to 1 
dimsyn ie n 
More than one dimsyn, the 
output term is reproduced 
(unless they conflict in any 
way – see next box below) 
 
tri: rin (return, investor, now)… 
 
quad: rsin (return, share, investor, now)… 
 
r-i; r-n (2) 
 
rs-i; rs-n (2) 
According to 2 
dimsyns ie first 
for n(a) and then 
for n(b) 
When dimsyns are present 
from associated 
dimensions they cancel 
each other and are not 
counted. These will, most 
likely, have been removed 
during earlier filtering. 
tri: rim (return, investor, manager)… 
 
quad: rsim (return, share, investor, 
manager)… 
r-i; r-m (0) 
 
rs-i; rs-m (0) 
No coding: 
VRT-i and VRT-
m cancel each 
other because 
they are 
considered 
opposing 
perceptions.  
 
Partials - after removal of 
conflicting dimsyns there 
is still a combo present. 
 
quad: rimn (return, investor, manager, 
now)… 
r-n (1) 
According to 1 
dimsyn ie n 
 
Table 4.7 General rules for handling tri and quad combo output 
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     Another observation is that with more combos present, it potentially provides an 
enhanced analysis in comparison to the bi analysis. Chapters 5 and 6 consider the meaning 
and usefulness of a combo analysis conducted in such a manner.  
 
4.7 Conducting secondary analyses 
Once generated, the use of positioning maps is not only to understand perceptions on an 
individual stakeholder basis but also in a comparative fashion. By consolidating many maps 
together in an original way, it becomes possible to gauge more universal perceptions of the 
producers of these data. This not only provides a hitherto unavailable understanding of 
large-scale perceptions across many stakeholder groups in an accessible manner but also 
enables the examination of alignments between different stakeholder organizations that 
might not be otherwise apparent.  
Fig 4.5 
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      In addition, while much of the thrust of the research is to consider the combo as a whole, 
but from the colour-coding perspective of the DimSyn, it is also possible to look in greater 
detail at the VRTs themselves by drilling down into the combo. Now described is how these 
analyses are done. 
 
4.7.1 Universal perceptions: A ‘consolidated view’ was formed of all the positioning maps 
as a type of single heat map. It is not quite a heat map, though it uses colour to denote the 
bias in each organization’s value-related narrative, as recorded from their positioning map. 
As such, it constitutes a narrative strip. 
       As demonstrated below, each corpus’s positioning map is recorded based on a count of 
the relative amounts of the combos present by colour and expressed according to which 
dimension has the greater number, hence has a bias. This approach allows the easy viewing 
of a very large amount of information as a whole, as well as allowing further assessment. As 
with the maps themselves, colours chosen are a personal choice; it is just a matter of what 
comes across clear and is easily interpretable, although it is advised to use the same colours 
as adopted for the maps in any study undertaken. 
 
 
 
Fig 4.6: Extract of Narrative Strip (Consolidated Stakeholder Narrative View) as basic form 
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      With Set 1 data for pre and post-Crash, each organization has eight dimension 
possibilities associated with it, ie four pre-Crash and four post-Crash (2x: shareholder/not 
shareholder, stakeholder/not stakeholder, short-term/not short-term, long-term/not long-
term).  
      Fig 4.6 is a simplified extract from the larger narrative strip. It shows results for four 
corpuses (Corporate, Regulatory, FSA, and FT). The way to consider the result is to look at 
each organization as a separate group of colours in relation to four squares. So, looking at 
the results for the corporate annual reports corpus, bordered in red, each of the four squares 
can take one of two colours, corresponding to two possible dimensions (though, to be 
specific, it can also show the absence of colour as a white square when there are no combos 
present for the dimensions). Hence, in the pre-Crash condition for the corporate governance 
bias, the strip is recording the results from the positioning map that showed the bias was 
towards a stakeholder perception (st), coloured green – as opposed to a potential bias 
towards a shareholder perception (sh), which would be coloured blue. While in the post-
Crash condition there is no stakeholder bias, rather the bias is in fact towards a shareholder 
perception (sh), and therefore in blue. The same logic is applicable to the next column 
displaying the map results for the temporal aspect of termism: Short-Term (ST, coloured 
orange) and Long-Term (LT, coloured purple).  
      The appearance of merged blue and green colours (and similarly the logic applies for 
any other merged colours) depicted in the corporate governance column for the regulatory 
corpus indicates an equal amount of combos for the shareholder and stakeholder primacy 
dimensions. Hence, there is no bias observable, and as this is carried through to post-Crash 
it suggests no change in perception across the period.  
      Although not shown in these extracts, any square merging a colour with white indicates 
the presence of only a single dimension and with only one instance of a combo present for 
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it. This does not necessarily mean a weak effect of that combo, only that its effect is 
occurring without a counterpart. 
 
 
 
      However, while merging colours within cells can highlight the magnitude of some of the 
effects observable on the maps, the gradient colouring facilities of Excel are limited. That 
aside, to take the analyses forward required something further. And, overlaying of the 
narrative strips with the actual counts for all dimensions for any corpus provides an even 
more detailed picture (Fig 4.7). In this way, for example, the first coloured square – 
primacy, pre-Crash – is denoted as b=2 and g=3 (or as later used, the format: b2, g3). This 
refers to the biasing observed and means there were 2 blue combos and 3 green combos 
appearing on the positioning map, pre-Crash. The square is coloured green as a stakeholder 
bias had the greater magnitude. As will become apparent, it is important to have this 
information in order to conduct further analyses but it does not alter the fact that the bias is 
for green (g3), hence for a stakeholder (st) perceptual bias. 
 
4.7.2 Alignment analysis: On examining the narrative strip stakeholder organizations that 
have the same or similar colour (biasing) profiles – as recorded from the perceptual maps – 
Fig 4.7: Extract of Narrative Strip (Consolidated Stakeholder Narrative View) with overlay 
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are considered to be aligned and may be placed in proximity for ease of observation, as has 
been done in Figs 4.6 and 4.7.  
 
 
 
 
 
      Table 4.8 shows how the overlay (depicted in Fig 4.7) is then used to form a matrix by 
calculating the mean number of different VRT-DimSyn (combo) instances for the 
stakeholder organizations that appear to align a particular way. For an example, Table 4.8 
represents the assessment of four stakeholder corpuses (Corp, Reg, FSA, FT) for alignment 
based on the overlay of data in Fig 4.6. Across the corpuses being assessed simple counts 
are made of each of the individual dimensions, additively, the means calculated (ie dividing 
by the number of corpuses examined), and the colour scheme physically applied for 
graphing (ie b = blue, etc). Then plotted, as Fig 4.8 shows, are the pre and post-Crash mean 
total colour count values of the combos - for the group of stakeholder organizations 
considered (in this example there are four).  
      To interpret the plot in Fig 4.8 (an Excel line plot) the observation is that no change is 
depicted for long-termism (purple) or stakeholder primacy (green) from pre to post-Crash; 
though opposing changes over the period can be seen for short-termism (yellow) which falls 
and shareholder primacy orientation (blue) which rises. As a whole from an output  
 
Example Group 
of VRT-DimSyn 
instances 
(corp, reg, FSA, FT) 
Pre-Crash 
(total 
colour 
count) 
Pre-Crash 
(mean of 
total colour 
count) 
Post-Crash 
(total 
colour 
count) 
Post-Crash 
(mean of 
total colour 
count) 
VRT-shareholder b=4 1 b=11 2.75 
VRT- stakeholder g=8 2 g=8 2 
VRT-short-term y=11 2.75 y=4 1 
VRT-long-term p=12 3 p=12 3 
Table 4.8 
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like this, few conclusions can be drawn – most likely because there is insufficient data for 
any real effect to emerge – something that changes with the addition of another two 
corpuses to this particular analysis in the later results. It is important to remember as well 
that any alignment is specific to the actual VRTs or DimSyns used, so can be sensitive to 
these term usage differences. 
      However, this is simply an example of how to carry out the procedure using data from 
Fig 4.7. Yet when definitive results are observable, there is potentially further interpretation 
needed. Indeed, when apparent, different VRTs – as constituents of different combos – that 
similarly align could be said to be accessing a similar value-related construct. 
   
4.7.3 Examining VRTs within combo: The maps, as viewed, do not necessarily show the 
more subtle value-related changes if they are there. In large part this is because VRTs are 
depicted as a single class, with the concentration in the analyses so far in this account of the 
methodology of narrative staining on the corporate governance and temporal dimensions 
linking to them, and from which the colour-coding is formed. 
Fig 4.8 
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      In the present study, however, there is also a requirement to examine whether there 
might be a split between financially-oriented terms and non-financially-oriented terms over 
time. This addresses hypotheses H1c: Pre Crash, there will be a dominance of financial 
value-related terms compared to non-financial value-related terms clustering towards the 
space representing short-term ShP; and H1d: Post-Crash, there will be a dominance of non-
financial value-related terms compared to financial value-related terms clustering towards 
the space representing long-term StP. 
       The positioning maps help to investigate this as they can have the information needed 
extracted from them. 
 
 
CBI, bi
Fig 4.9 
) 
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      As an example using the CBI, and with Set 1 VRTs, a count is conducted by 
determining instances in a combo of: r (return), c (customer), p1 (price)1, and s (share), and 
recording these. Consequently, looking at the pre-Crash condition for the CBI, ‘r’ is only 
evident with 9)ri. As ‘i’ is for investor, and therefore the shareholder dimension (blue), it is 
recorded as 1-ShP (Table 4.9). Instances of ‘p1’ for price, however, appear twice loading on 
to both shareholder and stakeholder dimensions, investor and manager respectively: 5)p1i 
and 6)p1m. These are recorded as 1-ShP and 1-StP.  
 
 
Count of VRTs loading on to DimSyns 
Set 1 VRTs Pre-Crash Post-Crash 
r (return) 1-ShP 1-ST,1-LT,1-StP 
c (customer) 0 1-ST,1-LT,1-StP 
p1 (price) 1-ShP,1-StP 1-ST,1-LT 
s (share) 0 1-ST,1-LT,1-StP 
 
 
      The same procedure is conducted for the other instances of VRTs, though in these cases 
all are in the post-Crash condition. The results are transferred to a matrix, as in Table 4.10, 
and thus where ‘1’ indicates the presence of a VRT for a combo and ‘0’ indicates its 
absence.  
 
 
Center for Policy Studies 
(CPS) Corpus 
Pre-Crash (1) Post-Crash (2) 
  VRTs (Set 1) ST1 LT1 ShP1 StP1 ST2 LT2 ShP2 StP2 
  r (return) 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
  c (customer) 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
  P1 (price) 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
  s (share) 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
 
                                                          
1’price’ is often denoted as ‘p1’ rather than ‘p’ as other terms used (eg ‘permanent’) have the same initial 
letter. 
Table 4.10 
Table 4.9 
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      Hence, for the CBI in this case1, the matrix (Table 4.10) contains a binary count of pre 
and post-Crash instances observable of bi combos (1 VRT and 1 DimSyn), utilizing Set 1 
VRTs, and with cells representing all possible instances appearing in the map for the 
individual VRTs against the primacy and termism dimensions. 
      A plot is then made of the matrix for a bar chart analysis in Excel (Fig 4.10), allowing a 
visual assessment of what happens to each of the VRTs, split between financial and non-
financial terms, as they load on to the dimensions across the period.  
      The plot appears to show more activity in the post-Crash scenario. However, rather than 
the particular dimension loaded on or a simple quantity of colour in evidence, what is 
important is the ratio of financial to non-financial terms overall. The effect can thus be on 
any of the dimensions. Hence in the pre-Crash condition, there is equal managerial 
favouring on the shareholder primacy dimension (ShP1) for financial terms (dark blue) 
compared to non-financial terms (light blue) - and which can therefore be discounted. Or put 
                                                          
1It may be noted that two data points from the shareholder primacy dimension did not record. 
Fig 4.10 
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another way, the main perceptual bias is for financial terms on the stakeholder primacy 
dimension (StP1). Alternatively, and giving the same result, considering ShP1 and StP1 
together, the ratio of financial terms compared to non-financial terms is greater.  
      In the post-Crash condition, however, there is equal managerial favouring on the 
termism dimensions - these can therefore be discounted1 - but the ratio is greater for non-
financial terms to financial terms on the stakeholder primacy dimension (StP2). There is 
therefore an evident movement from the use of financial terms pre-Crash to non-financial 
terms post-Crash. And from the perspective of the hypotheses, the conclusion is that there is 
support for both H1c and H1d. 
      A point to note is that the map and bar chart (Figs 4.9 and 4.10) are different depictions 
of the same data, and with a maintenance of the ratios. In the pre-Crash condition in Fig 4.9, 
for shareholder primacy (blue) the codes are ri and p1i, respectively return (non-financial) 
and price (financial), and both attached to investor (i); a shareholder term. Return and price 
are in the ratio of 1:1. In Fig 4.10, pre-Crash for ShP1 there are similarly equal financial v 
non-financial term amounts, a 1:1 ratio. The same effect is applicable for the other data. 
      As with examining alignments for multiple corpuses (Section 4.7.2), also considered are 
multiple corpuses together to analyse the way VRTs are employed by multiple managers 
when it comes to the use of financial versus non-financial terminology.  
 
FT + news-gen Pre-Crash (1) Post-Crash (2) 
  VRTs (Set 1) ST1 LT1 ShP1 StP1 ST2 LT2 ShP2 StP2 
  r (return) 2 0 0 2 0 2 2 0 
  c (customer) 2 1 2 2 0 1 0 0 
  P1 (price) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  s (share) 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 
 
                                                          
1See Section 4.6.3. 
Table 4.11 
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      Table 4.11 shows the matrix for a combination of the Financial Times and general 
newspaper corpuses, and where treatment of the individual loadings across corpuses is 
additive for each cell. 
      In this case, rather than ‘0’ and ‘1’, larger numbers form the matrix cells (here, 
therefore, the binary count for the FT corpus and the binary count for the news-gen corpus 
are added together). As previously, a bar chart analysis may be undertaken. In this broader 
context, though, it is to consider the behaviour of sections of the economy based on various 
combinations of corpuses or on an even larger scale at behaviour across the economy.  
      In addition to individual corpus analyses, this research has conducted these broader 
analyses. Significantly, they provide a further way to understand perceptual processes 
involved relating to the use of financial versus non-financial terms by multiple managers, in 
unison, working in a variety of organizations as the Crash progressed.  
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5. Some Counter-Intuitive Results  
 
 
 
    
 
 
The generation of results draws on the adaption of perceptual maps; and where visual 
representation begins to reveal the complexities of pre to post-Crash bias found to be 
operating within companies and other organizations. Appendices 8-10 demonstrate the 
preliminary findings, which helped identify a pre to post-Crash difference in term usage, and 
that variable combinations were in evidence to explore further.  
 
5.1 Pre to post-Crash difference as a minimax proportion 
Combinations (combos) were considered pre and post-Crash by a measure of change. This 
used a difference measure eventually producing a type of index of change from -100 to +100; 
and where 0 is the midway point representing no change from pre to post-Crash. 
      Table 5.1 - which is an extract of the fuller results - shows how a cut-off point was also 
applied, such that, at or in excess of (+/-) 60% to 80% was coloured green and that, at or in 
excess of (+/-) 80% to 100% was coloured pink. Any cell with values not meeting the cut-off 
point was coloured white.  
      Though not shown in Table 5.1, sub-corpuses were also analysed. These included: for the 
Corporate, websites (WS) and annual reports (AR) separately; and the same done for the 
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IPPR, where IPPR(a)1 included mixed corporate governance documents and IPPR(b) 
included documents on energy and climate change for comprehensive coverage. 
      The results with VRT-1 data (customer, price, return, and share), firstly allow an answer 
to Q3, that is whether regulatory changes over the crisis period are associated with any 
changing managerial or executive perceptions of corporate value?2 The correlation coefficient 
is calculated for the Corporate column and the Regulatory column (for all 8E data), with the 
two datasets representing an index of change over time found to have little association, 
r=0.03 (see Appendix 13). Using soft and hard law sub-corpuses, addressing Q3a and Q3b 
respectively, some significant results are evident, though these appear largely driven by 
websites, not annual reports. As with Q1, results appear dependent on the Set used  
Table 5.1:  Data result extract demonstrating differential biasing with minimax analysis across 
stakeholders (with Set 1 VRTs) 
Term code
Corporate 
(WS+AR) 
Regulatory FSA (AR's 
& BR's)
FT Newspapers 
(general)
CBI CIMA ICSA IOD CPS IPPR (a+b) TUC
4E - bi, tri & quad
1) cp1 39.510 -98.508 24.321 7.891 -73.652 100.000 -51.363 0.000 78.521 -100.000 83.237 94.897
2) cr 9.022 -90.355 -70.105 -26.434 -33.471 100.000 0.000 -100.000 71.361 -100.000 84.203 100.000
3) cs 40.435 -86.169 1.618 1.974 -61.204 100.000 -51.363 -100.000 14.082 -100.000 84.767 100.000
4) p1r 22.898 -64.688 -0.830 36.906 -20.009 -82.788 0.000 0.000 64.201 -37.255 72.683 100.000
5) p1s 2.175 -58.049 70.342 54.500 -53.354 100.000 -16.622 0.000 -6.888 -84.350 73.658 100.000
6) rs -21.076 -61.365 -23.715 32.853 15.096 100.000 0.000 -100.000 -30.166 -31.076 75.176 100.000
7) cp1r 3.612 -95.804 -37.410 11.120 -62.554 100.000 0.000 0.000 85.160 -100.000 91.495 100.000
8) crs 3.256 -82.912 -51.854 5.410 -44.864 100.000 0.000 -100.000 40.641 -100.000 92.271 100.000
9) cp1s 30.536 -93.239 53.009 35.905 -78.164 100.000 -55.588 0.000 55.480 -100.000 91.799 100.000
10) p1rs -17.919 -75.205 37.388 56.095 -33.707 100.000 0.000 0.000 25.801 -73.984 86.635 100.000
11) cp1rs -31.034 -90.156 0.795 38.151 -68.967 100.000 0.000 0.000 69.242 -100.000 95.839 100.000
8E - bi
1) ci 58.639 -99.845 29.367 -24.219 -30.879 0.000 -75.681 -100.000 50.677 -100.000 85.531 0.000
2) cm 55.897 -97.575 -41.917 -42.145 -74.623 100.000 41.256 -100.000 71.361 -100.000 87.306 91.169
3) cp2 67.067 -70.748 1.618 23.492 -53.584 100.000 0.000 -100.000 -100.000 -100.000 64.456 93.929
4) cn 3.577 -99.845 -63.172 -40.786 -67.284 100.000 -18.938 -100.000 49.881 -100.000 72.073 94.265
5) p1i 43.326 90.059 78.707 38.750 -16.892 -100.000 -58.311 0.000 38.346 16.118 74.979 0.000
/cont…
                                                                          '-' indicates greater bias pre crash; '+' greater bias post crash
 - based on pre and post crash comparison using high-low percent difference change over time
Filtered frequency term combinations for different stakeholder corpuses 
                                                                          High-Low Percent Diff: filter at >= +/-80%         ; +/- 60% - 80%
                                                        Periods are pre crash: 2004-2005; post crash: 2011-2012, unless otherwise stated
4 element set; combination (ie product) subsets <=4. Term reference codes: customer (c), price (p1), share (s), return (r)
8 element set; combination subsets <=4. Term reference codes: customer (c), price (p1), share (s), return (r), 
investor (i), manager (m), permanent (p2), now (n)
1IPPR data, as of secondary interest, were amalgamated and not assessed separately. 
2The story, however, is more complex, as with VRT-2 data (equity, pay, performance and strategy), r=0.78; a result 
highlighting both a strong association and how sensitive to different terms corporate perception is. Chapter 6 gives 
consideration to what might be occurring; see also Appendix 13 for a further breakdown of correlations by Set. 
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      Correlations notwithstanding, a further finding is that there is a distribution of coloured 
cells in a pattern and that the pattern varied amongst different stakeholders. The emergent 
pattern indicates that this variation breaks down differently according to a stakeholder focus 
for particular term combinations. Moreover, it is observable how (with both positively and 
negatively denoted figures) the results also vary from pre to post-Crash in many instances. 
Hence, some stakeholders, like the CBI, show high focus, post-Crash, for terms in the 4-
element bi, tri and quad combination column, while in contrast the CPS is biased towards the 
use of these term combinations pre-Crash. The amount of resulting data is extensive but 
analysis also showed, for example, that 8-element set term combinations for the regulatory 
dataset – as a whole – are heavily biased pre-Crash, while for the IPPR and TUC they are 
heavily biased post-Crash. The corporate dataset by contrast is somewhat mixed. 
 
5.2 Applying perceptual mapping 
Taking an original line as suggested in Chapter 4, the form of positioning (perceptual) map 
used represents a summary of much of the collected data. Indeed, though differential biasing 
in the results was observed (eg Table 5.1), it is hard to make sense of, particularly across 
multiple corpuses. As such, in order to answer the research questions about the nature of 
perceived corporate value, pre to post-Crash, some type of more detailed – and more visual – 
consolidation is required in order to gain an overall sense of specific biases.       
      Useful insights were provided by 4-elelment sets (see eg Appendices 7, 8; Table 5.1). But 
the study’s main focus is on 8-element sets with DimSyns (Table 5.1). Applying a perceptual 
mapping approach (Figs 5.1 and 5.2), what is found is that there is a type of conceptual space 
in which the twelve stakeholder organizations distribute in relation to one another. And the 
(bi) term combinations take up particular positions relative to the stakeholder organizations.  
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      Looking at pre and post-Crash separately, what is clear is that a definite movement is 
observable over time for both stakeholders and term combinations relative to them; a finding 
that addresses the original research question Q1, that proposes movement will occur. 
 
  
Fig 5.1 
Fig 5.2 
1This is in fact a 2D view of a 3D graph, rotated so that Dim II and Dim III appear to represent horizontal and vertical 
axes (Dim=dimension, referring to axes); hence Dim I is not shown. This rotation is made to give the best output view. 
Percentages in dimension brackets on axes refer to variance explained by the Dim or factor, ie its strength. This factor 
may be unknown but with several organizations and combos associating it suggests a common element – or depending 
on distance from Dims, a mixture of elements from both factors. Here, the Dims are attempting to characterize some 
combination of primacy and temporality in relation to stakeholder organizations, though variance is fairly low on these 
axes. But of real interest, only, is movement over time.  
1 
1 
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      While absolute positioning cannot be taken as meaningful on these maps as a rule, ICSA, 
for example, can nevertheless be seen to move from a pre-Crash position high on the vertical 
and in proximity to rp2 (return, permanent) to, post-Crash, a more central point, while rp2 
has moved to the lower left quadrant. This suggests that the (relative) affinity for this combo 
has moved over the period (a fact also supported by its ICSA’s minimax difference value of -
100, indicating a strong pre-Crash bias). In looking at the other stakeholder organizations and 
combos, a similar logic is applied. Clustering is also observable, specifically as it changes 
over time round the central axis. Though difficult to see or interpret on these maps, it 
suggests some type of alignment in operation. Further investigation to reveal any underlying 
effect, however, would be required. 
      Note, too, how stakeholder positions are also reflected in a correlation analysis (Appendix 
13) where, for example, r=0.771 for the CBI and TUC, and which in both the pre and post-
Crash conditions (Figs 5.1 and 5.2 respectively), though again hard to see, are in close 
proximity.  
 
5.2.1 Multiple stakeholder v single stakeholder maps: While providing useful snapshots 
across time, the above maps, however, do not allow a sufficient assessment of all the 
potential biases and effects required for this investigation, and hence to address fully the 
research questions. Fig 5.1 and Fig 5.2, for example, allow a sense of what is happening pre 
and post-Crash. But while the maps can be combined they can also become more difficult to 
interpret – a pre-Crash/post- Crash map of the frequencies may be plotted (Fig 5.3), or a 
difference measure (as from - Table 5.1) may be similarly plotted, to produce a single map 
but interpretation is difficult with overlapping combos. If attempting to examine all twelve 
stakeholder corpuses simultaneously, for a consideration of the wider views of the business 
community, this difficulty only enhances. 
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      Nevertheless, it is apparent in Fig 5.3, simply looking at the corporate and regulatory 
corpuses rather than all twelve, that the upper half of the map appears to be associated with 
the pre-Crash corpus conditions and the lower half with the post-Crash corpus conditions. 
Indeed, particular combos are then visible associating more with the different pre and post-
Crash conditions. For example, 10) rm (return, manager) is clearly within the upper pre-
Crash area, though roughly equally between the regulatory and corporate corpuses. More 
specifically, 13) si (share, investor) and 5) p1i (price, investor) are associated with the post-
Crash regulatory corpus, and in the lower half; while 14) sm (share, manager) appears to be 
somewhere between corporate, pre-Crash, and regulatory, post-Crash. The possible meaning 
of these associations are considered more fully in Chapter 6, although it can be said here that 
it only goes some way to provide the necessary information about overall biasing. 
      In a sense, maps with many stakeholder organizations and combos contain too much 
compressed information – and the above examples are also two dimensions of a 3D 
Fig 5.3 
1Dim II and Dim III account for 13.7% and 7.6% respectively. Again very low variances but anyway not of much 
interest in comparison to the relative positioning of combos in relation to stakeholder corpuses over time where 
biasing effects are depicted.  
   
1 
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representation, which similarly adds to the complexity. Though, in Fig 5.4, it can be seen that 
14) sm (share, manager) is in fact more associated with the corporate corpus, pre-Crash. The 
limited information at this point suggested therefore that for the primary corpuses combos 
with the term manager (a stakeholder term) are more prevalent pre-Crash and those combos 
with the term investor (a shareholder term) are more prevalent post-Crash. In terms of 
hypothesis H1a and H1b, with respect to predicted shareholder and stakeholder orientations 
as they might change over time, this is the reverse of what was expected. But there was a 
need for more supporting evidence for these findings - including for the termism dimensions, 
which are harder to see. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.4: 3D positioning map of corporate and regulatory 
corpuses, pre to post-Crash1  
1Fig 5.4 shows the corporate and regulatory corpuses in a space taking relative positions in relation to combos. 
Figs 5.3 and 5.4 both depict the same corpuses over time, though in 2D and 3D respectively. However, these maps, 
highlighting the affinity of combos to stakeholder corpuses, show heavy clustering (particularly evident with the 
3D image) making it difficult to interpret the maps. Considered together the maps reduce ambiguity. Eg 14)sm is 
more clearly associated with the pre-Crash corporate corpus in the 3D image; whereas 5)p1i and 13)si, both with 
the DimSyn ‘investor’, are more differentiated in the 2D image in Fig 5.3, and associating particularly with the 
post-Crash regulatory corpus. 
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      In the context of these perceptual maps, it is worth mentioning that other researchers 
using similar approaches in their fields are often faced with comparable challenges and may 
assess data in partial steps to generate a series of practical maps – as looked at above with just 
the corporate and regulatory corpuses. And, with a view to making additional simultaneous 
comparisons, if it is required to look at another temporal dimension - which this study has 
done when considering a ‘sense of urgency’, and the results of which are given further on – 
there are a lot of variables to handle and display. For this research, too, the approach is 
adapted in a manner not previously attempted – ie employing combinations of terms - so 
further interpretation is difficult on that basis alone. Partly, though, difficulties are also due to 
the way in which the utilities are designed to work, which is to say whether their function is 
for marketing purposes or a deeper statistical analysis as used, say, in ecological studies. 
      The novel solution therefore applied is to break the process down, first deconstructing the 
maps into a uni-dimensional form, so allowing biasing effects to be shown using narrative 
staining (as detailed in Chapter 4) for individual stakeholder organizations. From there, and 
based on a reconstitution of the results, secondary analyses may then be applied to more fully 
address the research questions.  
 
5.3 Main findings for primary corpuses 
Having looked previously at how the uni-dimensional positioning (or perceptual) maps are 
formed (see Chapter 4) and the rationale for using them, mapped combinations are produced 
in four colour-coded groups, depending on what (DimSyns) they contain. To reiterate, the 
groups are:  
 
 
 
VRT-shareholder primacy, VRT-Stakeholder primacy, VRT-long-term, VRT-short-term. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      The approach to interpretation of the maps is to look at the relative amounts of these 
coloured combos, particularly for associated dimensions – ie shareholder/stakeholder; long-
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term/short-term – and how they differ across time. This allows an answer to the general 
research questions Q1 and Q2 (i and ii). Respectively: Did the Crash of 2008 change 
perceptions of corporate value in relation to the relative merits of shareholder primacy and 
stakeholder primacy? And, did the Crash of 2008 change perceptions of corporate value in 
relation to the temporal horizon?1 At the same time, perceptual change is examinable in 
greater depth through hypotheses H1a – H1d, predicting movement of the combos. These 
hypotheses are thus variations of the same theme with respect to addressing potential change 
in value creation.2 For example, H1a: Pre-Crash, value-related terms will dominate in the 
space representing short-term ShP.  
      The following sections are structured as follows. The results for the corporate and 
regulatory corpuses are highlighted in turn, broken down by study. Each study highlights a 
different combination of VRTs and DimDyns. Study 1 utilizes Set 1 variables with VRT-1: 
customer, price, return, and share, and examined in the context of the different DimSyns 
relating to primacy (investor and manager) and temporality (long-term and short-term). 
      Underlying a strengthening of the validity of the approach, the question then arises of 
what would happen when VRTs are altered?  Considered in Study 2, are Set 2 variables, that 
is VRT-2: equity, pay, performance and strategy. Similarly, in line with research question 
Q2.ii – and utilizing both VRT-1 and VRT-2 in turn – there is a switch made in the focus for 
the temporal dimensions from termism to a sense of urgency to act (urgency and non-
urgency) in Studies 3 and 4. Held constant throughout are the primacy dimensions.  
      As an additional confirmatory assessment of effects, combos in the positioning maps are 
in a number of instances also examined at three levels of complexity: bi, tri, and quad.        
      Note, other than any main split apparent between clusters of combos for pre and post-
Crash conditions, the positioning of the combos themselves have no relevance.  
1The temporal horizon includes i, termism – LT versus ST outlook; and ii, a sense of urgency – UR versus NUR. 
2Similarly, with respect to movement of the combos, H2a – H2d addresses managers’ sense of urgency to act.   
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5.3.1 Corporate corpus: The results presented in this section use corporate annual reports as 
their basis1. Some of the data output is additionally shown with filtering. The use of filtering 
is to remove combos that have values that are near zero; the idea being to remove combos 
that demonstrate a weaker effect. 
 
 
 
Study 1: Highlighted here are the output maps for the initial analysis utilizing Set 1 data 
(VRT-1, primacy and termism). The first map highlighted (Fig 5.5) is for the corporate bi 
scenario, and without any filter.2  
    
                                                          
1Corporate websites were initially included in the corporate corpus but these tended to disrupt the later more 
complex analyses. The reason for this, it is believed, was that websites are more geared to a different audience 
and are more marketing-oriented rather than appealing to a commercially-minded audience, so skewing the data 
– or indeed, making it more difficult to extract a result. As all the other corpuses assessed were commercially-
focussed it made more sense to be consistent and focus on the annual reports and related documents of all the 
companies in the corporate corpus, and in this way making the range of analyses across corpuses for different 
stakeholder organizations more comparable (see also Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1.ii). 
2Dim l and Dim ll respectively have percentages (in brackets) denoting 100% and 0% variance. This is because 
the maps are uni-dimensional; hence, 100% variance has to be on the horizontal dimension – and as such, a 
manual exploding of the combos is from the horizontal axis, as Chapter 4 showed. Consequently, variance in 
these maps - while having use as demonstrated above in 2D and 3D maps - can be ignored here and in the 
following scenarios, as there is no effective Dim ll for any practical purpose. Dim l, however, with the utility’s 
graphics harnessed in the way they have been, indicates pre to post-Crash splits, where found, for the 
stakeholder organization examined. For example, as is observable in Fig 5.5 for the corporate domain. 
Fig 5.52 
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        What is observable is that shareholder primacy, denoted in blue, is the same pre and 
post-Crash, two instances of each. However, whereas pre-Crash there are more stakeholder 
instances than shareholder instances (3 green:2 blue), this is reversed post-Crash (2 blue:1 
green). There is a movement, therefore, pre to post-Crash, stakeholder to shareholder. 
Similarly, of short-termism (orange), pre-Crash, to long-termism (purple), post-Crash. 
Addressed, therefore, are research questions Q1 and Q2.i; though hypotheses H1a and H1b 
are not supported - ie the movement is not occurring in the proposed fashion. The fact that the 
bias is apparently dependent on only one combo difference in some cases has been found to 
be far less of an issue than might be thought and is discussed further on in relation to the 
usefulness of tri and quad terms. Green and orange, stakeholder and short-termism 
respectively, are in equal proportions in the pre and post-Crash scenarios too (1:1); which 
simply means that there is no change in short-term stakeholder perception over the period, 
although this does change a bit as is observable with filtering. 
 
 
Fig 5.6 
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      If a filter is added such that any combo values are excluded that are less than plus or 
minus 20% of zero (using a minimax difference value between pre and post-Crash data, see 
Table 5.1), similar results are found, as shown in Fig 5.6 (see also Chapter 4 concerning how 
this was done). 
      Though it is not a given, in this case, and with the absence of any stakeholder combo 
post-Crash (no green), the movement from short-term stakeholder primacy, pre-Crash, to 
long-term shareholder primacy, post-Crash, is maintained.  
      Bi terms, of the form AB, above suggest a change in corporate perception. However, the 
question was whether this effect was maintainable for tri terms, those of the form ABC.  
 
 
 
      There are more combos present, quite obviously in the tri map (Fig 5.7). And very 
apparently the predominating colours pre-Crash are green and orange, while post-Crash the 
Fig 5.7 
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predominating colours are blue and purple. Hence, as with the bi analysis, the movement over 
time is from a short-term stakeholder perception to a long-term shareholder perception. 
      It is of note that whereas with bi terms there has to be an element of each of a VRT and a 
DimSyn, with tri terms it is feasible to end up with two of either - ie two out of the three. 
Chapter 4 (Section 4.6.3) discusses the rationale for the handling of this.  
      Fig 5.8 shows that even with a 20% filter applied the same predominating movement is 
observed ie short-term stakeholder, pre-Crash, to long-term shareholder, post-Crash. 
 
 
 
 
      For quad terms of the form ABCD the findings are maintained. Fig 5.9 shows the result 
without filtering. Also looked at here are results without partials. Partials, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, refer to the way the different combinations form with increased options of what to 
include with the more elements there are – hence, more colour content too for the distribution 
if included. An example of a partial is: p1srm, where p1, s, and r, are all VRTs, and there is 
Fig 5.8 
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only one DimSyn for m (manager) present. Purely from an objective analytical standpoint, 
and without attempting to explain the finding, Figs 5.9 and 5.10 show respectively the results 
Fig 5.9 
Fig 5.10 
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without and with partials where it is similarly observable that the movement towards post-
Crash, long-term shareholder perceptual bias is maintained.  
      There is a generation of comparable results with the application of a 20% filter to the 
quad analysis, both without partials (Fig 5.11) and with partials (Fig 5.12). 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.11 
Fig 5.12 
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      What has been demonstrated is that though variables are manipulated, Q1, predicting 
change over time of the perceptions of value creation in relation to the relative merits of 
shareholder primacy and stakeholder primacy - and Q2.i, predicting this change in relation to 
termism - are addressed. But hypotheses H1a and H1b, relating to movement pre to post-
Crash, short-term shareholder primacy to long-term stakeholder primacy, are not supported. 
This is contrary to expectations. However, these findings only utilize Set 1 variables. 
 
Study 2: The basis for the next investigation was the generating of corpus positioning maps 
using Set 2 variables. Hence, the VRT-2’s: equity (e), pay (p3), performance (p4) and 
strategy (s2), in relation to the primacy dimensions of shareholder (investor: i) and 
stakeholder (manager: m), as well as termism: long-term (permanent: p2) and short-term 
(now: n). Figs 5.13 - 5.16 show the corporate corpus results.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.13 
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      What is noticeable in Fig 5.13 is the general lack of combos pre-Crash for this corporate 
corpus. However, p3m (performance, manager) is present; although its minimax difference 
value is 2.33, pre to post-Crash (ie below a 20% cut-off). Nevertheless, it still means there is 
a bias post-Crash towards shareholder primacy (shareholder:stakekeholder is in the ratio of 
four blue:three green). Q1 and Q2.i are therefore addressed, though hypotheses H1a and H1b 
are not supported.  
 
 
 
      Indeed, at a 20% filter the effect is only enhanced as shown in Fig 5.14 (b4:g2); and if an 
effect is evident it seems there is often little usefulness in additional processing.  
 
 
Study 3: The generation of positioning maps in this study are with a different temporal 
dimension pair and with Set 1, VRT-1 variables. Two of the dimensions assessed in this third 
study for a Set 3 data analysis, rather than termism, therefore, come within the category of 
‘sense of urgency’. Hence, examined are urgency to reorientate v non-urgency to reorientate 
Fig 5.14 
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with the synonyms respectively of action (a), coloured red, and efficient (e2) coloured lilac, 
in relation to: customer, price, return and share. Chapter 4 considers the rationale for the 
choice of these terms. The dimensions for shareholder and stakeholder (investor and manager 
respectively) remain unchanged. As previously, the focus is on a bi analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
      Pre-Crash it is observable in Fig 5.15 that only green and blue colours are in evidence, 
and with the green stakeholder combos in the greater amount (3:2). Post-Crash there is a 
reversal in this bias to favour shareholders. In fact, there is no expectation for there to be any 
difference here in perceived change from the Set 1 analysis, as there is no alteration to either 
the shareholder or stakeholder dimensions or the VRT-1 data. But what is observable, 
however, is that a sense of urgency – whether a need to reorientate or not, and hence with no 
particular bias either way – is a discussion of relevance only post-Crash. Q1 and Q2.ii are 
addressed, though hypotheses H2a and H2b are not supported. 
Fig 5.15 
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      Applying a 20% filter, as expected, while producing some differences serves to enhance 
the effect (Fig 5.16). 
 
 
 
 
Study 4: This study analysed Set 4 data using the combination of Set 2, VRT-2, data as the 
main corporate value variable and the dimensions for sense of urgency and the primacy 
dimensions for shareholder and stakeholder. Hence, examined are urgency to reorientate v 
non-urgency to reorientate with the synonyms respectively of action (a), coloured red, and 
efficient (e2), coloured lilac, in relation to: equity, pay, performance and strategy. As before, 
the dimensions for shareholder and stakeholder (investor and manager respectively) remain 
unchanged (Fig 5.17). 
Fig 5.16 
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      A similar distribution of clustering is evident to that in Study 2. While it might be 
expected to find some similarity where the dimensions and VRTs coincide, as with p3m, and 
hence for the relative amounts of shareholder v stakeholder primacy pre to post-Crash, and 
with a bias towards shareholders post-Crash as before, the presence of different associated 
dimensions is also a result much like in Study 3. In other words, it is found that a sense of 
urgency, whether to act to reorientate or not, is a discussion only had post–Crash for the 
corporate corpus. Nevertheless, Q1 and Q2.ii are addressed, though hypotheses H2a and H2b 
are not supported. 
      A 20% filter applied would remove combos 6 (pre-Crash) and 10 (post-Crash), and as 
before, enhancing the outcome. However, in this case, Q1 is addressed, but Q2.ii is not 
addressed; and once again, hypotheses H2a and H2b are not supported. 
 
5.3.2 Regulatory corpus: As considered with the corporate corpus, Study 1 to Study 4 again 
highlights results for different combos, and different levels of analysis. 
Fig 5.17 
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      It may be noted that as a general issue it is not always possible to apply filtering whatever 
the corpus domain examined due to a lack of a full result (ie pre and post-Crash material did 
not contain an element for the combo required so rendering a zero result). Or because – as 
found with the regulatory corpus – results have low values and filtering would remove too 
many combos, making an analysis difficult. But as with partials, while this kind of additional 
processing is helpful when feasible, it is often the case anyway that is supports the initial 
unfiltered findings. Hence, shown the following maps are their unfiltered state. 
 
Study 1: An analysis of the regulatory corpus – which included both hard and soft law – 
shows a somewhat different mapping to that seen with the corporate corpus.  
 
 
 
      In the bi analysis, Fig 5.18, the relative amounts of shareholder to stakeholder combos is 
the same in both the pre and post-Crash conditions. Hence, Q1 is not addressed. However, the 
main obvious difference is the orange (denoting short-termism) pre-Crash and its absence 
Fig 5.18 
, no filter
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post-Crash, such that post-Crash there is a bias towards the combos in purple only, and 
denoting long-termism and so addressing Q2.i. In this temporal sense, there is a similar 
perception to the corporate one. However, hypotheses H1a and H1b are not supported.        
      The maps for the tri analysis (Fig 5.19) and the quad analysis (Fig 5.20) for the regulatory 
corpus show similar biasing as in the bi analysis – even though there are an increased number 
of combos in the pre-Crash states; and a respectively decreasing number of combos in the 
post-Crash states.  
 
 
 
      In part, too, an uneven clustering effect for biases across the period - as seen particularly 
as well for the corporate bi analyses above - is also apparent. While the shareholder-
stakeholder relative bias is in about equal proportions for the same time periods and is, hence, 
different to the corporate corpus, the main perceptual bias is from short-term (orange), pre-
Crash, to long-term (purple), post-Crash. As far as the temporal aspect is concerned, 
, no filterPositioning Map (Dim l-ll), Regulatory, tri, Set 1, no filter (with partials) 
Fig 5.19 
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therefore, over the period examined both the bias of FT250 companies and the regulatory 
domain is similar.  
 
 
 
 
 
Study 2: The result for the regulatory bi scenario, Fig 5.21, shows very obviously only orange 
in the pre-Crash condition, denoting only a short-term perspective. By comparison, there is 
heavy biasing in the post-Crash condition towards long-termism (purple), while there is an 
equal perception for both shareholder and stakeholder primacy. Q1 is therefore not addressed, 
but Q2.i is; though hypotheses H1a and H1b are not supported. With this set of VRTs for the 
regulatory perspective, it is clearly very much about termism.        
 
 
 
Fig 5.20 
, no filterPositioning Map (Dim l-ll), Regulatory, quad, Set 1, no filter
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Study 3: In the regulatory corpus map, Fig 5.22, as indicated in the comments above, the 
main focus is on the sense of urgency dimensions.  
 
 
 
      In comparison to the corporate maps (Figs 5.15, 5.16), the interesting finding is that 
while, once again, any perception associated with an urgency to reorientate versus a non-
Fig 5.21 
, no filter
Fig 5.22 
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urgency to reorientate is in equal proportions (4 red: 4 lilac), rather than post-Crash, this 
discussion is instead only occurring in the pre-Crash condition1. In view of that, Q1 is not 
addressed, while Q2.ii is; though hypotheses H2a and H2b are not supported. 
 
Study 4: The result for the regulatory Set 4 analysis (Fig 5.23), by comparison to Study 3, 
shows that the discussion in relation to corporate governance is centered only post-Crash, 
without any particular bias favouring shareholders or stakeholder, and is therefore the same 
as in Set 2.  
 
 
 
      However, whereas in Set 2 the temporal dimensions focussing on termism showed a pre-
Crash bias towards short-termism and a post-Crash bias for long-termism, with regards to a 
sense of urgency there is no apparent difference in perception pre or post-Crash, as urgency to 
                                                          
1All combos, though applying no filter, also happen to be above a 20% pre/post-Crash difference. 
Fig 5.23 
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reorientate and non-urgency to reorientate are in equal proportions, relatively, in both 
conditions. Q1 is addressed, Q2.ii is not; and hypotheses H2a and H2b are not supported. 
      If a 20% filter is applied to this analysis, combos 12 (pre-Crash) and 15 (post-Crash) 
would be removed. This would have the effect of producing a bias, pre-Crash, favouring non-
urgency to reorientate (red) and a bias post-Crash of an urgency to reorientate (lilac). In this 
case both Q1 and Q2.ii would be addressed; though hypotheses H2a and H2b would still not 
be supported. 
 
5.3.3 Comparing bi, tri and quad levels of analysis: In conducting a variety of mapping 
assessments, what became increasingly clear was the degree of similarity of the colour 
clustering distributions for a particular corpus whatever level was under consideration. The 
basis of this observation was not only the corporate and regulatory corpus datasets but also 
the other ten peripheral stakeholder corpuses examined. Indeed, it appeared that simply 
having the biasing results of the bi level is predictive of tri and quad level biasing. An 
additional investigation was conducted to verify this (see Appendix 14), as it underscored an 
easier method of analysis. 
    
5.3.4 Extending the analysis to peripheral stakeholder organizations: The same analyses 
were conducted for all the other ten stakeholder organizations (FSA, FT, Newspapers-
general, CPS, CBI, CIMA, ICSA, IOD, IPPR, TUC). Appendix 9 shows the resulting maps. 
The combo distributions in the maps differ, reflecting value-related perceptions of these 
organizations. Consequently, some maps support the findings for the perceptions of the 
primary corpuses – corporate and regulatory – while others do not at all. Practically, this 
means that there is a degree of alignment seen between particular stakeholder organizations, 
such that groupings are observable. 
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      Because of the amount of data results generated from all the stakeholder corpuses a 
method had to be found to both assess the biases and consider the possible reasons for any 
findings, such as alignment, in an easier manner than the maps alone. It necessitated in some 
way a secondary analysis of the positioning maps. But in addressing this, what was developed 
was a method of presentation that consolidates all the results: the narrative strip (Table 5.2). 
Also afforded from the table is a read-off for answering in a simple manner the research 
questions and hypotheses.1 In the forthcoming section, ‘Universal perceptions’, the extensive 
map data findings, as biases, for the stakeholder organizations are highlighted below in 
relation to this table. And as will become apparent, one of the most striking features of the 
narrative strips is that, rather than what the media or hearsay might lead one to believe is the 
state-of-play regarding the favouring of shareholders or stakeholders at any one time, they 
allow a window into observing widespread economic perceptions held in a simple but 
objective fashion. 
 
5.4 Output of secondary analyses  
Having obtained maps for all twelve stakeholder corpuses2 – and knowing that the bi level is 
highly indicative of any biasing effect – the basis of the next step in the analysis were 
frequency counts of the combos and how they are constituted. This further qualitative part of 
the analysis opens up a great many possibilities depending on how to look at the data. 
Highlighted here are two aspects. The first focusses on how to make a comparison amongst a 
variety of corpuses to tell us something about more universal perceptions that organizations 
hold in common. The second focuses on examining the VRTs within the combo results (up 
till now we have only considered the VRTs in the context of the dimension to which they are 
attached). 
                                                          
1Summaries are also given below in Table 5.3 
2Secondary organizations’ perceptual maps are given in Appendix 15.  
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5.4.1 Universal perceptions: A construction was made of all the positioning maps into a 
‘consolidated view’. Having similarities to a type of heat map, this construction uses colour. 
But here it is to denote the bias in each organization’s value-related narrative, as recorded 
from their positioning map. In this way, it forms a narrative strip. As demonstrated in Table 
5.2, the recorded information from each corpus’s positioning map is a count of the relative 
amounts of the combos present by colour and expressed according to the greater number 
which a dimension has, and hence has a bias.1 This approach allows a very large amount of 
information to be easily viewable as a whole, and assessed further. Specifically, as Table 5.2 
highlights, it allows a consolidation of data across multiple stakeholder organizations.  
 
5.4.2 The narrative strip results: With the Set 1 variables of the first Study - using VRT-1 
(customer, price, return and share) and DimSyns for termism (long-term and short-term) - it 
is shown that the pre-Crash condition of the corporate corpus has a corporate governance bias 
towards a stakeholder perception (st), coloured green. While in the post-Crash condition there 
is no stakeholder bias, rather the bias is towards a shareholder perception (sh), and therefore 
depicted in blue. The same logic is applicable to the next column displaying the map results 
for the temporal aspect of termism. Here, it is shown that a Short-Term (ST, coloured orange) 
perception predominates pre-Crash and a Long-Term (LT, coloured purple) perception 
predominated post-Crash. As explained in Chapter 4, to make the analysis easier to follow, 
red borders surround the first four squares relating to these results. Hence, pre to post-Crash 
the narrative strip conveys in a summarized form that the corporate corpus, embodying the 
perceptions of executives, moves from a short-term stakeholder perspective to a long-term 
shareholder perspective. As previously indicated in Fig 5.5, the research questions Q1 and 
Q2.i are addressed. However, hypotheses H1a and H1b are not supported.      
                                                          
1An example of how this works is provided in Chapter 4, Section 4.7.1 
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      The Set 1 study also shows that the biasing is much the same for the next five corpuses. 
And it is observable that this also means there are similar biases in operation for the primary 
corpuses looked at: corporate and regulatory. From the CBI to the IOD, however, the picture 
is somewhat different, suggesting perceptions have moved either more post-Crash towards a 
short-term stakeholder perspective or that there is greater indecision about the value-related 
concepts involved. Similarly, a more complex picture emerges for the IPPR and the TUC. In 
both cases, it is visible that all the discussion whether for corporate governance or termism 
was taking place only post-Crash. And the only difference between them post-Crash is in 
relation to corporate governance where the IPPR has no bias either way towards shareholders 
or stakeholders, while the TUC is biased firmly only towards stakeholders. This was not 
surprizing necessarily, although what was (and it was double-checked) was that the TUC did 
not have any instances of stakeholder primacy pre-Crash. Chapter 6 discusses this further. 
But one possible reason worth noting here is that, simply put, for the TUC at that time 
managers were not stakeholders!    
      Study 2 presents an analysis of what happens when a different set of value-related terms 
(VRT-2) are applied (equity, pay, performance and strategy). This provides an independent 
check on Study 1 inasmuch as it is intended to address the same underlying construct relating 
to value, and at the same time provide an additional take on corporate value (and wider 
stakeholder) perception. By virtue of these points, it also helps to smooth out any variations 
in perception – and where by having multiple stakeholder corpuses similarly meets this 
purpose. Moreover, the objective in this research is to map changes in perception rather than 
seek statistical significance between the pre and post-Crash conditions – and which is not 
necessarily evident even when testing is possible due, for example, to very small numbers 
worked with. However, the more there are similar results generated for different VRTs, it can 
be suggested, the greater the ‘qualitative significance’ of the findings.  
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      It is observable that the corporate corpus once again moves from a pre-Crash stakeholder 
bias to a post-Crash shareholder one, albeit the pre-Crash stakeholder bias is weak. Pre-Crash 
termism is not discussed – in the context of VRT-2 language – while post-Crash termism is 
discussed but there is no preference either way; the short-term and long-term usage being 
equal. In comparison, for the regulatory corpus there is no discussion pre-Crash of corporate 
governance, though post-Crash there is but it is in equal proportions regarding shareholder 
and stakeholder primacy. There is, however, a very stark movement from a pre-Crash short-
term bias to a post-Crash long-term bias. 
      Overall, and with the other stakeholder corpuses examined, the picture is much the same 
as for Study 1, including, by contrast, a change in perspective for the four stakeholder 
organizations from the CBI to the IOD. Some differences that do appear are visible for the 
IPPR, which is quite clearly moving from a pre-Crash bias of long-term stakeholder 
perception to a post-Crash short-term shareholder perception. The TUC has an identical post-
Crash bias to that seen in Study1 but unlike Study 1 it has the same bias pre-Crash as well.   
      Nevertheless, what can be said is that there appears to be a degree of support for the 
biasing effects whether using VRT-1 or VRT-2. Chapter 6 examines the implications of this 
further.    
      In Study 3, using Set 3 variables, and Study 4, using Set 4 variables, an assessment was 
made of the temporal dimensions associated with a sense of urgency. To recap the synonyms 
used, action (a), represented an urgency to reorientate and efficient (e2), represented a non-
urgency to reorientate. 
      The narrative strips for Set 3 and Set 4 show a degree of similarity with Set 1 and Set 2 
results respectively. This is due to the fact there are common variables (ie for Study 1 and 3, 
VRT-1 and shareholder and stakeholder primacy; for Study 2 and 4, VRT-2 and shareholder 
and stakeholder primacy). Yet also seen is that there is a degree of similarity between Set 3 
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and Set 4 such that, particularly for the first six corpuses, the bias in the sense of urgency 
dimensions is similar. Moving across to the CBI, CIMA, ICSA and the IOD, this similarity 
appears to break down somewhat, with perhaps a bit more clarity for the IPPR and the TUC.  
      Furthermore, while it is difficult to make direct comparisons between dimensions relating 
to termism and to a sense of urgency, it is noticeable that pre-Crash to post-Crash there is a 
high number of combos observable representing a movement in perceptual bias from non-
urgency-to reorientate towards an urgency-to-reorientate. On its own, this effect might be 
expected - or at least from the perspective of H2a and H2b it formed part of the prediction. 
Although as hypotheses of greater complexity involving primacy, they were not supported. 
Yet the four studies taken together suggest that in many instances there is, pre-Crash, a bias 
to be both short-term and non-urgent in perception and similarly, post-Crash, a bias to be 
both long-term and urgent in perception. Although there appears to be reversal in bias for the 
IOD and the IPPR with urgency having precedence pre-Crash and non-urgency post-Crash. 
      The method of interpretation once understood means that overall the results depicted in 
the narrative strips become very telling about perceptual biases operating with respect to 
primacy and temporality. There is clearly, as well, similarity observable on a bigger scale 
amongst various stakeholder organizations than might be otherwise thought. In attempting to 
highlight these similarities, the analysis leads on to the idea of alignment. 
 
5.4.3 Stakeholder alignments: The different stakeholder corpuses in this research appeared 
to align according to three main groupings, which are termed A, B and C. Besides the biasing 
effects previously discussed, Table 5.2 in fact also demonstrates how the analysis appears 
after similarly resulting component corpuses are moved into proximity (shown with bold 
vertical separators between the groups). 
      In Group A, for Set 1 map results, it is found the particular corpuses grouping together are 
the: corporate, regulatory, FSA, FT, Newspapers-general, and CPS. These seemingly portray 
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similar perceptual biasing, where for the value-related terms chosen, the effect shows that 
these corpuses appear to be generally biased pre-Crash to a short-term stakeholder 
perception, while post-Crash this has moved to a long-term shareholder perception. 
      Group B, is also for Set 1 data but for the map results for the: CBI, CIMA, ICSA and the 
IOD corpuses. Although not quite as strong and more difficult to interpret, the narrative strip 
suggests something of a reversal in perception where for these organizations a bias is 
predominating more pre-Crash towards long-term shareholders and post–Crash towards a 
greater short-term stakeholder perspective. It can however be observed - especially where 
there is an equal bias for, say, shareholder and stakeholder primacy as with ICSA pre-Crash 
or no combos have been recorded as with ICSA post-Crash – it is not an absolute, simply a 
bias overall for the group.  
      In Group C, using Set 1 data, are the map results for the IPPR and the TUC. To some 
extent, these can be considered as not truly forming a pair (although there is some basis for 
doing so on account of their political orientation). However, it is instructive to consider them 
together, and not least because they do not conform to the biasing patterns of the other 
groups.    
       Alignments for the groups can be shown graphically. To do this all the data generated by 
the corpus perceptual maps are used. These data constitute an overlay on the narrative strip 
(Table 5.2). 
      What this means is that where, for example, it is found for a dataset there were two value-
related combos for shareholder primacy and three for stakeholder primacy, both numbers are 
taken into account. For each dimension the combo counts are summed and their means taken. 
Across groups of corpuses designated for assessment, the same process is applied. This 
provides a more accurate picture than can be observed simply from the basic form of the 
narrative strip where overall the recording of biasing is by colour alone.  
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      What is clear is that for the Group A result (Fig 5.24a) the alignment in perception is very 
strong on the different dimensions assessed and a clear difference over the time period is 
observed. Long-term (purple) shareholder primacy (blue) rises from pre to post-Crash, while 
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short-term (orange) stakeholder primacy (green) falls. There also appears to be close to a 
parity for the pre-Crash, short-term and stakeholder biases verses the post-Crash, long-term 
and shareholder primacy biasing, which shows an almost identical parity in its alignment. 
This Group A result is about as close to perfect as could be hope to achieve in examining the 
association of perceptions for a given group of stakeholder organizations. 
      Similarly, in Fig 5.24b, there is a further highlighting of the Group B effect, as with more 
comprehensive map data the reversal in perception has greater definition than in the narrative 
strip. Very apparently, these corpuses (CBI, CIMA, ICSA and the IOD), orientate in 
perception completely differently to the corpuses in Group A. Long-term (purple) shareholder 
primacy (blue) falls from pre to post-Crash, while short-term (orange) stakeholder primacy 
(green) rises. Although it is observable that in the pre-Crash condition, long-term bias and 
shareholder bias in comparison to each other display a slightly reduced alignment or parity as 
observed in Group A.  
      Fig 5.24c displays the results for Group C, which included the IPPR and the TUC. As 
noted previously the results of this group are ambiguous on the narrative strip. Hence, the 
results here cannot be taken to be a true reflection of perceptual bias. Certainly, as to what the 
graph in Fig 5.24c depicts, it suggests that there is only conversation post-Crash on all the 
dimensions, with a full alignment on termism (hence undifferentiated); and somewhat less 
alignment on corporate governance perception in relation to any other dimension. Overall, it 
shows that if considered as a group, these two corpuses would suggest only a movement in 
the conversation alone. However, going back to the narrative strip it is apparent that the TUC 
does in fact have a stakeholder bias post-Crash. But what is happening is that it is being 
overshadowed by the other results, not least the presence of an equal post-Crash biasing for a 
shareholder as well as a stakeholder primacy for the IPPR, giving the appearance in the graph 
of a perception that is not actually held by the TUC. In essence, putting the IPPR and the 
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TUC together does not really tell us anything about them as a group with similar perceptions. 
Yet if nothing else, a result of this sort highlights the importance in referring to the narrative 
strip where there are ambiguities in the results when attempting to form groupings. It is, 
therefore, quite likely that another grouping, one possibly larger if the data is present, to 
include the TUC, might have made more sense – there is a certain amount of trial and error.1 
These Group C graphs are included here for completeness though, as well as to demonstrate 
the approach and what to look out for. 
      In the next set of graphs (Set 2), examining the groupings with VRT-2 variables, much 
the same effect is evident for Group A as for the Set 1 Group A graphs. Fig 5.25a shows the 
same corpuses, therefore, demonstrating alignment for the same pre-Crash short-term 
stakeholder biasing moving towards post-Crash long-term shareholder biasing (ie it is above 
the other combo results). 
 
 
  
                                                          
1in a similar manner – and though not a perfect matching of data – the application of this thinking is used to 
check for alignments in a Group D analysis, shown further on, where the TUC is looked at along with the CBI 
and CIMA. 
Fig 5.25a 
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      For the next group of corpuses in Fig 5.25b, Group B is generally moving in a similar 
fashion to Group B of Set 1, which is to say in a reversal to Group A corpuses pre to post-
Crash. Although the differentiation on the corporate governance dimensions is more marked 
and here seen is only a slight difference between the stakeholder and shareholder dimensions 
post-Crash, albeit a small bias for shareholder primacy is in evidence. The stronger result is 
Fig 5.25c 
Fig 5.25b 
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for the movement from a pre-Crash long-term perception to a post-Crash short-term 
perception. 
      Group C, depicted in Fig 5.25c, apparently shows a pre-Crash movement of long-term 
stakeholder bias to a post-Crash short-term shareholder bias. However, in the light of 
previous comments caution is required when assessing these results. 
      On the whole, these Set 2 graphical results, which have used a different set of VRTs, 
support the findings of the Set 1 graphical analysis and show that alignment can be observed 
for the same groups of corpuses. 
      Next considered is the way different corpuses may align when an examination is made of 
the temporal dimensions concerning a sense of urgency, ie to reorientate or not to reorientate.         
      The narrative strip suggests there to be fairly good alignment that can be considered for 
the same (or similar) corpus groupings. So to get a comparison the map results are graphed 
using the same A, B, C, groupings. 
 
 
      Indeed, in Fig 5.26a it can be observed that there is quite a good alignment on the 
dimensions, and that this alignment is similar to previous Group A analyses. But here, rather 
Fig 5.26a 
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than a bias for short-termism pre-Crash and long-termism post-Crash, there is a sense of non-
urgency to reorientate (lilac) aligning to a greater extent with stakeholder primacy (green) 
pre–Crash and this moving towards a bias in favour of an urgency to reorientate (red) along 
with shareholder primacy (blue) post-Crash. Once again, it is not complete parity but a 
definite bias that may be observed, suggesting how these six corpuses (corporate, regulatory, 
FSA, FT, News-gen, and the CPS) again display a similar perception. 
 
 
Fig 5.26b 
Fig 5.26c 
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      For Group B in Fig 5.26b, and reflecting the results of the narrative strip, any alignment 
appears to break down, largely, although a pre to post-Crash movement is observable with 
respect to stakeholder primacy, while there is a considerable reduction of any other 
conversation over the period. 
      Similarly, the Group C set of corpuses shown in Fig 5.26c (the IPPR and the TUC), does 
not work together and there is no observable differentiation in alignment over the period. 
      In the fourth set of graphs, again looked at are the groups, though here examining whether 
any alignment is observable with Set 4 variables for the same corpus groups. Group A, in Fig 
5.27a, shows that some alignment is achievable with these corpuses placed together. Though 
somewhat on the weak side, indicated by how far the plots are apart, there is nevertheless a 
movement pre-Crash for a bias of non-urgency to reorientate and a stakeholder perception to 
a post-Crash bias of an urgency to reorientate and a shareholder perception. 
       
Fig 5.27a 
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      For Group B, looking at Set 4 variables (Fig 5.27b), again much like observed in the 
narrative strip and in Fig 5.26c above, there is no evidence of alignment that could be easily 
produce. These corpuses do not really go together – all that is observable is some alignment 
for the corporate governance dimensions and similarly for the sense of urgency dimensions, 
themselves. This only indicates some weak movement in the conversations pre to post-Crash.  
      And, though there is some evidence of a pre to post-Crash movement of stakeholder 
primacy, with a sense of urgency to reorientate, towards a post-Crash shareholder primacy, 
Fig 5.27b 
Fig 5.27c 
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with a non-urgency to reorientate, Fig 5.27c for Group C is a skewed graph. Also again seen 
is largely the same kind of lack of differentiation when observing the Group B graph. It 
highlights once more that these corpuses together are not a good reflection of the narrative 
strip results. 
      These results, of course, beg the question of why not just put another group of corpuses 
together to throw light on how different stakeholder organizations (ie their corpuses) 
potentially change their perception in line with one another? Unfortunately, the three main 
groupings chosen appear to be the best achievable with the data that has been generated. With 
the two different time period involved, there are a lot of differences in Group B and Group C, 
even allowing for playing around with groupings based on the different temporal dimensions, 
making this a difficult endeavour.  
      Nevertheless, there was the possibility of examining one further configuration. This was a 
configuration constituted with the TUC in relation to the CBI and CIMA. Fig 5.27d shows 
this as Group D, a blend of corpuses utilizing Set 4 variables, ie VRT-2 and DimSyns for 
primacy and a sense of urgency. 
 
Fig 5.27d 
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      Some alignment is apparent for this group, despite the distance apart between dimensions, 
inasmuch as it is observable that there is some differentiation. Pre-Crash – assume the lines 
are extended back a bit to make this clearer – there can be considered a slight bias for 
shareholder primacy (where its position is slightly above in comparison to stakeholder 
primacy) and a non-urgency to reorientate, while post-Crash there is more obviously a bias 
for stakeholder primacy with an urgency to reorientate. This Group D set of corpuses is of 
note as well as it is in an opposite configuration to Group A (with Set 4 variables). Chapter 6 
looks at the meaning of this, but there is clearly a different business perception for this group 
in evidence. 
      One of the intriguing findings from these analyses overall was the preponderance of a pre 
to post-Crash movement of not only short-term to long-term perception (particularly for 
Groups A) but also for a movement from a sense of non-urgency to a sense of urgency. Seen 
in the narrative strip, this result was in fact stronger and more widespread than that for the 
termism results. Intuitively, the expectation might be the opposite when it comes to a sense of 
urgency over time but these results suggest otherwise. In Chapter 6, there is further 
consideration given to these observations along with the delicate nature of different groupings 
based on VRTs and DimSyns.   
   
5.4.4 Results from assessing VRTs within combos: In addition to examining movement 
across stakeholder corpus datasets to gain an understanding – in line with the first research 
question – of any changing corporate value narrative, also to be addressed is how financial 
versus non-financial value-related terms might move. It is important to stress that this aspect 
is different from what has so far been undertaken. Up to now when looking at combos in the 
perceptual maps they have been considered from the perspective of the dimension to which 
the VRTs are attached - ie VRTs are depicted as a single class, while the analytical focus is 
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on the corporate governance and temporal dimensions linking to them, and the combos then 
colour-coded according to the relevant dimension. Yet this means the combos do not 
apparently show the more subtle value-related changes if they are there. Addressed in the 
following analysis, however, is the other end of the combo to understand more about the 
value-related terms themselves.   
 
i) Primary corpuses in relation to hypotheses: As noted in the Chapter 4, the types of 
hypothesis conceptualized to examine value-related terms included H1c: Pre Crash, there 
will be a dominance of financial value-related terms compared to non-financial value-related 
terms clustering towards the space representing short-term ShP. And H1d: Post-Crash, there 
will be a dominance of non-financial value-related terms compared to financial value-related 
terms clustering towards the space representing long-term StP (see also Table 5.3 for a 
summary of results).  
      A matrix for the map data under consideration was constructed1 and the results graphed. 
First, Set 1 results for the corporate corpus (Fig 5.28) is looked at, consisting, as before, of the 
annual reports for twenty FT250 companies. As previously indicated in the methodology the 
graph is in two halves, ie pre-Crash and post-Crash, which has been appended with 1 or 2 to 
the dimension plotted to depict this. Return and customer2 are conceptualized here as non-
financial value-related terms - and coloured light blue - and price and share as financial 
value-related terms - and coloured dark blue (all the following graphs use the same colour 
scheme). Admittedly, there is a degree of self-selection – where ‘price’ and ‘share’ are taken 
                                                          
1Chapter 4, Section 4.7.3, provides an example of how this secondary analysis is carried out. 
2See Chapter 4, on how terms were chosen, and how such choice is subject to experimental limitations; ‘return’ 
was thus one of the best choices as a VRT. Indeed, the fact that ‘return’ in a business context has a financial 
meaning - and it was business-related material (eg ARs) that formed the corpuses - meant there was support for 
the use of the term in that financial sense. It may be noted, though, that how the term would be used for this later 
secondary analysis was not known in advance - and using another term would have required major redoing of 
the whole investigation – but alternatives would be a useful exploration for future research. 
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as more likely to be financial and ‘customer’ non-financial. Indeed, ‘return’ is somewhat 
ambiguous. But for the purpose of experimentation, it will be taken as a non-financial type of 
term. On that basis, it is instructive to see what happens. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      In the light of H1c then it would be expected to see more instances pre-Crash of financial 
value-related terms (price, share) loading on ShP1 (shareholder primacy) and ST1 (short-
term). What is actually apparent, however, are equal amounts of financial and non-financial 
value terms loading on to ShP1. Meanwhile, on ST1 it is seen there are slightly more 
financial terms (price, share) present. Hence, because of the dominance on ST1 of financial 
terms, H1c is not supported. In fact, though, there is a greater dominance for financial terms, 
pre-Crash, loading on to long-term stakeholder primacy, as there is a pre-Crash 
preponderance of financial terms. The relevance of this is highlighted further moving through 
this section. Note, overall, that in comparison to previous biasing observed on the maps and 
the narrative strips, this is the same, as evidenced by the highest columns for ST1 and StP1; it 
is just broken down more into the financial and non-financial categories. 
Fig 5.28 
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      Similarly, for H1d it would be expected to see post-Crash more instances of non-financial 
terms (return, customer) on LT2 (long-term) and StP2 (stakeholder primacy). This is what is 
actually see, and hence H1d is supported. However, it is also observable that only non-
financial terms are loading on to ST2, so that there is a stronger biasing for the effect on this 
dimension for short-termism. In ‘b) Group effects’ below, this kind of effect is expanded on. 
      Next, an assessment was made of the regulatory corpus datasets (Fig 5.29). As far as H1c 
is concerned, there was no expectation, as before, to see financial VRTs (price, share) more 
prominent on dimensions of ST1 and ShP1. What is actually apparent is that they are in an 
equal ratio on ST1 and not in evidence on ShP1. Hence, H1c is not supported. Similarly, for 
H1d, the plot indicates a complete reversal of what the expectation might have been, as there 
are no non-financial terms loading on to LT2 and StP2. The hypothesis is, therefore, not 
supported for the regulatory corpus dataset.1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
      There is one important thing that is observable, however. It is that while it has previously 
been determined that on the face of it there is no preference for shareholder or stakeholder 
                                                          
1Additional matrices for all the Sets for the primary corpuses is given in Appendices 16 and 17. 
Fig 5.29 
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primacy, as they are in equal proportions for both time periods (Fig 5.28), it can now be seen 
that this is propelled by different types of value perception – non-financial, pre-Crash, and 
financial, post-Crash. 
 
ii.a) Group effects: Even after all the deconstruction done, examining single stakeholder 
datasets does not at this juncture provide a lot of data from which to work from. Combining 
matrices is helpful in this regard. Moreover, when combined into twos or threes – or rather 
based on some common corporate interest – the results are additionally revealing. 
      Here are the findings for a cluster of the corporate dataset together with that of the CBI 
and the IOD. 
 
 
 
 
 
      As with the corporate dataset on its own, the results (Fig 5.30) are similar, inasmuch as a 
relative change occurs over time from managers’ use of financial terminology to non-
financial terminology. Hence, a pre to post-Crash analysis shows a movement from a bias of 
financial value-related terms clustering in the space representing short-term ShP to that later, 
Fig 5.30 
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post-Crash, of non-financial value-related terms clustering in the space representing long-
term StP. Hypotheses H1c and H1d are therefore supported. The rider, though, is that some 
dimensions can bias more than others can. In this case, StP1 has a stronger financial to non-
financial term bias than ShP1 (as indicated by the greater ratio of dark to light blue). Hence, 
while the specified hypotheses are supported the plot tells us about perceived corporate value 
beyond that, inasmuch as it shows for that pre-Crash time, and for that cluster of 
organizations, there was a stakeholder discourse occurring. But that multi-actor discourse was 
occurring with greater reference to financial terminology.  
      Switching the temporal category to a sense of urgency, it may be noted, similarly supports 
H1c and H1d and Table 5.3 records this. 
      Other clusters examined were the regulatory and the FSA corpuses together, and the FT 
and General newspaper corpuses together. 1 
 
 
                                                          
1Letter by bars indicate relative amounts of different VRTs. 
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      Both these graphs (Figs 5.31 and 5.32) are again relatable to hypotheses H1c and H1d, 
and which are not supported (Table 5.3). But what is of more interest here is that both 
datasets are, in the main, biasing in similar ways pre and post-Crash, ie a focus pre-Crash on 
non-financial value-related terms and post-Crash on financial value-related terms.  
 
 
 
   
      With comparable pre to post-Crash biasing, what is observed from Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 
overall is that the narrative of corporate value is to an extent aligned for the stakeholders 
involved when considered as groups with multiple actors. Moreover, it might be thought that, 
based on the many articles they write on business activities, newspapers would be more 
aligned with the corporate world (see Fig 5.28), rather than the regulatory one (see Fig 5.29). 
But these results, tentatively, suggest otherwise.  
 
ii.b) Overview of group effects in relation to hypotheses: Highlighted in Table 5.3 are the 
grouped alignments that have been given consideration, and in comparison to the primary 
corpuses. 
Fig 5.32 
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      And though somewhat redundant - as indicated above in Section 5.4.3 for Group C - also 
highlighted is whether the alignments serve to better support the research questions and 
hypotheses or otherwise. Chapter 6, considers the meaning of the results. 
  
aNotes to Table 5.3: 
1. Research question addressed or hypothesis supported denoted ‘’; not addressed or not supported denoted ‘x’. 
2. Groups: A=corp, reg, FSA, FT, News-gen, CPS; B=CBI, CIMA, ICSA, IOD; C=IPPR-T, TUC 
3. Cluster: 1=corp, IOD, CBI, 2=reg, FSA; 3=FT, News-gen (all as above in Section 5.4.4.iia);  
4. ‘Cluster 4’ refers to analysis below in iv) Multiple corpuses in the broader corporate context. 
5. Diff = pre to post-Crash difference ie where there is unspecified change over time 
6. Q3 not included – as not a group-based analysis (see Section 4.4.7.ii; Appendix 13). 
7. Primacy and termism together represent (part of) a managerial corporate governance outlook. 
8. For research questions and hypotheses, see Introduction: Specifying the research questions and hypotheses. 
 
  
Research Questions Addressed and Hypotheses Supported Summary Table for 
Primary Corpuses and Stakeholder Corpus Groups 
 
Corpus 
    
Set 
type 
 
 
Q1 
(primacy) 
 
 
Q2.i 
(termism) 
 
 
 
Q2.ii 
(SofU) 
 
H1a 
(primacy 
/term.) 
 
H1b 
(primacy 
/term.) 
 
H2a 
(primacy 
/SofU) 
 
H2b 
 
(primacy 
/SofU) 
   
H1c 
(primacy 
/term.) 
   
H1d 
(primacy 
/term.) 
   
H2c 
(primacy 
/SofU) 
   
H2d 
(primacy 
/SofU) 
  Diff Diff Diff Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Corp. Set 1    x x   x    
 Set 2    x x   x x   
 Set 3      x x   x x 
 Set 4      x x   x x 
Reg. Set 1 x   x x   x x   
 Set 2    x x   x x   
 Set 3 x     x x   x x 
 Set 4   x   x x   x x 
             
Group A Set 1    x x       
 Set 2    x x       
 Set 3      x x     
 Set 4      x x     
Group B Set 1    x x       
 Set 2    x x       
 Set 3   x   x x     
 Set 4      x x     
Group C Set 1  x  x x       
 Set 2    x x       
 Set 3      x x     
 Set 4      x x     
Group D Set 4            
             
Cluster 1 Set 1            
Cluster 2 Set 1        x x   
Cluster 3 Set 1        x x   
Cluster 4 Set 1        x x   
 Set 2        x x   
 Set 3          x x 
 Set 4          x x 
 Table 5.3a 
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ii.c) Are dimensions related to a term’s financial or non-financial orientation?: One other 
group comparison that can be made is through looking at a summary of the above primary 
stakeholder and corpus cluster graphs in relation to the DimSyns examined in the Set 1 
positioning maps and narrative strip.  
 
Financial (F) v non-financial (NF) 
bias (VRT-1) 
VRT-dimension 
bias (VRT-1) 
 
Pre-
Crash 
Post-
Crash 
Pre-
Crash 
Post-
Crash 
Corporate F NF ST,StP LT,ShP 
Corporate, 
IOD, CBI 
F NF LT,StP ST,- 
Regulatory NF F ST,- LT,- 
Regulatory, 
FSA 
NF F ST,StP LT,- 
FT, News-gen NF F ST,StP LT,ShP 
 
 
 
 
      Whether a stakeholder organization or group is financially or non-financially oriented in 
regards to their value-related perception, there is not necessarily a linkage to their dimension 
orientation, as Table 5.4 demonstrates. For example, whether managers are pre-Crash short-
term stakeholder biased (as with the corporate corpus and the combined regulatory and FSA 
corpuses) different pre-Crash financial v non-financial dispositions are observable.  
 
iii) Further analysis of sets:, A somewhat different picture, however, emerges when the 
second set of value-related terms are examined; as conducted above with Set 2 (VRT-2) 
alignments and as also depicted in the narrative strip (Table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.4 Colour key: VRT-shareholder primacy, VRT-Stakeholder 
primacy, VRT-long-term, VRT-short-term 
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      In this analysis performance and strategy are viewed as non-financial value-related terms 
and equity and pay as financial value-related terms. Leaving aside any overarching pre to 
post-Crash difference, which has already highlighted above, here for example, there is more 
of a roughly equal split in financial and non-financial biasing specifically, post-Crash, in both 
the corporate and regulatory corpuses. Although, for the corporate corpus there is a financial 
VRT bias on the stakeholder primacy dimension (StP1) and a greater non-financial bias post-
Crash loading on to the same dimension (StP2). Nevertheless, hypotheses H1c and H1d are 
not supported.  
      By contrast, when examining what occurs when the sense of urgency dimensions are 
used, the picture is different once again. Although this is so only for those specific 
dimensions, as represented by the relevant bars on the graphs; for the corporate and 
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regulatory corpuses – for example as shown in Figs 5.34a, 5.34b - the shareholder and 
stakeholder primacy dimensions are the same as depicted in Figs 5.19 and 5.21 respectively1  
 
 
     
 
 
  
       
 
                                                          
1See also Chapter 4 on comparing these bar charts to perceptual maps. 
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      Overall for these analyses, the pre to post-Crash shift is very loosely maintained it 
appears in these other sets, in a similar manner to that seen, for example, with Set 1 (ie 
corporate – financial to non-financial; regulatory – non-financial to financial). Though 
hypotheses H2c and H2d are not upheld (see Table 5.3). Hence, being seemingly so 
dependent on the variable sets examined, therefore, these kinds of analyses are also not clear 
cut – particularly as observed when the financial and non-financial VRTs are in equal 
proportions, as with Set 4 for the regulatory corpus.  
      Yet, for these primary corpuses, there are, at the very least, slight differences in evidence. 
This is apparent by referring back to looking at termism in Table 5.2 as an example. Whereas 
alignment can be observed for both these primary corpuses for Set 1 variables (though some 
ambiguity on the corporate governance dimensions; and with somewhat comparable results 
for Set 2 variables, and so forth for the other sets), it is still possible that one source of biasing 
might stem from an underlying financial versus non-financial perception by the organizations 
involved.  
 
iv) Multiple corpuses in the broader corporate context: The primary corpuses alone address 
the hypotheses as specified, showing that hypotheses H1a – H2b are not upheld (as indicated 
in Table 5.3). Though for the corporate corpus there is a financial to non-financial movement 
in term use; and for the regulatory corpus, there is a non-financial to financial movement in 
term use – just not on the dimensions proposed. Beyond that, these corpuses provide only a 
partial picture and are not definitive of the wider business perceptions as a whole for the 
stakeholder organizations we have researched. Groups of aligned corpuses, meanwhile, show 
how, to a better extent, financial v non-financial value-related perceptions may be operating 
to reflect bias amongst certain business community segments. But there is also the possibility 
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the formation of these corpus groups is too artificial. And the results are somewhat limited, 
therefore, if it to be truly understood what is occurring for the economy as a whole.  
      Yet, even though the bias of some groups of corpuses are operating in opposition to one 
another - as seen above (Figs: 5.35a, 5.35b) and which itself could be reflective of the 
broader economy - it is still possible to take all the twelve stakeholder corpuses as a proxy for 
wider financial perspectives amongst UK organizations. Indeed, as a cross section of the 
national economic landscape they provide a credible sampling. In this case, might there be 
any overall bias – even slight - observable?  
      In fact, the finding for all twelve stakeholder corpuses, however assessed (that is for Set 1 
to Set 4; Figs 5.36a – 5.36d), is that while hypotheses H1c – H2d are not supported there is a 
nominal post-Crash biasing towards the use of financial value-related terminology.1,2 The 
effect is most marked for Set 2 and Set 4, which both use VRT-2 variables (performance, 
strategy, equity, pay). 
 
 
                                                          
1Depicted by the dark blue part of the bars being longer than the light blue part, and in greater evidence below 
the red line post-Crash. 
2Appendix 18 provides an alternate depiction as radar graphs. The bar charts, however, are superior. 
Fig 5.36a 
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      To place these findings1 in context, with respect to the VRTs used in this research there 
appears to be a systematic effect occurring, such that across sets, where despite manipulating 
the variables, financial versus non-financial value-related perceptions have similar movement 
pre to post-Crash. How strong this effect is, is another matter. But certainly the relevance of 
this effect in relation to the debate on financialization is apposite. 
      Ultimately, though, from the perspective of this study, the extent there might be greater 
movement towards financial VRTs post-Crash (hence, potential financialization) is seen as 
dependent on the particular part of the economic discourse being focused on. Indeed, it is 
feasible the Crash may not have curbed any prevailing financialization ethos at all. An open 
mind needs to be kept, therefore, on this part of the analysis as to what is driving value 
perception, particularly with respect to the corporate world.      
                                                          
1Table 5.3 above provides a summary of results for the primary corpuses and groupings; Appendix 19 provides 
a summary of results for the primary corpuses and secondary corpuses of peripheral stakeholder organizations.  
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6. An Exploration of the Findings 
 
 
 
    
 
 
This research started out with the expectation that companies were overly shareholder-
oriented leading up to the Crash of 2008. It was an expectation in line with a widely-held 
academic and popular view, propounding the existence of a financialized commercial 
environment at that time (eg Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2002; Krippner, 2005; Froud, 2006). 
And as Jack Welch’s famous comments exemplified (Guerrera, 2009), it engendered a variety 
of short-termist business practices. Ultimately, the thinking went, this behaviour was to 
destroy the ability to generate value and fuelled the financial crisis that followed (see eg 
Foroohar, 2017). After the Crash, by contrast, there was the expectation companies would 
have likely become more aware of the need to focus on broader stakeholder interests over the 
longer term as a necessity for improving value generation.1 
      The results of this study challenge these ideas, finding the managerial discourse 
concerned with value generation was not as expected either before the crisis or after. This, 
however, is only apparent when the discourse is examined from the perspective of a complex 
set of questions and associated hypotheses; an approach more in keeping perhaps with the 
                                                          
1See eg: Donaldson and Preston, 1995; DesJardins and McCall, 2004, Sprague, 2010; Vasudev, 2012. 
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way individuals actually think. Specifically, when primacy and temporality orientations are 
considered together, they can be observed to have progressed differently from hypothesised; 
and H1a – H2b are thus not supported. Indeed, for the Study 1 analyses, as time advanced the 
corporate domain demonstrated a short-term stakeholder to long-term shareholder movement; 
for the regulatory domain, a movement of short to long-termism accompanied by an 
unchanged primacy orientation.  
      Managers, apparently, were thinking about the concepts involved in a manner against the 
accepted wisdom. Indeed, with shareholder primacy not in the ascendency for the corporate 
domain prior to the Crash of 2008, despite the popular portrayal of an ignoring of stakeholder 
primacy, apparently had the upper hand at that point in time.1    
      And it is not only the results for the corporate and regulatory domains that challenge 
expectations about managerial behavior in relation to where their corporate governance focus 
lay at points over the crisis period. Extending the investigation to other stakeholder 
organizations showed they similarly did not conform to the hypotheses but instead manifested 
varied new primacy and temporality biasing configurations. One unanticipated consequence 
of this was that the configurations gave rise to behavioural alignments amongst particular 
organizations. And with the application of narrative staining to these domains, groupings 
became apparent. Such a broad analysis culminating in this sort of breakdown of constituents 
produced an unprecedented view of the UK business arena – as seen in the narrative strip. It 
meant that as the effects of the 2008 Crash took hold new biases became manifest. Indeed, it 
was these biases that were at work within managers’ thinking, supporting an alteration in 
their perceptions across the economy about the how the creation of corporate value occurs.  
                                                          
1The extent this is so is due, it might be thought, to the term ‘manager’ being used as a stakeholder term, and 
therefore not truly reflective of stakeholders as a group. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the use of the term 
‘manager’ as a proxy of stakeholder primacy is justified. 
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      This discussion looks at some possible reasons for these findings. In that context a 
number of factors are stressed: the sensitive and often ambiguous thinking executives bring to 
bear on value creation; that primacy and temporality are highly stratified variables; that value 
creation may mean something different depending on what variables or combinations (VRTs, 
DimSyns) are looked at; and when relevant variables are looked at, something particularly 
pertinent when faced with major crises. All explanations offered are therefore tentative. And 
though the basis for this investigation is the shareholder versus stakeholder debate - a 
complex field as the literature review in Chapter 2 highlighted - this research is not about 
proving or disproving any particular theoretical position on primacy or temporality. 
Similarly, it is important to emphasise the research aim was not to provide solutions for how 
UK companies should function to best effect in creating value. Rather, for the first time is the 
belief, the purpose was to map potentially changing perceptions when it came to value 
creation. Hence, objectively determining – and depicting in visual form – what a variety of 
UK organizations thought about these aspects of their work, aspects that underpinned how 
value generation was conceived as they went into the financial crisis and then as they came 
out of it. 
 
6.1 Primary corpuses  
The analysis began with three general research questions. These concerned a non-specific 
directional change in perception over time with respect to how managers perceived corporate 
governance change with respect to value creation. Thus, Q1 is addressed, with the results 
demonstrating an alteration in thinking for the primary corpuses - the corporate and 
regulatory domains - across the pre to post-Crash period.1 Similarly, as general questions 
                                                          
1Table 5.3 in Chapter 5, under the Q1 column, shows that with the exception of two sets in the regulatory 
analyses both the corporate and regulatory corpuses display a change of primacy orientation of some description 
– ie without considering any specific bias in operation. 
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regarding the appearance of a perceived temporal change Q2i and Q2ii were addressed. The 
results for these questions indicate, respectively, that executives changed their perceptual 
orientations with regard to, first termism, and second, a sense of urgency. As far as that goes, 
findings were much as expected from the thrust of the research. 
      Yet what was an unexpected outcome was that corporate governance perceptions did not 
occur in line with expectations once a consideration was made of primacy and temporality in 
combination and their potential direction of change specified.1  
 
6.1.1 The Behaviour of the corporate domain: The expectation was – and on the basis of 
which there had been a formulation of the hypotheses – that companies would change their 
perception from one of short-term shareholder primacy before the Crash to that of long-term 
stakeholder primacy after the Crash, as they – the thinking might be – learnt from their 
mistakes. However, this was not borne out. An apparent shift from short to long-term 
perception (orange to purple), pre to post-Crash was clearly evident. But the hypotheses in 
this regard (H1a, H1b, H2a and H2b), that used a combined variable encapsulating value as it 
is associated with both primacy and temporality, demonstrated something different was 
occurring within the corporate and regulatory corpuses. In looking at the results from Study 1 
(using Set 1 terms2) for the corporate domain, it is observable that corporate executives shift 
their perception from short-term stakeholder primacy prior to the Crash to long-term 
shareholder primacy following the Crash. It is an effect that is partially supported in Study 2 
(using Set 2 terms) where again there is a clear movement towards shareholder primacy post–
Crash. Although unlike in Study 1 which showed a short to long-term shift in bias in this 
instance executives seem to have no preference regarding time horizon – pre-Crash it is non-
                                                          
1The pre to post-Crash primacy orientation on its own also varied across multiple stakeholder organizations, 
additionally only apparent with the use of the narrative strip, and suggesting a more intricate dynamic was 
involved. 
2The ‘Set’ refers to the combo investigated, ie VRT plus DimSyn. 
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existent, and post-Crash it is in equal measure. This does not negate any apparent effect 
regarding time horizon observed with Set 1; all it means is that this is the effect found for the 
terms employed in the sets used.  
      But certainly, as far as these sets are concerned, the studies conducted provide surprising 
results. Indeed, it represents an effect against much of the literature as well as popular 
preconceptions: that managers or senior executives were stakeholder oriented to any extent 
pre-Crash, and then move in their view of corporate governance towards a shareholder 
orientation post-Crash. A financialization model would suggest the opposite: that the 
corporate world must have been overly shareholder biased pre-Crash as a feed to that event 
and the general economic downturn of the period (see eg Froud et al, 2006; Krippner, 2013; 
Fine, 2013).1  
      Indeed, many corporate practices do appear to have been shareholder-centric as a prelude 
to the global financial crisis. A ‘retain and reinvest’ approach, as mentioned in Chapter 2, 
gave way to that of ‘downsizing (job losses), and distribute (increased payout ratios)’ as the 
basis of shareholder value primacy (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2002). While Englander and 
Kaufman (2004) see the period as one of moving away from any notions of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) to executives instead focusing on earnings and short-term growth for 
corporate success. 
      It has been similarly argued an increasing trend had been in place for the stripping down 
of companies to their barest competencies, splitting off seemingly less able units, or indeed 
selling them off entirely (see eg Berger, 2014; Panchak, 2014; Collins, 2015). And 
particularly as regards to the ills of corporate America the suggestion is, if not board 
pressures alone, it is traceable to the pressures from activist investors (see eg Foroohar, 
2017). R&D, design, manufacturing, testing, and logistics through sales and after-market 
                                                          
1See also Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2002; Froud et al, 2006: Andersson et al, 2008; Gleadle and Haslam, 2010. 
228 
 
services, all suffer in favour of the financial bottom line and short-term stock market 
performance. At the same time, there was a marginalization of stakeholder interests while 
managerial interests increasingly aligned with external financial ones such as pension funds 
(Englander and Kaufman, 2004). And goes the argument, it is all part of a trend that started 
during the 1980s, its effects then mounting due to pressure from the financial markets into the 
years leading up to the 2008 Crash, and beyond (see Berger, 2014; Foroohar, 2017). 
      But to think only in terms of shareholders and stakeholders represents a limited view and 
can only produce spurious outcomes for UK businesses by offering simple solutions; and that 
may culminate in favouring one constituency over another. The many strident opinions of 
politicians and the media predominating in the debate, as the literature review discussed, do 
not necessarily help either. Positions taken on termism, for example, present a similar 
problem to that with the primacy debate where noise may cloud a coherent picture of reality. 
In that context, drawing simple connections between believed causes and effects is 
misleading. And it would serve to miss the point that what managers face in attempting to 
create value is far more complex with a variety of mediators impacting their decisions, not 
least the choice of time horizon to employ. Further, assuming a one-dimensional focus can 
lead to a position where how primacy and temporality might actually interact in companies 
gets pushed aside in a populist wave (see eg Edmans, 2017). But, by contrast, the results of 
this original research to attempt to map changing biases over time have visually shown the 
way different organizations within the economy can have different primacy and temporality 
biases simultaneously. 
      Indeed, besides termism, Study 3 and Study 4 considered what happens when switching 
the temporal dimension to a sense-of-urgency (urgency to reorientate v non-urgency to 
reorientate). As Chapter 3 showed while this temporal concept has attracted limited research 
interest what there has been has proven to be highly suggestive concerning its importance in 
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any discussion about managerial behaviour1. Nevertheless, the current research goes some 
way to addressing this lack of investigation. And in the narrative strip, the way perceptions 
about a sense of urgency manifest become observable. 
      The findings of relevance to this discussion relate to the use of urgency variables for Set 
32 and Set 4 under the temporal columns of the narrative strip. And looking at the corporate 
corpus the finding is that a sense of urgency varies across time, although there is an equality 
of perceptions. A sense of urgency may be important post-Crash compared to pre-Crash 
where there was no interest but following the Crash, though there is interest, there is no 
apparent bias either. 
      What may be concluded from this discussion is that if financialization - and with a focus 
on shareholders - is informed at all by termism (and urgency) then pre-Crash it is commonly 
understood to increase with respect to short-termism (and urgency3); and reverse post-Crash. 
That is, though, if one considers these variables separately. A different picture emerges with 
an examination of the variables together. Indeed, the results highlight the complexity 
involved: combinations of perceptions appear to underlie bias; primacy and temporality do 
not necessarily operate in unison as expected; and findings are also organization-dependent4. 
      That is not to say, though, that there is a direct moderating effect (a different primacy 
orientation resulting from a different temporal orientation systematically). The link is more 
subtle. Rather, there is a relationship of primacy and temporality to how perceptions of value 
change over time. Yet while apparently separate conceptually somehow together they become 
central to how corporate views alter in relation to managerial perceptions as the effects of the 
                                                          
1As also discussed in Chapter 3, why the field of managerial perceptions of temporality as a whole, not just this 
concept of a sense of urgency, has not received far more interest previously is unclear. 
2Sets 1 and 3, and 2 and 4, show the same primacy result as the same primacy terms were used – to keep 
constant while temporal terms were altered.   
3In accordance with H2b and H2c, the suggestion is that pre-Crash the corporate world acted with great urgency 
to maximize profits. 
4This refers to alignments discussed below in ‘Secondary corpuses’. 
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Crash took hold. It suggests that while primacy regarding the favouring of shareholders or 
stakeholders can be considered as distinct, perhaps even independent in some cases, from 
termism or a sense of urgency, they appear to be connected because of interrelated 
perceptions about corporate value. Though it is also fair to say that somewhere in the 
cognitive processing of these variables by executives these concepts come together in their 
minds.  
      The research findings thus represent a start to a conversation, the suggestion of which is 
that in looking at any believed financialization investigators in that area have previously 
tended to conflate behavioural and market-based concepts, narrative with numbers, and 
imposing ideas that there is a simple relationship.1 Indeed, it is far too easy to say things like 
short-termism causes increased shareholder primacy2, one impacting the other in some linear 
fashion, and it is therefore unsurprising that solutions offered can tend to take the form, as the 
regulatory environment has promoted, that the way forward for companies is to simply move 
to long-termism. But as the literature review in Chapter 3 highlighted, though there is 
definitely a connection it is not necessarily about primacy per se, or any other factor alone. 
Corporate governance orientation towards a particular constituency has to be considered, 
instead, from the perspective of the moderating effects of different conceptions of value along 
with temporality (termism, urgency) in impacting executive thinking.3 
 
6.1.2 The regulatory domain and its impact on the corporate domain: There was no 
primacy preference demonstrated for the regulatory domain pre or post the financial crisis for 
both Set 1 and Set 2. Consequently, H1a and H1b were not supported. In that sense, this 
corpus’s orientation is for a corporate governance perception where shareholders and 
                                                          
1See, for example, Andersson et al, 2008, on share buy-backs. 
2See, for example, comments made by FDIC’s Sheila Blair, 2011 
3It may be noted the conversation is beginning to change eg the enlightened view (see Jensen, 2002), as well as 
recent ideas about termism (see eg Mauboussin and Callahan, 2015). 
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stakeholders are equally important1. But by the same token, there may be no bias but there is 
an interest in the concepts by managers2. Hence, for example, the Set 1 cells have two colours 
indicating perceptions exist but that neither has preference.3 
      It perhaps reinforces a notion that the UK legislative and regulatory environment is fairly 
non-partisan when it comes to primacy orientation – they leave it up to companies themselves 
to decide, hence to director discretion. To that extent the Companies Act could be said to be 
doing its job as far as s172 is concerned with ‘members as a whole’ being considered 
appropriately. Indeed, shareholders remain a central focus, although perhaps nowadays there 
is a greater stress on them being one of a variety of stakeholders.  
     Termism for the Set 2 analysis for regulatory domain, however, showed an apparent 
movement from short-termism to long-termism in the perceived temporal horizon of 
managers. Moreover, in further examining the narrative strip, primacy it can be said appears 
to be important to companies, but less so for the regulatory bodies. But termism though – a 
short to long-term orientation over the crisis period – seems to be equally important to both 
domains with Set 1 terms. Set 2, on the other hand, with a different set of terms, on the whole 
seems to support the effect only for the regulatory corpus. Simply put, a stakeholder to 
shareholder primacy orientation is most consistent for the corporate corpus. And a short to 
long-term time horizon is most consistent for the regulatory corpus.  
      The period considered in this investigation might also be reflective of the general changes 
in the regulatory environment. For example, soft law regulation had been growing apace4 
                                                          
1If indeed, they are at all important as the Set 2 pre-Crash results indicate. Though in that case it is an equal non-
perception. Though from the experimental perspective now, there may be an appreciation that perceptual bias is 
dependent on the choice of terms examined. 
2It is important to recognize by comparison that where there is a white cell in the narrative strip (Chapter 5, 
Table 5.2) it means there is no observable bias or interest at all for either aspect of the factors, in this case 
shareholder and stakeholder primacy. This is in addition to the point that any effect is limited by the terms in the 
sets used. Hence, an effect is not negated by the appearance of a white cell but rather might be occurring though 
cannot be observed. 
3The cells for the Set 2 corporate corpus for termism show a similar perceptual effect. 
4See Part 2, Fig 2.2: Milestones in Corporate Governance Regulatory Development. 
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with the legislative requirements of CA20061. Such soft law development recognized that 
companies and financial institutions necessitated differences in corporate governance 
oversight. Prior to 2008, the Combined Code2 was a consolidated document. However, from 
2010 there was a split in this soft law requirement between the Corporate Governance Code 
and the Stewardship Code, the latter focusing on financial institutions and their behaviour. In 
making a fair comparison over time, this research used both post-Crash documents to 
compare with the pre-Crash Combined Code. Yet findings were still that there was a 
maintenance of the short to long-term regulatory perspective over time. Indeed, with the 
Stewardship Code used it may well have reinforced the perception, with their stated objective 
being: 
 
‘Stewardship aims to promote the long term success of companies in such a way that 
the ultimate providers of capital also prosper. Effective stewardship benefits 
companies, investors and the economy as a whole.’3 
  FRC, 2012, p1 
 
      And what is very clear from the analysis is that when it comes to the regulatory domain’s 
view of value creation, post-Crash, of importance to them is long-termism. Indeed 
conversely, a sense of urgency for the regulatory domain shows that while there is some 
movement concerning where the interest is there is no bias4. Similarly, for shareholder or 
stakeholder primacy there is interest but again no bias. Hence, primacy is of less concern than 
temporality – despite the shareholder emphasis in the Stewardship Code; and a recognition of 
stakeholder interests in the legislative CA2006, s172.  
                                                          
1Specifically s172 that stresses a need to move from a short-term to a long-term perspective where directors 
should be taking into account the way they organize and implement their corporate governance procedures. 
2Often simply referred to as the ‘Code’. 
3The current FRC web page for the Code appears to have evolved this statement to that of: ‘The Stewardship 
Code aims to enhance the quality of engagement between institutional investors and companies to help improve 
long-term returns to shareholders and the efficient exercise of governance responsibilities.’ 
4While a sense of urgency appears to have limited applicability in the primary corpus results, considerably more 
of an effect was observable in the secondary corpuses. The importance of this is considered below. 
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      The regulatory environment evidently influences the corporate one. But the findings 
are that the extent companies take their lead from that environment is unclear. For 
example - and in addition to applying the narrative strip - to address Q3, Q3a, and Q3b, 
which compared the corporate and regulatory domains, there was an assessment of their 
correlations. The findings were of substantial variations.1 A possible cause stems from the 
use of websites. With annual reports alone, no association is evident comparing hard law, 
soft law or both together. This likely reflects audience focus – perhaps even lip-service 
with websites being for non-business consumption. But rather than a problematic result, it 
underscores how terms matter, differentially, to different domains and how sensitive 
narrative is to value creation. 
      Nevertheless, regulatory pressures play an important role, even if not from a purely 
legislative standpoint but a voluntary one where businesses try to improve governance 
practices and create value. The tentative suggestion is, in that case, that this voluntary – 
regulatory-inspired – change is essentially only a starting point. Hence, somewhere along 
the way the corporate domain, looking largely to itself, will continue to make its own 
decisions, switching away from the lead of the regulatory domain when it determines that 
to be the correct strategic course.  
      Similarly, while a short to long-term view is evident in both sets of terms used in the 
two studies on termism for the regulatory domain, this tracks through to the corporate 
domain less strongly as far as Set 2 is concerned. It suggests value creation does not 
emanate from a company’s activities in concert with all time horizon perceptions – as 
reflected in particular terms (equity, pay, performance, strategy). These terms, apparently, 
have more meaning for the regulatory domain. The result likely reflects some sort of 
                                                          
1For Q1, and sets of terms examined, VRT-1: r=0.03, VRT-2: r=0.78. And separating soft and hard law (Q3a, 
Q3b), the effect is maintained in some cases with the driver Set 2-based, and with a boost if a website (ibid 
p167:2; Appendix 13). 
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mismatch between regulatory and corporate thinking on what constitutes value generation 
practices with respect to time horizon. Set 1 terms (customer, price, return, share) on the 
other hand look to have more value-creating resonance between the two domains.  
      Such decisions the corporate domain takes are reflected in the terms they employ and 
how their use changes. It is also business behaviour reflected, for example, in the partial 
aligning of the corporate domain with the regulatory environment, and that may be 
observed with respect to termism – both moving from a pre-Crash short-termism to a 
post-Crash long-termism1. Companies, meanwhile, move from an expedient stakeholder 
bias pre-Crash to a perceived-to-be-more-needed shareholder bias post-Crash in an 
attempt to strengthen their value-creation position.  
      The forces on managerial behaviour impacting both primacy orientation and termism 
might, as a result, be said to come from within companies to a greater degree than from 
outside. This is largely unsurprising though it demonstrates a concern. It means that despite 
attempts to broaden the view of directors to consider the interests of ‘members as a whole’ 
(s172 CA2006) as distinct constituencies, such laudable aims are represented in very little of 
the corpus terminology. At best, all that can be said is that what comes from the regulatory 
environment to impact corporate thinking is the stressing of shareholders and stakeholders 
together, somewhat equally, in promoting effective corporate governance for the purpose of 
value creation.  
 
6.1.3 Further reasons for primary corpus findings: The results obtained for the primary 
corpuses (the largest of the corpuses)2 are revealing, and offered in this section are some 
additional possibilities for the findings. In presenting these, it should be borne in mind that 
                                                          
1It is difficult to draw any absolute conclusions, it is recognized, as this research is currently only able to look at 
a limited number of sets with different terms. 
2Primary corpus word sizes: annual reports totals = 562,015 pre-Crash, 1,047,662 post-Crash; regulatory totals = 
330,275 pre-Crash, 583,831 post-Crash. See also Chapter 4. 
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what is observable is largely a managerial self-perception and not necessarily one that is 
reflective of reality; it could be but it does not always follow. What is echoed in managerial 
narrative is what they think about concepts of value creation – corporate governance primacy, 
value, temporal horizon etc – is. And their narrative is a measure of this. But this narrative 
that managers may well earnestly believe in may nonetheless in a variety of instances be at 
odds with wider economic perceptions by commentators and scholars of their actual 
behavior, not to mention the circumstances on the ground that constitute the reality of their 
own corporate condition. Furthermore, the ways in which such perceptions come about, as 
highlighted in the review of the literature, are not only through market forces but often 
through board pressures as well in a self-reinforcing cycle, or just plain denial. Yet however 
the perceptions come about it all serves to make belief in a particular type of primacy and 
termism narrative very strong. 
 
i) Changing corporate perceptions: For the hypotheses investigated (H1a – H2b),1 there was 
no support for the view that companies were stakeholder oriented prior to the financial crisis. 
However, the effect could be due to the increased pressures on them to be mindful of broader 
stakeholder and societal interests that had been gaining momentum. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
the development of such thinking owes much to the work of Edward Freeman (1984). Also 
gaining credence, though, was the idea that attention to CSR would produce strategic 
advantage when it came to being able to generate corporate value (Porter and Kramer, 2006). 
It is the idea of doing well by doing good2, and not only an attractive proposition for many 
companies but also something that then gets reflected in the narrative they attempt to convey 
– however superficial the sentiments actually are. Indeed, many researchers understood social 
                                                          
1That is a stakeholder orientation with a temporal orientation. 
2The origin of the term is unclear though has been attributed to Benjamin Franklin 
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/do_well_by_doing_good. For a history of the concept, see Nancy Koehn 
https://hbr.org/2012/06/a-brief-history-of-doing-well. 
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responsibility as slipping from the purview of managers in favour of shareholder interests in 
the run-up to the Crash of 2008 (see eg Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2002; Froud et al, 2006). 
Yet there is considerable evidence that companies at the time increasingly wanted to be seen 
to be saying and doing the right things to gain social acceptance. It was an environment 
where some businesses were no doubt societally well-intentioned where there were good 
people at the helm, but executives of other companies might not have had purely altruistic 
reasons (see Deakin, 2010). Nevertheless, the focus here is on the early 2000s, a period when 
it seems the use of CSR initiatives were gaining ground1,2. Yet while doing well by doing 
good seemed to check many boxes for big business, arguably it was often cosmetic corporate 
behavioural change (see The Economist Survey, 2005). The order of the day was, 
consequently, a PR exercise in the form of reputation management (see also Henderson, 
2005) to stave of accusations of wrongdoing in the light of scandals such as Enron, 
WorldCom and Arthur Anderson. Or it was one of the worst kinds of reputation management 
known as ‘greenwashing’.  
 
 
‘BP… had rebranded itself as a progressive, renewable-energy company – out with 
British Petroleum and in with Beyond Petroleum – long before safety shortfalls led 
to a 2005 explosion at its refinery in Texas. The disaster, which killed 15 people and 
injured 180, exposed BP as CSR's Potemkin village…. This did not stop Fortune 
magazine from ranking BP as the world's most "accountable" company, praising it 
for investing in renewables - even though they represent a sliver of the company's 
overall expenditure on traditional oil and gas exploration – and for "replacing 
several executives" involved in the accidents. Is that all it takes to be number one?’ 
 
   Yakabuski, 2008 
 
                                                          
1For how the run up to this change in perception developed see Preston and Post, 1975; Frederick, 1978; 
Preston, 1978; Carroll, 1979; Freeman, 1984; Freeman et al, 1988; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997. 
2A period soon after the worldwide dot com bubble featuring bankruptcies and re-ratings (eg Amazon, Yahoo, 
eBay).  
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1 
                                                          
1CSR based or otherwise, where narrative is mal- or misaligned with stated core values, lip-service may prevail. 
An underlying, covert narrative is what companies tell themselves and often really believe in but do not 
necessarily broadcast in their material. Narrative that is overt gets broadcast as a rule. The aim should be for 
Fig 6.1. Covert and overt corporate narrative 
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       Likewise, it was lip-service, something that dramatically impacts a company’s narrative 
as well as the business at its core, as Fig 6.1 shows, by disenfranchising many vital 
stakeholders. And by the time another three years had elapsed, for around 48 percent of 
corporate respondents to a further survey, the viewpoint on CSR was as a necessary cost of 
doing business (The Economist, 2008). In other words, with the economy moving towards the 
height of the financial crisis, attending to broader constituencies was simply an essential part 
of the corporate brief for many managers but distinct from business itself. Moreover, a level 
of ideological self-belief may have predominated too where managers bought-in to the idea 
they were acting in the interests of stakeholders and wider society through CSR activities, 
when in truth they might not actually have been.  
       Even so, the fact these same types of companies became more shareholder focused after 
the Crash in the results is revealing. For one thing, accompanied by a long-term bias, as the 
narrative strip picks up on, the results likely reflect an increasingly enlightened view (see eg 
Jensen, 2002; Keay, 2013) taken by managers. It suggests they are thinking about the need to 
refocus business attention on their actual corporate objective further into the future, albeit this 
corporate objective favoured their primary stakeholders, namely shareholders. But at least 
they were beginning to consider temporal horizon, perhaps following on from the influence 
of CA2006, s172. Yet the findings may also reflect the tenuous nature of managers’ pre-
Crash motivations – including the narrowness of a view that assumes broader constituency 
interests have little part to play in real value generation. There is a kind of battening down the 
hatches, with companies reverting to what they believe works best for them. And that is what 
gets trumpeted to the world and we see in the narrative strip. 
                                                          
managers to have their narrative at all levels fully in alignment with their core values as they portray them, 
though it does not follow they will and they could just spout empty rhetoric.       
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      One interesting corollary to this idea of a greater stressing of CSR prior to the Crash is 
that as some researchers and commentators viewed it companies that sought to maximize 
profits had in fact to be addressing CSR concerns amongst wider constituencies, even if those 
militants promoting such endeavours did not quite understand that. It was central to being a 
well-run business.   
 
‘Under the label of Corporate Social Responsibility, firms are to take on a non-wealth 
producing agenda of goals: profits will be lowered to safeguard labour rights, human 
health, civil liberties, environmental quality, sexual equality, and social justice. The 
fact that the corporation already plays its most effective role in these areas by profit 
maximization is little understood by CSR advocates.’  
 
       Forbes, 2005, fp.11 
 
      CSR and the favouring of broader stakeholder concerns may well have been the focus of 
managers prior to the Crash, and this possibly is what gets identified on the narrative strip. 
This represents a positive viewpoint where many companies might have really been 
concerned with involving different stakeholders to promote deep-rooted value creation within 
their activities. A commercial context developed by that account, as the quote by Steve 
Forbes suggests, wherein when businesses are truly effective and maximize shareholder 
profits this may also be the best way for them to act socially responsible as well (The 
Economist Survey, 2008).  
      Some companies, though, could have been forced to make diversionary changes away 
from their corporate (overly shareholder-focussed) objective due to societal pressure, whether 
they wanted to or not. Businesses therefore, may have been superficially addressing CSR 
concerns to look good not only in the eyes of the general public, but in the eyes of social 
activists, their competitors, as well as their own employees. Again, reputation management. 
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      But whatever the interpretation of these activities, in the end it all amounts to the same 
thing: the focus of managers before the financial crisis was not necessarily only on 
shareholder primacy but could have increasingly taken a broader stakeholder orientation as 
well. Whether such a stakeholder orientation was sustainable, of course, is moot. And 
superficial or not, this changing behaviour is what is revealed in the narrative strip.  
 
ii) Primacy and termism operating together: The literature highlights how termism carries 
significant weight in how corporate managers think (see Chapter 3). Adding to that body of 
work, this investigation finds that in the understanding of value short-termism pre-crisis 
associates in Study 1 with stakeholder primacy1. Then, post-crisis this switches to long-term 
shareholder primacy in managerial perceptions. In Study 2, the reason for a lack of total 
emulation of this termism effect is debatable. It suggests, however, that for whatever reason 
the particular VRTs (which combine with the termism dimensions) were not in evidence. Of 
itself that is intriguing as the terms (equity, pay, performance, strategy) are hardly rare and 
the expectation is they would be in evidence. But bearing in mind that Study 1 clearly 
showed the effect and Study 2 did not it could be reflective of the fact that short-termism is 
not always an issue. This is much in line with how some investigators have cast the matter, as 
Chapter 3 showed, or indeed that short and long-termism are of equal importance – as the Set 
2, post-Crash condition indicates – and this may be the truer reflection of the managerial 
perception. Certainly, however, the finding is that a short to long-term change in time horizon 
is of importance for the regulatory domain for both Study 1 and Study 2. And considering 
that is the outlook the regulatory environment is promoting, it is an unsurprising finding, 
though it is nonetheless corroborative.  
                                                          
1Also referred to in Chapter 3 - and further highlighting the association of primacy and termism - was how if 
short-termism is misapplied the same problems attributed to shareholders can manifest with stakeholders 
(Danielson, et al, 2008). 
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      Termism, however, appears a more fluid concept for the corporate domain. Yet the 
ambiguous findings indicated by studies 1 and 2 as a whole do not negate the powerful 
effects of termism – and it is known how powerful and encompassing termism is not only 
from the regulatory corpus findings but from the results obtained from the twelve corpuses 
examined overall. That being the case, experimental reasons for this finding, rather than 
simply internal or external ones - such as social or market factors - are considered further 
below.  
 
6.2 Secondary corpuses 
Because of observed similarities in the narrative strip, it has been instructive to look at 
particular secondary corpus results together.  
 
 
 
      This is not to say that the identification of interesting effects from individual corpuses and 
the changes they displayed over time was not possible, but that a conjoint approach appears 
    
Group 
   
General Organizational Profiles Observed in Secondary 
Corpuses 
   
A 
   
Politically motivated, often partisan towards Conservatives, right-
wing, economically neo-liberal (for this reason primary corpuses are 
included in this group). In that context, organizations in this group 
may promote social change as well as free market principles for wealth 
creation, regulation rather than legislation, the reduction of regulatory 
barriers to trade. 
   
B 
   
No apparent political agenda and non-partisan. In that context, this 
group is for free enterprise, entrepreneurialism, the support of effective 
business leadership, wealth creation, and the development of good 
corporate governance. 
   
C 
   
Politically motivated, partisan towards Labour and Socialism, left of 
centre. 
   
Table 6.11 
1The table shows some of the underlying corpus characteristics that may have led to the ability to group organizations 
for alignment. Due to their agendas – political or otherwise – organizations are thinking in a certain way about value 
creation and what supports that. It is not absolute and for different research corpuses might align better in another 
way. 
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to provide the more revealing effect. Hence, Groups A, B and C1 were formed due to their 
respective corpus alignments. From this perspective, the questions arise as to what might be 
causing the observed alignments. And if a cause is apparent, how might it affect a group’s 
behaviour? 
      One possible reason for comparable results amongst certain corpuses, as Table 6.1 
indicates, could be their organizational profiles, where different business-related agendas – 
often ideologically-driven – might be responsible for the observed effects (see also Appendix 
20). It is worth, therefore, considering what group constituents have in common - including 
as peripheral stakeholder organizations in relation to the primary corpuses. The findings, 
therefore, offer the possibility this might have brought about the alignments seen.  
 
6.2.1 Group A agenda and behaviour: In general, corpuses placed into Group A – as the 
narrative staining procedure has identified them as being associated2 – are found to portray3 
themselves, to a greater or lesser extent, as emphasising business, free enterprise and political 
conservatism. 
      Looking at the FSA, a ‘light touch’, principle-based rather than rule-based, means of 
regulation is known to have been the way they operated; a form of regulation much in 
keeping with a free enterprise culture.4  
                                                          
1Group A: Corp, Reg (primary), FSA, FT, Newspapers-gen, and CPS (secondary); Group B: CBI, CIMA, ICSA, 
and the IOD (secondary); Group C: IPPR, TUC (secondary). 
2This includes the narrative strip results, and the stronger effect shown from the Group A graphical analysis of 
the overlay (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.4), demonstrating almost parity when the biasing for the group is considered 
as a whole. 
3The basis of the assessment is largely on a review of the organizations’ websites. 
4This led to them often being highly supportive of financial organizations when greater enforcement would 
have, arguably, been more appropriate. Overall, it is not surprizing to find that the FSA would have mirrored the 
outlook of companies and the UK’s regulatory environment in regard to ‘promoting the success of the company’ 
(CA2006, s172). That they took the promotion of business to an extreme could however be said. Why they did 
this is not clear; though a peruse of the FSA’s directors around the pre-Crash period in question shows many 
came from the banking and finance institutions concerning which they were providing oversight ( 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_Services_Authority), Notwithstanding that, a variety of criticisms were 
levelled at the FSA, notably on the Equitable Life Assurance Society crisis by the European Parliamentary 
inquiry (Final report of the European Parliament's inquiry into the crisis of the Equitable Life Assurance Society 
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      When it comes to journalism, the FT is generally a Conservative leaning newspaper, 
although it has at times, such as in 2001and 2005, favoured Labour Party policies1. Feasibly, 
this dual tendency may have to an extent cropped back in to its outlook with respect to 
notions of value creation during the period covering the financial crisis. And the different 
primacy results for Set 1 and Set 2 perhaps reflect this; with Set 1 only showing a clear 
movement. That remains an open question, however, as given the current dataset it is difficult 
to demonstrate. But with some certainty, the conclusion is that termism is of particular 
prominence, switching from short to long-termism over the period in Set 1 and Set 2. It is, 
hence, reflective of the FT’s editorial position.  
      In the same way, for the newspaper-gen corpus the Times and the Telegraph newspapers 
are pro Conservative. However, as with the FT the Times aligned with the Labour Party in 
2001 and 20052, though was pro-Conservative in 2009.3 And as with the FT this slight 
ambiguity in outlook may be reflected in the narrative strip results, though in this case the 
effect is centred on termism – Set 1 showing a pre to post-Crash change of short to long-
termism; Set 2 showing equal perceptions pre to post-Crash. 
      However, there are inconsistencies in Group A, inasmuch as many could think of the FSA 
as non-partisan, while the Guardian, a constituent in the newspaper-gen corpus is, left 
leaning. Were these agendas to be sufficiently strong they could potentially place such an 
organization within other alignment groups.  
      As an independent body set up by the Government, there might nevertheless be an 
expectation of the FSA’s agenda being in keeping with CA2006 and the various regulatory 
Codes. It is therefore not surprising that the FSA would have a similar outlook on time 
                                                          
European Parliament, (25th May 2007); and the handling of the collapse of Northern Rock (Seib, C., 27th 
March 2008, "The FSA Northern Rock report: condemned in its own words, the regulator that missed the 
collapse". The Times).  
1http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8282189.stm. 
22004-2005 also represented the pre-Crash coverage of the present study so is an important time point. 
3http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8282189.stm. 
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horizon to the regulatory domain. It is intriguing, however, that in relation to that domain it 
has a more differentiated primacy bias and instead more closely resembles that of the 
corporate domain. One possible explanation relates to criticisms levelled against the FSA 
during this period that it was overly favourable to financial institutions.1 And a consequential 
effect might be a similar primacy outlook. A greater role at the time in the establishment and 
development of broad trade relationships may also have given it more of a corporate outlook. 
      Despite its left-leaning views, the Guardian has occasionally promoted a Liberal 
Democrat view as well. Furthermore, a 2005 MORI pole showed there was a representation 
of no more than 48 percent of Labour supporting readers at the time. Notwithstanding that, 
and though the Guardian represents a minority proportion in the pre and post-Crash 
newspaper-gen corpuses, it might still be the case that removing it from these corpuses would 
serve to strengthen them; the newspaper-gen corpus is presently fairly weak on the termism 
dimensions. As a result, there might be a strengthening of Group A as well. 
      Overall, despite the potential negative effect such problematic domains may suggest, it is 
possible that a certain fluidity in sentiment, reflected in term use by these domains to reach a 
wider audience, or to curry favour, is being identified by the analysis. Or indeed, either any 
negative terminology has insufficient weight in the corpus or there is no reflection of it in the 
combos used. It should also be remembered that groups are formed objectively on the basis of 
the combo distributions they display.  
      Turning towards an example of a conservative-oriented think tank – though they claim to 
be non-partisan - the focus of the CPS is on the development of free markets and the removal 
of trade barriers in order to create a less state-dependent British society. Indeed, the CPS’s 
emphasis is on the curbing of regulation and taxes that would hinder business creativity or act 
as a disincentive to work or of the raising of investment. The high profile Conservative trio 
                                                          
1Ibid p242: 4. 
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founded the CPS in 1974: Margaret Thatcher, Alfred Sherman and Sir Keith Joseph. And 
with the agenda pursued it is not surprizing the CBI would mirror the outlook of companies 
and the UK’s regulatory environment in a similar vein to ‘promoting the success of the 
company’ (CA2006, s172). 
      Promoting business, as well as a longer-term view of commerce and corporate 
governance - as the soft law regulatory environment had encouraged – appears to be the 
standpoint of these organizations. And it is logical therefore that the FSA, the CBI, and the 
other secondary corpuses in Group A reflected this by demonstrating, to some level at least, a 
movement from short-term stakeholder primacy to long-term shareholder primacy over the 
period of the financial crisis.  
      It is unexpected as a result that hypotheses (H1a, H1b) were not addressed. But it can be 
suggested that the Group A organizations before the financial crisis took hold largely 
understood that value generation required broad constituency inputs if they were going to 
have any value-enhancing success (see eg Freeman, 1984; Jensen, 2002). Although the 
degree to which organizations saw these constituencies as adjuncts to value creation as 
opposed to core in that process is debatable – and can depend on the narrative organizations 
tell themselves (see Fig 6.1). Indeed, when it came to the handling of the PPI situation the 
FSA could be determined to have been highly insensitive to consumer complaints1. And if a 
tenuous view predominated prior to the Crash regarding stakeholder constituencies amongst 
the organizations, albeit stemming from a political or economic agenda, that might have led 
more easily post-Crash to a switching to a shareholder emphasis and could account for what 
the narrative strip shows. 
                                                          
1Personal Protection Insurance ensures repayment of credit if a borrower becomes incapacitated or loses their 
means of livelihood. However, the FSA repeatedly stalled on the matter (see Citizens Advice Press office, 19th 
October 2006. "Citizens Advice urges swifter action on PPI". Citizensadvice.org.uk. 
246 
 
      At the same time, what is observable is perhaps the continuous tension between pursuing 
a regulatory and legislative orientation and pursuing a market reality-based orientation – and 
all in a context of a conservative conception of free enterprise1. And pre to post-Crash, it is 
this switch in perception that is possibly apparent on the narrative strip results. This might be 
said to be illuminating, as once the crisis unfolded these corpuses, it would seem, often 
tended to narrow their viewpoint onto shareholders as far as primacy orientation was 
concerned. And from this perhaps more conservative understanding of free markets and 
entrepreneurship, they act when crisis bites to favour shareholders. Involving other 
constituencies – directly as employers or from an advisory or support perspective – was in all 
likelihood too risky for these more conservative organizations to pursue or even contemplate.  
      Temporal as well as primacy effects, seen from Study 1 and Study 2, might reflect the 
fact that as the financial crisis progressed many organizations perhaps learnt that a greater 
appreciation of long-termism was important if they were going to achieve any strategic 
advantage. Though they might have been too short-term oriented in the past, as the regulatory 
environment was telling the economy2, it was nevertheless shareholders who were seen as the 
stakeholder of most relevance to value generation but, crucially, over the longer-term. The 
primary regulatory domain aside, in essence Group A constituents, companies included, 
revert post-Crash to what they know best, and the constituency to favour, when it comes to 
creating value in that long-term context. Hence, a long-term shareholder orientation. 
      By the same token, for the primary corpuses a sense of urgency does not seem to show 
any particular bias. Although in Set 3 and Set 4 for the corporate corpus, the observation is 
that it is of interest but post-Crash only, though there is no preference. In the regulatory 
corpus, Set 3 showed the same effect. While in Set 4 it is of no difference in preference both 
                                                          
1What is stressed here is the dynamic multi-factor process, and where no orientation is absolute. 
2The regulatory environment, pre-Crash, had promoted a change in organizational thinking towards long-
termism (see eg Keay, 2013). But it was only after the Crash – in relation to Group A organizations – that more 
long-termism became manifest. 
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pre or post-Crash. However, for the other four corpuses in Group A there is a clear movement 
in both Set 3 and Set 4; a movement over the period from a non-urgent to an urgent 
perception by these organizations. 
      It is interesting to speculate further on this temporal aspect as to why some organizations 
might have been NUR oriented prior to the Crash; and UR oriented after the Crash. The 
narrative strip is perhaps showing that it is uncertainty driving perception for the primary 
corpuses – uncertainty, as is also known, being a major force in financial market volatility1. 
To that extent, it is possibly the case that the corporate and regulatory domains are at least 
thinking about the two aspects – or not – at the same time, though cannot make up their 
minds. But for the other Group A organizations it may be they simply did not feel they had to 
move at all in their outlook, and not being part of their perception it is a much starker effect 
observed when they do than found with the primary corpuses.  
      Why this is so, the argument might be, is that the secondary corpuses in Group A having 
a greater political agenda, their thinking is that much harder to dislodge. Indeed, as the 
economic environment changed around them they had to finally respond, which they did with 
greater urgency. In turn, and whether they were offering advice, commentary, or practical 
support, this urgency perhaps made these secondary domains take more notice of the need to 
focus on the longer-term. 
 
6.2.2 Group B agenda and behaviour: Corpuses placed in Group B by contrast to Group A 
are, apparently, non-partisan and hence without any political agenda. As with Group A, they 
are for free enterprise and entrepreneurialism when it comes to value generation2. But instead 
                                                          
1See eg http://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/news/151453/what-is-causing-market-volatility.aspx; and on the 
volatility index, VIX  
2What makes perception concerning value creation so difficult to pin down when considering the economy is 
that many espouse the same ideals; there is a lot of noise. Buzzwords like CSR, for example, predominate. 
Indeed as with group A, Group B constituent organizations may also talk about free enterprise and 
entrepreneurialism in the creation of wealth. They are common stated goals. It is this noise that possibly drives 
the believed pre-Crash shareholder emphasis – or an indecision about it – more than anything; and the 
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of an ideological motivation, the profiles of the organizations in Group B suggest instead the 
motivation to be for creating successful businesses. As organizations providing support 
therefore their emphasis is on the creation of wealth through fostering good business 
leadership, high standards of professional and commercial practice, and the development of 
effective corporate governance. 
      The agenda of the IOD, for example, is to make business leaders better at their role. The 
IOD acts as a business information and (confidential) advisory and guidance service on the 
different elements of running a successful business - including on HR, marketing, legal and 
financial matters). While training and mentoring is available on different aspects of board 
development, coaching and leadership (including a course to become a chartered director). It 
also provides access to a local and national network of contacts. Feeding into this is that it 
represents ‘the views of businesses and IOD members in the media and with government.’ 
And the IOD campaigns to the public and government for a policy of effective business and 
entrepreneurial activity. But more than a lobby group, the IOD is dedicated to supporting 
members by also encouraging entrepreneurial activity and promoting responsible business 
practice and corporate governance for the benefit of the business community and society as a 
whole. It is a context that has allowed the IOD recently to call for protection of EU workers’ 
rights as uncertainty over Brexit mounts, and to call for investors to be provided with a larger 
say on executive pay. ‘It has also sharply criticised the awards to executives at collapsed 
contractor Carillion and warned bosses to take note of public disquiet on the issue more 
generally’.1 
                                                          
concomitant believed stakeholder bias post-Crash when observed. However, the group alignments show this 
effect to be more subtle. 
1https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/iod-misconduct-allegations-lady-barbara-judge-
international-womens-day-a8245846.html 
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      From their apolitical business-oriented position, Group B constituents are far less 
interested in who is in power in government but seek support wherever it is to be found. The 
concern is about what works for business and commercial success, at home and 
internationally. And in that context they are very much about developing the individuals who 
run businesses, the administrative professions that companies and other organizations need to 
call on, and promoting good corporate governance, so that boards do what they are supposed 
to do in reaching their corporate objective. The organizations in Group B are therefore 
concerned with, for example: influencing policy, providing insight into their business 
specialty, education, and representation. And this type of terminology is what they employ. 
With these concerns as well, Group B organizations are thus likely to be less contentious in 
their activities, it seems, than Group A. It is from that perspective of improving business 
practices that an enhancement in value creation is understood to occur for Group B 
constituents.       
      Looking at other constituents of Group B in the narrative strip, the CBI and CIMA 
clearly have a reverse primacy orientation to Group A, and where a shareholder primacy 
orientation is in evidence before the Crash and a stakeholder primacy one following the 
Crash. ICSA and the IOD appear to have no particular preference on examining the 
colours alone – and ICSA post-Crash in fact demonstrated no interest at all for any 
primacy. Given the pro-business orientation of Group B organizations, this is perhaps 
unsurprising. However, the dataset is incomplete for Group B in spots for primacy 
orientation and temporal horizon. Nevertheless, gaps can be filled to some extent and, 
supported by graphical analysis of these corpuses as a whole (Set 1: Fig 5.24b; Set 2: Fig 
5.25b), a general movement is seen from long-term shareholder primacy pre-Crash to 
short-term stakeholder primacy post-Crash. Again though, it does not support the 
hypotheses (H1a, H1b).  
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      In their supporting role it makes sense, is the argument, that the narrative strip shows a 
greater focus on shareholders prior to the Crash. As, unlike Group A constituents, the 
generation of value was purely a business proposition – and where shareholder primacy 
would have had precedence. Post-Crash, however, it is feasible these organizations began 
considering the broader context, and hence seeing the relevance of stakeholder input to 
value creation. Similarly, for termism, they again might have taken a business perspective 
yet there is apparently some ambivalence1 in the narrative strip. However, with the 
alignment analysis they are more biased, pre-Crash, to long-termism and post-Crash to 
short-termism – though not as powerfully as Group A. Tentatively, the suggestion is, that 
this result may be reflecting the fact that they are not fully accepting, for example, of the 
regulatory promotion of long-termism in the post-Crash economy.   
      Indeed, without any underlying political motives, Group B is perhaps reflective of the 
general indecision about the best kind of termism in business, an ongoing debate as 
Chapter 3 demonstrated. Furthermore, their narrative might be said, where they are able, 
to reflect an ‘ideal’ perception of how they would like business to be. And with that 
purpose in mind, it is understandable there is a much greater focus of these organizations 
on education – including how to foster relationships with employers, and how to develop 
the necessary influence amongst peers and government – as well as how to implement 
effective corporate governance. As such, while this group may be non-partisan it can be 
activist and may have a lobbying role. But, importantly, this effect manifests in a different 
way, and for a different purpose, to Group A constituents. 
                                                          
1What makes perception concerning value creation particularly difficult to pin down when considering the 
economy is that so many espouse the same ideals, and there is a lot of noise. Buzzwords like CSR, for example, 
predominate. Indeed, as with group A, Group B constituent organizations may also talk about free enterprise and 
entrepreneurialism in the creation of wealth. They are common stated goals. It is this that possibly drives the 
pre-Crash shareholder emphasis – or an indecision about it – more than anything; and the concomitant 
stakeholder bias post-Crash when observed.  
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      Concerning the sense of urgency dimensions results manifests as somewhat mixed in 
the Set 3 pre-Crash results showed there was a degree of indecision for the CBI, CIMA, 
and ICSA. To some extent, more of an effect is obtainable with respect to the CBI and 
CIMA from non-urgent to urgent on Set 4 over time. But as a four-constituent group, and 
with the IOD showing the opposite effect (UR to NUR), it suggests either the IOD is not 
suited for this group, or that as a group there were considerable mixed feelings or 
uncertainty about the urgency needed for value creation in response to the financial crisis. 
The IOD is seemingly the only organization consistent in their sense of urgency narrative 
as determined from their use of Set 3 and Set 4 terms, and where they move towards a 
post-Crash non-urgency in their reporting and associated documents. 
      Overall, the tentative conclusion might be that in relation to their non-partisan position 
Group B are more concerned with termism than with urgency. Though reading this data is 
subjective. 
    
6.2.3 Group C agenda and behaviour: Group C contains two stakeholder organizations 
the IPPR and the TUC. The only information known prior to the research was about the 
TUC’s socialist ideology and its promotion of worker rights. There was no foreknowledge 
concerning information about the agenda of the IPPR at that stage. However, it transpires 
that the profiles of both organizations share some characteristics. Notwithstanding the 
poor alignment of this group (see Fig 5.27c), they are nevertheless found to both be 
politically motivated organizations that are left of centre, and partisan towards socialism 
and the Labour Party.  
      In that context, the IPPR is a political think tank that seeks to address ‘big’ social 
issues such as jobs, housing and political reform. The TUC, an umbrella organization for 
affiliated unions such as UNISON and UNITE, is specifically focused on labour issues 
and what impacts workers ability to do their job. Broadly speaking these are concerns 
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representing a focus in one form or another related to the TUCs wide stakeholder and 
topic coverage that includes: the workplace, the economy, industry, equality, unions, 
international concerns, and social issues. 
      With left-leaning, socialist or Labour leaning tendencies Group C constituents have a 
very different political ideology to Group A and Group B constituents. Yet, as distinct 
from them, their orientation could dictate the particular way they might favour broader 
constituencies when it comes to value creation. 
      Alignment results, though not very differentiated, provide a contrast with that of 
Group A and Group B. And Group C’s similar organizations profiles indicate an effect 
possibly occurring at a deeper level of ideological behaviour than is being fully picked up 
in the analysis – or the finding of their profile resemblance could have been down to luck.  
      Any sense of urgency for the IPPR and the TUC as a group does not align well. The 
organizations are in opposition for this effect. Although, with the fair amount of 
consistency between Set 3 and Set 4, it does mean individually the IPPR moves from an 
urgent to non-urgent outlook over the period, and the TUC moves from non-urgent to 
urgent, with some uniformity for the different VRTs used. Of note as well is that the IPPR 
and ICSA are mirrors of each other, pre to post-Crash, suggesting similar outlooks at 
these different time points, though why this might have occurred is not clear. While the 
absence of interest before the financial crisis the TUC showed for stakeholder concerns in 
Study 1 compared to Study 2 points to how a particular narrative employed subtly 
determines organizational bias. The result also highlights how the use of VRTs identifies 
this. 
      But caution is required when reading these results. Rather, it is important to look at 
the temporal aspects in relation to primacy more generally for anything meaningful to be 
made of them. And the findings perhaps indicate something about the organizations 
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themselves where the IPPR may be reluctant to advise any alterations in post-Crash 
governance, preferring to be cautious when it comes to shareholders who are more 
evident in their primacy outlook at that point in time. On the other hand, the TUC after the 
financial crisis is firmly for action in relation to stakeholders.  
      Whether these findings reflect the types of socialist views involved – and as a result 
the preferred shareholder or stakeholder constituency these organizations would want to 
deal with according to a particular sense of urgency – remains an open question. 
     Furthermore, to an extent the formation of group C was from information left after the 
findings that organizations aligned into Group A and Group B due to their similar results. 
The alignment shown in the graphical analysis (Chapter 5: Fig 5.24c) of these two small 
TUC and IPPR corpuses is consequently demonstrating a weak effect; and one where it is 
difficult to draw any firm conclusions from only two small corpuses. Though if nothing 
else, it suggests further research to look deeper into the findings and whether, for 
example, a larger left-wing based dataset of organizations would more strongly align. 
    
6.2.4 Matrix analysis and its interpretation: This analysis provides another view of the 
data, demonstrating how in narrative staining a subdivision of the concept can lead to 
further examination (and how the subdivided concept loads on to different dimensions 
chosen). This study has used corporate value as the main concept (and subdivisions of this 
are into terms for financial and non-financial corporate value). For this secondary 
analysis, a narrative assessment of both individual organizational corpuses and group 
(cluster) effects of multiple corpuses has been key. These results also show the flexibility 
of the approach. And, like the other secondary analysis, the narrative strip, it adds to the 
toolbox of techniques within the realm of corpus linguistics.  
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      This analysis overall is found to be highly domain and term dependent as well as 
dependent on cluster formation, where combining the corpuses of specific stakeholders may 
more readily align them for financial versus non-financial term use. Cluster 1 alone, however, 
supports the hypotheses (H1c-H1d), suggesting the constituent organizations when together 
are biased towards a non-financial discourse.1  
      Furthermore, looking at the analysis of all the corpuses as a whole – where the twelve 
stakeholder corpuses are cast as a proxy for wider financial perspectives amongst UK 
organizations – it is found there is a post-Crash bias towards a more financial discourse. The 
effect is nominal when considered from looking at Set 1 to Set 4 (Figs 5.36a – 5.36d) but it is 
there. Further work, though, running repeated analyses with different financial and non-
financial terms – and with different DimSyns – is needed to verify the findings.  
      Yet taken on face value, could it mean organizations were more non-financially 
oriented before the financial crisis and more financially oriented after the financial crisis? 
Possibly. Though as far as companies are concerned it would seem to contradict the 
findings of a pre-Crash focus on financial terminology, while the regulatory corpus 
appears to support the effect (see Chapter 5)2. Although work of Danielson et al (2008) is 
apposite as it suggests the managerial issue causing concern is not about favouring 
shareholders of stakeholders per se but about how each of these groups are handled and 
indeed, whether they are handled strategically for the short or long-term. At the same time 
other corpuses show differing effects to a greater or lesser extent. Unsurprisingly, it may 
be this very dissimilarity perhaps causing such confusion amongst media and scholarly 
observers. But the research, at the least, is now depicting it objectively. 
                                                          
1On its own, this is an interesting finding. However, it also suggests predictive possibilities, revealing - with any 
cluster of organizations formed and examining the VRT (or another construct) - how their thoughts in unison on 
the topic of interest will bias. Hence, extrapolating from the combined material they produce to a real-world 
scenario where they come together. 
2Section 5.4.4, Figs 5.28 and 5.29 respectively show the effect for the corporate and regulatory corpuses.  
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      Of course, the findings depend on how a slice-up is made of all the corpuses in the 
analysis, as well as the organizations used. Yet overall, in this study an increasing 
disposition towards the employment of post-Crash financial terminology, however slight, 
is apparent. It should not be forgotten, either, that the finding is underlined by the 
portrayal companies and organizations want to transmit at any given time; the lip-service 
they pay to whatever constituency or fashionable idea being favoured. For example, 
where companies favour financial terminology pre-Crash, though their aim could be 
shareholders or stakeholders. In that sense, it suggests the idea has greater resonance than 
the constituency1. It is all part of the discourse, which may be in tune with actual 
corporate behaviour, or indeed the analysis reveals managerial behaviour at odds with that 
stated.  
      However, the salient point is that while individually it can be seen how different 
domains perceive primacy and temporality in relation to value creation, a multi-actor 
perspective can also be seen, demonstrating what happens when stakeholder organizations 
are considered together. In that scenario, the balance tips and organizations appear to 
show in totality an effect reflecting the economy with a greater financial value perspective 
following the financial crisis.  
 
6.3 Further possible reasons for changes in corporate narrative orientation 
The varied honest or disingenuous possibilities in how the managerial handling of CSR might 
have underlain a corporate narrative disposition looked at above, along with ideology driving 
an even more nuanced outlook, are crucial to primacy and temporality orientation; the 
favouring of one stakeholder group over another as well as time horizon and urgency. But 
there are undeniably more factors at play, and organizational narrative is multifaceted as this 
                                                          
1As, for example, Chapter 5, Fig 5.28 indicates. 
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investigation highlights. That being so, as we now turn to, narrative change may be observed 
as being heavily influenced by a variety of crises, not only major economic crashes. While 
also highlighted are linguistic factors relating to term use, further revealing how narrative 
becomes biased. Similarly, it affects lip service when it comes to what managers say versus 
what they do. Either way, they are all part of a mechanism that can feed what is observable in 
the narrative strip. 
    
6.3.1: Crisis and narrative change: Its zenith between 2007 and 2009, the financial crisis is 
understandably seen to represent a major factor to which companies had to respond in some 
manner. Scientifically it is not possible to say, however, that the crisis produced direct change 
in corporate behaviour. Causal relationships in this area are difficult to isolate and 
substantiate due to the complexity involved. Yet as the largest event of the period covering 
this investigation, it is a likely part of some sort of triggering effect for companies and, more 
relevantly for the work, one that appears to track through to making alterations in their 
organizational narrative.  
      Support for this view comes from research concerning how management changes their 
behaviour to meet crisis generally, emanating from both within their organization or 
externally from, say, the market; and with by default an associated change in the overt 
(written or spoken) or covert (unwritten) narrative they produce (see Fig 6.1). For example: 
coping with turbulence and unpredictability crises may initiate (Drucker, 1981); the handling 
of the unexpected (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007); the criticality of how managers must 
communicate in the right way with a variety of stakeholders as crisis hits (Ruff and Aziz, 
2007); the often poor ethical or socially responsible behaviour promoted by wide-ranging 
organizational or business activity in the face of any crisis as well as from the financial crisis 
itself (eg Sharma and Narwal, 2006; Jackall, 2010; Arbogast, 2017); the clash of opposing 
257 
 
regulatory and business narratives prompted by the 2008 Crash where ‘conflict over agendas 
is immediately a narrativized struggle between different groups trying to put one over with 
their competing stories’ (Froud et al, 2012); the alterations caused to brand perception 
amongst employees (Bravo et al, 2017), in addition to the impact of crisis on corporate 
reputation (Griffin, 2014).  
      And bearing in mind the cognitive dispositions managers bring to bear they perhaps do 
not act haphazardly but with some systematization involved regarding what they do and what 
they communicate. Isabella (1990), for example, proposes a four-stage model managers go 
through as crisis mounts: anticipation, confirmation, culmination and aftermath. Narrative 
transmission can also be understood from an epidemiological perspective (Shiller, 2017), 
moving from managers outwards and modifying as the demands of a crisis change. It all 
underlies a corporate reality for managers who begin to interpret or construe events in a 
progressively altering fashion, and in turn similarly affecting the periodic discourses they 
communicate. 
      While clearly, there are many points at which there can be an effect on narrative, so 
becoming otherwise biased after a crisis compared to before, it is instructive to consider the 
association more deeply. Weick (1988) characterizes crises as events having a low 
probability of occurring, but should they materialize have a high consequence in terms of 
their potential for jeopardizing the most vital goals of an organization. Evidently, the Crash of 
2008 fits those criteria. But it is how individuals make sense of a crisis and respond that on 
the one hand can help them understand the forces at play but on the other can have the 
unwanted effect of causing them to add fuel to that crisis, as Weick points out. He also 
proposes that individuals ‘enact the environments that constrain them’ and where this 
enactment could potentially serve to reduce the chance of a crisis occurring. The definition of 
enactment is the social process by which there is a laying down of a ‘material and symbolic 
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record of action’ (Smircich and Stubbart, 1985, p726). And the suggestion is that a 
managerial procedure that ends with an appropriate narrative produced by senior executives 
who have a value system that allows for the support of various eventualities can aid in 
addressing catastrophes like the 2008 Crash. And the converse with a value system producing 
a self-serving or even harmful narrative that nobody in the organization buys in to. Whether 
the primary and secondary stakeholder organizations in the current study had appropriate 
narratives is debatable; indeed, it is not the focus of the investigation to determine this. Yet 
whatever narrative bias they did in fact produce could have been feeding the results generated 
in the narrative strip. 
      Responding to the Crash, however, the narrative strip only reflects a present state of 
companies; it does not signify their limitations. Indeed, change represents a forward-looking 
proposition where crisis itself can act as a propulsive agent for redirecting a company towards 
new goals, a perspective that looks to the future rather than dwelling on past events, however 
destructive (see Seeger et al, 2005). This is not about burying the effects of a past crisis, on 
the contrary it needs to be learned from. But for a post-Crash narrative, the crisis engendered 
with its accompanying financial fallout can be an important part of a rebuilding process, and 
one again we possibly see reflected by the variation over time in the results.  
      Rebuilding of this type, though, necessitates creating corporate value. Though corporate 
value, as has been observed, is perceivable in amorphous ways. Indeed, how such value 
creation in its intricacies manifests with respect to crises dynamically, over time, has until the 
present work been largely unclear. Indeed, such denseness is highlighted where, in contrast to 
the types of companies examined in this research, ‘corporate ethical standards’ and ‘social 
responsibility’ have been shown to have more positive perceptions following the Crash, but 
specifically for finance professionals and in organic organizations as opposed to mechanistic 
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ones (Jin and Drozdenko, 2013)1. Companies (and sectors) are, therefore, not all the same and 
a differentiated perspective often needs taking for understanding their behaviours.  
      But for most companies, alliances, critical information-sharing, and conflict resolution, 
may be essential value drivers at these times, and hence recognizing the wider intrinsic value 
of stakeholders more likely meets the needs thrown up by crises. Whereas a narrower 
shareholder value maximization stance could leave managers ill-prepared (Alpaslan et al, 
2009). Yet, these authors conclude, socially-responsible or ethical behaviour in this regard is 
a necessary but insufficient condition. And in a similar vein to other researchers (eg Bistrova 
and Lace, 2012; Danielson et al, 2008), stress the primary importance for businesses as being 
the ability to refocus from any short-term losses towards retaining shareholder value over a 
longer-term.  
      With the post-Crash finding of corporate long-term shareholder value, could this be 
another facet of crisis management identified? Possibly. But whatever the actuality or the 
biases involved when crisis interacts with organizational discourse, the narrative staining 
approach developed for this investigation, focusing on the relative change in term use rather 
than any absolute change, has perhaps been better able to reflect the extent to which 
rebuilding was achieved. 
 
6.3.2: Managers may form biases when putting terms together: However companies portray 
their organizational narrative with any intent to influence stakeholders, through for example, 
developing content for their annual reports or mission statements, components at the term or 
word level underpin the process where managers bring particular biases to bear. 
                                                          
1Refers to Jin and Drozdenko’s, 2013, conceptualization of financial firms’ core values: organic (humanistic, 
enabling, relatively democratic, open, trusting); mechanistic (coercive, callous, closed, controlling, 
authoritarian). 
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      In the work by Musek (2008), the 150 most frequently used terms, which might 
customarily be found in companies’ mission statements, were itemized. And with words like 
stakeholder, initiative, affiliation, reliability, money, customer, ethics, beauty and profit in the 
list, it is clear that the mission statements from which the terms were extracted include words 
that go beyond the purely financial.  
      These terms are interesting in themselves as indicating the target of the narrative, as well 
as the general corporate focus – whether non-financial or indeed financial – and the 
managerial perceptions underlying the narrative use of these terms. However, other work has 
centered on structuring these types of component terms to tell us something about the latent 
quality of the texts from which they are drawn. This is a feature, which could potentially also 
modify the term’s focus of influence due to the way different terms combine. 
 
 
1 customer  11 us  21 achieve  31 performance  
2 value  12 employees  22 best  32 excellence  
3 people  13 mission  23 help  33 financial  
4 company  14 health  24 needs  34 responsibility  
5 products  15 provide  25 respect  35 strive  
6 business  16 world  26 vision  36 committed  
7 service  17 integrity  27 opportunities  37 diversity  
8 community  18 believe  28 success  38 serve  
9 work 19 care  29 associates  39 shareholders  
10 quality  20 environment  30 growth  40 innovative 
 
Source: Tian, 2005 
 
 
      In a study that looked at the mission statements of fifty-five Fortune 500 companies 
(Tian, 2005) it was found that the forty most frequently used terms (Table 5.2) could be 
grouped according to two corporate social responsibility clusters. These were ‘ethical and 
philanthropic responsibilities’ (eg environment, care, health, diversity, respect, excellence, 
integrity) and ‘economic/legal responsibilities’ (eg needs, serve, work, product, customer, 
Table 6.2 
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community). While arguably one could also potentially find other groups of terms in this list, 
such work shows that how the utilization of language to convey a message is not necessarily 
a matter of one single word versus another but often involves more complex linguistic 
structures, and ones that are not always overt. In this study’s use of term combinations as 
fundamental to the analyses undertaken, this is a very relevant point (see Chapter 4).  
       Of particular interest in this study, though, is how the use of words might change over 
time. Very few studies have looked at anything like this. However, King et al (2012) 
conducted an important one in this area. Although an international study to look at how term 
usage varies for different countries one part also conducted a content analysis examining the 
percentages of US mission statements containing the same fifteen specific terms for four 
periods: 2001, 2008, 2010, and 2011. A split was made of these terms as follows: seven 
‘stakeholder’ terms (communities, competitors, customers, employees, government/law, 
stockholders and suppliers) and eight ‘goal/objective’ terms (core values, ethics, global, 
leadership, profits, quality/value, and technology). Though not all terms for the 
‘stakeholders’ group show that much of an alteration of use over the period, with most 
declining in use slightly – stockholders, for example, as a term itself drops from 34% in 2001 
to 24% in 2011 – there is evidence of increase too. The word communities increases from 6% 
in 2001 to 28% in 2011, and suppliers from 6% to 8%. Similarly, with the ‘goal/objectives’ 
group, core values drops from 25% to 8%, environmental 9% to 4%, and technology from 
14% to 0%. Yet this group also showed more increases than the stakeholders group – 
although they do also show some fluctuations during the course of time. Notably, these are 
ethics 3% in 2001 rising to 28% in 2011, global 15% to 28%, profits 6% to 16% and 
quality/value 25% to 44%.  
      For the authors of the study one of the main points of interest was the relative use of these 
words. As a stakeholder term customers, for example, is found in mission statements more 
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than any other stakeholder term, with a mean percentage for the four periods of 63.75%, 
while suppliers comes way down at a mean of 9%. Interestingly, Bartkus et al (2004) also 
previously found similar findings for these terms. Yet from the perspective of this research, 
what is even more interesting than this focus is the way these terms demonstrate change over 
time. It is not inevitably a given, after all, particularly as the study by King et al (2012) 
sought to assess changing term use without reference to the driving effects of crises, even 
though 2008 was one of the periods looked at. Furthermore, in the current study, with the 
initial work carried out to form a master list of terms – including for stakeholders, 
shareholders, and value-related terms – frequency analysis identified that some terms would 
in fact be more favoured than others. The heavier use of words like customers should not 
come as too much of a surprise then since they have popular resonance. Nevertheless, it is 
evident that there is a realization by the authors that the terms cannot all be treated the same 
and an effort has been made to split them; in this case into ‘stakeholders’ and 
‘goal/objective’. But is it really possible to say that terms like ethics and leadership have an 
equality of definition as objectives?  
      What these authors might be said not to have done then, despite their intriguing findings, 
is attempt to make the groups more cohesive, in order to best reveal potential change of term 
usage over time – as well as any associated alteration in how they influence their target 
audience. This is something we have in fact addressed on a larger scale in examining a wide 
range of annual reports. Indeed as yet, for example, it appears no one has looked at mission 
statements through the lens of value-related terms (VRTs) or other specific dimensions as has 
been constructed for this research. Though notwithstanding what others might do in the future 
the rationale was that it was preferred to bypass this aspect – as a mission statement is 
essentially a snippet – to examine much bigger corpuses and how they compare from pre to 
post-crash. 
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6.3.3: Managerial bias leading to broader change in corporate governance orientation: 
Bias in the use of terms is, it appears, a feature of managerial thinking; and these certainly 
relate to the VRTs we chose. But can we look deeper into the rhetoric to observe how this 
translates into the relative favouring of shareholders versus stakeholders? 
      A rare study on corporate governance narrative orientation carried out by Fairfax (2006) 
examined fifty Fortune 500 companies by assessing their annual reports, mission statements, 
good citizenship reports, websites, and corporate codes of conduct. The emphasis was on 
stakeholder rhetoric with reference to language used by corporate constituents other than 
shareholders, including employees, creditors, customers, and the community; addressing the 
interests and concerns of these groups as well as any discussion of corporate social 
responsibility. The author points out that legal scholars, Hansmann and Kraakman (2001), 
had stated ‘there is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should 
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value’. Yet in spite of this fact, corporate 
law had apparently moved closer, Fairfax (2006, p690) argued, to a stakeholder primacy 
approach than what was generally believed to be a normative shareholder approach.  
      Compared to the current study the methodology is simple, a basis on which the work may 
be criticized. Nonetheless, the study is unusual, and there is a certain irony too that it was 
undertaken by a researcher in corporate law rather than by organizational scholars from other 
disciplines. More tellingly, it makes the case even back then prior to the 2008 crash that 
companies and the law demonstrated a narrative disposition towards a ‘heightened embrace’ 
of stakeholder concepts. It is a finding supportive of the current work. Though having gone 
through worldwide economic crisis and recession since and with reverberations still being 
felt, how reflective that corporate narrative was of real underlying corporate perceptions and 
attitudes – or in fact, how deep that embrace went – is clearly debatable. Indeed, the finding 
is, for the reasons highlighted earlier (eg Section 5.1.2), that companies moved post-Crash to 
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a shareholder focus. And temporality aside, for peripheral stakeholder organizations it seems 
the movement equally depends on ideology amongst the more term-based preferences they 
have. 
 
6.3.4: Terms can reflect changing core values: Another factor affecting narrative produced 
by managers, and which possibly informs the narrative strip over the two time periods, is the 
way core values companies and organizations hold can govern changes in their thinking. 
Notwithstanding the influence of the financial crisis compounding the effect, core values can 
vary, it seems, when in the form of espoused narratives, where manages may perceive and 
frame these values differently across different organizational types (Kabanoff et al, 1995). 
Narratives, reflecting core values, may also converge to become generic and rhetorical 
amongst companies (Anderson and Jamison, 2015). Or drawing on impoverished terminology 
could have no practical meaning whatsoever except sounding good: eg narrative stressing, 
putting the customer first or getting close to the customer (Giblin and Amuso, 2001). 
Similarly, any ‘truth’ within a corporate narrative can be socially defined by the organization 
and therefore never morally absolute (see Jackall, 2010, p117), subject to whim, let alone 
societal or economic influences. 
      Still, core values do need to support and be in synch with a company’s narrative at some 
level, whatever sector that company is in and whatever components the narrative is built with. 
This may seem an obvious necessity yet, as discussed, good intentions can easily get side-
tracked. And, as Auster and Freeman (2012) stress, a need for there to be ‘authenticity’ in the 
company is critical. It means, too, that what is stated as the corporate message should be in 
line with proclaimed corporate values so that all stakeholders, including managers and 
employees, can be in alignment when it comes to attaining the corporate purpose.  
      Yet reality does not always conform to reason and like the saying garbage in, garbage 
out, if core values alter detrimentally then the company can begin telling itself a new 
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narrative about how value creation should happen. And consequently, which constituency to 
favour to that end. Leaving aside temporality, this could partially account for the unexpected 
corporate primacy findings observed to favour stakeholders pre-Crash and shareholders post-
Crash. Overall, the perspective taken on core values is a factor that could easily underpin a 
redirected primacy and temporality focus.  
      The British chemical and pharmaceutical company, ICI (Imperial Chemical Industries), is 
a good illustration of how changes in narrative terminology reflect changes in core values. 
ICI became the country’s biggest manufacturing company, had stockmarket placings on the 
FT100 and FT30 indexes, while also having an international reputation. 
      As commentators have noted (eg: Kay, 2010, pp.19-21; Lusk and Birks, 2014, pp.179-
180), the business orientation of ICI altered towards an excessive shareholder focus with 
detrimental effects, and with the company’s outlook overtly mirrored in its mission statement.  
 
Up till 1997, ICI’s mission was stated as: 
    ‘ICI aims to be the world’s leading chemical company, serving customers    
      internationally through the innovative and responsible application of chemistry and      
      related science. Through achievement of our aim, we will enhance the wealth and   
      well-being of our shareholders, our employees, our customers and the communities  
      which we serve and in which we operate.’ 
 
From 1997, to its demise in 2008, ICI’s stated mission changed to become: 
     ‘Our objective is to maximise value for our shareholders by focusing on businesses   
      where we have market leadership, a technological edge and a world competitive cost  
      base.’ 
 
      ICI’s mission statement might not be specifically responsible for the changing fortunes of 
the company – though if managers and employees buy-in to the new narrative it can begin to 
feed off itself, reflexively. But there is certainly a changed narrative with changed core values 
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supporting it. This is in addition to a changed corporate self-perception that leads to managers 
altering their vision of what the role of the company’s corporate governance orientation 
should be in meeting the demands of a perceived new market reality. Managers begin to think 
the conduction of their business needs to be with a different approach – often a different 
stakeholder emphasis – as a means to creating any real value, financial or otherwise.  
      Another point is that even if you make seemingly positive changes to core values in an 
attempt to improve corporate governance, and hence to positively impact long-term financial 
performance, it does not necessarily follow you radically change the relative focus between 
shareholders and stakeholders. That is, as well, assuming everyone buys-in to the corporate 
goal and that it is fit for purpose. Improvements, for example, do not necessarily track 
through to financial performance linearly, as Appendix 21 shows. And there are 
psychological inputs to a sense of urgency to act, a factor highlighted in Chapter 3. In other 
words, managers may be doing all the right things – or simply think they are – or at least 
operating to the best of their ability. Yet besides affecting the bottom line somewhat 
arbitrarily the resulting primacy and temporality outlook companies have can become very 
convoluted; something again accounting for, or compounding, the type of biasing findings in 
this study. 
      To examine this further an additional examination was made of the mission statements of 
companies used in the investigation. Mission statements, as a constituent of annual reports, 
are often regarded as a signal for underlying corporate thinking, as seen with ICI. However, 
in contrast to ICI’s extreme position it is noticeable how it is not always easy to determine 
primacy orientation from these declarations. Table 6.3 is an extract from the full table shown 
in Appendix 21, where there was an extraction of mission statements from seventeen FT250 
companies from the corporate corpus dataset. Some companies like Cairn and Bodycote seem 
to show an obvious post-Crash orientation towards shareholders in their mission statements.  
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   Table 6.3: Comparison of Corporate Mission Statements, Pre to Post-Crasha 
 
aNotes: 
1. Source: Corporate annual reports 
2. V = value statement 
3. Mission statements shown in table are not always explicit in annual report but exist within text 
4. Comments in italics are additional statements extracted from text 
5. Full table in Appendix 1; extract only shown 
 
 
 
Company Pre-crash Post-crash 
Amec …design, deliver and support infrastructure – from 
local technical services to international landmark 
projects 
 
…total life of asset services and project delivery to 
clients in the international oil and gas industry 
 
Across the world responsibly for the long term 
…provide [our] people with the technical expertise to support our 
customers as they build, operate or decommission their assets. 
 
AMEC’s vision is that by continually delivering excellence, we 
inspire trust and loyalty in our customers. (v) 
Bodycote • To provide world class companies with 
metallurgical and testing services that make a 
positive contribution to the success of their 
businesses. 
• To earn sustainable profits which attract 
shareholder interest. 
• To engage, develop and retain competent people, 
harness their enthusiasm and inspire them to excel. 
• To act as a good corporate citizen. 
Bodycote’s objective is to create superior shareholder returns 
through the provision of selected thermal processing services that 
are highly valued by our customers, giving full regard to a safe 
working environment for our employees and minimal 
environmental impact. 
 
As a group, Bodycote is committed to acting responsibly as a good 
corporate citizen, to reducing the environmental impact of the 
Group’s activities and to providing our employees with a safe 
working environment. 
BTG The Company’s mission is to identify opportunities 
for therapeutic advances in the treatment of 
neurologic and psychiatric disorders, and to license 
and develop compounds that can meet these needs. 
Our mission is to bring to market medical products that meet the 
needs of specialist physicians and their patients. 
Cairn Maximizing the value of discovery 
 
Our Strategy: To secure high equity interests and 
strategic positions in potential high worth 
exploration plays. 
 
Our goal: To create and deliver shareholder value by 
accelerating development, production and 
monetisation of exploration discoveries where 
appropriate. 
Discovering hidden value 
 
Delivering growth and shareholder 
value within a balanced portfolio 
 
We aim to deliver transformational growth by discovering hidden 
value within a balanced oil and gas exploration, development and 
production portfolio. We, along with our JV partners, responsibly 
develop assets which produce hydrocarbons to provide the cash 
flow to fund future exploration activity. 
Croda Innovation: If research is the heart of Croda, and 
new products are our lifeblood, then innovation is 
the spirit of ingenuity that drives us forward. 
Innovating for a Sustainable Future 
 
At Croda, we strive to create value for our shareholders by driving 
profitable sales growth through successful new product 
development, moving ever closer to our customers and increasing 
our focus on fast growing markets. We are a business committed 
to financial growth, high returns, environmental protection and 
social progress. 
 
• continue innovating to improve our products and processes by 
minimising their effect on the environment, whilst maximising the 
efficient use of all resources 
• foster open and comprehensive dialogue with all stakeholders 
and work cooperatively to address our Material Issues  
• provide development opportunities for all employees to reach 
their full potential; and 
• ensure fair and equitable employment conditions, providing a 
stimulating working environment based on respect and 
partnership. 
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Language changes from a focus on the contribution Bodycote, for example, can make to its 
customers’ businesses prior to the Crash, to the provision of a leverageable service after the 
Crash, as customers will then value that service more. However, despite what could be taken 
to be a leaning towards post-Crash shareholder primacy in this mini-corpus as a whole, 
overall the finding is - as with non-uniform financial performance - the mission statements of 
the seventeen companies are fairly mixed in shareholder terminology use over time. 
      The old adage ‘the more things change the more they stay the same’ comes to mind as a 
potential explanation. There may be such an underlying reason for the primacy orientations 
depicted in Table 6.3 (and expanded on in Appendix 21). Yet, despite that, what might be 
observable in some of the post-Crash mission statements is rather an expression of managers’ 
need to respond but due to their deeper altering perceptions about how to best support the 
process, and improve performance, in changed economic conditions according to their core 
values. Managers then reorientate from, say, a short-term perspective to a long-term 
perspective, and which in turn has a knock-on effect on primacy orientation concerning who 
they are going to favour when crisis hits.  
      Due to the limited data they provide, such intricate change, though, cannot be easily 
identified or objectively assessed from an examination of mission statements alone. Hence, 
how to accomplish a deeper analysis has been one of the emphases of the main study. To this 
end the narrative staining technique has allowed a consolidation of multiple variables – 
largely thought of separately when previously researched or debated – and by so doing going 
further in examining primacy and temporality bias than has been undertaken in the past.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
   
 
     
     
 
This research takes its lead from the debate about how corporate value is perceived best 
generated with respect to favouring shareholders or stakeholders. The specific focus, 
though, has been about whether such perceptions altered through the experience of the 2008 
Crash. And to understand this highly complicated process this work has attempted to differ 
from other investigations by firstly examining these primacy concepts integrated with 
temporality (something carried out in two forms), and then, secondly, visually map what 
took place over time across the economy as the financial crisis progressed. Further, this 
investigation makes no judgements about the merits of each of the main constituencies, 
shareholders or stakeholders, but rather has sought to understand a relative change in 
perception managers may have brought to bear in that regard. Indeed, as a new tune for the 
primacy debate, a relative assessment as opposed to an absolute one has been vital for 
revealing what took place and making some sense of the often-conflicting factors and 
viewpoints, many of which have dogged this field of inquiry in the past. Hence, the research 
makes no corporate governance recommendations, neither are reasons assigned for the 
Crash. And the researcher has attempted to be solely an objective observer.    
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      Considered in that way, and in the light of the original research questions, the findings 
are that over the period of the financial crisis there was a change in perceptual bias for the 
primary corpuses. A peruse of Table 5.3 in Chapter 5 shows that quite clearly. Yet largely, 
however, the change did not manifest as expected. For example - and notwithstanding some 
of the results for Study 1 on the regulatory domain - in line with Q1 and Q2 change is 
shown occurring and the research questions thus addressed. Yet, in examining the primary 
corpuses, the consideration of the phenomena separately is likely responsible for that result. 
Once the hypotheses are more complex, and hence there is a consideration of the constructs 
in unison, as in H1a – H2b, the change is there but in a very different configuration from 
expected.  
      Some attempt has been made in Chapter 6 to provide tentative explanations for the 
findings: why, for example, there is a short-term stakeholder orientation pre-Crash, moving 
to a long-term shareholder orientation post-Crash, chiefly for the primary corpuses, although 
less so for the regulatory corpus; but then again also when the results are considered as part 
of a Group (Group A). And then counter to expectations, how biasing is carried through in a 
different way, in many cases reversing, for Group B and Group C. The determination 
overall is that Group A showed alignment of constituents partially due to the regulatory 
environment but also, and more relevantly to the corporate corpus, because stakeholders 
were given more consideration in the material these businesses put out. Whether this 
reflected a genuine desire by managers to attend to different constituencies, as well as CSR 
concerns, or whether it was lip-service cannot be known, yet there is movement over time 
certainly evident in that corporate narrative.  
      In the same way, whether calling it lip-service or indecisiveness, as far as the regulatory 
domain is concerned, there is a static effect noticeably apparent with respect to their outlook 
on primacy. Yet they have a clear movement over time from pre-Crash short termism to 
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post-Crash long-termism. Whatever the regulatory and legislative forces portray themselves 
as, and however the torch is lifted up to further any agendas (ie the promotion of long-
termism), objectively in their narrative, that is where they are at. 
      Four studies conducted, however, can only provide a suggestion of what is taking place 
and, ideally, there needs to be an expansion of the work. But despite such lack of clarity 
dealt with in this research one thing was clear: that to consider value creation to be the same 
for all companies and organizations with respect to primacy – in terms of favouring one 
stakeholder group over another – is to miss the point that there is far more complexity 
involved (see also Mauboussin and Callahan, 2015). For this research, in fact, the findings 
are that temporality (termism and urgency) is of vital importance to the shareholder versus 
stakeholder debate, and perhaps more so than the enlightened view depicts – because it is 
not as straightforward as saying something to the effect, short-term bad, long-term good.  
      Seen in that light the work of Danielson et al (2008) makes particular sense, which is to 
say the way termism functions is equally applicable to shareholder and stakeholder 
perspectives. If such notions become overlooked, however, by stressing a particular agenda 
of, for example, stakeholders, the end result is that if their interests are under-specified in 
some manner, there may be a production of similar results concerning which shareholder 
theory is accused. In other words, as the researchers emphasise, a destruction of long-term 
stakeholder value by less R&D or innovation or overly ambitious attempts to redistribute 
any economic surplus to a variety of stakeholder interests.   
      But in addition to that, whilst particular organizations (primary and peripheral) appear to 
have similar outlooks on the value creation process, the effect is not the same across the 
board. And that variation is important to recognize because it is meaningful. Indeed, without 
any a priori thoughts – or hypotheses – on how the twelve stakeholder organizations would 
break down across the economy with respect to the variables considered, the best groupings 
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for the narrative strip were later found to reflect the ideological perspectives involved, be 
they politically oriented or stressing business, of those stakeholder organizations. And while 
recognizing the need to repeat the research for verification, this was quite a startling finding.  
      And once there was an understanding of the process of mapping complex constructs, 
further investigation was possible by conducting secondary analyses. In looking, therefore, 
at how the relative amounts of a financial versus a non-financial disposition to use certain 
terminology (price, share v return, customer) functioned (H1c – H2d), the finding was that 
the only hypothesis supported was H1d for the corporate corpus. In this case, post-Crash, 
non-financial terms were loading onto long-term stakeholder primacy.  
      Just looking at the corporate corpus alone on the narrative strip,1 it may therefore be 
noticeable that on the one hand companies post-Crash were long-term shareholder oriented 
but on the other, as regards a lesser focus on stakeholders generally,2 they were also 
associating these stakeholders with non-financial terminology. Such findings may not be 
totally untoward, given the reasons discussed. Yet these findings also highlight the 
complexity that needs addressing if real light is going to be shed on this field of inquiry, and 
how the use of multiple analyses based on narrative staining can help in this. 
      One thing that does appear clear, however, is the boundary condition that the financial 
crisis imposed. Whether companies might have been short-term stakeholder oriented prior 
to the Crash and long-term shareholder oriented following it, and other organizations with 
different biases, including with respect to their sense of urgency to change, the financial 
crisis, it appears, represented a crucial turning point. And for better or worse, organizations 
responded to events in the economic environment at that time, and employing the best 
approach at their disposal (eg Appendix 1: Timeline). But even though there is a body of 
work about how crisis operates, and its import is relatable to the 2008 Crash (see Section 
                                                          
1See also Table 5.3.  
2That it is biases dealt with, not complete switches in organizational outlook, should be remembered. 
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6.3.1), whether this event truly represented a cause cannot be said objectively. Indeed, that 
kind of determination was not the aim of this research. Nevertheless, there was an alteration 
in perceived primacy and temporality over that period with respect to value creation was 
certainly the case. However, to contextualize this finding, a connection of these biases – and 
their components – to the broader economic context is supportable only insofar as the Crash 
was the biggest and most likely propulsive force of change in evidence.  
      But despite such apparent limitations involved in assessment, intricacies have been 
revealed  about the relative merits of shareholders and stakeholders to value creation, and 
how this changed over the crisis period,. Furthermore, unlike many other attempts the basis 
of this work is on an objective appreciation of how some of the many variables interact. 
Hence, this research has looked at organizational narrative as it reflects dynamic biasing as a 
result of a furtherance of stakeholder interests however hollow – or indeed substantial – the 
pursuance of that agenda by managers. And how that process, starting out in manager’s 
minds, undergoes mediation by perceptions of temporality.  
      Moreover, with the findings not in accord with the hypotheses generated,1 that 
alignments then became apparent was significant. It additionally pointed the way to a better 
understanding of some of the deeper, inherent intricacies of the shareholder versus 
stakeholder debate in a more sophisticated, broader economic perspective. Fig 1.7 depicts 
how a multi-actor economy impacting the corporate value narrative has its complexity 
revealed with narrative staining2. And for this research it seems that political and business 
agendas stemming from the profile of the organizations examined is very much at play 
                                                          
1An assumption was that the initial conception of how an exploration of the area should proceed – and hence 
how hypotheses were generated – was that there was a single organizational view of perceived value creation 
across the UK economy. 
2The graphic in Fig 7.1 is comparable to Fig 1.2 in the Introduction, and therefore how the research process 
has led to this point. The second scenario is also identical to that portrayed in the narrative strip (Chapter 5, 
Table 5.2).  
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where, as shown, organizational groupings are the reality; rather than an economy where all 
organizations are fundamentally identical in their thinking about value creation. The work, 
therefore, moves beyond investigating a basic discourse of the relative merits of 
shareholders versus stakeholders and beyond basic notions of temporality. It also, unlike a 
financialization view (see eg Froud et al, 2006), shows that essential to understanding the 
issues is to go beyond a financial versus a non-financial focus; considering more than 
capital market outcomes or simplistic corporate governance changes (see eg Deakin, 2010). 
Indeed, to consider even more than specifics concerning who took advantage in a company 
as the emphasis for explaining the 2008 Crash. The perspective of this work, therefore, is 
that without an appreciation of how varied organizations differentially function to align, and 
hence have outlooks on the generation of corporate value that are group-driven, there is only 
a limited understanding of their behaviour, not only with respect to the financial crisis but at 
any time. On that basis, it is unsurprising that academic viewpoints or the media, having 
drawn their information from a particular organizational segment, could reach different 
conclusions – or conclusions that are not reflective of the economy as a whole. A multi-
actor economy is more intricate than that. 
 
7.1 From the Crash of 2008 to an appreciation of the complexity of narrative 
The fundamental underlying contribution of the research concerns narrative. In that respect  
the investigation has demonstrated that in the fostering of corporate value creation the 
discourse can be differentiated between who should be favoured in that process 
(shareholders or stakeholders) and how they should be handled temporally (time horizon 
and sense of urgency). But that differentiation does not preclude considering the issues as a 
whole, as the narrative strip demonstrates. Consequently, looking for possibly the first time 
at the surrounding debates on the issues in an integrative fashion, and with particular 
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relevance to the 2008 Crash, it is apparent that managers clearly utilize narrative to express 
their biases on the subject - whichever primacy and temporality ones are implicated or how 
they alter. This work, therefore, reinforces the fact that narrative is a means by which 
complex information, at many corporate levels, is perceived and handled by employees, 
executives and other stakeholders. Narrative may thus be said to intimate bias.  
      In that context, whatever the cause of change in corporate value perception (including 
both internal and external forces) the purpose of forming and applying term combinations 
has been to reflect any potential outcome from pre to post-Crash in managers’ thinking; to 
pick up on their changing biases. This has not only been achieved but as the findings have 
indicated it is a highly individualistic process, where pre or post-Crash narrative term use is 
found to map differently for different organizations, or indeed for different groups of 
organizations. It is only through the application of narrative staining, however, that this 
effect, one leading organizational perceptions, became observable. Moreover, with 
hypotheses largely not supported, there is an underscoring of the complexity of examining 
the shareholder versus stakeholder debate within that multi-actor economic environment. 
      For value-creation, narrative development is also a process sensitive to change as new 
economic events arise. Broader stakeholder relationships and how they influence company 
performance, as we have seen, had been progressively coming to the fore, such as the 
growing concern shared amongst many observers about CSR and the environment and the 
vital role such constituencies had to play even prior to the financial crisis. Managers, more 
than others, are often in a position to perceive these concerns as they materialize both within 
their organizations and when looking towards the outside world, and it is through the 
narrative they cultivate that they respond. The way they respond, though, is a result of the 
dispositions they bring to bear; dispositions which are themselves reflective of multi-actor 
forces. 
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      Indeed, demonstrated in this research is that corporate narrative is reflective of human 
perception and resulting behaviour in an intricate and dynamic manner. Furthermore, 
through the prism of managerial and executive bias alterations in managerial behaviour have 
become observable as a major economic crisis took place. Narrative, however, has 
implications beyond being a useful analytical means to look at bias. Significantly, the 
research points to an inextricable link between corporate narrative and perceived value. And 
with all the myriad variables in play, and specifically those involving temporality, how an 
understanding of value creation occurs amongst a variety of organizations in the economy 
can be discerned to be far more than just about shareholders or stakeholders. 
 
7.2 Interdisciplinary and future real-world applications 
An impetus for this investigation was the desire to examine changing perceptions of 
corporate value by managers as they met the challenges of the financial crisis. But once it 
became a multivariate investigation – not least by considering the influence of both primacy 
and time horizon dimensions – it opened up a new way of thinking about large corpus 
datasets. This also promoted a contemplation about what physical limitations existed on 
more elaborate investigations, and whether it was possible to remove or reduce these 
limitations. Indeed, added to the research were several modes of the temporality concept. 
But other complex variables – outside the scope of this research – were determined to be 
equally possible to examine. 
      Consequently, the approach described allows assessment of a variety of cognitive 
concepts within the context of other variables that may influence them. The concept of value 
in the context of primacy and temporality has been the focus for the current work. But 
belief, beauty, quality, injustice, are all potential concepts, to name a few, that could be 
similarly examined within the same primacy and temporality context (specified as 
DimSyns) if one wished; which is to say, crucially, can be looked at in relation to something 
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else. Though more likely the DimSyns would relate more specifically to particular research 
questions involved. Indeed, these context variables could be changed entirely. 
     The research has only just opened a door on the technique. And without a doubt, for 
future work there is more that can be done to develop it, as well as further investigate how 
companies and organizations respond when different combo terms are used. Will there be 
support for the initial findings; will something new materialize from a much broader data 
analysis? What other combos, as research goes deeper into the process, might become 
relevant? And the process so far has used a simple multiplicative approach to forming the 
combo. That itself has provided fascinating and original insights about the economy. But 
exploring the use of other mathematical ways of combining terms could open up more 
possibilities and perhaps reveal ways better reflecting more sophisticated cognitive biasing.  
      Furthermore, the description of narrative staining also appears to provide a new 
technique applicable to the domain of corpus linguistic analysis. And one as well that has a 
visual element.  
      Taken together, this all suggests many interesting opportunities for new applications and 
future research discovery. 
      Yet it is important to state that more computing power and dedicated specialized 
systems need developing to flesh out what the potential is. However, there has been a 
demonstration of two secondary analyses: a narrative strip and a matrix analysis. And what 
became apparent is that though the feed to these may come from perceptual or positioning 
mapping it is feasible that the technique can also interface with more advanced methods of 
assessment such as correspondence analysis. Flexibility of this kind suggests further 
research potential to explore qualitative findings in new ways. 
      Certainly, the findings of this study with a corpus analytical approach have provided 
new insights into the reality of how managers of different organizations think about 
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shareholders and stakeholders. And that was an initial goal. Indeed, an investigation has 
been made of the shareholder versus stakeholder debate, and with its mediation by temporal 
factors, at a highly sophisticated level not hitherto seen. But as meaningful as the results are 
from this study’s specific focus, there is also greater potential.  
      Firstly, the approach is equally applicable to other academic domains, where the 
technique provides open-ended possibilities for future research from a qualitative 
perspective. Areas the technique may be applied include: social science, psychology, 
marketing, ecology, business and economics. Indeed, the possible applications, it seems, 
depend only on the investigator’s imagination. The potential multi-disciplinary crossover – 
an approach this research employed – may also represent in time an area of fruitful 
exploration. 
      Secondly, looking at the data output in the form of a narrative strip opens up a number 
of possibilities beyond the research lab. And that is perhaps the overriding, exciting 
outcome for future exploration from techniques developed in this work. Because key is that 
narrative staining is a qualitative data reduction method. It means that once handling of 
complex – or combination – variables is undertaken, it then becomes an original question 
for researchers to consider of how many corpus datasets to look at; rather than the standard 
approach of examining, for example, two or three. This work has applied the technique to 
twelve corpuses – or twenty-four if both time points are taken into account – itself 
something that does not appear to have been done before.  
      As a result of these features embodied in narrative staining, the implications for real-
world use are highly significant. Now turned to in some detail, therefore, are several 
suggestions as they bear explanation. 
 
7.2.1 Negotiations: These interactions are often difficult because parties have different 
agendas that habitually do not come across or are misinterpreted, or what is actually thought 
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remains uncommunicated. Narrative staining can help reveal what is important so that 
parties can better understand one another, or indeed so that they employ appropriate 
negotiating tactics. 
 
i) A question can arise in the corporate – or organizational – world concerning how different 
companies, in contrast to how they respond individually on a particular subject, might 
respond on the subject if brought together or amalgamated in some form.   
      To find this out, a matrix analysis is conducted (based on an initial narrative staining 
procedure of material they produce) for the cluster of companies involved. And by then 
examining the XRTs1 - how their thoughts in unison on the subject of interest are likely to 
bias. It is thus a predictive2 process; extrapolating from the combined material the 
companies produce to a real-world scenario should these companies come together. 
      Views may stay the same of they may be found to differ. But knowing such information 
gives a party an indication in advance of the likelihood that a merger – or simply working 
together on a project – will run smoothly, with everyone on the same page, and not be 
fraught with cultural obstacles. 
 
ii) Another procedure that would be useful in negotiations relates to having advance 
knowledge of where a party sits on different aspects of a dispute they bring to the 
negotiating table. To find this out, a consideration is made of where an organization might 
potentially fit on a narrative strip based on a potential, predictive relationship between the 
complex terms they use and their organizational group profile.  
      To conduct the investigation what happens in essence is as follows. One organization is 
known, for example, to fit into Group 1 based on a full set of combos. And a second 
                                                          
1‘X’ refers to the construct of importance.  
2It is notable that from the perspective of qualitative analysis the idea of prediction has hitherto largely been 
thought unfeasible. 
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organization is known (tentatively) to fit in to Group 1 but has an incomplete set of combos, 
missing several XRTs. Since the second organization has sufficient combos to place it in 
Group 1 its unknown XRTs are predictable, based on results of the first organization. 
Hence, it leads to knowing how, in all likelihood, the second organization will respond on a 
given topic. 
      In business, it is rare to know how a party thinks about a complex concept underlying a 
dispute. But by forming a narrative strip, an assessment can more readily be undertaken. 
          
7.2.2 Analysis of share performance: A feature of the way the financial markets operate is 
their price indexes for different company shares. These types of price indexes represent a 
straightforward way of assessing how well a company – and often a manager too – is 
performing. It encapsulates much information, and many hundreds of shares can 
simultaneously be scrutinized utilizing price performance and comparisons to their 
respective indices. The issues of such indices aside, they provide a quantitative, measurable 
method of assessment and in that respect are objective. And updated at regular intervals, 
they are time based. As such, a representation of this type is referred to as a time series. 
      However, conceptually the use of indexes based on data other than price to construct a 
time series is possible. And one of the most popularly attempted qualitative approaches in 
this field utilizes sentiment data extracted from a corpus. Research carried out often uses 
Twitter as the corpus, though other financial data sources are frequently a better feed. By 
this approach, sentiment is determined, at its simplest level, by an algorithm that assesses 
the relative amounts of positive versus negative words for a given number of words in a 
text; though far more advanced algorithms are also employed. Generated in this manner is 
thus a single number, updating at intervals to form an index. The idea then, whichever the 
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chosen source, is to look at how well the two indexes, sentiment and price, correlate1. And 
indeed with whichever feed is used, or that draws on multiple sources including Twitter, 
whether the index of a specific share’s sentiment can predict its price (see eg Pagolu et al, 
2016).  
      The claims of scholarly works concerning having found a wondrous predictive financial 
algorithm that gives above average returns can be manifold, as can be the claims stated as 
scientific advances by companies involved with building systems for corpus linguistic data 
extraction for predicting stock prices. But the reality is that using corpus linguistics in the 
financial arena represents a difficult field to achieve success in – companies may go bust 
before finding that success; as happened to an early market entrant, Monitor 110, in 2008. 
And for sentiment analysis there is particular difficulty as ‘sentiment’ can be defined in 
multiple ways. Indeed, despite work in this area of corpus linguistics applied to the financial 
markets (see eg Das and Chen, 2007; Bollen et al, 2010; Mittal and Goel, 2012; Pagolu et al, 
2016), sentiment based approaches have yet to find real traction in the industry. Or so it 
would seem, as a hedge fund with an effective algorithm would likely keep it to themselves!  
      While successful proprietary methods no doubt do exist, somewhere, and may even 
utilize other qualitative components as well (eg GPOMS (Google Profile of Mood States), 
looking at: happiness, kindness, alertness, sureness, vitality and calmness),2 they are still 
single term elements manipulated in those approaches. Narrative staining, however, offers 
an alternative technique, much more complex in character, for looking at time series data. 
      Expressed simply, once a combo is formed it can be tracked. Whereas previously this 
research utilized two time points, pre-Crash and post-Crash (ie t1 and t2), with sufficient 
computer power and accessing the appropriate corpus data this is achievable on a more 
                                                          
1For a useful explanation showing a comparison of sentiment and price indexes for several companies, see 
Sentdex,   Sentiment analysis accuracy: http://sentdex.com/how-accurate-is-sentiment-analysis-for-stocks/ 
2See also Brants, T., and Franz, A. (2006) https://catalog.ldc.upenn.edu/LDC2006T13. 
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consistent basis to form a dynamic time series (ie t1, t2, t3… tn). Fundamentally, the 
procedure makes more use of the vertical potential of the narrative strip for a particular 
corporate corpus (based on a feed not an annual report); although the procedure moves 
horizontally for other companies in the same way conducted before in the investigation to 
assess multiple organizations. The end product is a constantly updating result for a combo 
(made up of an effective XRT and of DimSyns) in an index for any share assessed in this 
manner.   
      But as with any other potential implementation of narrative staining, the key is in 
finding the combo that works to produce the best predictions. It would not be an easy task, 
and combo effectiveness may alter after a while in use too – something that is an observed 
outcome with many predictive factors in algorithmic trading as the market responds or 
changes. It would undoubtedly keep a researcher or developer very busy, though a 
successful arbitrage algorithm at the end would be the reward. And despite the additional 
research and development that would have to be done, what is conceived here is showing 
what is possible in the financial markets with the methodology developed through the 
present research 
 
7.2.3 Counter terrorism: In this domain, there can be a vast amount of data on persons of 
interest coming in to security services all the time. One of the biggest problems is often not, 
therefore, that there has been no gathering of information, it is rather that amongst the mass 
of intelligence at what point does the often disparate pieces of information become of 
importance so that action can be taken?1 It is frequently, too, a matter of diverting human 
resources to the task and to check this information, something that takes a lot of time. 
                                                          
1That also assumes there could potentially be assembly of the intelligence in to some meaningful form in the 
first place. Until work begins, this may be an unknown 
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Resources are limited, but get the focus wrong and there can be terrible consequences, and 
from a source of attack on the radar yet overlooked. 
 
 
  ‘The risk from each individual was assessed on a ‘daily and weekly basis’ and 
then prioritised ‘accordingly’… One of the main challenges we've got is that we 
only ever have fragments of information, and we have to try to assemble a 
picture of what might happen, based on those fragments… when an attack 
happened, it would be carried out [in all likelihood] by someone ‘that we know 
or have known.’ 
21 
      But in theory, with a narrative staining approach that looks at bias, in other words subtle 
yet multifaceted behavioural change, if there is access to a corpus of narrative for a person 
already under surveillance2 – ie through their websites, blogs, forum postings, email, phone, 
site location recordings – then more automated analysis can be applied. The corpus of every 
person of interest, for example, is like each of the organizational corpuses in the narrative 
strip. As in this research, there is consideration of the linguistic terms in complex forms that 
are key to individual behaviour, this being far more reflective of how people think. All 
things being equal, there would be no alteration in the narrative strip at different time points. 
But if there is demonstration of colour and/or numerical change, it indicates an individual 
requiring a focus by the security services. Importantly by this approach, as well, 
simultaneous monitoring of hundreds of individuals can be undertaken, and the results 
rapidly scanned by an operator (or by computer) for change. As such, this is a technique 
stressing a change in profile as opposed to a profile itself. It is not meant as an alternative to 
                                                          
1Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-41655488 
2This is specifically about cases where individuals are already under surveillance, and not about breaching the 
legal right to privacy. 
Andrew Parker, Chief of MI51 
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current practices either, but rather as a check to assess what might have been missed. And as 
history unfortunately shows it is very easy to miss important data – even though it exists.  
      Besides the computer and software requirements, one of the challenges in setting up 
such a system would be – as with a share trading algorithm – in getting the right combo 
terms for assessment (including choosing whatever the X is for an XRT that is relevant to 
the potential terrorists concerned, as well as the most appropriate contextual DimSyns).  
      But all that notwithstanding, the technique of narrative staining shows that it is 
theoretically possible and offers an alternative tool for approaching potential terrorist threat.  
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Appendix 1 - Extract of timeline showing details of important events for the 
year 2007.1  
            
 
 
2007  
January 1: Provisions of the Companies Act 2006 come into force. These deal largely, though 
not exclusively, with document delivery and disclosure (Sections 2: (1) a – h; (2) a-h). 
January/February: FSA imposes further fines on major PPI providers for not treating customers 
fairly.  
February: OFT makes formal referral of PPI to the Competition Commission. 
April 6: Provisions of the Companies Act 2006 come into force.2 These deal largely, though not 
exclusively, with repeals of previous requirements, the registrar’s function and fees payable to 
them (Sections 4: (1) a – f; (2) a –c; (3) a – c; (4).). 
July 11: Shareholder Rights Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies. Particular emphasis 
is on voting shares – and use of proxies - in relation to minimum requirements for general 
meetings of companies on a regulated market situated or operating within a Member State 
(subsequently amended 08.07.15 to include greater shareholder oversight). 
July 26: The Pensions Act 2007. This Act incorporated the main findings of the all-party 
Pensions Commission in 2006 as set out in the white paper Security in retirement: towards a new 
pension system published in May 2006. 
- Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 
Late July/early August: The UK stock market goes through a period of volatility. Banks begin 
to stop lending to each other due to market fears over - amongst other things - exposure to 
potential losses on high-risk US mortgages. The credit crunch begins in earnest. 
August 9: Investment bank BNP Paribas tells investors they will not be able to take money out of 
two of its funds because it cannot value the assets in them, owing to a "complete evaporation of 
                                                          
1The full timeline of economic events leading up to the UK financial crisis (not shown) is for 1986 to 2014 
inclusive, and available on request. 
Sources include: The Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph, FT, BBC, Guardian, Independent, Wikipedia, ICSA, BoE, 
HM Treasury, Government Legislation, FRC, EU directives, OECD. 
2The content of this and later Provisions to CA2006 are particularly important to the current research inasmuch as 
continued amendments allowed a comparison of the 2006 and 2012 material. And Provisions that had more terms 
looked at in this research were hence of even more relevance. These terms were also characteristic of text 
reflecting an increasing focus on better corporate governance processes. 
Colour key 
  UK Legislative 
  Codes-related 
321 
 
liquidity" in the market. It is the clearest sign yet that banks are refusing to do business with each 
other. “BNP's statement is scary, to put it mildly” says BBC Business Editor, Robert Peston  
August 28: Portman and Nationwide Building Societies merge under the Nationwide brand, 
creating a mutual body with assets of more than £150 billion 
September 4: The rate at which banks lend to each other (LIBOR) rises to its highest level since 
December 1998.  
September 13: Northern Rock seeks bail out from BoE. News breaks that Northern Rock has 
sought emergency funding from the Bank of England in its capacity as "lender of last resort". It 
prompts the first run on a bank for more than a century. Northern Rock relied heavily on the 
markets, rather than savers' deposits, to fund its mortgage lending. The onset of the credit crunch 
has dried up its funding.  
- Barclays alerts US regulators about its concerns that other banks are submitting dishonestly low 
interbank rates (beginning of LIBOR scandal). 
September 17: Chancellor guarantees all deposits held by Northern Rock. 
September 19: Bank of England announces an injection of £10 billion into the money markets in 
an attempt to bring down the cost of inter-bank lending. 
October 9: Treasury confirms that the guarantee arrangements previously announced to protect 
existing depositors of Northern Rock will be extended to all new retail deposits made after 19 
September. 
October 1: Provisions of the Companies Act 2006 come into force. These deal largely, though 
not exclusively, with member rights, meetings, resolutions, director’s duties, political donations 
and expenditures, and company share capital rules (Sections 2: (1) a – l; (2); (3) a – k; (4)). 
December: The Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) says that the Barclays 
employee responsible for submitting the bank's dollar Libor rates contacted it to complain that 
Barclays was not setting ‘honest’ rates (Barclays alleged to have manipulated Libor submissions 
to give a healthier picture of the bank's credit quality and its ability to raise funds. A lower 
submission would deflect concerns it had problems borrowing cash from the markets). 
December 6: A Barclay’s compliance officer contacts the FSA about concerns over the levels 
that other banks were setting their US Libor rate. This was made after a submitter flagged to 
compliance his concern about mis-reporting the rate. Compliance informed the FSA that ‘we 
have consistently been the highest (or one of the two highest) rate provider in recent weeks, but 
we're justifiably reluctant to go higher given our recent media experience’. He also reported that 
the FSA ‘agreed that the approach we've been adopting seems sensible in the circumstances, so I 
suggest we maintain status quo for now’. 
December 6 – 13: The Bank of England cuts interest rates by a quarter of one percentage point to 
5.5%. The Bank of England calls it an attempt to "forestall any prospective sharp tightening of 
credit conditions". The move succeeds in temporarily lowering the rate at which banks lend to 
each other.  
Cont/... 
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Appendix 2 - Table summarizing research questions and hypotheses - in 
relation to primary and peripheral stakeholder corpuses examineda 
 
 
Note that as an overview, and for ease of further explanation, this is not an exact replication of 
the wording of the specified questions and hypotheses in the Introduction.9 
 
 
 
 
 
Is there, pre to post the 2008 financial crisis, a movement concerning perceptions of corporate 
value?6 
  
 
Q1. Did the crash of 2008 change perceptions of corporate value in relation to the relative merits of shareholder primacy (ShP) and 
stakeholder primacy (StP)? 
 
Q2. Did the crash of 2008 change perceptions of corporate value in relation to the temporal horizon (ie termism - long-term (LT) versus 
short-term (ST) outlook; and a sense of urgency (SofU) - non urgency-to-reorientate (NUR) versus urgency-to-reorientate (UR))? 
 
 
Hypotheses7 
 
 
 
Dataset: corporate8 – annual reports (& websites) 
 
 
Dataset: regulatory – hard & soft law Datasets: other3 St… 
 
Termism 
 
Sense of Urgency 
 
Termism 
 
Sense of Urgency Termism 
Sense of 
Urgency 
Q1and Q2 combined, and 
expressed as a hypothesis 
for corporate corpus – 
source of perception shown 
in brackets 
 
H1: Post-crash compared 
to pre-crash, the 
perception of value will 
move with respect to 
dimensions of ShP/StP 
and (managerial) termism 
 
Q1 and Q2 combined, and 
expressed as a hypothesis 
for corporate corpus – 
source of perception 
shown in brackets 
 
H2: Post-crash compared 
to pre-crash, the 
perception of value will 
move with respect to 
dimensions of ShP/StP 
and SofU (amongst 
managers) 
Q1 and Q2 combined, and 
expressed as a hypothesis 
for regulatory corpus – 
source of perception 
shown in brackets 
 
H1: Post-crash 
compared to pre-crash, 
the perception of value 
will move with respect 
to dimensions of 
ShP/StP and (regulatory) 
termism 
Q1 and Q2 combined, and 
expressed as a hypothesis 
for regulatory corpus – 
source of perception 
shown in brackets 
    
H2: Post-crash compared 
to pre-crash, the 
perception of value will 
move with respect to 
dimensions of ShP/StP 
and SofU (from social 
and legal pressure) 
   
Q1… 
 
 
 
 
 
H1… 
Q2… 
 
 
 
   
 
H2… 
H1a: Pre crash, value-
related terms will 
dominate in the space 
representing short-term 
ShP 
H2a: Pre crash, value-
related terms will 
dominate in the space 
representing NUR / ShP 
H1a: Pre crash, value-
related terms will 
dominate in the space 
representing short-term 
ShP 
H2a: Pre crash, value-
related terms will 
dominate in the space 
representing NUR / ShP 
H1a… H2a… 
H1b: Post-crash, value-
related terms will 
dominate in the space 
representing long-term 
StP 
H2b: Post-crash, value-
related terms will 
dominate in the space 
representing UR / StP 
H1b: Post-crash, value-
related terms will 
dominate in the space 
representing long-term 
StP 
H2b: Post-crash, value-
related terms will 
dominate in the space 
representing UR / StP 
H1b… H2b… 
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aNotes (Items 3, 4, 6, and 7, refer to superscript numbers in table): 
1. Value-related terms include value assessment terms, associated corporate value terms and synonyms  
2. Pre-crash and post-crash are represented by separate datasets within the regulatory, corporate (managerial) and 
other stakeholder datasets 
3. Table highlights primary corporate and regulatory corpuses, though research questions and hypotheses are the 
same for all corpuses and applied to all twelve corpuses, including ten (‘other’) peripheral stakeholder 
organizations. 
4. These are subsidiary questions and only applicable to primary corpuses – see Appendix 13 for correlation 
analysis. 
5. For hypotheses H1c to H2d, temporal change only - no DimSyn variation for corporate governance 
6. This is a general, overarching question. However, the thrust of the research is to consider this question in the 
context of the shareholder v stakeholder primacy debate (and secondarily to assess the impact of temporality on the 
players involved). Hence, the main research questions of interest are expressed as Q1 and Q2 (Q2i and Q2ii).  
7. Besides actual research questions, hypotheses are also employed as they better reflect the idea of movement in a 
virtual search space, which is the core approach to the analysis undertaken. 
8. Corporate docs, besides annual reports, include managerial docs, company business reviews and topic reports; 
websites used only in initial pilot study. 
9. Eg. Q2 is the theoretical question and includes the tested questions Q2i (termism) and Q2ii (SofU); both with 
reference to perceptions of value. A ‘dominance in the space’ also implies, as above, that perception ‘moves’. 
 
 
 
Dataset: corporate – annual reports & websites 
 
 
Dataset: regulatory – hard & soft law Datasets: other3 St… 
 
Termism 
 
Sense of Urgency 
 
Termism 
 
Sense of Urgency Termism 
Sense of 
Urgency 
H1c: Pre crash, there 
will be a dominance of 
financial value-related 
terms compared to 
non-financial related 
terms clustering 
towards the space 
representing short-term 
ShP 
H2c: Pre crash, there will 
be a dominance of 
financial value-related 
terms compared to non-
financial related terms 
clustering towards the 
space representing NUR / 
ShP 
H1c: Pre crash, there will 
be a dominance of 
financial value-related 
terms compared to non-
financial related terms 
clustering towards the 
space representing short-
term ShP 
H2c: Pre crash, there will 
be a dominance of 
financial value-related 
terms compared to non-
financial related terms 
clustering towards the 
space representing NUR / 
ShP 
H1c… H2c… 
H1d: Post-crash, there 
will be a dominance of 
non-financial value-
related terms compared 
to financial related 
terms clustering 
towards the space 
representing long-term 
StP 
H2d: Post-crash, there 
will be a dominance of 
non-financial value-
related terms compared 
to financial related terms 
clustering towards the 
space representing UR / 
StP 
H1d: Post-crash, there 
will be a dominance of 
non-financial value-
related terms compared 
to financial related terms 
clustering towards the 
space representing long-
term StP 
H2d: Post-crash, there 
will be a dominance of 
non-financial value-
related terms compared 
to financial related terms 
clustering towards the 
space representing UR / 
StP 
H1d… H2d… 
 
 
 
 
Q3: Are regulatory changes (hard and soft law together) over the crisis period associated with any changing managerial perceptions of 
value?  
[Databases: regulatory - hard/soft law & corporate] 
 
 
Databases: soft law & corporate 
 
 
Databases: hard law & corporate 
   
Q3a: Post-crash compared to pre-crash, are soft law changes 
associated with any changing managerial or executive perceptions 
of corporate value?4 
    
Q3b: Post-crash compared to pre-crash, are hard law changes 
associated with any changing managerial or executive perceptions 
of corporate value?4 
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Appendix 3 - Dataset example    
 
Set 1 corpus frequency data, bi analysis, normalized, for twelve stakeholder organizations1.  
 
      Pre-crash 
 
                
 
 
           Post-crash 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1Red corner marker for IPPR indicates that it includes two sub corpuses, IPPR-a (corporate governance based) and 
IPPR-b (also corporate governance based but with more emphasis on environmental concerns). 
bi corp (pre) (reg pre) FSA (pre) FT (pre) CBI (pre) CIMA (pre)ICSA (pre) IOD (pre) CPS (pre) IPPR (pre) News-gen (pre)TUC (pre)
1) ci 1.605815 0.011948 0.188067 0.804844 0 0.397871 0.096886 0.095213 0.003526 0.01596 0.8219396 0
2) cm 0.529745 0.009357 0.282101 0.39493 0 0.132624 0.048443 0.006143 0.010226 0.00347 0.3128554 0.000653
3) cp2 0.153097 6.33E-05 0.0403 0.007849 0 0 0.024221 0.003071 0.000353 0.006245 0.0111073 0.000245
4) cn 0.520255 0.002987 0.926904 0.258292 0 1.193612 0.217993 0.0215 0.017983 0.053432 0.3813504 0.008921
5) p1i 2.786019 0.012412 0.016943 2.089685 0.026645 0.044208 0 0.14282 0.227431 0.082081 2.2502281 0
6) p1m 0.296998 0.012608 0.025415 1.025391 0.053289 0.014736 0 0.009214 0.65955 0.017844 0.8565058 0.018929
7) p1p2 0.050145 0.000528 0.003631 0.020378 0 0 0 0.004607 0.022743 0.032119 0.0304085 0.007098
8) p1n 0.435103 0.003103 0.083505 0.670626 0 0.132624 0 0.03225 1.159899 0.274793 1.0440248 0.258695
9) ri 0.299624 0.010372 0.057606 1.774535 0.097697 0 0.16609 0.476067 0.033498 0.00304 0.4850791 0
10) rm 0.066555 0.023083 0.086409 0.870749 0.195393 0 0.083045 0.030714 0.097143 0.000661 0.184636 0
11) rp2 0.015073 0.002449 0.012344 0.017305 0 0 0.041522 0.015357 0.00335 0.00119 0.0065551 0
12) rn 0.134413 0.002593 0.283917 0.569487 0 0 0.373702 0.107499 0.170838 0.010178 0.2250592 0
13) si 4.906446 0.101212 0.013554 5.566028 0 0.044208 0.249135 0.761708 0.128701 0.00228 6.6159402 0
14) sm 0.965832 0.386613 0.020332 2.731203 0 0.014736 0.124567 0.049142 0.373234 0.000496 2.5182295 0
15) sp2 0.250568 0.049713 0.002905 0.054279 0 0 0.062284 0.024571 0.01287 0.000892 0.0894046 0
16) sn 1.740012 0.025303 0.066804 1.786261 0 0.132624 0.560554 0.171999 0.656377 0.007633 3.0695578 0
corp (post)(reg post) FSA (post) FT (post) CBI (post) CIMA (post)ICSA (post)IOD (post) CPS (post) IPPR (post)News-gen (post)TUC (post)
3.88244 1.85E-05 0.266259 0.609919 0 0.096757 0 0.19304 0 0.110306 0.568137 0
1.201142 0.000227 0.163851 0.228487 0.033632 0.225766 0 0.021449 0 0.027332 0.079395 0.007392
0.464875 1.85E-05 0.040963 0.010259 0.008408 0 0 0 0 0.017571 0.005156 0.004032
0.539554 4.63E-06 0.341357 0.152946 0.08408 0.967568 0 0.042898 0 0.191327 0.124763 0.155559
4.915847 0.124862 0.079572 3.411735 0 0.01843 0 0.231648 0.271132 0.328052 1.870117 0
0.254583 0.036902 0.048967 1.278096 0.016816 0.043003 0 0.025739 0.022594 0.081287 0.261341 0.022667
0.031343 0.002494 0.012242 0.057384 0.004204 0 0 0 0.169457 0.052256 0.01697 0.012364
0.453476 4.63E-05 0.102015 0.855542 0.04204 0.184299 0 0.051477 0.723018 0.569011 0.410679 0.477046
0.536443 0.001 0.061209 1.963177 0 0 0 0.579119 0.175869 0.012893 1.017912 0
0.044612 0.012254 0.037667 0.735441 0.201792 0 0 0.064347 0.014656 0.003195 0.142249 0.000493
0.012677 0.001 0.009417 0.03302 0.050448 0 0 0 0.109918 0.002054 0.009237 0.000269
0.117664 0.00025 0.078473 0.492295 0.50448 0 0 0.128693 0.468985 0.022363 0.223534 0.010371
9.111508 2.258173 0.048967 8.538868 0 0.01843 0.116119 0.308864 0.168541 0.010028 8.095951 0
0.784249 0.794864 0.030134 3.198811 0.08408 0.043003 0 0.034318 0.014045 0.002485 1.131376 0.001971
0.18938 0.055557 0.007533 0.14362 0.02102 0 0 0 0.105338 0.001597 0.073466 0.001075
1.221299 0.0035 0.062778 2.141245 0.2102 0.184299 0.139343 0.068636 0.449444 0.017393 1.777877 0.041482
bi
1) ci
2) cm
3) cp2
4) cn
5) p1i
6) p1m
7) p1p2
8) p1n
9) ri
10) rm
11) rp2
12) rn
13) si
14) sm
15) sp2
16) sn
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Appendix 4 - Extracts from Master Lists of VRTs and DimSyns1 
 
Value-related terms (VRTs) 
2 
Value-related terms 
(VRTs) 
(inc value assessment terms, 
value drivers etc) 
Search volume 
UK average 
per/month (source: 
KeywordSpy.com)2 
Ngram  
average minimax %,  
09/04 – 03/12  
(Source BL: 
webarchive.org.uk/u
kwa/ngram/)2 
Advantage 3,350,000 5.417 
Agreement 3,350,000 6.849 
 
Alliance 
 
7,480,000 3.964 
Asset 2,740,000 4.170 
Assets 1,000,000 4.170 
Bargaining power 9,900 0.037 
Bond 11,100,000 4.899 
Bonus 4,090,000 0.891 
Book value 450,000 0.174 
Bottom line 201,000 3.252 
Brand 11,100,000 4.830 
Brand loyalty 27,100 0.066 
Business ideas 450,000 0.111 
Business strategy 246,000 1.025 
Capital  24,900,000 6.594 
Cash 16,600,000 5.452 
Cash flow 1,220,000 0.418 
Charge 3,350,000 8.141 
                                                          
1Full VRT and DimSyn master lists available on request to view. 
2Threshold values considered for use indicated in green (KS >10,000; Ngram >5.0) 
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Dimension Synonyms (DimSyns) 
 
Dimension – 
corporate 
governance: 
(shareholder value) 
ShV Primacy 
 
Search volume 
 
 
 
UK average per/m 
(source: 
KeywordSpy.com) 
Dimension – 
corporate 
governance: 
(stakeholder) StV 
Primacy 
 
Search volume 
 
 
UK average per/m 
(source: 
KeywordSpy.com) 
Angel investor 27,100 Affiliate 2,740,00 
Banker 1,830,000 Agent 11,100,000 
Bondholder 8,100 Ally 1,500,000 
Boss n/a (US: 20,400,000) 
 
 
Associate 
 
 
1,500,000 
Business owner 90,500 Backer 246,000 
Capital provider n/a (US: 2,900) Benefactor 60,500 
Capitalist 165,000 CEO 2,740,000 
Chief 4,090,000 Co partner 6,600 
Director n/a (US: 20,400,000) Co worker 60,500 
Entrepreneur 1,500,000 Collaborator 27,100 
Employer 673,000 Colleague 201,000 
Equity holder 1,000 Constituency 110,000 
Financier 368,000 Constituent 90,500 
Investor 1,500,000 Contributor 60,500 
Lender 550,000 Corporate sponsor 5,400 
Owner 2,740,000 Endorser 18,100 
President 11,100,000 Employee 5,000,000 
Principle 1,500,000 Executive 7,480,000 
Shareholder 301,000 Manager 37,200,000 
Stock owner 1,300 Social investor 480 
Stockholder 40,500 Stakeholder 246,000 
Venture capitalist 40,500 Steward 550,000 
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Appendix 5 – Researcher instructions for implementing the ‘narrative 
staining’ procedure 
 
 
Stages 
1. Form or choose corpuses to be looked at based on research questions. A minimum of 
two or two sub-corpus datasets are required. The corpuses should be big – small 
corpuses are unlikely to generate sufficient material needed for an analysis. 
2. Determine a list of terms for the topic under examination as synonyms or related terms 
– within reason as many as possible. This can be considered the main variable (in the 
present case the topic is about value, therefore conceptualized as a value-related term or 
VRT. If it was about, say, ‘belief’ it would be a BRT, and so forth accordingly). These 
go into a Master List under the category of VRT. 
3. Determine dimensions to be examined. Four are likely to be adequate (eg as we used: 
synonyms for ‘shareholder’ and ‘stakeholder’; ‘long-term’ and ‘short-term’).  
4. For each of the four chosen dimensions, as in Stage 2, determine a list of synonyms or 
related terms – again, within reason, as many as possible. As dimension-synonyms these 
are conceptualized simply as DimSyns. (Dimension ‘category’ terms, such as 
highlighted in Stage 3, may themselves also be used if they are found to meet criteria). 
These DimSyns go into the Master List for their respective dimension categories. 
5. By a means such as an internet-based monthly volume analysis (using a site or utility 
for usage stats), popularity ratings or expert knowledge, whittle the options down and 
focus on a small subset of terms for the main topic and DimSyns (in practice we have 
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finalized on 4 VRTs and 4 DimSyns, which are manageable quantities given technical 
constraints, though larger sets are feasible). 
6. Code the chosen terms (eg by a letter)  
7. Determine all possible combinations of the letters to be looked at (or combos as we also 
refer to them) with an n choose r approach. Hence, using four VRTs and one dymsyn 
for each category, making eight in total, we want letter combinations of, say, two from 
the larger set of eight terms (ie a set of bi terms: AC, BD, DC…). (With Excel combos 
are easily produced and filtered, and in this case of bi sets actually 16 usable 
combinations after filtering - see Chapter 4). The same process, if required, is done for 
the next r values of r=3 and r=4, tri and quad respectively.  
8. Find term frequencies for the sets of individual terms from chosen corpuses (ie for each 
VRT and DimSyn) with Nvivo or similar software. 
9. Having generated the letter (bi) combinations, their corresponding term combination 
frequency totals are calculated (again with an Excel utility and using the frequencies 
obtained in Stage 8). At this time we use simple multiplication but other combinatory 
approaches are theoretically feasible too. (Note that with very small frequency totals 
often obtained, it can be necessary to increase the totals by an exponent of 10, and 
which must be done for both conditions. This does not change the distribution of results 
across conditions – though may statistically - but allows them to be processed by 
utilities that would otherwise have problems carrying out the calculations – in effect it 
magnifies the result). 
10. The procedure is repeated for the second corpus dataset (therefore in this case giving us 
pre and post-crash combo result datasets).  
11. The corpus dataset results are graphed using a perceptual mapping approach. The 
corpus, therefore, consisting of two datasets (pre and post-crash), is portrayed on one 
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graphical output, allowing the observation of combos as a (time-based) split (at present, 
due to the uni-dimensional nature of the results part of the output is manually separated 
to give an exploded view for further examination, though it is hoped in the future to be 
an automatic process).  
12. The exploded view of the variable combinations are coloured – stained – according to 
their DimSyn (not their VRT) 
13. A simple eyeballing of the results, which are now in map form, provides a great deal of 
qualitative information, showing as it can any potential difference or movement of term 
combos between corpus datasets. But secondary analyses can also then be made to 
examine the distribution of colours (term combos) in more detail. This is particularly 
relevant when there are extensive results from multiple corpuses, and where narrative 
strips may be formed to easily view and understand more widespread differences or 
associations between these corpuses. 
14. The procedure is repeated for the next corpus (in practice this usually means repeating 
from Stage 8), and then so on for however many corpuses - and with their 
accompanying sub-datasets where appropriate – that there are under consideration. 
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Appendix 6 - Term combinationsa 
 
 Using 4-element set Using 8-element set 
Term1 bi, tri & quad2 bi tri quad 
 
1) c (customer) 
2) p1 (price) 
3) r (return)  
4) s (share) 
 
 
5) I (investor) 
 
6) m (manager) 
 
7) p2 (permanent) 
 
8) n (now) 
 
 
1) cp1 
2) cr 
3) cs 
4) p1r 
5) p1s 
6) rs 
7) cp1r 
8) crs 
9) cp1s 
10) p1rs 
11) cp1rs 
 
1) ci 
2) cm 
3) cp2 
4) cn 
5) p1i 
6) p1m 
7) p1p2 
8) p1n 
9) ri 
10) rm 
11) rp2 
12) rn 
13) si 
14) sm 
15) sp2 
16) sn 
 
1) cp1i 
 
2) cri 
 
3) csi 
 
4) p1ri 
 
5) p1si 
 
6) rsi 
 
7) cp1m 
 
8) crm 
 
9) csm 
 
10) p1rm 
 
11) p1sm 
 
12) rsm 
 
13) cp1p2 
 
14) crp2 
 
15) csp2 
 
16) p1rp2 
 
17) p1sp2 
 
18) rsp2 
 
29) cp1n 
 
20) crn 
 
21) csn 
 
22) p1rn 
 
23) p1sn 
 
24) rsn 
 
25) cim 
 
26) p1im 
 
27) rim 
 
28) sim 
 
29) cip2 
 
30) p1ip2 
 
31) rip2 
 
32) sip2 
 
33) cin 
 
34) p1in 
 
35) rin 
 
36) sin 
 
37) cmp2 
 
38) p1mp2 
 
39) rmp2 
 
40) smp2 
 
1) cp1im 
2) crim 
3) csim 
4) p1rim 
5) p1sim 
6) rsim 
7) cp1ip2 
8) crip2 
9) csip2 
10) p1rip2 
11) p1sip2 
12) rsip2 
13) cp1in 
14) crin 
15) csin 
16) p1rin 
17) p1sin 
18) rsin 
19) cp1mp2 
20) crmp2 
21) csmp2 
22) p1rmp2 
23) p1smp2 
24) rsmp2 
25) cp1mn 
26) crmn 
27) csmn 
28) p1rmn 
29) p1smn 
30) rsmn 
31) cp1p2n 
32) crp2n 
33) csp2n 
34) p1rp2n 
35) p1sp2n 
36) rsp2n 
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41) cmn 
 
42) p1mn 
 
43) rmn 
 
44) smn 
 
45) cp2n 
 
46) p1p2n 
 
47) rp2n 
 
48) sp2n 
 
 
 
1,2, 3, 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
aNotes: 
1Term and 4-element set columns shown for completeness – main study focuses only on 8-element set 
2Bi, tri & quad column (column 2) refers to coded terms without DimSyns; ie for a 4 element set 
3Term combinations for 4-element and 8-element sets based on n choose r approach. 
Coded term combinations 
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Appendix 7 - Filtering for term combinations1,2 
                                                          
1Coded term combos, automatically generated, showing exclusions for bi, tri and quad groups – main exclusions 
in yellow; with partials indicated where there is an additional red term to match with a black one - in the Quad 
column (eg first partial is C I M P2. I and M cancel, leaving C (customer) and P2 (permanent); hence 1 VRT and 1 
DimSyn). Bracketed terms refer to Set 2 VRTs used for alternate output. 
2Utility developed from source: http://www.get-digital-help.com/2015/02/26/return-all-combinations/#comment-
285532. 
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Appendix 8 - Preliminary term frequency analysis 
 
 
A frequency analysis of the twenty VRT’s for the corpus comprising the corporate and 
regulatory datasets was conducted (the corporate dataset containing annual reports and 
websites the regulatory dataset containing soft and hard law ie Codes and Acts and). These 
were examined in different ways (using their VRTs) to see how they compare pre and post-
crash (Figs 1, 2) and from an intra-corpus perspective pre and post-crash (see Appendices 9 
and 10).  
 
    
 
      Horizontal axis numbers refer to Excel reference numbers for each of the twenty VRTs1 
examined (see Chapter 4, Table 4.1). And as with all the frequency analyses in this part of the 
study, though there are minor differences in VRT usage, graphs tend to be similar. 
 
                                                          
1Note that the number for VRT ‘35’ does not display 
Fig 2 Fig 1 
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Corpus datasets compared: In comparing the regulatory and corporate datasets, however (Fig 
3 and Fig 4) what we find is that the bias towards the corporate dataset is enhanced for the 
particular VRTs seen diverging pre-crash and in fact extended to encompass others including 
numbers 25 - which appears to have switched prominence between the datasets - 32, and 34. 
Respectively these are: information, resource and share. Of particular note, then, is the 
increased divergence for the corporate dataset away from the regulatory dataset for the VRT’s 
considered. This is shown more clearly by the trend lines, and it suggests that while the 
frequency divergence is small there is perhaps a greater interest for these terms for companies 
post-crash. 
      
 
Term frequency combinations 
Initially considered was the 4-element set; comprising the terms: customer (c), price (p), share 
(s), and return (r), in product combinations of two as indicated in Table 4.4 (ie subsets =2), and 
referred to as bi combinations. The corporate and regulatory datasets were then analysed pre 
and post-crash for these combinations – as before these were examined in different ways to see 
how they compared, both in relation to each other and pre and post-crash as well as later for the 
Fig 3 Fig 4 
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‘tri’ and ‘quad’ combinations. Main intra-corpus examples are shown below with others in 
Appendix 8 and 9. Here it can begin to be seen that term combinations – or combos - are 
displaying as different within each of the two datasets pre and post-crash.1 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                          
1Note: for these graphs and the following ones including for the ‘quad’ terms, Figs 9 and 10 below, see also 
Appendix 4 for spreadsheet reference number term codes. 
Fig 5 
Fig 6 
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Comparable results were obtained when an inter-corpus analysis was carried out. 
 
         
 
 
      Having determined that something was occurring over time for combinations between the 
datasets – with some combos differentially favoured - next examined were 8-element sets, 
subset <=4, labelled as bi, tri and quad groups (see Appendix 6), and which along with the 
other four terms included: investor (i), manager (m), permanent (p2), now (n). 
      Examining graphs pre and post-crash for corporate and regulatory datasets, what appears to 
be happening is that there's no specific term variation pre and post-crash, except mildly so, for 
what is looked at (remember evaluations can only be made based on the specific set of terms; 
another set of terms could potentially produce a different outcome). However, in some cases 
there is a pulling away so that if a term combination use is demonstrated this tends to be more 
pronounced after the crash. This result occurred in a variety of instances where variables or 
method of analysis were altered slightly to investigate in more detail (eg focusing on 
combinations with a VRT bias v a DimSyn bias) and was observed to be a consistent finding. 
The effect was most pronounced on the quad term combinations. Here the vertical axis values 
Fig 7 Fig 8 
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are, Fig 9 and Fig 10, pre-crash 0.000005 v post-crash 0.00001; hence the frequencies are 
double.   
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      For the analyses in this group, terms per million are being looked at, so very small effects. 
But then again, this level of measurement is often used in corpus linguistic analysis. 
      It should be noted too that the Excel graph sets itself in relation to the biggest numbers. 
Hence, while some data points may be observed as flat, at this point in the examination of the 
data what was happening at a deeper level was not known, and whether there were differences 
that were significant but could not be seen. Subsequent analysis began to shed light on this. 
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Appendix 9 - Intra-corpus frequency analyses of VRTs for corporate and 
regulatory datasets 
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Appendix 10 – Intra-corpus combination frequency analyses on 8-element 
sets 
a) Intra-corpus combination frequency analysis on 8-element set for the combined 
corporate (website + annual report) datasets  
 
 
                
 
 
 
ci
p1i
si
0
5
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516
p
ro
d
u
ct
 f
/1
0
^6
ref number
Bi terms, combined 
corporate docs pre & post-
crash 
pre crash post crash
cp1i
csi
p1si
cmp2
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45
p
ro
d
u
ct
 f
/1
0
^6
ref number
Tri terms, combined 
corporate docs pre & 
post-crash
pre crash post crash
cp1im
csim
p1sim
cp1in
csin
p1sin
0
0.000002
0.000004
0.000006
0.000008
0.00001
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35
p
ro
d
u
ct
 f
/1
0
^6
ref number
Quad terms, combined corporate docs pre & 
post-crash
pre crash post crash
8 element set; combination subsets <=4 
Term reference codes: customer (c), price (p1), share (s), return (r), investor (i), manager (m), permanent 
(p2), now (n) 
i ii 
iii 
342 
 
Secondary analysis of tri terms ensuring at least two terms from either VRT or DimSyn groups. 
Note similarity of (iv) to (ii) above suggesting a great deal of the variance is due to the VRT 
component. 
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b) Intra-corpus combination frequency analysis on 8-element set for the combined 
regulatory (hard + soft law) datasets  
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Secondary analysis of tri terms ensuring at least two terms from either VRT or DimSyn groups. 
Note similarity of (v) to (ii) above suggesting a great deal of the variance is due to the DimSyn 
component. 
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Appendix 11 – Comparison of a basic combo bar graph with a perceptual 
mapa 
 
 
Standard graphing for observed biasing is found to have limitations. Available graphical 
utilities from Excel were able to visually highlight the overall direction of any biasing for a 
corpus (ie where there was a greater frequency of combo use - be it pre-Crash or post-Crash – 
it would plot on the relevant side of the graph, and hence would be considered a bias, as shown 
in Fig 1). The graph is therefore useful. For example, it can be observed in Fig 1, which is a 
plot of the Institute of Directors corpus, that certain combos like 3)cp2 (customer, permanent) 
and 7)p1p2 (price, permanent) are prevalent pre-crash while combos including 1)ci (customer, 
investor) and 2)cm (customer, manager) are prevalent post-crash. But it was nevertheless a 
method difficult to employ. 
 
aNotes: 
1. -ve values indicate pre-post direction not a numerical negative 
2. % is proportion of max (ie minimax calculation of pre and post-Crash frequency 
values)  
3. Set 1 terms used 
Fig 1: Institute of Directors (IOD) bar chart 
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     The combo codes, it was found, had to be manually constructed into a list in Word and then 
superimposed over the bar chart in Excel, lining it up to display in the central position. 
Matching the codes to the bars also had to be done manually. With the intention, too, of 
moving to analyse tri and quad results, the method while effective to some extent, and with 
more work could be used as the preliminary data input for the narrative strip, was found to be 
impractical. Other secondary analyses, ie matrix analysis, would have been similarly 
problematic. 
       
 
 
         It may be observed how the colours are distributed in exactly the same way in both Fig 1 
and Fig 2, even though data is handled differently in each case: the bar chart in Fig 1 is a 
display of a minimax analysis and the positioning map in Fig 2 is a normalized frequency 
analysis. However, labelling, is difficult in Excel; there is more physical flexibility and space 
in the positioning map, which also allows for deconstruction of the terms with the colour 
coding applied. Albeit the initial part of the deconstruction is done manually the map is a much 
more straightforward method that can similarly be easily applied to multiple corpus data.  
Fig 2: IOD positioning map 
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Appendix 12 - Comparison of analyses between utilities MEXL and 
XLSTAT  
 
 
 
Positioning Map (Dim l-ll), CPS, bi, Set 1, no filterPositio ing Map (Dim l-ll), CPS, bi, Set 1, no filterPositioning Map (Dim l-ll), CPS, bi, Set 1, no filter
Fig 1. MEXL plot for CPS (Centre for Policy Studies) 
Fig 2. XLSTAT plot for CPS (Centre for Policy Studies) 
1. Note how variables for the XLSTAT graph, in 
producing a uni-dimensional plot, are generated 
along the horizontal line (labels and connecting 
lines have been added), whereas for MEXL the 
variables themselves are in manually exploded 
positions from two single masses. 
 
2. Axis values refer to variance - though for narrative 
staining with two conditions somewhat redundant 
3. Results do not always generate with complete 
comparability between utilities – most likely due to 
low variance values - and further work is required to 
set down rules. 
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A basic 2D plot for primary 
corpuses (corporate and 
regulatory) pre and post-Crash. 
Though colour clusters can be 
seen with XLSTAT and the 
utility is a useful tool, it is 
nevertheless difficult to pick up 
slight variations in data or to 
relate these to the pre and post-
Crash conditions. The problem is 
similarly observable with MEXL 
(as indicated in Fig 3; see also 
Results: Fig 4.13 for a 
comparison). Though as 
explained in the Method, MEXL 
is more manipulable. 
 
Note, even with slight variations 
in utility output, the important 
aspect of how the combos as a 
whole in both utility results are 
clustering closest to the corporate 
corpuses.  
In reality, this level of analysis is 
inappropriate as it is showing the 
relative favouring of the combos 
to a particular corpus – which is 
why it is useful for marketing and 
brand analysis (XLSTAT also 
presents users with a significance 
test value which is confusing and 
unlikely to be relevant to this 
kind of  qualitative investigation). 
Hence, to demonstrate bias for 
multiple stakeholder 
organizations, the need to 
deconstruct to a uni-dimensional 
graph as done with the narrative 
staining approach, and as 
highlighted in Figs 1 and 2 
above, which can then be 
subjected to secondary analysis. 
 
 
Fig 3. MEXL plot for primary corpuses (uncoloured) 
Fig 4. XLSTAT plot for primary corpuses (coloured) 
The following graphs are shown only for completeness and to demonstrate similar scaling issues if 
using a conventional (multivariate positioning, correspondence or associated analytical) approach. 
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Fig 5. MEXL plot for Group A corpuses (uncoloured) 
Fig 6. XLSTAT plot for Group A corpuses (connecting lines omitted due to 
complexity; coloured) 
A basic 2D plot for Group A 
corpuses (corp, reg, FSA, FT, 
Newspapers, CPS) pre and post-
Crash. Though colour clusters 
can be seen with XLSTAT and 
the utility is a useful tool, it is 
nevertheless difficult to pick up 
slight variations in data or to 
relate these to the pre and post-
Crash conditions. The problem is 
similarly observable with MEXL 
(as indicated in Fig 5). Though as 
explained in the Method, MEXL 
is more manipulable. 
Note, similarly to above, even 
with slight variations in utility 
output, the important aspect of 
how the combos as a whole in 
both utility results are clustering 
closest to similar corpuses – and 
away from others eg FSA, CPS.  
In reality, this level of analysis is 
inappropriate as it is showing the 
relative favouring of the combos 
to a particular corpus – which is 
why it is useful for marketing and 
brand analysis (XLSTAT also 
presents users with a significance 
test value which is confusing and 
unlikely to be relevant to this 
kind of  qualitative investigation). 
Hence, to demonstrate bias for 
multiple stakeholder 
organizations, the need to 
deconstruct to a uni-dimensional 
graph as done with the narrative 
staining approach, and as 
highlighted in Figs 1 and 2 
above, which can then be 
subjected to secondary analysis. 
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Appendix 13 - Correlations results for primary corpuses 
This analysis addresses Q3, and its subsidiary questions Q3a and Q3b.1.It thus looks at the 
regulatory corpus and its sub-corpuses against the corporate corpus and its sub-corpuses. 
 
   
  Correlations (bi only,  
  and using Set 1) 
  Corp Total      Corp ARs     Corp WSs 
 
Soft law -0.146544        0.053332 -0.31563  
Hard law -0.300204          -0.3002 -0.1189  
Soft law + Hard law -0.174066        -0.13951 -0.21724  
    
 
    
 
Correlations (bi only, 
and using Set 2)    
 
  Corp Total Corp ARs Corp WSs 
 
Soft law 0.8266931 0.468166 0.613597  
Hard law 0.8551164 0.460398 0.822518  
Soft law + Hard law 0.91908 0.444577 0.768401  
 
    
 
Correlations (bi, tri 
and quad 
together2, and using 
Set 1)     
 Corp Total Corp ARs Corp WSs 
Soft law -0.139559 0.09698 -0.23124 
Hard law -0.084393 -0.22928 -0.02849 
Soft law + Hard law 0.03650883 -0.05091 0.015832 
    
    
Correlations (bi, tri 
and quad 
together, and using 
Set 2)    
 Corp Total Corp ARs Corp WSs 
Soft law 0.6805128 0.530884 0.474162 
Hard law 0.6851087 0.491164 0.725084 
Soft law + Hard law 0.7821451 0.460308 0.719546 
    
                                                          
1Highlighted figures in yellow indicate fairly strong to strong significant correlations (>0.6), and where it may be 
noted how using Set 2 VRTs seems to be the source of the strong total correlations, though it seems driven largely 
by websites. 
2The bi, tri, and quad correlations use a larger sequence of combos for verification than with bi combos alone. 
3Highlighted figure in blue is the non-significant correlation in answer to Q1, though as discussed in Chapter 6 
looking at Set 1 alone provides only a limited answer as Set 2 has stronger correlations. 
     
Set 1 refers to VRT-1 
(customer, price, return, 
share). 
Set 2 refers to VRT-2 
(equity, pay, performance, 
strategy). 
DimSyns = primacy, 
temporal (termism).  
Soft law = Combined Code 
2003, Corporate 
Governance Code 2012, 
Stewardship Code 2012. 
Hard law = Companies Act 
2006, Companies Act 2006 
- with amendments and 
notes 2015.  
Corp Total = Corporate 
annual reports and websites 
together for twenty FT250 
companies. 
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 Appendix 14 - Comparing bi, tri and quad levels of analysis 
 
 
   
 
 
As a variety of mapping assessments were carried out, a degree of similarity of the colour 
clustering distributions for a particular corpus was consistently observed whatever level was 
considered. This observation was based not only on the corporate and regulatory corpus 
datasets but also for the other ten peripheral stakeholder corpuses examined.  
      To explore this further the minimax difference values (see Chapter 5, Table 5.1) were taken 
for the corporate bi set and ranked. This was repeated for the tri and quad sets. As illustrated in 
the following graphs, there is a high degree of similarity to the shapes (Fig 1: a, b, c). The 
analysis was repeated with the regulatory corpus (as well as out of curiosity for the quint level - 
combinations of five from an eight-element set), and the effect was confirmed (Fig 1: d, e, f, g). 
Though each corpus has its own distinct shape for the combos examined (ie Figs 1: a, b and c 
approximate a straight line; Figs 1: d, e, f, and g a more serpentine form), whatever level is 
looked at it can be predicted that the distribution of combos will be similar. The reason this 
likely occurs is because tri sets contain bi sets and quad sets contain tri and bi sets, and so on if 
larger sets are used. And the combo frequencies are calculated in the same way for all the sets 
(note that correlations can be calculated in theory as well here to show association between 
levels, but some of the datasets are of different sizes so making it largely unfeasible). 
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      This effect does not mean that deeper tri and quad levels of analysis are unimportant, on 
the contrary they can flesh out a more detailed and richer assessment of the distributions. They 
are also useful for providing additional combo content to differentiate when more than one 
time period is assessed, which is to say with more complex analyses. But for the purposes of 
this research the bi level of analysis is found to provide sufficient information from which to 
assess any possible perceptual bias, and the focus is therefore on this level. Having said that, 
this assumption of predictability can only be made using the multiplicative approach to 
forming combos that have been chosen; another approach if taken would need to be assessed 
for this assumption. Due to the technical limitations of the utilities at the disposal of this 
investigation, so that a great deal of manual input is required to obtain the results, it does, 
though, make the work that much easier. 
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Set 1, bi, positioning mapsa 
    
   
                                                          
aNotes:  
1. Note change of pre and post-crash orientation for some of the maps, which is the result of the way the utility 
handles the data (in the main body of the document for the primary corpuses this has been manually altered into 
the correct orientation for ease of assessment where required). It can be further noted that this is a characteristic of 
many utilities produced by different vendors. 
2. Due to the reduced sizes of the maps below, to magnify press ctrl-key and scroll mouse wheel. 
3. All maps are uni-dimensional. 
Positioning Map (Dim l-ll), CBI, bi, Set 1, no filter
CBI (pre) CBI (post)
Positioning Map (Dim l-ll), CIMA, bi, Set 1, no filter
Positioning Map (Dim l-ll), CPS, bi, Set 1, no filter
Appendix 15 - Perceptual maps for peripheral stakeholder organizationsa 
 
The following maps for the ten secondary stakeholder corpuses show bi combo results by Set. 
 Set constituents: 
Set 1. VRT-1: ‘customer’, ‘price’, ‘return’, ‘share’; DimSyns-termism (long-term / ‘permanent’, short-term / ‘now’); 
DimSyns-primacy (shareholder / ‘investor’, stakeholder / ‘manager’) 
Set 2. VRT-2: ‘equity’, ‘pay’, ‘performance’, ‘strategy’; DimSyns-termism (long-term / ‘permanent’, short-term / ‘now’); 
DimSyns-primacy (shareholder / ‘investor’, stakeholder / ‘manager’) 
Set 3. VRT-1: ‘customer’, ‘price’, ‘return’, ‘share’; DimSyns-sense of urgency (urgency-to-reorientate / ‘action’, non-
urgency-to-reorientate / ‘efficient’); DimSyns-primacy (shareholder / ‘investor’, stakeholder / ‘manager’) 
Set 4. VRT-2: ‘equity’, ‘pay’, ‘performance’, ‘strategy’; DimSyns-sense of urgency (urgency-to-reorientate / ‘action’, non-
urgency-to-reorientate / ‘efficient’); DimSyns-primacy (shareholder / ‘investor’, stakeholder / ‘manager’) 
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Positioning Map (Dim l-ll), FT, bi, Set 1, no filter
FT (pre)FT (post)
Positioning Map (Dim l-ll), IOD, bi, Set 1, no filter
Positioning Map (Dim l-ll), ICSA, bi, Set 1, no filter Positioning Map (Dim l-ll), IPPR-T, bi, Set 1, no filter
Positioning Map (Dim l-ll), TUC, bi, Set 1, no filter
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Set 2, bi, positioning maps 
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Set 3, bi, positioning maps 
      Note, same colours have been used here as in Set 1 and Set 2 - ‘sense of urgency’ variables are action (orange), and efficient  
      (purple) 
 
   
   
   
Positioning Map (Dim l-ll), CBI, bi, Set 3, no filter
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Set 4, bi, positioning maps 
         Note, colours for ‘sense of urgency’ variables are action (red), and efficient (lilac) 
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Appendix 16 – Data matrices for secondary analyses of VRTs  
Set 1 to Set 4 matrices (bi, no filter) – for the assessment of financial v non-financial 
terms in primary corpuses 
 
Non-financial = return, customer 
Financial = price, share 
ST = short-term, LT = long-term, ShP = shareholder primacy, StP = stakeholder primacy,  
   a = action, e2 = efficiency 
1 = pre-crash, 2 = post-crash 
 
 
Set 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Set 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corp-AR (Set 1)
VRT ST1 LT1 ShP1 StP1 ST2 ST2 ShP2 StP2
return 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
customer 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
price 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
share 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Pre Post
reg (Set 1)
VRT ST1 LT1 ShP1 StP1 ST2 ST2 ShP2 StP2
return 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
customer 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
price 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
share 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Pre (1) Post (2)
Corp-AR (Set 2)
VRT ST1 LT1 ShP1 StP1 ST2 LT2 ShP2 StP2
performance 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
strategy 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
equity 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
pay 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
reg (Set 2)
VRT ST1 LT1 ShP1 StP1 ST2 LT2 ShP2 StP2
performance 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
strategy 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
equity 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
pay 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Pre (1) Post (2)
Pre (1) Post (2)
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Set 3 
 
 
Set 4 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1For additional visualization techniques using categorical data (though generally not binary) see work by Michael 
Friendly: http://www.math.yorku.ca/SCS/friendly.html ; http://www.datavis.ca/ 
Corp-AR (Set 3)
VRT a1 e2-1 ShP1 StP1 a2 e2-2 ShP2 StP2
return 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
customer 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
price 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
share 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
reg (Set 3)
VRT a1 e2-1 ShP1 StP1 a2 e2-2 ShP2 StP2
return 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
customer 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
price 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
share 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
Pre (1) Post (2)
Pre Post
Corp-AR (Set 4)
VRT a1 e2-1 ShP1 StP1 a2 e2-2 ShP2 StP2
performance 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
strategy 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
equity 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
pay 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
reg (Set 4)
VRT a1 e2-1 ShP1 StP1 a2 e2-2 ShP2 StP2
performance 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
strategy 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
equity 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
pay 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
Pre (1) Post (2)
Pre (1) Post (2)
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Appendix 17 – Data matrices for alignment graph generation 
 
The example data matrices are formed from narrative strip overlay data to generate alignment 
graphs for secondary analysis of the narrative strip 
 
These matrices refer to Chapter 4, Section 4.7.2, and are for the Set 1 analysis. Mean values 
were calculated based on the number of corpuses required to be looked at together. The 
procedure allows the formation of Groups A, B and C. Note, where there is a red corner marker 
this indicates that the value had to be manually altered slightly to allow the graph to display the 
separate plot lines – otherwise they obscure each other.  
 
Group A              Group B 
     
   
Group C 
 
 
 
Group constituents 
G-A: corp, reg, FSA, FT, News-gen, CPS 
G-B: CBI, CIMA, ICSA, IOD 
G-C: IPPR-Total, TUC  
 
 
S1,G-A (/6) Pre Crash Post Crash
VRT-shareholder 1.167 2.667
VRT- stakeholder 2.667 1.333
VRT-short-term 3 0.833
VRT-long-term 1.333 2.667
S1,G-B (/4) Pre Crash Post Crash
VRT-shareholder 2.25 0.75
VRT- stakeholder 1.28 2.28
VRT-short-term 1.25 2.25
VRT-long-term 1.75 1
S1,G-C (/2) Pre Crash Post Crash
VRT-shareholder 0 2
VRT- stakeholder 0.1 4.1
VRT-short-term 0 4
VRT-long-term 0.2 4.2
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Appendix 18 - Radar graphs for a twelve-stakeholder corpus analysed by set  
The graphs show a pre-Crash bias for non-financial VRT’s (light blue) moving to a post-Crash bias for 
financial VRT’s (dark blue) in all cases, even though graph ‘a’ appears ambiguous (see also Chapter 5, 
Section 5.4.4 for further clarification).a 
 
     
 
     
 
.  
 
 
   
                                                          
a1. Note that while visually impactful, where these graphs have a dominant edge (as in the lower left quadrants) 
the degree of overlap (ie bias) is obscured. 
2. ‘Cluster 4’ = a 12-stakeholder corpus 
a b 
c d 
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 Appendix 19 – Cross-corpus table of results for research questions and    
 hypotheses 
 
 
  
Research Questions and Hypotheses Supported (✓) or not Supported (x), Summary 
Table, for Primary and Peripheral Stakeholder Corpuses1 
 
Corp
-uses 
 
   
Set 
type 
 
 
Q1 
(primacy) 
 
 
Q2.i 
(termism) 
 
 
 
Q2.ii 
(SofU) 
 
H1a 
 
(primacy 
/term.) 
 
H1b 
 
(primacy 
/term.) 
 
H2a 
(primacy 
/SofU) 
 
H2b 
 
(primacy 
/SofU) 
   
H1c 
(primacy 
/term.) 
   
H1d 
(primacy 
/term.) 
   
H2c 
(primacy 
/SofU) 
   
H2d 
(primacy 
/SofU) 
  Diff Diff Diff Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Corp. Set 1 ✓ ✓  x x   x ✓   
 Set 2 ✓ ✓  x x   x x   
 Set 3 ✓  ✓   x x   x x 
 Set 4 ✓  ✓   x x   x x 
Reg. Set 1 x ✓  x x   x x   
 Set 2 ✓ ✓  x x   x x   
 Set 3 x  ✓   x x   x x 
 Set 4 ✓  x   x x   x x 
FSA Set 1 ✓ ✓  x x       
 Set 2 ✓ ✓  x x       
 Set 3 ✓  ✓   x x     
 Set 4 ✓  ✓   x x     
FT Set 1 ✓ ✓  x x       
 Set 2 x ✓  x x       
 Set 3 ✓  ✓   x x     
 Set 4 x  ✓   x x     
News
-gen 
Set 1 ✓ ✓  x x       
 Set 2 ✓ x  x x       
 Set 3 ✓  ✓   x x     
 Set 4 ✓  ✓   x x     
CPS Set 1 ✓ ✓  x x       
 Set 2 ✓ ✓  x x       
 Set 3 ✓  ✓   x ✓     
 Set 4 ✓  ✓   x x     
CBI Set 1 ✓ ✓  x x       
 Set 2 ✓ ✓  x x       
 Set 3 ✓  ✓   x      
 Set 4 ✓  ✓   ✓ ✓     
CIMA Set 1 ✓ ✓  ✓ x       
 Set 2 ✓ ✓  x x       
 Set 3 ✓  ✓   x x     
 Set 4 ✓  ✓   ✓ ✓     
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aNotes: 
1. Diff = pre to post-crash difference ie change over time 
2. Area coloured pink, under H1c – H2d concerning the use of financial v non-financial 
VRT’s, refers to peripheral stakeholder organizations where - other than the primary 
corpuses - were only analysed as groups, not individually (see Table 5.3 in Section 
5.4.4.iib; Appendix 18 for alternate radar graphs of 12-stakeholder corpus). 
3. term = termism; SofU = sense of urgency 
4. Q3 not included (see Appendix 13) 
 CIMA Set 1 ✓ ✓  ✓ x       
 Set 2 ✓ ✓  x x       
 Set 3 ✓  ✓   x x     
 Set 4 ✓  ✓   ✓ ✓     
ICSA Set 1 ✓ ✓  x x       
 Set 2 ✓ ✓  x x       
 Set 3 ✓  ✓   x x     
 Set 4 ✓  ✓   x x     
IOD Set 1 x ✓  x x       
 Set 2 ✓ ✓  x x       
 Set 3 x  ✓   x x     
 Set 4 ✓  ✓   x x     
IPPR-
T 
Set 1 ✓ ✓  x x       
 Set 2 ✓ ✓  x x       
 Set 3 ✓  ✓   x x     
 Set 4 ✓  ✓   x x     
TUC Set 1 ✓ ✓  x x       
 Set 2 ✓ x  x x       
 Set 3 ✓  ✓   x ✓     
 Set 4 ✓  ✓   x ✓     
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Appendix 20 - Secondary Corpus Organizational Profiles1,2  
 
 
 
 
 
Group A  
 
1. The Financial Services Authority (FSA)  
The FSA was a body set up by the British Government in December 2001 to regulate the 
financial services industry in the UK. 
      Under the terms of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 the FSA promoted four 
statutory objectives which, according to its website, were: “market confidence – maintaining 
confidence in the UK financial system; financial stability - contributing to the protection and 
enhancement of stability of the UK financial system; consumer protection; and reducing the 
extent to which it is possible for a regulated business to be used for a purpose connected with 
financial crime. “ It also has secondary objectives of providing accountability and transparency 
– eg rule-making and guidance had to be seen to be in line with their statutory objectives. 
      The FSA supported these activities through the application of a set of ‘principles of good 
regulation’ concerning which it stated, ‘we must have regard to when discharging our 
functions’. It pursued common standards setting, and the development of methods to monitor 
global firms and markets through dialogue and the formation of good relationships with 
overseas regulators. 
      The FSA has been superseded (April 1, 2013), by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). 
 
                                                          
1Secondary corpuses only; ie excluding primary corporate and regulatory domains for Group A 
2For all profiles, main sources include the respective organizational website and Wikipedia. 
369 
 
2. The Financial Times (FT) 
The FT is the UK’s leading daily business and finance newspaper. The paper covers the latest 
business, market, economic and political stories, with reports, columns by regular contributors, 
and opinion pieces. The FT provides its readers with a section specifically on financial data, 
including stock prices by sector, indices such as the FT100, as well as news about different 
capital markets and the latest news items from a variety of companies and the people who work 
there or run them. In addition to financial news the FT has TV listings, weather reports, the 
occasional article on non-financial topics, and a monthly magazine, How to Spend it – a 
lifestyle magazine on expensive homes, yachts, clothes, cars, and luxury items. While it 
concentrates on the UK its coverage is worldwide.  
      Importantly for the present research it can be noted that the FT’s editorial position is for 
promoting globalization and free markets. The FT is generally a Conservative leaning 
newspaper. 
 
3. Newspapers (General) 
Several different general newspapers are combined and analysed, including The Times, Sunday 
Times, Daily Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph, and The Guardian. 
 
i) The Times and Sunday Times. Considered ‘quality newspapers’ and aimed at a general 
readership; though it has a history and cultural persona of being seen as an elite paper. In 
actuality ABC1 classification on the NRS (national readership survey) social grades system 
places the Times’s readership as being largely middle class, including upper middle. 
      Its political stance is historically Conservative and many of its journalists follow this line, 
although there have been columnists with labour affiliations who have written for the paper 
too, such as Oliver Kamm, David Aaronovitch and Jenni Rusell.  
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ii) The Telegraph and Sunday Telegraph. Considered ‘quality newspapers’ for a general UK 
readership. This largely includes readers of the middle classes (NRS grade ABC1) but to some 
extent also working class individuals (NRS grade C2DE). The Political stance of the Telegraph 
and Sunday Telegraph is staunchly Conservative, with its loyalty tending to be right wing with 
respect to party activism. Their wholehearted support for the Conservatives has been satirized 
by the magazine, Private Eye, who labelled the paper Torygraph! 
 
iii) The Guardian. Considered a ‘quality newspaper’ it has a middle class readership segment 
(ABC1) though other social group sub-segments are represented too. However, according to a 
MORI pole taken in 2005, 48 percent of readers at the time were Labour supporters and 34 
percent were Liberal Democrats. The paper’s political stance is as a result considered left of 
centre, and very supportive of the Labour Party. At times, though, its writers have also 
supported the policies of the Liberal Democrats. Editors and journalists have occasionally 
taken a more radical, politically-correct, leftist position on a variety of issues. 
      For some readers the paper is understood to constitute an integral part of their left-leaning, 
middle-class activism. They may be described pejoratively, however, as ‘Guardian reader’ or 
‘Guardianista’. 
       
4. The Centre for Policy Studies  
The CPS is a think tank focusing on the development of free market principles in order to 
establish a society for Britain that is less state dependent; aiming to curb regulation that would 
stifle business creativity, as well as curb taxes that act as a disincentive to work or the 
attracting of investment. Similarly, to give people the opportunity to choose the type of public 
policy provision they can access and reducing state monopolies so that new providers can enter 
a market. In turn this is expected to positively feed into the money supply. Broadly speaking 
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the CPS addresses societal concerns in the areas of: the economy, the family, energy, public 
services, prison services, drug use, and media broadcasting where public funds are at issue. 
      The CPS was founded in 1974 by Margaret Thatcher, Alfred Sherman and Sir Keith 
Joseph. With its historical links to the Conservative Party and its economic liberalist ideology, 
the CPS may not be as non-partisan as it might often portray itself. 
      It advocates through its activities – including publications and speeches - and high-profile 
relationships with politicians  
 
Group B 
 
1. The Confederation of British Industry  
The CBI is a leading UK representative body of employers at both a national and international 
level that works to further the aims of British business. Currently it has over 800 members and 
represents in excess of 190,000 businesses from FT100 companies to privately owned 
businesses, trade associations, universities and other public bodies. Its motto is ‘The Voice of 
Business’. About one third of all private sector employees, about 7 million people, fall under 
its purview.  
      The CBI formulates responses to the changing landscape of industry and the factors 
affecting it. It then supports and advises its members in this regard so that they may plan ahead 
and develop. It thus represents member views with policymakers with the aim of creating a 
business environment where companies can succeed, create jobs and ‘ultimately, drive 
economic growth and prosperity’, as its website explains. As a major lobbyist it seeks as well 
to ‘shape pro-enterprise policies’ with government that companies require in order to locate 
opportunities and make it easier for businesses of all types to trade with less restriction, with 
everyone able to benefit and prosper. However, this liberalism is business influenced not 
ideological. And in that context it is a not-for-profit, non-political organization. 
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2. The Chartered Institute of Management Accountants  
CIMA is the professional body for management accountancy in the UK, has a stated 
mission ‘to help people and businesses succeed in the public and private sectors.’ The CBI 
is interested in promoting the interests of its members in order to create a successful 
business environment to ‘ultimately, drive economic growth and prosperity’. 
      CIMA thus seeks to promote and develop the management accounting profession, as well 
as ensure businesses get a high level of accounting expertise. This it does through encouraging 
students to become management accountants to gain CIMA accreditation through its qualifying 
exams, and standard-setting to ensure good practice in a corporate and organizational context. 
Membership is directed at those accountants working in companies and industry where the 
body’s professional objectives can be furthered.  
 
3. The Institute of Company Secretaries and Administrators  
ICSA is a professional organization but one focusing on the development of good corporate 
governance through the development of the necessary skills company secretaries require to 
that end. ICSA is a not-for-profit does and not promote a political position, stating on its 
website that ‘we are impartial, independent and informed’. 
      ICSA supplies support and resources in such areas as the development of director’s 
duties. It also produces consultation papers and research (including on the Charity 
Commission, The Takeover Panel and the FSA), guidance notes (including on competition 
law and risk management), and compliance information. Further, it provides training, 
guidance and qualifications through certification and post-qualification courses, 
ICSA also train, advise, and work with policy-makers and regulators to improve 
governance standards of leadership, accountability and corporate behaviour in the broader 
UK industry as well as internationally.  
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4. Institute of Directors  
The IOD is a representative body focusing on the business needs and development of 
corporate and business leaders. According to its mission statement the IOD stands for: ‘free 
enterprise, entrepreneurialism, wealth creation and good corporate governance’. It is 
believed that around ‘seventy-eight per cent of FTSE 100 companies currently have an IOD 
member on their board or in a senior management position’. 
      The IOD aims to make business leaders better at their role. It acts as a business 
information and (confidential) advisory and guidance service on the different elements of 
running a successful business; training and mentoring members on different aspects of 
board development. it represents ‘the views of businesses and IOD members in the media 
and with government.’; campaigns to the public and government for a policy of effective 
business and entrepreneurial activity; and the promoting of responsible business practice for 
the benefit of the business community and society as a whole. 
 
Group C 
 
1. The Institute of Public Policy Research  
The IPPR is a left of centre political thinktank, and producing thought-led reports. It 
describes itself as independent and as ‘the UK’s leading progressive thinktank.’ 
Historically, it had close ties to the Labour Party with trustees including former Labour 
leader Neil Kinnock and TUC Deputy Secretary General, Frances O’Grady (in this context 
it was criticized in 2015 by the Charity Commission for being supportive of Labour Party 
policy rather than remaining independent). 
      The IPPR is concerned with affecting change in areas that it terms ‘the big issues’. 
Currently these include: the economy, jobs and skills, housing, political reform, welfare, 
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children and families, health and social care, immigration, tax and spending, schools, crime and 
justice, energy and climate change. 
 
2. The Trades Union Congress  
The TUC is a national umbrella organisation for affiliated unions – in essence a federation 
of unions in England and Wales representing the interests of around 5.8 million workers. It 
is, according to its website, ‘the voice of Britain at work’, with an aim of improving the 
quality of working life and creating equality for everyone - occasionally against difficult 
employers. It also campaigns on issues such as health and safety, as well as disability 
discrimination in the workplace,  
      There are presently 51 unions affiliated to the TUC; though this number has historically 
tended to reduce over time as smaller unions with few members are merged into larger 
ones. Approximately half of the TUC union membership is through UNISON and UNITE, 
the largest and second largest British unions respectively.  
      While there is no actual official link between the TUC and the Labour Party, many of its 
members are drawn from TUC affiliated unions. The TUC also seeks the more long-term aim 
of a socialist transformation of society, and thus to create greater equality. As a consequence 
the TUC has at times taken a highly militant stance against corporate leadership and 
government. In part this was due to the fact that its Trades Councils were often headed by 
militant and communist-influenced lay activists. 
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Appendix 21 - The impact of mission statement narrative on financial 
performance 
 
 
 
 
To examine in a basic form the corpus constituent’s financial performance, the mission 
statements of seventeen companies in the corpus were reviewed (Table 2) to compare them 
with how these companies actually performed over time. This was an additional analysis to the 
main investigation. The question was whether narrative (reflected in MSs) and with particular 
reference to primacy orientation bore at all on financial performance?  
      In fact it does seem that some companies who stressed a shareholder focus achieved greater 
returns if one compares them pre to post-Crash (Table 1), though findings are far from 
uniform.  
      Croda, for example, led with an adjusted rise of 881.25% over the period. Pre-Crash its 
emphasis is squarely on innovation but post-Crash it focuses much more on shareholders 
(‘…we strive to create value for our shareholders by…’. While with Bodycote, looking more 
deeply at the terminology, we see that pre-Crash its primary emphasis is: ‘To provide world 
class companies with metallurgical and testing services that make a positive contribution to the 
success of their businesses’. The company does also want: ‘To earn sustainable profits which 
attract shareholder interest’, but it is not featured as the primary aim. Post-crash, however, 
greater prominence is given to its goal: ‘to create superior shareholder returns through the 
provision of selected thermal processing services that are highly valued by our customers’. The 
language has changed from being focused on the contribution Bodycote can make to its 
customers’ businesses to the provision of a service which can be leveraged as customers will 
then value it more. Notable too are the handling of their employees and to a  
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Table 1: Share prices for corporate corpus constituents, pre and post-Crasha 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
aNotes: 
1. Earliest date available for data: 10th Feb 2006 for QQ; 2nd July 2004 for VEC 
2. Adjusted prices are prices adjusted for dividends and splits 
3. AA, AO, Sophos and PZ Cussons not included due to insufficient data for one or both periods 
4. LSE ticker symbols shown in table without suffix ‘.L’ for looking up, eg AMFW is AMFW.L 
5. Source: Yahoo Finance historical stock prices (eg, https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=AMFW.L) 
Company name  
(and LSE ticker 
symbol) 
1 June 
2004 share 
price 
1 June 
2012 share 
price 
% 
change 
1 June 
2004 
adjusted 
share 
price 
1 June 
2012 
adjusted2 
share 
price 
Adjusted2
% change 
Amec (AMFW) 273 967 254.21 178.3 783.11 339.21 
Bodycote (BOY) 157.5 354.6 125.14 192.23 321.05 67.01 
BTG (BTG) 108 376.7 248.80 108 376.7 248.80 
Cairn Energy (CNE) 555.45 289.7 -47.84 173.54 289.7 66.94 
Croda (CRDA) 285.75 2255 689.15 213.65 2096.43 881.25 
Electrocomponents 
(ECM)  
357 202.7 -43.22 165.33 159.87 -3.30 
Greene king (GNK) 3263.78 481.2 -85.26 957.11 401.51 -58.05 
Michael Page Int. / 
Page Group (PAGE) 
179 365 103.91 135.1 326.14 141.41 
National Express 
(NEX) 
350.17 184 -47.45 188.79 154.6 -18.11 
Pennon (PNN) 6416.1 738.5 -88.49 1411.96 595.29 -57.84 
Qinetiq (QQ) *198.25 153 -22.82 *157.25 137.24 -12.72 
Rank Group (RNK) 208.12 118 -43.30 133 103.56 -22.14 
Redrow (RDW) 274.59 112 -59.21 207.68 106.18 -48.87 
Tate & Lyle (TATE) 330 643 94.85 184.22 525.53 185.27 
UDG Healthcare 
(UDG) 
280 176.5 -36.96 221.56 158.4 -28.51 
Vectura (VEC) 57.51 65 13.04 57.51 65 13.04 
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lesser extent their greater emphasis post-Crash on corporate citizenship. But its post-Crash 
adjusted percentage change has in fact risen only by 67.01%. 
      Other companies like Amec with an adjusted rise of 339.21% and BTG with 248.80%, 
apparently show little change in primacy focus. And with Cairn, pre-Crash its aim is 
‘maximizing the value of discovery’, while post-crash its aim is ‘discovering hidden value.’ 
Here it can be argued that the change has been to move from a more abstract rationale of the 
company’s purpose, in this case that of discovery, to one stressing there is something valuable 
that can be found and when discovered can be leveraged. Cairn shows an adjusted rise over the 
period of 66.94%. Perhaps this comparatively small increase could be attributed to the fact 
there are sub-statements for each time period that are very similar in their focus on shareholder 
value. But it is not a given. 
      Meanwhile Greene King with a somewhat mixed post-Crash primacy focus falls with an 
adjusted change of -58.05. And Pennon, appearing to have a shareholder focus both pre and 
Post-Crash, falls with an adjusted change of -57.84%.  
      Interpretations are therefore not clear cut. Indeed, there could be a variety of reasons for the 
findings besides the assumption of some kind of simple linear relationship between mission 
statement elements and performance (whatever the primacy orientation) – time horizon 
companies use in strategic planning being one. There also appears to be no way to forecast the 
level of the effect these possible performance-related elements might have. For example, we 
could not know in advance that Croda would outperform other companies also stressing a 
shareholder focus. The tenuous nature of going too far in stressing a particular primacy 
orientation is another factor to bear in mind within this context too. These sorts of points must 
therefore be taken into account in examining this type of material. 
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          Table 2: Comparison of Corporate Mission Statements, Pre to     
            Post-Crasha 
 
Company Pre-Crash Post-Crash 
Amec …design, deliver and support 
infrastructure   – from local technical 
services to international landmark 
projects 
 
…total life of asset services and project 
delivery to clients in the international oil 
and gas industry 
 
Across the world responsibly for the long 
term 
…provide [our] people with the technical expertise 
to support our customers as they build, operate or 
decommission their assets. 
 
AMEC’s vision is that by continually delivering 
excellence, we inspire trust and loyalty in our 
customers. (v) 
Bodycote • To provide world class companies with 
metallurgical and testing services that 
make a positive contribution to the 
success of their businesses. 
• To earn sustainable profits which attract 
shareholder interest. 
• To engage, develop and retain 
competent people, harness their 
enthusiasm and inspire them to excel. 
• To act as a good corporate citizen. 
Bodycote’s objective is to create superior 
shareholder returns through the provision of 
selected thermal processing services that are highly 
valued by our customers, giving full regard to a safe 
working environment for our employees and 
minimal environmental impact. 
 
As a group, Bodycote is committed to acting 
responsibly as a good corporate citizen, to reducing 
the environmental impact of the Group’s activities 
and to providing our employees with a safe working 
environment. 
BTG The Company’s mission is to identify 
opportunities for therapeutic advances in 
the treatment of neurologic and 
psychiatric disorders, and to license and 
develop compounds that can meet these 
needs. 
Our mission is to bring to market medical products 
that meet the needs of specialist physicians and 
their patients. 
Cairn Maximizing the value of discovery 
 
Our Strategy: To secure high equity 
interests and strategic positions in 
potential high worth exploration plays. 
 
Our goal: To create and deliver 
shareholder value by accelerating 
development, production and 
monetisation of exploration discoveries 
where appropriate. 
Discovering hidden value 
 
Delivering growth and shareholder 
value within a balanced portfolio 
 
We aim to deliver transformational growth by 
discovering hidden value within a balanced oil and 
gas exploration, development and production 
portfolio. We, along with our JV partners, 
responsibly develop assets which produce 
hydrocarbons to provide the cash flow to fund 
future exploration activity. 
Croda Innovation: If research is the heart of 
Croda, and new products are our 
lifeblood, then innovation is the spirit of 
ingenuity that drives us forward. 
Innovating for a Sustainable Future 
 
At Croda, we strive to create value for our 
shareholders by driving profitable sales growth 
through successful new product development, 
moving ever closer to our customers and increasing 
our focus on fast growing markets. We are a 
business committed to financial growth, high 
returns, environmental protection and social 
progress. 
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• continue innovating to improve our products and 
processes by minimising their effect on the 
environment, whilst maximising the efficient use of 
all resources 
• foster open and comprehensive dialogue with all 
stakeholders and work cooperatively to address our 
Material Issues  
• provide development opportunities for all 
employees to reach their full potential; and 
• ensure fair and equitable employment conditions, 
providing a stimulating working environment based 
on respect and partnership. 
Electro-
components 
To do great things… to lead the high 
service segment of every distribution 
market in which we operate. 
 
…to exceed the expectations of customers 
everywhere with our service levels and 
product offer; to exploit new 
opportunities through electronic trading; 
to develop new markets by rolling out our 
business model worldwide; and we do all 
of this with the support of our established 
process infrastructure and expertise. 
Leveraging our global presence  
 
1. Focus on International markets 
2. Develop our electronics and 
maintenance offers 
3. Exploit the full potential of 
e-commerce 
4. Leverage our global infrastructure 
and increase operating margins 
5. Maintain UK profitability 
 
Our business model is designed to create long-term 
growth for our shareholders through delivering a 
service that is second to none for our customers. 
Greene king Building the best beer business in Britain 
 
• constantly improving the quality of our 
people and our assets 
• concentrating on those market sectors 
where competition is less intense, the 
barriers to competitive entry are higher, 
and the returns are more reliable 
• focusing on the traditional drinks and 
pub markets, where timeless high quality 
will be rewarded  
• marketing brands and concepts which 
have genuine consumer appeal without 
being dependent upon branding per se. 
To be Britain’s best pubs and beer business 
 
Drive attractive shareholder returns and deliver 
earnings and dividend growth 
 
…to deliver value, service and quality to all of our 
customers  
 
All of our businesses are building customer loyalty 
by delivering industry-leading value, service and 
quality as we strive to become Britain’s best pubs 
and beer business. 
Michael 
Page Int. / 
Page Group 
…to stay focused on our core competency 
of specialist recruitment and to grow the 
business organically by the expansion of 
existing business in their local markets, 
the introduction of new disciplines into 
existing locations, and by entering new 
geographic markets. 
…organic growth by region and discipline, a focus 
on growth markets, development of internal 
management expertise and a structure that 
champions our own talent. 
National 
Express 
Joining up people and places 
 
…Provide transport services and solutions. 
By the very nature of what we do, we are 
adding to the quality of life of the 
communities we serve by providing 
mobility and delivering social, economic 
and environmental benefits. 
 
…Is to earn the lifetime loyalty of our customers by 
consistently delivering frequent, high performing 
public transport services which offer excellent 
value. (v) 
 
…on improving profitability by delivering 
operational excellence and driving organic growth 
across our divisions. We have targeted strong cash 
generation. We have sought to build on this 
platform and expand into new markets… 
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We remain focused on providing quality 
public services and increasing shareholder 
value. 
Operational excellence is crucial to our goal of 
achieving best-in-class margins. 
Pennon …the creation of shareholder value 
through its strategic focus on water, 
sewerage and waste management. 
…the creation of shareholder value through its 
strategic focus on water and sewerage services, 
recycling, renewable energy and waste 
management. 
 
Our strategy is to promote the success of the Group 
for the benefit of our shareholders, customers and 
other stakeholders through our focus on water and 
sewerage services, recycling, renewable energy and 
waste management. We aim to be a pre-eminent 
provider of customer services to high standards of 
quality, efficiency and reliability. 
Qinetiq (In solving defence and security problems 
…) operate at the leading edge of 
technology which enables us to give 
commercial customers access to solutions 
that are often beyond the state-of-the-art 
available in civil markets. 
Our Mission: Our business is based on technical 
expertise, knowledge and advice to solve some of 
the world’s most challenging problems. Our most 
prized possession is trust. Customers around the 
world rely on the ideas, innovations and drive of 
our people to help them meet their goals – often in 
environments where their mission has no second 
chance for success. Whether we are supplying 
technical services support to the defence industry 
or helping a bank to keep its customer records safe 
– we aim to deliver solutions that work first time 
and every time. 
Rank Group The Board’s primary objective is to 
continue to deliver attractive returns for 
shareholders through a combination of 
income and capital growth 
We aim to deliver sustainable growth in earnings 
per share by stimulating and meeting demand for 
gaming-based entertainment. 
 
Creating fun and enjoyment for our customers is 
what Rank does and we’ve been doing it well for 75 
years! 
Redrow Redrow is committed to developing 
quality living and working environments 
with the objective of delivering 
sustainable and profitable growth, 
creating value for our Shareholders. 
Our aim is to be the premium brand in the sector, 
by delivering a high quality product to our 
customers. 
 
At Redrow we take pride in delivering quality 
homes to our customers and value to our 
shareholders 
 
Goal: Deliver long term sustainable value… 
Tate & Lyle Creating the world’s leading renewable 
ingredients business 
Turning raw materials into distinctive, high quality 
ingredients and solutions for our customers. 
 
Our vision is to become the leading global provider 
of speciality food ingredients and solutions. (v) 
UDG Our focus is to use our leading market 
positions within our chosen healthcare 
service sectors as a platform for future 
growth. 
 
Our vision is to be recognized as an 
innovative, international healthcare 
Accelerating Effectiveness in Healthcare 
 
Underline our position as ‘an international 
healthcare services group, headquartered in 
Ireland’. 
 
…provide(s) outsourced commercial solutions to 
international healthcare companies. 
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services company, expanding from our 
leading positions in Ireland and the UK, 
through successfully leveraging our skills 
in our other chosen markets. (v) 
To enable healthcare companies to operate more 
effectively – by providing better solutions for 
providers, payers and patients. (v) 
Vectura …make it easier for patients to inhale 
powders that otherwise could not be 
delivered to the lungs 
…we are committed to developing therapies that 
improve the quality of patients’ lives. The 
respiratory market is a large and growing market 
and we are confident we will succeed in creating 
value for our shareholders. 
 
 
 
 
The crucial performance-related elements, ultimately: Research on the whole, from what has 
been observed, suggests that it is not so much about particular - though superficial - elements 
of mission statements being responsible in determining excess financial or stockmarket returns 
but rather a terminology reflecting something deeper and authentic (see Auster and Freeman, 
2012). It is about having the right core values adhered to ‘that many may view as the 
fundamental rules of business… be concerned with your employees, be responsible to the 
society in which you do business, and emphasize and communicate your value system’ 
(Bartkus et al, 2006). Certainly then, managers need to espouse the correct narrative but it is 
only a necessary but insufficient condition. And with external market forces there are, of 
course, no guarantees either for commercial success. Put another way, managers need to walk 
the talk, where an aligned narrative is a central factor, and a starting point at the least, for better 
performance. 
 
aNotes: 
1. Source: Corporate annual reports 
2. V = value statement as source 
3. Mission statements shown in table not always explicit in annual report but exist within text 
4. Comments in italics are additional statements extracted from text 
5. AA, AO, Sophos and PZ Cussons not included due to insufficient information in annual report for one or both 
periods. 
 
